Papers by Sruthi Rothenfluch
Biography Sruthi Rothenfluch is a visiting instructor of philosophy at the University of Portland... more Biography Sruthi Rothenfluch is a visiting instructor of philosophy at the University of Portland in Oregon. She completed her doctorate at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in 2011, working primarily within epistemology. Her current research centers on the ethics of involuntary medical intervention as this applies to pre-natal genetic enhancement and psychiatric treatment. Her previous work within contextualism and virtue epistemology, which addressed differences between expert and lay deliberation and judgment, raised more practical questions about the content of expert claims and whether they ought to be invariably accepted. This led her to examine conditions under which treatments may be permissible or even obligatory in the absence of consent.
Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, 2016
I argue that epistemic contextualism, as conceived by Lewis and DeRose, cannot accommodate knowle... more I argue that epistemic contextualism, as conceived by Lewis and DeRose, cannot accommodate knowledge-ascribing behavior in contexts where expert counsel is sought. Narrowly focusing on the subject’s epistemic position with respect to p in ∼p possibilities yields the wrong verdict in such cases. To account for our judgments, I propose that contextualists should look to virtue responsibilism, which founds epistemic evaluation both on the mastery of relevant underlying principles and their explicit and implicit application. Such assessment is not measured by S’s ability to rule out relevant alternatives or track the truth of p, and for this reason, is not captured by either version of contextualism.
Teaching Philosophy, 2011
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2019
Thought insertion is a condition characterized by the impression that one's thoughts are not ... more Thought insertion is a condition characterized by the impression that one's thoughts are not one’s own and have been inserted by others. Some have explained the condition as resulting, in part, from impaired or defective self-knowledge, or knowledge of one’s mental states. I argue that such models do not shed light on the most puzzling feature of thought insertion: the patient’s experience that an introspected thought does not feel like her own. After examining ways in which existing versions of the model might address this worry, I propose a significant modification. I argue that the experience of disownership consists in a rational indifference that one feels towards one’s inserted thought. I further contend that the experience is generated by an underlying absence of an expectation of rational authority towards the inserted thought, such that the patient does not expect her thought to reflect, or be shaped by, her own rational considerations. I defend my proposal using empirical studies from cognitive and social psychology which suggest that we ordinarily have and experience an expectation of rational authority towards a certain subset of our thoughts, and direct analysis of patient reports, which strongly suggest that it is this expectation and the corresponding experience that thought insertion patients lack.
Philosophical Explorations, 2015
Duncan Pritchard has recently argued that a certain brand of virtue epistemology, known as “virtu... more Duncan Pritchard has recently argued that a certain brand of virtue epistemology, known as “virtue responsibilism”, cannot account for knowledge acquired through the use of tacit reasoning processes. I defend virtue responsiblism by showing that Pritchard's charge is founded on a mischaracterization of the view. Contra Pritchard, responsibilists do not demand that agents have complete access to the grounds for their beliefs in order to know. A closer examination of prominent accounts of virtue responsiblism, including Zagzebski's and Hookway's, reveals that the accessibility requirement is much weaker than Pritchard presumes. Zagzebski maintains that it is only intellectually virtuous motivations which drive the agent to adopt truth-conducive procedures and habits that must be accessible, rendering the agent responsible for her belief. Hookway writes that agents may display virtue not by actively monitoring or accessing each step of their deliberation, but by allowing deeply embedded intellectual traits to tacitly guide or shape their process of inquiry. Additional support for Hookway's claim comes from Dreyfus and Dreyfus's model of learning and mastery, which will be briefly discussed at the end. I conclude, therefore, that virtue responsibilists can accommodate knowledge acquired through nonreflectively accessible cognitive operations.
Teaching Philosophy, 1999
Alan Soble’s The Philosophy of Sex and Love is a wide-ranging survey of various topics within, as... more Alan Soble’s The Philosophy of Sex and Love is a wide-ranging survey of various topics within, as the title suggests, the philosophy of sex and love. The book is helpfully divided into three main sections: background, sex and love. The first begins with an overview that both draws a distinction and identifies the relationship between the conceptual and normative analysis of the relevant concepts, and their significance. This section also offers a brief history, which summarizes views dating back to ancient western philosophers to contemporary western thinkers. (No mention is made of eastern ideologies.) The remaining eight chapters are divided equally between the subjects of sex and love, respectively. The book is an interesting, informative and entertaining read, and raises a number of provocative questions along the way. Pedagogically, however, I have the following worries: first, it is unclear whether the text is intended for introductory or advanced courses; second, the chapters do not follow a discernible organizational structure; third, there is disproportionate time and analysis devoted to different topics, which might be compensated for by supplemental texts. What I’d like to do here is offer a brief overview of the content of the chapters and explain my remarks about the difficulties of using this text for a course.
Philosophical Studies, 2016
Pre-natal genetic enhancement affords us unprecedented capacity to shape our skills, talents, app... more Pre-natal genetic enhancement affords us unprecedented capacity to shape our skills, talents, appearance and perhaps subsequently the quality of our lives in terms of overall happiness, success and wellbeing. Despite its powerful appeal, some have raised important and equally persuasive concerns against genetic enhancement. Sandel has argued that compassion and humility, themselves grounded in the unpredictability of talents and skills, would be lost. Habermas has argued that genetically altered individuals will see their lives as dictated by their parents’ design and therefore will not acquire an appropriate self-understanding. How should we view enhancement efforts in light of these concerns? I propose that we begin by adopting a defeasibility stance. That is, I ask whether our belief that genetic enhancements serve in the best interests of the child is reason to genetically enhance, underscoring a sort of epistemic vulnerability. I utilize the epistemological notions of defeasible reasons, undercutting (also called undermining) and overriding (or rebutting) defeaters in order to better understand and systematically evaluate the force of such concerns. I argue that close examination of both objections using this framework shows that we have reason to enhance, a reason that is defeasible but as yet, undefeated.
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Papers by Sruthi Rothenfluch