Europe is implementing common security systems, but does not seem that they are wellfunctioning a... more Europe is implementing common security systems, but does not seem that they are wellfunctioning and integrated. Beyond of the technical difficulties, we believe that problems of poor cooperation between the States are present and that a cause of this stems from the concerns about migration and its regulation at European level. Aft er reporting on the major issues on European security agencies, Europol, SIS and VIS, we dwell o n the Eurodac system, created for the control of asylum seekers arriving in Europe. We argue that some European regulation, like the Dublin agreement on asylum seekers, puts improper incentiv es, dampening a cooperative behaviour of the participants to the European Union. We argument that this, among other things, derives from rival interests of the various States, and that thi s has negative implications on the construction of an European intelligence system.
Balancing national objectives and settling rivalries. Towards a new European asylum system? by En... more Balancing national objectives and settling rivalries. Towards a new European asylum system? by Enzo Rossi° We offer a view of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in which the national objectives of the states emerge in terms of trade-off between control and respect of the asylum seekers' human rights. Control implies spillover of the flows towards neighbouring states and rivalries between the states in a non-cooperative game. An asylum system is a set of rules designed to settle rivalries, balancing out the national objectives. Thus, on the basis of a Pareto criterion, one system is preferred to another if all are better able to achieve their national objectives. We examine the conditions under which a relocation system based on quotas may be preferable to the Dublin rules, and why greater consideration of the humanitarian aspects of asylum can favour adoption of such a system.
We delineate a non-cooperative game in which the countries of Europe implement restrictive measur... more We delineate a non-cooperative game in which the countries of Europe implement restrictive measures to reduce the inflow of asylum seekers (AS) in their territories. These restrictions divert the AS towards other countries, with spillover effects. In the eventuality of massive, unforeseen inflows in one country, moreover, the game is found to entail competitive restrictions amongst the countries, while a country with a more accommodating policy (dove country), showing greater attention to the rights of the AS, is found to play a stabilising role. The model representing how each country implements its restrictions is extended to the area of the diverse national regulations. Attention focuses on the role of harmonisation of regulations, concluding that it can mitigate competition between countries without, however, entailing full respect of the rights of the AS and fair burden sharing.
Sign showing EU 85% funding through the Instrument for Accession programme (sign visible on all f... more Sign showing EU 85% funding through the Instrument for Accession programme (sign visible on all furniture, towels, etc.
We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (fro... more We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (from February 1999 to February 2000) in terms of their ambiguity. In this paper, we use our survey to derive a definition of ambiguity and to evaluate ECB communication. A Structural Vector Autoregression model is estimated and the results show that am-biguous messages were able to affect agents ’ expectations for a limited period after a speech by ECB members; more-over, they show that ambiguity had temporary effects also on volatility and moved rates away from the policy rate.
We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (fro... more We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (from February 1999 to February 2000) in terms of their ambiguity. In this paper, we use the answers provided by the surveyed sample to derive a definition of ambiguity and to evaluate ECB communication. Also, we give examples on how to use our definition of ambiguity for econometric purposes. A Structural Vector Autoregression model is estimated and the results show that ambiguous messages were able to affect agents’ expectations for a limited period after a speech by ECB members; moreover, they show that ambiguity had temporary effects also on volatility and moved rates away from the policy rate.
La cooperazione europea in campo di asilo ha mostrato, anche di recente, di non funzionare in mod... more La cooperazione europea in campo di asilo ha mostrato, anche di recente, di non funzionare in modo ottimale e di non generare politiche ed azioni veramente efficaci. Il vero problema irrisolto, che frena la costruzione di un autentico sistema europeo comune di asilo, e quello della ripartizione degli oneri dell’accoglienza fra gli Stati Membri
The European asylum system operates according to the ‘Dublin system' rules, where the respons... more The European asylum system operates according to the ‘Dublin system' rules, where the responsible Member State will be the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the system. This has been immediately a source of controversy between states. A fairer system would be based on quotas, where host countries share the burden according to appropriate criteria, but member states never reached a common agreement. In this paper we offer a vision of the European asylum system as a non-cooperative game where states compete to reduce their asylum burden. As the two different systems (Dublin-like or quotas) lead to different equilibriums, according to the Pareto criterion the preferred system is the one where all states are better able to achieve their national objectives. We examine the conditions under which a relocation system based on quotas may be preferable to the Dublin rules, and why greater consideration of the humanitarian aspects of asylum can favour its adoption and reinforce cohesion of the system.
The attitude of European states towards asylum seekers is in restraining overall. The review of t... more The attitude of European states towards asylum seekers is in restraining overall. The review of the European rules
We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (fro... more We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (from February 1999 to February 2000) in terms of their ambiguity. In this paper, we use our survey to derive a definition of ambiguity and to evaluate ECB communication. A Structural Vector Autoregression model is estimated and the results show that ambiguous messages were able to affect agents' expectations for a limited period after a speech by ECB members; moreover, they show that ambiguity had temporary effects also on volatility and moved rates away from the policy rate.
