Natio nal Mi ss ile D efens e If U.S. national missile defense (NMD) were only about countering b... more Natio nal Mi ss ile D efens e If U.S. national missile defense (NMD) were only about countering ballistic missiles deployed by rogue states, 1 then whether to deploy limited NMD would be a "normal" national security issue. The military-technical question would concern feasibility: Would the missile defense work against the small missile forces that a few states may eventually deploy? The military-political questions would concern the risks to the United States of being vulnerable to rogue-state missiles and the amount Washington should be willing to pay for insurance against these risks. What makes NMD special is its unavoidable connection to U.S. strategic nuclear policy and to the United States' political relationships with Russia and China. Both states view U.S. NMD as a threat to their strategic nuclear capabilities and their relationship with the United States. If technically successful, even the limited NMD planned by the Clinton administration might in some scenarios undermine the capability of Russian nuclear forces. Russia will nd limited NMD still more worrisome, anticipating that initial U.S. deployments would be followed by larger ones. The NMD system under development poses a larger and more immediate challenge to Chinese nuclear capabilities, which currently include only about 20 single-warhead intercontinental-range missiles. The Bush administration has called for more robust and ambitious NMD-possibly increasing the number of ground-based interceptors and adding sea-and space-based interceptors-which promises to make it still more threatening. 2 Moreover, some proponents favor deploying NMD not only against rogue states, but also against China and possibly Russia. For example,
In their article "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," Charle... more In their article "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter perform a valuable service for readers of International Security and, more generally, the U.S. debate on national missile defense (NMD). 1 Their nonpolemical treatment of the technical, military, diplomatic, and strategic issues in the missile defense debate is unusual for its rigor and thoughtfulness. They argue that deploying defenses against the possible rogue-state missile threat would have some value-especially if the defenses emphasized boost-phase systems on land, at sea, or in the air that could shoot down enemy missiles early in their ight before most countermeasures could be deployed. But at the same time, they wisely argue that missile defenses could do more harm than good for U.S. security if Russia and China are not reassured in the process. 2 On balance, given these latter concerns, the authors offer a decidedly ambivalent overall assessment of the desirability of NMD, but much sage advice about how NMD should be deployed if it is to be built. Glaser and Fetter, however, tend to underestimat e the potential importance of missile defenses. They do well to avoid the mistake of many NMD critics when they note that missiles have a certain cachet not possessed by "suitcase bombs." Missiles need not be predeployed by agents of questionable trustworthiness who must get past border inspectors without being caught. Moreover, their very existence can serve a political purpose even if their owners do not explicitly threaten to employ them. The authors are also surely right not to go to the other extreme and portray missiles as the top security threat facing the United States in the years ahead. That said, there are three main points that Glaser and Fetter brush over too lightly or ignore altogether. All bolster the case for limited national missile defense, making the desirability of such a system greater than the authors allege-even if they are still right to argue that any NMD system must be limited and nonthreatening to Moscow and Beijing.
Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability agai... more Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability against China: U.S. nuclear superiority is impossible to maintain beyond the short term, and its pursuit will provide few beneªts while incurring serious costs. In an extended arms race, however, we argue that U.S. damagelimitation capabilities are far more technically plausible than Glaser and Fetter conclude. Further, damage limitation capabilities can make a vital contribution to U.S. strategy. Glaser and Fetter argue that various countermeasures can thwart U.S. surveillance systems relevant to hunting mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (pp. 68-70). They further argue that China can thwart attacks on its command and control (C2) by dispersing it to mobile platforms, pre-delegating launch authority, and adopting a launch-on-warning posture (pp. 73-74). truncated analysis. Glaser and Fetter conclude their analysis without extending the measure-countermeasure competition very far. In so doing, they fall prey to the "fallacy of the last move," as though there were no counters to the countermeasures they propose. 2 For instance, China can employ decoy mobile missile complexes, but countering decoys is routine in long-term military competitions. 3 In the case of surveillance of mobile missiles, U.S. space-based radar (SBR) or other
Lindsay and O'Hanlon argue that we have underestimated the probability that the United State... more Lindsay and O'Hanlon argue that we have underestimated the probability that the United States will fail to deter a missile attack by a rogue state, and therefore that we undervalue the expected benefits of NMD. At the danger of oversimplification, the challenge posed by Lindsay and ...
