Papers by Stathis Kalyvas
The Sociology of Civil Wars: Warfare and Armed Groups Stathis N. Kalyvas Department of Political ... more The Sociology of Civil Wars: Warfare and Armed Groups Stathis N. Kalyvas Department of Political Science Yale University 8 Prospect Place, room 101 New Haven, CT 06511-3516 Voice: 203-432-5386 Fax: 203-432-6196 Email: [email protected] 4 November 2003 ...
Rationality and Society, 1999
I use a rationalist framework to explore an issue typically framed and understood as irrational: ... more I use a rationalist framework to explore an issue typically framed and understood as irrational: large-scale violence against civilians in the context of civil wars. More specifically, I focus on the massacres of civilians in Algeria and seek to uncover the logic that drives such actions. The main thesis is that these massacres are not irrational instances of random violence motivated by extremist Islamist ideology, as they are typically described in the media; they can be understood instead as part of a rational strategy initiated by the Islamist rebels aiming to maximize civilian support under a particular set of constraints. Mass, yet mostly targeted and selective, terror is used to punish and deter defection by civilians in the context of a particular strategic conjuncture characterized by (a) fragmented and unstable rule, (b) mass civilian defections toward the incumbents and (c) escalation of violence. I check this thesis against the available evidence, address puzzles such as the identity of the victims and the behavior of the army, extend it to similar massacres in other countries, draw a number of implications and discuss a research agenda.
Abstract will be provided by author.
... Stathis N. Kalyvas (Corresponding Author) and Laia Balcells Department of Political Science, ... more ... Stathis N. Kalyvas (Corresponding Author) and Laia Balcells Department of Political Science, Yale University Yale University 8 Prospect Place, room 101 New Haven, CT 06511-3516 Email: [email protected] Recent ...
Abstract will be provided by author.
We distinguish between four types of warfare (conventional, irregular, symmetric non-conventional... more We distinguish between four types of warfare (conventional, irregular, symmetric non-conventional, and urban) and disaggregate civil wars accordingly. We find that while irregular war is the most common type of civil war, it is not the only one. Conventional war turns out to be less exceptional than previously thought, while symmetric non-conventional warfare is an important, though localized, type of civil war. Contrary to what has been argued in the literature, ethnic civil wars are not associated with a distinct type of warfare. We find that the end of the Cold War had a significant impact on the type of warfare that characterizes civil wars; its demise increased the likelihood of conventional civil wars and, especially, symmetric non-conventional wars. Finally, we find that warfare type turns out to have key implications for the duration and severity of civil wars. Irregular civil wars tend to last longer than all other types of warfare, while symmetric non-conventional wars tend to be more severe in terms of violence than irregular wars.
Comparative Political Studies, 2008
The Journal of Ethics, 2004
A great deal of violence in civil wars is informed by the logic of terrorism: violence tends to b... more A great deal of violence in civil wars is informed by the logic of terrorism: violence tends to be used by political actors against civilians in order to shape their political behavior. I focus on indiscriminate violence in the context of civil war: this is a type of violence that selects its victims on the basis of their membership in some group and irrespective of their individual actions. Extensive empirical evidence suggests that indiscriminate violence in civil war is informed by the logic of terrorism. I argue that under certain conditions, that tend to be quite common, such violence is counter productive. I specify these conditions and address the following paradox: why do we sometimes observe instances of indiscriminate violence evenunder conditions that make this strategy counterproductive? I review four possible reasons: truncated data, ignorance, cost, and institutional constraints. I argue that indiscriminate violence emerges because it is much cheaper than its main alternative – selective violence. It is more likely under a steep imbalance of power between the competing actors, and where and when resources and information are low; however, most political actors eventually switch to selective violence. Thus, given a balance of power between competing actors, indiscriminate violence is more likely at early rather than late stages of the conflict. Overall, the paper suggests that even extreme forms of violence are used strategically.
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Papers by Stathis Kalyvas