Papers by Christopher Stratman
Philosophy & Technology, 2021
In these replies, I shall respond to criticisms offered by Kaczor and Rodger to my article (Strat... more In these replies, I shall respond to criticisms offered by Kaczor and Rodger to my article (Stratman 2020) titled "Ectogestation and the Problem of Abortion." In the process, I shall also try to bring into focus why the possibility of ectogestation will radically alter the shape of the abortion debate.
This article was published in the Spring 2013 issue of the Journal of Undergraduate Research
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2021
This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented ... more This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinction between two forms of skepticism. I call these Ontological Skepticism and Epistemic Skepticism. The former is skepticism about the ontological status of fundamental reality, while the latter is skepticism about our empirical knowledge. Philosophers often assume that Moore’s response to “external world skepticism” deals exclusively with the former, not the latter. But this is a mistake. I shall argue that Moore’s anti-skeptical argument targets an ontological form of skepticism. Thus, the conclusion is an ontological claim about fundamental reality, while the premises are epistemic claims. If this is correct, then the conclusion outstrips the scope of its premises and proves too much.
Philosophy & Technology, 2020
Ectogestation involves the gestation of a fetus in an ex utero environment. The possibility of th... more Ectogestation involves the gestation of a fetus in an ex utero environment. The possibility of this technology raises a significant question for the abortion debate: Does a woman's right to end her pregnancy entail that she has a right to the death of the fetus when ectogestation is possible? Some have argued that it does not Mathison & Davis (Bioeth 31:313-320, 2017). Others claim that, while a woman alone does not possess an individual right to the death of the fetus, the genetic parents have a collective right to its death Räsänen (Bioeth 31:697-702, 2017). In this paper, I argue that the possibility of ectogestation will radically transform the problem of abortion. The argument that I defend purports to show that, even if it is not a person, there is no right to the death of a fetus that could be safely removed from a human womb and gestated in an artificial womb, because there are competent people who are willing to care for and raise the fetus as it grows into a person. Thus, given the possibility of ectogestation, the moral status of the fetus plays no substantial role in determining whether there is a right to its death.
JCCC Honors Journal, 2011
Inquiry
It may be true that we are epistemically in the dark about various things. Does this fact ground ... more It may be true that we are epistemically in the dark about various things. Does this fact ground the truth of fallibilism? No. Still, even the most zealous skeptic will probably grant that it is not clear that one can be incognizant of their own occurrent phenomenal conscious mental goings-on. Even so, this does not entail infallibilism. Philosophers who argue that occurrent conscious experiences play an important epistemic role in the justification of introspective knowledge assume that there are occurrent beliefs. But this assumption is false. This paper argues that there are no occurrent beliefs. And it considers the epistemic consequences this result has for views that attempt to show that at least some phenomenal beliefs are infallible.
Uploads
Papers by Christopher Stratman