This chapter explores the most controversial aspect of the NPR: the identification of possible ne... more This chapter explores the most controversial aspect of the NPR: the identification of possible new roles and missions for U.S. nuclear weapons. 1 The NPR lists three ways in which the United States might use nuclear weapons in future conflicts: 1) to destroy underground facilities that house weapons of mass destruction, leadership, and command and control assets; 2) to defeat chemical and biological agents; and 3) to attack mobile and relocatable targets. Although the United States long considered many or all of these missions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (and now, presumably, Russia), the NPR states that "new capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats," which presumably refers to North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Libya, which are mentioned in the document. As a result of the NPR, an "advanced concepts initiative" was established to explore "possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use of potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities; and warheads that reduce collateral damage." According to the NPR, the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Agency will "jointly review potential programs to provide nuclear capabilities, and identify opportunities for further study, including assessments of whether nuclear testing would be required to field such warheads." 2
Current U.S. nuclear strategy identifies new nuclear counterforce missions as a means of impeding... more Current U.S. nuclear strategy identifies new nuclear counterforce missions as a means of impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy appears to overvalue these counterforce missions. U.S. conventional weapons can destroy most targets that can be destroyed with nuclear weapons; only moderately deep and precisely located targets can be destroyed only by nuclear weapons. In addition, the benefits of nuclear counterforce-which could include deterrence, damage limitation, and the continued ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy objectives-are relatively small, because the United States possesses large nuclear forces and highly effective conventional forces. Finally, nuclear counterforce would bring a variety of costs, including an increased probability of accidental war and unnecessary preemptive attacks in a severe crisis. Nevertheless, the case for nuclear counterforce is stronger than during the Cold War, when the enormous size and redundancy of U.S. and Soviet forces rendered counterforce useless. When facing a small nuclear force, the United States may decide to use counterforce to limit damage. Although complex trade-offs are involved, if there are critical targets that can be destroyed only with nuclear weapons, then under a narrow set of conditions the benefits of planning for damage limitation might exceed the dangers. The United States must not, however, rely on nuclear counterforce to support a more assertive foreign policy; doing so would unjustifiably increase the probability of nuclear war.
A methodology has been developed for calculating indices of three classes of radiological hazards... more A methodology has been developed for calculating indices of three classes of radiological hazards: reactor accidents, occupational exposures, and waste-disposal hazards. Radionuclide inventories, biological hazard potentials (BHP), and various dose-related indices are calculated. In the case of reactor accidents, the critical, 50-year and chronic dose are computed, as well as the number of early deaths and illnesses and late cancer fatalities. For occupational exposure, the contact dose rate is calculated for several times after reactor shutdown. In the case of waste-disposal hazards, the intruder dose and the intruder hazard potential (IHP) are calculated. Sample calculations for the MARS reactor design show the usefulness of the methodology in exploring design improvements.
A true "low-activation" material should ideally achieve all of the following objectives: 1. The p... more A true "low-activation" material should ideally achieve all of the following objectives: 1. The possible prompt dose at the site boundary from 100% release of the inventory should be <2 Sv (200 rem); hence, the design would be "inherently safe" in that no possible accident could result in prompt radiation fatalities. 2. The possible cancers from realistic releases should be limited such that the accident risk is <0.1%/yr of the existing background cancer risk to local residents. This includes consideration of elemental volatility. 3. The decay heat should be limited so that active mitigative measures are not needed to protect the investment from cooling transients; hence, the design would be passively safe with respect to decay heat. 4. Used materials could be either recycled or disposed of as near-surface waste. 5. Hands-on maintenance should be possible around coolant system piping and components such as the heat exchanger. 6. Effluents of activation products should be minor compared to the major challenge of limiting tritium effluents.
's paper, "Estimates of Performance and Cost for Boost Phase Intercept," [http://www.marshall.org... more 's paper, "Estimates of Performance and Cost for Boost Phase Intercept," [http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=262] examines some implications of constellation size and interceptor cost and weight for the total costs and feasibility of a space-based boost-phase interceptor (SBI) system. The paper argues, in general, that a "concentrated" system, that is, one that is tailored to defend against missiles launched from a small geographic area, can be substantially cheaper than is currently believed. North Korea might be considered "small." The paper states that reductions in expected cost come about from a combination of lower estimates of SBIs mass, lower estimates of individual satellite cost, and a constellation that requires fewer interceptors because it covers only a restricted range of latitudes.
