Papers by Simon Robertson
Cadernos Nietzsche, 2016
Resumo Florescimento e excelência são dois ideais que ocupam um lugar central no perfeccionismo d... more Resumo Florescimento e excelência são dois ideais que ocupam um lugar central no perfeccionismo de Nietzsche. Este artigo procura oferecer uma interpretação original acerca do que está envolvido nestes termos, de como eles se diferenciam e se conectam, desenvolvendo assim um quadro axiológico que confira sentido a esse conjunto. Uma sugestão adicional é de que o modelo subjacente de valor que emerge a partir desta interpretação - com efeito, um modelo de uma vida boa - seja interessante e atrativo por si só, e que, portanto, possa ter um apelo filosófico mais amplo.
Journal of Philosophical Research
Constitutivist theories in ethics seek to derive and justify normative ethical claims via facts a... more Constitutivist theories in ethics seek to derive and justify normative ethical claims via facts about constitutive features of agency. In Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism, Paul Katsafanas uses Nietzsche to elucidate a version of the position he believes avoids worries besetting its competitors. This paper argues that Nietzschean constitutivism falters in many of the same places: it may remain vulnerable to 'schmagency' objections; it faces problems giving an account of the weights of reasons that adequately explains why we have more reason to perform some actions than others; and it is unable to generate normativity from constitutive aims. These doubts have wider import than Nietzschean constitutivism alone, though: they give good reason to think that such difficulties arise from the very structure of constitutivist approaches.
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ABSTRACT A significant portion of recent literature on Nietzsche is devoted to his metaethical vi... more ABSTRACT A significant portion of recent literature on Nietzsche is devoted to his metaethical views, both critical and positive. This article explores one aspect of his positive metaethics. The specific thesis defended is that Nietzsche is, or is plausibly cast as, a reasons internalist. This, very roughly, is the view that what an agent has normative reason to do depends on that agent's motivational repertoire. Section I sketches some of the metaethical terrain most relevant to Nietzsche's organising ethical project, his "revaluation of all values", and lays out three "design-requirements" that an adequate account of Nietzsche's metaethical views must satisfy. Section II introduces the basic internalist position. Sections III-IV provide textual support for the internalist reading of Nietzsche, with Section V showing how it meets each of the design-requirements. Section VI concludes by showing how the internalist apparatus also illuminates Nietzsche's views about the process of revaluing values.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2011
Abstract The focal objection of Nietzsche's critique of morality is that morality is disvalu... more Abstract The focal objection of Nietzsche's critique of morality is that morality is disvaluable because antagonistic to the highest forms of human excellence. Recent advances in Nietzsche commentary have done much to unpack this objectionan objection which, at ...
Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, 2012
The Routledge Companion to Ethics, 2011
Spheres of Reason, 2009
Normativity, on one wide construal, concerns norms, values, oughts, require- ments, reasons, just... more Normativity, on one wide construal, concerns norms, values, oughts, require- ments, reasons, justification, rationality. We all use normative concepts. They feature explicitly in the contents of everyday thinking, in judgements and decisions, plans and assessments, the premises and conclusions of our reasoning about what to do and believe. They can play more of a background role too, guiding how we
Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, 2012
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2013
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2013
Mountaineering is a dangerous activity. For many mountaineers, part of its very attraction is the... more Mountaineering is a dangerous activity. For many mountaineers, part of its very attraction is the risk, the thrill of danger. Yet mountaineers are often regarded as reckless or even irresponsible for risking their lives. In this paper, we offer a defence of risk-taking in mountaineering. Our discussion is organised around the fact that mountaineers and non-mountaineers often disagree about how risky mountaineering really is. We hope to cast some light on the nature of this disagreement – and to argue that mountaineering may actually be worthwhile because of the risks it involves. Section 1 introduces the disagreement and, in doing so, separates out several different notions of risk. Sections 2–4 then consider some explanations of the disagreement, showing how a variety of phenomena can skew people's risk judgements. Section 5 then surveys some recent statistics, to see whether these illuminate how risky mountaineering is. In light of these considerations, however, we suggest tha...
Polish Journal of Philosophy, 2008
Synthese, 2011
What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to th... more What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish 'objective' from 'subjective' oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent's beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of 'ought': 'warranted oughts'. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective 'oughts'. Sections 2-3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective 'oughts' with objective 'wide-scope oughts' operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted 'ought' and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted 'oughts'. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2006
This paper responds to Susan Hurley's attempt to undermine the adequacy of the distinction at the... more This paper responds to Susan Hurley's attempt to undermine the adequacy of the distinction at the heart of the internalism-externalism debate about reasons for action. The paper shows that Hurley's argument fails and then, more positively, indicates a neat way to characterize the distinction.
Inquiry, 2011
ABSTRACT A significant portion of recent literature on Nietzsche is devoted to his metaethical vi... more ABSTRACT A significant portion of recent literature on Nietzsche is devoted to his metaethical views, both critical and positive. This article explores one aspect of his positive metaethics. The specific thesis defended is that Nietzsche is, or is plausibly cast as, a reasons internalist. This, very roughly, is the view that what an agent has normative reason to do depends on that agent's motivational repertoire. Section I sketches some of the metaethical terrain most relevant to Nietzsche's organising ethical project, his "revaluation of all values", and lays out three "design-requirements" that an adequate account of Nietzsche's metaethical views must satisfy. Section II introduces the basic internalist position. Sections III-IV provide textual support for the internalist reading of Nietzsche, with Section V showing how it meets each of the design-requirements. Section VI concludes by showing how the internalist apparatus also illuminates Nietzsche's views about the process of revaluing values.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2008
A common view of the relation between oughts and reasons is that you ought to do something if and... more A common view of the relation between oughts and reasons is that you ought to do something if and only if that is what you have most reason to do. One challenge to this comes from what Jonathan Dancy calls 'enticing reasons.' Dancy argues that enticing reasons never contribute to oughts and that it is false that if the only reasons in play are enticing reasons then you ought to do what you have most reason to do. After explaining how enticing reasons supposedly work and why accepting them may appear attractive, I firstly show why we are not committed to accepting them into our conceptual framework and then argue that no reasons work in the way enticing reasons are claimed to. Thus we should reject the category of enticing reasons entirely.
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Papers by Simon Robertson