Papers by Stephen Broadberry
We provide a model of the links between commercialisation and technological progress, which is co... more We provide a model of the links between commercialisation and technological progress, which is consistent with the historical evidence and places market relations at the heart of the industrial revolution. First, commercialisation raised wages as a growing reliance on impersonal labour market transactions in place of customary relations with a high degree of monitoring led to the adoption of efficiency wages. Second, commercialisation lowered interest rates as a growing reliance on impersonal capital market transactions in place of active investor involvement in investment projects led investors to allow borrowers to keep a larger share of the profits. Third, the resulting rise in the wage/cost of capital ratio led to the adoption of a more capital-intensive technology. Fourth, this led to a faster rate of technological progress through greater learning by doing on the capital intensive production technology. Fifth, the rate of technological progress was raised further by the patent...
We provide a model of the links between commercialisation and technological progress, which is co... more We provide a model of the links between commercialisation and technological progress, which is consistent with the historical evidence and places market relations at the heart of the industrial revolution. First, commercialisation raised wages as a growing reliance on impersonal labour market transactions in place of customary relations with a high degree of monitoring led to the adoption of efficiency wages. Second, commercialisation lowered interest rates as a growing reliance on impersonal capital market transactions in place of active investor involvement in investment projects led investors to allow borrowers to keep a larger share of the profits. Third, the resulting rise in the wage/cost of capital ratio led to the adoption of a more capital-intensive technology. Fourth, this led to a faster rate of technological progress through greater learning by doing on the capital intensive production technology. Fifth, the rate of technological progress was raised further by the patent...
Abstract: This paper reconstructs GDP from the output side for medieval and early modern Britain.... more Abstract: This paper reconstructs GDP from the output side for medieval and early modern Britain. In contrast to the long run stagnation of living standards suggested by daily real wage rates, output-based GDP per capita exhibits modest but positive trend growth. One way of reconciling the two series is through variation in the annual number of days worked, but there are also reasons to doubt the representativeness of the sharp rise and fall of daily real wage rates in the late middle ages, which creates the impression of no trend improvement of living standards. Acknowledgements: This paper forms part of the project "Reconstructing the National Income of Britain and Holland, c.1270/1500 to 1850", funded by the Leverhulme Trust, Reference Number F/00215AR. It is also part of the Collaborative Project HI-POD supported by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme for Research, Contract Number SSH7-CT-2008-225342. We are grateful to Richard Britnell, Ben Dodds, J...
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau
John From Grandchildren": Maynard the earliest Keynes times (1931) of which wrote we in have his ... more John From Grandchildren": Maynard the earliest Keynes times (1931) of which wrote we in have his record essay "Economic-back, say, Possibilities to two thousand for Our Grandchildren": From the earliest times of which we have record-back, say, to two thousand years before Christ-down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was no very great change in the standard of life of the average man living in the civilised centres of the earth. Ups and downs certainly. Visitations of plague, famine, and war. Golden intervals. But no progressive, violent change. Some periods perhaps 50 per cent better than others-at the utmost 100 per cent better-in the four thousand years which ended (say) in A.D. 1700.
Explorations in Economic History, 2021
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been absent from recent debates about comparative long-run growth ow... more Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been absent from recent debates about comparative long-run growth owing to the lack of data on aggregate economic performance before 1950. This paper provides estimates of GDP per capita on an annual basis for eight Anglophone African economies for the period since 1885, raising new questions about previous characterizations of the region's economic performance. The new data show that many of these economies had levels of per capita income which were above subsistence by the early twentieth century, on a par with the largest economies in Asia until the 1980s. However, overall improvements in GDP per capita were limited by episodes of negative growth or "shrinking", the scale and scope of which can be measured through annual data.
The Journal of Economic History, 2018
As a result of recent advances in historical national accounting, estimates of GDP per capita are... more As a result of recent advances in historical national accounting, estimates of GDP per capita are now available for a number of European economies back to the medieval period, including Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain. The approach has also been extended to Asian economies, including India and Japan. So far, however, China, which has been at the center of the Great Divergence debate, has been absent from this approach. This article adds China to the picture, showing that the Great Divergence began earlier than originally suggested by the California School, but later than implied by older Eurocentric writers.
The Economic History Review, 2014
As a result of recent work on historical national accounting, it is now possible to establish fir... more As a result of recent work on historical national accounting, it is now possible to establish firmly the timing of the Great Divergence of living standards between Europe and Asia. There was a European Little Divergence as Britain and Holland overtook Italy and Spain, and an Asian Little Divergence as Japan overtook China and India. The Great Divergence occurred because Japan grew more slowly than Britain and Holland, starting from a lower level. Key turning points are identified around 1348 and 1500, and a framework is developed to explain these divergences via the differential impact of shocks on economies with different underlying structures. The key shocks were the Black Death of the midfourteenth century and the new trade routes which opened up from Europe to Asia and the Americas at the end of the fifteenth century. The key structural factors were the extent of sectoral diversification, the nature of state institutions and the quantity and quality of labour.
A number of writers have recently questioned whether labor productivity or per capita incomes wer... more A number of writers have recently questioned whether labor productivity or per capita incomes were ever higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States. We show that although the United States already had a substantial labor productivity lead in industry as early as 1840, especially in manufacturing, labor productivity was broadly equal in the two countries in agriculture, while the United Kingdom was ahead in services. Hence aggregate labor productivity was higher in the United Kingdom, particularly since the United States had a larger share of the labor force in low value-added agriculture. U.S. overtaking occurred decisively only during the 1890s, as labor productivity pulled ahead in services and the share of agricultural employment declined substantially. Labor force participation was lower in the United States, so that the United Kingdom's labor productivity advantage in the mid-nineteenth century translated into a larger per capita income lead.