International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies — 36th Session, 2007
Much of the recently renewed interest in nuclear energy is driven by the desire to reduce emissio... more Much of the recently renewed interest in nuclear energy is driven by the desire to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and thereby mitigate global climate change. The climate-change imperative is described well in Article II of the Framework Convention on Climate Change: The ultimate objective of this Convention…is to achieve…stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
Devices that could detect the presence of nuclear weapons could be useful in verifying compliance... more Devices that could detect the presence of nuclear weapons could be useful in verifying compliance with various arms control agreements. Examples include monitoring a ban on nuclear weapons on surface ships, verifying compliance with the current ban on placing nuclear weapons in space, verifying limits on the number of nuclear warheads on missiles, or verifying limits on the nuclear versions of dual-capable weapons.
... Also see letter to Representative Dante Fascell from Hans Bethe, Norris Bradbury, Richard Gar... more ... Also see letter to Representative Dante Fascell from Hans Bethe, Norris Bradbury, Richard Garwin,Spurgeon M. Kenney, Jr., Wolfgang Panofsky, George Rathjens, Herbert Scoville, Jr., and Paul Warnke, May 14, 1985, and letter to Representative Henry J. Hyde from Roger E ...
The specific activity limits for shallow land ("Class C") waste disposal of all long-lived radion... more The specific activity limits for shallow land ("Class C") waste disposal of all long-lived radionuclides with atomic number less than 88 have been calculated using the 10 CFR 61 methodology. These specific activity limits were used to determine the concentration limits of nearly all naturally-occurring elements in fusion reactor blanket materials. Of the elements that could be constituents of or impurities in blanket materials, aluminum, silicon, nickel, zirconium, tantalum, and tungsten were found to be limited to concentrations of 0.1 to 10%, and niobium, molybdenum, silver, gadolinium, terbium, and holmium were found to be restricted to 0.1 to 10 parts per million.
Natio nal Mi ss ile D efens e If U.S. national missile defense (NMD) were only about countering b... more Natio nal Mi ss ile D efens e If U.S. national missile defense (NMD) were only about countering ballistic missiles deployed by rogue states, 1 then whether to deploy limited NMD would be a "normal" national security issue. The military-technical question would concern feasibility: Would the missile defense work against the small missile forces that a few states may eventually deploy? The military-political questions would concern the risks to the United States of being vulnerable to rogue-state missiles and the amount Washington should be willing to pay for insurance against these risks. What makes NMD special is its unavoidable connection to U.S. strategic nuclear policy and to the United States' political relationships with Russia and China. Both states view U.S. NMD as a threat to their strategic nuclear capabilities and their relationship with the United States. If technically successful, even the limited NMD planned by the Clinton administration might in some scenarios undermine the capability of Russian nuclear forces. Russia will nd limited NMD still more worrisome, anticipating that initial U.S. deployments would be followed by larger ones. The NMD system under development poses a larger and more immediate challenge to Chinese nuclear capabilities, which currently include only about 20 single-warhead intercontinental-range missiles. The Bush administration has called for more robust and ambitious NMD-possibly increasing the number of ground-based interceptors and adding sea-and space-based interceptors-which promises to make it still more threatening. 2 Moreover, some proponents favor deploying NMD not only against rogue states, but also against China and possibly Russia. For example,
In their article "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," Charle... more In their article "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter perform a valuable service for readers of International Security and, more generally, the U.S. debate on national missile defense (NMD). 1 Their nonpolemical treatment of the technical, military, diplomatic, and strategic issues in the missile defense debate is unusual for its rigor and thoughtfulness. They argue that deploying defenses against the possible rogue-state missile threat would have some value-especially if the defenses emphasized boost-phase systems on land, at sea, or in the air that could shoot down enemy missiles early in their ight before most countermeasures could be deployed. But at the same time, they wisely argue that missile defenses could do more harm than good for U.S. security if Russia and China are not reassured in the process. 2 On balance, given these latter concerns, the authors offer a decidedly ambivalent overall assessment of the desirability of NMD, but much sage advice about how NMD should be deployed if it is to be built. Glaser and Fetter, however, tend to underestimat e the potential importance of missile defenses. They do well to avoid the mistake of many NMD critics when they note that missiles have a certain cachet not possessed by "suitcase bombs." Missiles need not be predeployed by agents of questionable trustworthiness who must get past border inspectors without being caught. Moreover, their very existence can serve a political purpose even if their owners do not explicitly threaten to employ them. The authors are also surely right not to go to the other extreme and portray missiles as the top security threat facing the United States in the years ahead. That said, there are three main points that Glaser and Fetter brush over too lightly or ignore altogether. All bolster the case for limited national missile defense, making the desirability of such a system greater than the authors allege-even if they are still right to argue that any NMD system must be limited and nonthreatening to Moscow and Beijing.
Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability agai... more Fetter argue that the United States should not pursue a nuclear damage-limitation capability against China: U.S. nuclear superiority is impossible to maintain beyond the short term, and its pursuit will provide few beneªts while incurring serious costs. In an extended arms race, however, we argue that U.S. damagelimitation capabilities are far more technically plausible than Glaser and Fetter conclude. Further, damage limitation capabilities can make a vital contribution to U.S. strategy. Glaser and Fetter argue that various countermeasures can thwart U.S. surveillance systems relevant to hunting mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (pp. 68-70). They further argue that China can thwart attacks on its command and control (C2) by dispersing it to mobile platforms, pre-delegating launch authority, and adopting a launch-on-warning posture (pp. 73-74). truncated analysis. Glaser and Fetter conclude their analysis without extending the measure-countermeasure competition very far. In so doing, they fall prey to the "fallacy of the last move," as though there were no counters to the countermeasures they propose. 2 For instance, China can employ decoy mobile missile complexes, but countering decoys is routine in long-term military competitions. 3 In the case of surveillance of mobile missiles, U.S. space-based radar (SBR) or other
Lindsay and O'Hanlon argue that we have underestimated the probability that the United State... more Lindsay and O'Hanlon argue that we have underestimated the probability that the United States will fail to deter a missile attack by a rogue state, and therefore that we undervalue the expected benefits of NMD. At the danger of oversimplification, the challenge posed by Lindsay and ...
This chapter explores the most controversial aspect of the NPR: the identification of possible ne... more This chapter explores the most controversial aspect of the NPR: the identification of possible new roles and missions for U.S. nuclear weapons. 1 The NPR lists three ways in which the United States might use nuclear weapons in future conflicts: 1) to destroy underground facilities that house weapons of mass destruction, leadership, and command and control assets; 2) to defeat chemical and biological agents; and 3) to attack mobile and relocatable targets. Although the United States long considered many or all of these missions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (and now, presumably, Russia), the NPR states that "new capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats," which presumably refers to North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Libya, which are mentioned in the document. As a result of the NPR, an "advanced concepts initiative" was established to explore "possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use of potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities; and warheads that reduce collateral damage." According to the NPR, the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Agency will "jointly review potential programs to provide nuclear capabilities, and identify opportunities for further study, including assessments of whether nuclear testing would be required to field such warheads." 2
Current U.S. nuclear strategy identifies new nuclear counterforce missions as a means of impeding... more Current U.S. nuclear strategy identifies new nuclear counterforce missions as a means of impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy appears to overvalue these counterforce missions. U.S. conventional weapons can destroy most targets that can be destroyed with nuclear weapons; only moderately deep and precisely located targets can be destroyed only by nuclear weapons. In addition, the benefits of nuclear counterforce-which could include deterrence, damage limitation, and the continued ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy objectives-are relatively small, because the United States possesses large nuclear forces and highly effective conventional forces. Finally, nuclear counterforce would bring a variety of costs, including an increased probability of accidental war and unnecessary preemptive attacks in a severe crisis. Nevertheless, the case for nuclear counterforce is stronger than during the Cold War, when the enormous size and redundancy of U.S. and Soviet forces rendered counterforce useless. When facing a small nuclear force, the United States may decide to use counterforce to limit damage. Although complex trade-offs are involved, if there are critical targets that can be destroyed only with nuclear weapons, then under a narrow set of conditions the benefits of planning for damage limitation might exceed the dangers. The United States must not, however, rely on nuclear counterforce to support a more assertive foreign policy; doing so would unjustifiably increase the probability of nuclear war.
