Naše primjedbe o Hirschu ponegdje se preklapaju s kritikom P. D. Juhla izloženom u drugom poglavl... more Naše primjedbe o Hirschu ponegdje se preklapaju s kritikom P. D. Juhla izloženom u drugom poglavlju njegove interpretation: an essay in the philosophy of literary criticism (Princeton, N. J., 1980). Juhlov stav komentirat ćemo dalje u tekstu. Svi daljnji citati ovih djela bit će navedeni u tekstu. steven knapp & walter benn michaels
Belief and Rationality In recent years deep questions have been raised not only about what consti... more Belief and Rationality In recent years deep questions have been raised not only about what constitutes rational justification for religious beliefs, but also about the relevance of standard notions of justification to the analysis of a believer's relation to her beliefs. Indeed, the net tendency of the Anglo-American discussion since (roughly) 1983 has been to say that religious persons can be entitled to believe a set of religious propositions, and to do so with strong subjective certainty, even while lacking the sort of intersubjective grounds that many philosophers in the past took to be necessary. One prominent expression of this tendency has been the claim that (some) religious beliefs are "properly basic," requiring no support beyond the disposition of a properly functioning mind to hold them. Another is the argument that there is a 1 "parity" among different perceptual practices, say between ocular perception (perceiving a tree) and religious perception (perceiving God). 2 Let's use the label Calvinists for those who maintain that religious truths can be among the basic deliverances of reason and therefore do not require the support of more general evidential considerations. 3 In one sense, the Calvinist approach is an instance of a broader strategy, which is to shift the burden of proof from those who hold religious beliefs to those who challenge the rationality of holding them. Thus D.Z. Phillips maintains that the only reasons that are required for a religious belief are those that are called for within a particular religious language game; to criticize it "from outside" is to ignore the role of religious beliefs as expressions of a unique form of life. Similarly, T.F. Torrance contends that one cannot 4 challenge religious beliefs for failing to live up to the standards of scientific evidence, since Christians, for example, use methods and criteria appropriate to their own particular object, the self-revealing God of the Christian tradition, which is all that the concept of science requires. 5 We might call this broader strategy the Separatist Strategy, since it divides the domain of religious belief off from other epistemic domains. Religious separatists may even agree with non-religious thinkers about what counts as evidence in other domains or even "in general." Yet they argue that, although
We are grateful to Stanley Fish for demonstrating what "Against Theory" had merely assu... more We are grateful to Stanley Fish for demonstrating what "Against Theory" had merely assumed, that the only kind of theory worth attacking is the kind which claims to be more than just another form of practice. Some readers have thought that our arguments were directed against all general reflection about literature or criticism. Others have thought that we were resisting the encroachment on literary study of themes derived from politics, or psychoanalysis, or philosophy. These are plausible misreadings of our intention, since the term "theory" is indeed sometimes applied to any critical argument marked by historical or aesthetic generalization or by the reading of literature in terms of themes derived from other disciplines. But, as Fish shows, neither empirical generality nor thematic novelty is enough to make an argument theoretical in more than a trivial sense, that is, in a sense that marks it as importantly different in kind from other critical arguments. Theory in a nontrivial sense always consists in the attempt "to stand outside practice in order to govern practice from without," and this strong ("foundationalist") kind of theory is the kind whose coherence we deny (p. 742). It is also the kind of theory engaged in by the vast majority of those who consider themselves theoristsincluding many who might prefer to think of themselves as practicing theory in some weaker sense. At the conclusion of "Philosophy without Principles," Richard Rorty appears to join those who think we are attacking theory in its weaker senses as well as in the strong sense just described. He suggests that eliminating the writing and teaching of theory would deprive literary
Christopher Southgate has made important contributions to theodicy and the theory of divine actio... more Christopher Southgate has made important contributions to theodicy and the theory of divine action in light of the contingency in evolution and the suffering of creation. What happens then when one thinks through the implications of contingency for Christology? One can admit that aesthetic and moral judgments are products of a contingent history and yet affirm that they really are valid. Similarly, we argue, one can acknowledge the contingency of Jesus' existence, actions, and subsequent impact and still maintain that his will was uniquely united with the divine will. Following a critical engagement with the recent work of Keith Ward, we argue that a high Christology is compatible with the actual contingencies of evolutionary and social history, without the necessity of interventionist divine action.
