SISP Conference, Societa Italian di Scienza Politica, 9-11/9/2021., 2021
On 25 April 2016, the Walloon parliament adopted a resolution on the Comprehensive Economic and T... more On 25 April 2016, the Walloon parliament adopted a resolution on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, inviting their executive not to grant full powers to the Federal government for the signing of CETA. While the Brussels Parliament and its counterpart of the Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles soon followed the Walloon region, the same level of mobilization was not observed in other (major) Belgian parliaments (i.e., notably the Flemish parliament or the House of Representatives). Actually, the degree of scrutiny conducted by some of the Belgian parliaments-and in particular the Walloon parliament-is in itself surprising as the existing literature on Belgian (sub)parliaments and the European Union does not identify the latter as influential actors in EU affairs (e.g., Randour and Wolfs, 2017; Meir and Bursens, 2020; Sierens and Brack, 2020). The case of Belgium and CETA is of particular relevance to mutli-level governance scholars, as Belgian (sub)national authorities wield major competences in the field of international trade, making regional authorities the effective center-society gatekeepers, and potentially shifting the focus of attention for opposition groups (Piattoni, 2010). It also depicts an interesting case of differentiated politicization of EU trade agreement negotiations within one member state. In Belgium, this differentiated politicization is reflected by the important variation in degree and types of mobilization of Belgian parliament(arian)s and executives acting at the regional and national levels. On this background, this contribution seeks to uncover the motivations that led to variation in the degree of (sub)national (parliamentary) mobilization in EU trade politics. The principle question being addressed is whether this case reflects (a) a top-down decision-making process, with the constitutional particularities of Belgian federalism adding an extra gate-keeper or (b), if it illustrates a more 'surprising' case of multi-level governance, with civil society allying with a regional partner to effectively alter the application of supranational authority. To this end, the article starts by mapping and measuring the degree of parliamentary scrutiny conducted by Belgian parliamentarians in (sub)national parliaments. As a second step, relying on the works conducted on (sub)national mobilization in EU trade politics (notably, Broschek and Goff, 2020 and, on the Belgian case, Bursens and De Bièvre, forthcoming) and using the multilevel governance approach as an heuristic device (Piatonni, 2010), the article examines the variation in parliamentary mobilization along two analytical gates-the coreperiphery gate (i.e., between regional and national authorities) and the state-society gate (i.e., mobilization of societal actors and their access to (sub)national authorities).
SISP Conference, Societa Italian di Scienza Politica, 9-11/9/2021., 2021
On 25 April 2016, the Walloon parliament adopted a resolution on the Comprehensive Economic and T... more On 25 April 2016, the Walloon parliament adopted a resolution on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, inviting their executive not to grant full powers to the Federal government for the signing of CETA. While the Brussels Parliament and its counterpart of the Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles soon followed the Walloon region, the same level of mobilization was not observed in other (major) Belgian parliaments (i.e., notably the Flemish parliament or the House of Representatives). Actually, the degree of scrutiny conducted by some of the Belgian parliaments-and in particular the Walloon parliament-is in itself surprising as the existing literature on Belgian (sub)parliaments and the European Union does not identify the latter as influential actors in EU affairs (e.g., Randour and Wolfs, 2017; Meir and Bursens, 2020; Sierens and Brack, 2020). The case of Belgium and CETA is of particular relevance to mutli-level governance scholars, as Belgian (sub)national authorities wield major competences in the field of international trade, making regional authorities the effective center-society gatekeepers, and potentially shifting the focus of attention for opposition groups (Piattoni, 2010). It also depicts an interesting case of differentiated politicization of EU trade agreement negotiations within one member state. In Belgium, this differentiated politicization is reflected by the important variation in degree and types of mobilization of Belgian parliament(arian)s and executives acting at the regional and national levels. On this background, this contribution seeks to uncover the motivations that led to variation in the degree of (sub)national (parliamentary) mobilization in EU trade politics. The principle question being addressed is whether this case reflects (a) a top-down decision-making process, with the constitutional particularities of Belgian federalism adding an extra gate-keeper or (b), if it illustrates a more 'surprising' case of multi-level governance, with civil society allying with a regional partner to effectively alter the application of supranational authority. To this end, the article starts by mapping and measuring the degree of parliamentary scrutiny conducted by Belgian parliamentarians in (sub)national parliaments. As a second step, relying on the works conducted on (sub)national mobilization in EU trade politics (notably, Broschek and Goff, 2020 and, on the Belgian case, Bursens and De Bièvre, forthcoming) and using the multilevel governance approach as an heuristic device (Piatonni, 2010), the article examines the variation in parliamentary mobilization along two analytical gates-the coreperiphery gate (i.e., between regional and national authorities) and the state-society gate (i.e., mobilization of societal actors and their access to (sub)national authorities).
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Drafts by Scott Hamilton