A methodology has been developed for calculating indices of three classes of radiological hazards... more A methodology has been developed for calculating indices of three classes of radiological hazards: reactor accidents, occupational exposures, and waste-disposal hazards. Radionuclide inventories, biological hazard potentials (BHP), and various dose-related indices are calculated. In the case of reactor accidents, the critical, 50-year and chronic dose are computed, as well as the number of early deaths and illnesses and late cancer fatalities. For occupational exposure, the contact dose rate is calculated for several times after reactor shutdown. In the case of waste-disposal hazards, the intruder dose and the intruder hazard potential (IHP) are calculated. Sample calculations for the MARS reactor design show the usefulness of the methodology in exploring design improvements.
A true "low-activation" material should ideally achieve all of the following objectives: 1. The p... more A true "low-activation" material should ideally achieve all of the following objectives: 1. The possible prompt dose at the site boundary from 100% release of the inventory should be <2 Sv (200 rem); hence, the design would be "inherently safe" in that no possible accident could result in prompt radiation fatalities. 2. The possible cancers from realistic releases should be limited such that the accident risk is <0.1%/yr of the existing background cancer risk to local residents. This includes consideration of elemental volatility. 3. The decay heat should be limited so that active mitigative measures are not needed to protect the investment from cooling transients; hence, the design would be passively safe with respect to decay heat. 4. Used materials could be either recycled or disposed of as near-surface waste. 5. Hands-on maintenance should be possible around coolant system piping and components such as the heat exchanger. 6. Effluents of activation products should be minor compared to the major challenge of limiting tritium effluents.
's paper, "Estimates of Performance and Cost for Boost Phase Intercept," [http://www.marshall.org... more 's paper, "Estimates of Performance and Cost for Boost Phase Intercept," [http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=262] examines some implications of constellation size and interceptor cost and weight for the total costs and feasibility of a space-based boost-phase interceptor (SBI) system. The paper argues, in general, that a "concentrated" system, that is, one that is tailored to defend against missiles launched from a small geographic area, can be substantially cheaper than is currently believed. North Korea might be considered "small." The paper states that reductions in expected cost come about from a combination of lower estimates of SBIs mass, lower estimates of individual satellite cost, and a constellation that requires fewer interceptors because it covers only a restricted range of latitudes.
International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies — 36th Session, 2007
Much of the recently renewed interest in nuclear energy is driven by the desire to reduce emissio... more Much of the recently renewed interest in nuclear energy is driven by the desire to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and thereby mitigate global climate change. The climate-change imperative is described well in Article II of the Framework Convention on Climate Change: The ultimate objective of this Convention…is to achieve…stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
Devices that could detect the presence of nuclear weapons could be useful in verifying compliance... more Devices that could detect the presence of nuclear weapons could be useful in verifying compliance with various arms control agreements. Examples include monitoring a ban on nuclear weapons on surface ships, verifying compliance with the current ban on placing nuclear weapons in space, verifying limits on the number of nuclear warheads on missiles, or verifying limits on the nuclear versions of dual-capable weapons.
... Also see letter to Representative Dante Fascell from Hans Bethe, Norris Bradbury, Richard Gar... more ... Also see letter to Representative Dante Fascell from Hans Bethe, Norris Bradbury, Richard Garwin,Spurgeon M. Kenney, Jr., Wolfgang Panofsky, George Rathjens, Herbert Scoville, Jr., and Paul Warnke, May 14, 1985, and letter to Representative Henry J. Hyde from Roger E ...
The specific activity limits for shallow land ("Class C") waste disposal of all long-lived radion... more The specific activity limits for shallow land ("Class C") waste disposal of all long-lived radionuclides with atomic number less than 88 have been calculated using the 10 CFR 61 methodology. These specific activity limits were used to determine the concentration limits of nearly all naturally-occurring elements in fusion reactor blanket materials. Of the elements that could be constituents of or impurities in blanket materials, aluminum, silicon, nickel, zirconium, tantalum, and tungsten were found to be limited to concentrations of 0.1 to 10%, and niobium, molybdenum, silver, gadolinium, terbium, and holmium were found to be restricted to 0.1 to 10 parts per million.
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Papers by Steve Fetter