The Predicament of BeliefScience, Philosophy, and Faith
... But we owe a large debt to many others, includingJohn Cobb, Jr., Louis Dupre´, Kate Clayton, ... more ... But we owe a large debt to many others, includingJohn Cobb, Jr., Louis Dupre´, Kate Clayton, Dorothy Hale, Stuart Kauffman, Catherine Keller, Jeffrey Knapp, Jesse Knapp, Robert McKenzie, Walter Benn Michaels, Ju¨rgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Alvin Plantinga ...
... If the past is merely a source of explanations, it may well be irreplaceable (there is no oth... more ... If the past is merely a source of explanations, it may well be irreplaceable (there is no other way to explain how we ... Hence the pressure to focus on historical phenomena whose combination of symbolic resonance and explanatory uniqueness will make these two benefits seem ...
... wonder what it means, no matter how it got there. On his view, the marks "A slumberdid m... more ... wonder what it means, no matter how it got there. On his view, the marks "A slumberdid my spirit seal" can still be said to mean something even if they were produced by a natural accident. If this is true, then it is, of course, also ...
By "theory" we mean a special project in literary criticism: the attempt to govern interpretation... more By "theory" we mean a special project in literary criticism: the attempt to govern interpretations of particular texts by appealing to an account of interpretation in general. T h e term is sometimes applied to literary subjects with no direct bearing on the interpretation of individual works, such as narratology, stylistics, and prosody. Despite their generality, however, these subjects seem to us essentially empirical, and our argument against theory will not apply to them. Contemporary theory has taken two forms. Some theorists have sought to ground the reading of literary texts in methods designed to guarantee the objectivity and validity of interpretations. Others, impressed by the inability of such procedures to produce agreement among interpreters, have translated that failure into an alternative mode of theory that denies the possibility of correct interpretation. Our aim here is not to choose between these two alternatives but rather to show that both rest on a single mistake, a mistake that is central to the notion of theory per se. T h e object of our critique is not a particular way of doing theory but the idea of doing theory at all. Theory attempts to solve-or to celebrate the impossibility of solving-a set of familiar problems: the function of authorial intention, the status of literary language, the role of interpretive assumptions, and so on. We will not attempt to solve these problems, nor will we be con
What are the consequences of "Against Theory"?' According to E. D. Hirsch, the &quo... more What are the consequences of "Against Theory"?' According to E. D. Hirsch, the "most probable effect is to foster the comforting idea that there's no point in pursuing historical scholarship" (Hirsch, p. 746). According to Jonathan Crewe, "Against Theory," taken "seriously enough," "would entail a significant, and in my view retrogressive, change in professional attitude"; it would establish "an ideology under which a privileged status quo would be secured against fundamental questioning" (Crewe, pp. 748, 749). According to William C. Dowling, "Against Theory" shows the essential correctness of the New Critical distinction between author and speaker and therefore has the consequence of promoting a "formalist program of objective interpretation" (Dowling, p. 788). According to Daniel T. O'Hara, the "rhetorical effect" of "Against Theory" "is essentially nihilistic"; "by clearing the air of theory," we have "taken away from students the means necessary to do criticism at all" (O'Hara, pp. 732-33). This list of consequences is interesting for several reasons. First, its diversity: the proposed consequences range from technical problems of critical method, to questions of professional politics, to fundamental issues in epistemology. More interesting than their diversity, however, are their problematic relations. Where Dowling thinks "Against Theory"
... text, which, because it is "something other than the subjective intention" ... more ... text, which, because it is "something other than the subjective intention" of the author, may be "construed in various ways" (IT, p. 76 ... possible meanings provided by the language rule is somehow more appropriate than the range of possible meanings provided by the antonym rule ...