The Journal of Economic History, 2008
This response offers a critical appraisal of the claim of Albrecht Ritschl to have found a possib... more This response offers a critical appraisal of the claim of Albrecht Ritschl to have found a possible resolution to what he calls the Anglo-German industrial productivity puzzle, which arose as the result of a new industrial production index produced in an earlier paper by the same author. Projection back from a widely accepted 1935/36 benchmark using the Ritschl index showed German industrial labor productivity in 1907 substantially higher than in Britain. This presented a puzzle for at least two reasons. First, other comparative information from the pre—World War I period, such as wages, seems difficult to square with much higher German labor productivity at this time. Second, a direct benchmark estimate produced by Stephen Broadberry and Carsten Burhop, using production census information for Britain and industrial survey material of similar quality for Germany, suggested broadly equal labor productivity in 1907. Broadberry and Burhop also showed that if Walther Hoffmann's indu...
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 2005
A number of writers have recently questioned whether labour productivity or per capita incomes we... more A number of writers have recently questioned whether labour productivity or per capita incomes were ever higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States. We show that although the United States already had a substantial labour productivity lead in industry as early as 1840, especially in manufacturing, labour productivity was broadly equal in the two countries in agriculture, while the United Kingdom was ahead in services. Hence aggregate labour productivity was higher in the United Kingdom, particularly since the United States had a larger share of the labour force in low value-added agriculture. US overtaking occurred decisively only during the 1890s, as labour productivity pulled ahead in services and the share of agricultural employment declined substantially. The share of the population in the labour force was lower in the United States, so that the United Kingdom’s labour productivity advantage in the mid-nineteenth century translated into a larger per capita income lead.
This paper provides the first annual GDP series for Great Britain over the period 1700-1870. The ... more This paper provides the first annual GDP series for Great Britain over the period 1700-1870. The series is constructed in real terms from the output side, using volume indicators and value added weights. Sectoral estimates are provided for agriculture, industry and services, and for a number of sub-sectors. Estimates of nominal GDP are also provided, based on a benchmark for 1841 and projected back to 1700 and forward to 1870 using the real output series and sectoral price indices. The new data are used to provide a consistent account of economic growth and the business cycle. The results are broadly consistent with the long run path of real output suggested by Crafts and Harley, although growth rates for sub-periods differ, largely as a result of changes in the growth of agriculture. Nominal GDP increased more rapidly than suggested by Lindert and Williamson during the eighteenth century, and more slowly than suggested by Deane and Cole during the first half of the nineteenth centu...
Explorations in Economic History, 2006
A number of writers have recently questioned whether labor productivity or per capita incomes wer... more A number of writers have recently questioned whether labor productivity or per capita incomes were ever higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States. We show that although the United States already had a substantial labor productivity lead in industry as early as 1840, especially in manufacturing, labor productivity was broadly equal in the two countries in agriculture, while the United Kingdom was ahead in services. Hence aggregate labor productivity was higher in the United Kingdom, particularly since the United States had a larger share of the labor force in low value-added agriculture. U.S. overtaking occurred decisively only during the 1890s, as labor productivity pulled ahead in services and the share of agricultural employment declined substantially. Labor force participation was lower in the United States, so that the United Kingdom's labor productivity advantage in the mid-nineteenth century translated into a larger per capita income lead.
Explorations in Economic History, 2010
The Economic History Review, 2006
Contrary to the claims of Pomeranz, Parthasarathi and other "world historians", the prosperous pa... more Contrary to the claims of Pomeranz, Parthasarathi and other "world historians", the prosperous parts of Asia between 1500 and 1800 look similar to the stagnating southern, central and eastern parts of Europe rather than the developing northwestern parts. In the advanced parts of India and China, grain wages were comparable to those in northwestern Europe, but silver wages, which conferred purchasing power over tradable goods and services, were substantially lower. The high silver wages of northwestern Europe were not simply a monetary phenomenon, but reflected high productivity in the tradable sector. The "Great Divergence" between Europe and Asia was already well underway before 1800.
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5183, 2005
The shift of competitive advantage in cotton textiles from India to Britain was a key episode in ... more The shift of competitive advantage in cotton textiles from India to Britain was a key episode in the Great Divergence of living standards between Europe and Asia. We offer a new, quantitative perspective on this pivotal development, centred on the interactions between the two countries. The growth of cotton textile imports into Britain from India via the East India Company opened up new opportunities for import substitution as the new cloths, patterns and designs became increasingly fashionable. However, high silver wages in Britain as a result of high productivity in other tradable goods and services, meant that British producers of cotton textiles could not use labour-intensive Indian production methods. The growth in British labour productivity that resulted from the search for labour-saving technical progress meant that unit labour costs became lower than in India despite the much higher wages in Britain. However, the full effects of the rise in British productivity were delayed until after the Napoleonic Wars by increasing wage and raw cotton costs before supply adjusted to the major increase in demand for inputs.
Abstract: This paper provides annual estimates of English agricultural output and labour producti... more Abstract: This paper provides annual estimates of English agricultural output and labour productivity during the period 1250-1850, based on manorial records from the medieval period, probate inventories from the early modern period and farm accounts from the modern period. Agricultural ...
Uploads
Papers by Stephen Broadberry