Naše primjedbe o Hirschu ponegdje se preklapaju s kritikom P. D. Juhla izloženom u drugom poglavl... more Naše primjedbe o Hirschu ponegdje se preklapaju s kritikom P. D. Juhla izloženom u drugom poglavlju njegove interpretation: an essay in the philosophy of literary criticism (Princeton, N. J., 1980). Juhlov stav komentirat ćemo dalje u tekstu. Svi daljnji citati ovih djela bit će navedeni u tekstu. steven knapp & walter benn michaels
Belief and Rationality In recent years deep questions have been raised not only about what consti... more Belief and Rationality In recent years deep questions have been raised not only about what constitutes rational justification for religious beliefs, but also about the relevance of standard notions of justification to the analysis of a believer's relation to her beliefs. Indeed, the net tendency of the Anglo-American discussion since (roughly) 1983 has been to say that religious persons can be entitled to believe a set of religious propositions, and to do so with strong subjective certainty, even while lacking the sort of intersubjective grounds that many philosophers in the past took to be necessary. One prominent expression of this tendency has been the claim that (some) religious beliefs are "properly basic," requiring no support beyond the disposition of a properly functioning mind to hold them. Another is the argument that there is a 1 "parity" among different perceptual practices, say between ocular perception (perceiving a tree) and religious perception (perceiving God). 2 Let's use the label Calvinists for those who maintain that religious truths can be among the basic deliverances of reason and therefore do not require the support of more general evidential considerations. 3 In one sense, the Calvinist approach is an instance of a broader strategy, which is to shift the burden of proof from those who hold religious beliefs to those who challenge the rationality of holding them. Thus D.Z. Phillips maintains that the only reasons that are required for a religious belief are those that are called for within a particular religious language game; to criticize it "from outside" is to ignore the role of religious beliefs as expressions of a unique form of life. Similarly, T.F. Torrance contends that one cannot 4 challenge religious beliefs for failing to live up to the standards of scientific evidence, since Christians, for example, use methods and criteria appropriate to their own particular object, the self-revealing God of the Christian tradition, which is all that the concept of science requires. 5 We might call this broader strategy the Separatist Strategy, since it divides the domain of religious belief off from other epistemic domains. Religious separatists may even agree with non-religious thinkers about what counts as evidence in other domains or even "in general." Yet they argue that, although
We are grateful to Stanley Fish for demonstrating what "Against Theory" had merely assu... more We are grateful to Stanley Fish for demonstrating what "Against Theory" had merely assumed, that the only kind of theory worth attacking is the kind which claims to be more than just another form of practice. Some readers have thought that our arguments were directed against all general reflection about literature or criticism. Others have thought that we were resisting the encroachment on literary study of themes derived from politics, or psychoanalysis, or philosophy. These are plausible misreadings of our intention, since the term "theory" is indeed sometimes applied to any critical argument marked by historical or aesthetic generalization or by the reading of literature in terms of themes derived from other disciplines. But, as Fish shows, neither empirical generality nor thematic novelty is enough to make an argument theoretical in more than a trivial sense, that is, in a sense that marks it as importantly different in kind from other critical arguments. Theory in a nontrivial sense always consists in the attempt "to stand outside practice in order to govern practice from without," and this strong ("foundationalist") kind of theory is the kind whose coherence we deny (p. 742). It is also the kind of theory engaged in by the vast majority of those who consider themselves theoristsincluding many who might prefer to think of themselves as practicing theory in some weaker sense. At the conclusion of "Philosophy without Principles," Richard Rorty appears to join those who think we are attacking theory in its weaker senses as well as in the strong sense just described. He suggests that eliminating the writing and teaching of theory would deprive literary
Christopher Southgate has made important contributions to theodicy and the theory of divine actio... more Christopher Southgate has made important contributions to theodicy and the theory of divine action in light of the contingency in evolution and the suffering of creation. What happens then when one thinks through the implications of contingency for Christology? One can admit that aesthetic and moral judgments are products of a contingent history and yet affirm that they really are valid. Similarly, we argue, one can acknowledge the contingency of Jesus' existence, actions, and subsequent impact and still maintain that his will was uniquely united with the divine will. Following a critical engagement with the recent work of Keith Ward, we argue that a high Christology is compatible with the actual contingencies of evolutionary and social history, without the necessity of interventionist divine action.
The Predicament of BeliefScience, Philosophy, and Faith
... But we owe a large debt to many others, includingJohn Cobb, Jr., Louis Dupre´, Kate Clayton, ... more ... But we owe a large debt to many others, includingJohn Cobb, Jr., Louis Dupre´, Kate Clayton, Dorothy Hale, Stuart Kauffman, Catherine Keller, Jeffrey Knapp, Jesse Knapp, Robert McKenzie, Walter Benn Michaels, Ju¨rgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Alvin Plantinga ...
... If the past is merely a source of explanations, it may well be irreplaceable (there is no oth... more ... If the past is merely a source of explanations, it may well be irreplaceable (there is no other way to explain how we ... Hence the pressure to focus on historical phenomena whose combination of symbolic resonance and explanatory uniqueness will make these two benefits seem ...
... wonder what it means, no matter how it got there. On his view, the marks "A slumberdid m... more ... wonder what it means, no matter how it got there. On his view, the marks "A slumberdid my spirit seal" can still be said to mean something even if they were produced by a natural accident. If this is true, then it is, of course, also ...
By "theory" we mean a special project in literary criticism: the attempt to govern interpretation... more By "theory" we mean a special project in literary criticism: the attempt to govern interpretations of particular texts by appealing to an account of interpretation in general. T h e term is sometimes applied to literary subjects with no direct bearing on the interpretation of individual works, such as narratology, stylistics, and prosody. Despite their generality, however, these subjects seem to us essentially empirical, and our argument against theory will not apply to them. Contemporary theory has taken two forms. Some theorists have sought to ground the reading of literary texts in methods designed to guarantee the objectivity and validity of interpretations. Others, impressed by the inability of such procedures to produce agreement among interpreters, have translated that failure into an alternative mode of theory that denies the possibility of correct interpretation. Our aim here is not to choose between these two alternatives but rather to show that both rest on a single mistake, a mistake that is central to the notion of theory per se. T h e object of our critique is not a particular way of doing theory but the idea of doing theory at all. Theory attempts to solve-or to celebrate the impossibility of solving-a set of familiar problems: the function of authorial intention, the status of literary language, the role of interpretive assumptions, and so on. We will not attempt to solve these problems, nor will we be con
What are the consequences of "Against Theory"?' According to E. D. Hirsch, the &quo... more What are the consequences of "Against Theory"?' According to E. D. Hirsch, the "most probable effect is to foster the comforting idea that there's no point in pursuing historical scholarship" (Hirsch, p. 746). According to Jonathan Crewe, "Against Theory," taken "seriously enough," "would entail a significant, and in my view retrogressive, change in professional attitude"; it would establish "an ideology under which a privileged status quo would be secured against fundamental questioning" (Crewe, pp. 748, 749). According to William C. Dowling, "Against Theory" shows the essential correctness of the New Critical distinction between author and speaker and therefore has the consequence of promoting a "formalist program of objective interpretation" (Dowling, p. 788). According to Daniel T. O'Hara, the "rhetorical effect" of "Against Theory" "is essentially nihilistic"; "by clearing the air of theory," we have "taken away from students the means necessary to do criticism at all" (O'Hara, pp. 732-33). This list of consequences is interesting for several reasons. First, its diversity: the proposed consequences range from technical problems of critical method, to questions of professional politics, to fundamental issues in epistemology. More interesting than their diversity, however, are their problematic relations. Where Dowling thinks "Against Theory"
... text, which, because it is "something other than the subjective intention" ... more ... text, which, because it is "something other than the subjective intention" of the author, may be "construed in various ways" (IT, p. 76 ... possible meanings provided by the language rule is somehow more appropriate than the range of possible meanings provided by the antonym rule ...
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