This study explores the results of a survey conducted in some reception centers for refugees in I... more This study explores the results of a survey conducted in some reception centers for refugees in Italy to assess the perceptions of asylum seekers about the administrative procedures following their application and the general conditions of reception. Our findings are also corroborated by the views of social workers, managers of the centers, officials of Italian Agencies for refugees and UNHCR representatives. We discuss the push-pull factors underlying the choice of leaving their homeland and the perils they went through during the journey to Europe. Safety emerges as the main concern of asylum seekers. The pull factors and the presence of networks of fellow countrymen turn out to be not very significant in determining the country of destination of refugees, in contrast with previous studies. Some remarks about the design of the reception system in Europe follow, since the distribution of the burden among States is far from efficient and refugees human rights might be, at times, undermined.
The deficit bias, inherent in the single European democracies and magnified in the framework of a... more The deficit bias, inherent in the single European democracies and magnified in the framework of a monetary union, calls for additional budget discipline to be enforced throughout Europe. In the terms in which it has been signed, however, the Growth and Stability Pact does not ...
E. Rossi, Lemma on relative stability 77 relations (3) hold for solutions ut, starting from any u... more E. Rossi, Lemma on relative stability 77 relations (3) hold for solutions ut, starting from any uo belonging to some neighbourhood of uo in S. Observe that Definition 2 of relative stability coincides with the one usually found in the literature where m 1. Indeed, in this case, any trajectory ...
Europe is implementing common security systems, but does not seem that they are wellfunctioning a... more Europe is implementing common security systems, but does not seem that they are wellfunctioning and integrated. Beyond of the technical difficulties, we believe that problems of poor cooperation between the States are present and that a cause of this stems from the concerns about migration and its regulation at European level. Aft er reporting on the major issues on European security agencies, Europol, SIS and VIS, we dwell o n the Eurodac system, created for the control of asylum seekers arriving in Europe. We argue that some European regulation, like the Dublin agreement on asylum seekers, puts improper incentiv es, dampening a cooperative behaviour of the participants to the European Union. We argument that this, among other things, derives from rival interests of the various States, and that thi s has negative implications on the construction of an European intelligence system.
Balancing national objectives and settling rivalries. Towards a new European asylum system? by En... more Balancing national objectives and settling rivalries. Towards a new European asylum system? by Enzo Rossi° We offer a view of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in which the national objectives of the states emerge in terms of trade-off between control and respect of the asylum seekers' human rights. Control implies spillover of the flows towards neighbouring states and rivalries between the states in a non-cooperative game. An asylum system is a set of rules designed to settle rivalries, balancing out the national objectives. Thus, on the basis of a Pareto criterion, one system is preferred to another if all are better able to achieve their national objectives. We examine the conditions under which a relocation system based on quotas may be preferable to the Dublin rules, and why greater consideration of the humanitarian aspects of asylum can favour adoption of such a system.
We delineate a non-cooperative game in which the countries of Europe implement restrictive measur... more We delineate a non-cooperative game in which the countries of Europe implement restrictive measures to reduce the inflow of asylum seekers (AS) in their territories. These restrictions divert the AS towards other countries, with spillover effects. In the eventuality of massive, unforeseen inflows in one country, moreover, the game is found to entail competitive restrictions amongst the countries, while a country with a more accommodating policy (dove country), showing greater attention to the rights of the AS, is found to play a stabilising role. The model representing how each country implements its restrictions is extended to the area of the diverse national regulations. Attention focuses on the role of harmonisation of regulations, concluding that it can mitigate competition between countries without, however, entailing full respect of the rights of the AS and fair burden sharing.
Sign showing EU 85% funding through the Instrument for Accession programme (sign visible on all f... more Sign showing EU 85% funding through the Instrument for Accession programme (sign visible on all furniture, towels, etc.
We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (fro... more We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (from February 1999 to February 2000) in terms of their ambiguity. In this paper, we use our survey to derive a definition of ambiguity and to evaluate ECB communication. A Structural Vector Autoregression model is estimated and the results show that am-biguous messages were able to affect agents ’ expectations for a limited period after a speech by ECB members; more-over, they show that ambiguity had temporary effects also on volatility and moved rates away from the policy rate.
We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (fro... more We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (from February 1999 to February 2000) in terms of their ambiguity. In this paper, we use the answers provided by the surveyed sample to derive a definition of ambiguity and to evaluate ECB communication. Also, we give examples on how to use our definition of ambiguity for econometric purposes. A Structural Vector Autoregression model is estimated and the results show that ambiguous messages were able to affect agents’ expectations for a limited period after a speech by ECB members; moreover, they show that ambiguity had temporary effects also on volatility and moved rates away from the policy rate.
La cooperazione europea in campo di asilo ha mostrato, anche di recente, di non funzionare in mod... more La cooperazione europea in campo di asilo ha mostrato, anche di recente, di non funzionare in modo ottimale e di non generare politiche ed azioni veramente efficaci. Il vero problema irrisolto, che frena la costruzione di un autentico sistema europeo comune di asilo, e quello della ripartizione degli oneri dell’accoglienza fra gli Stati Membri
The European asylum system operates according to the ‘Dublin system' rules, where the respons... more The European asylum system operates according to the ‘Dublin system' rules, where the responsible Member State will be the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the system. This has been immediately a source of controversy between states. A fairer system would be based on quotas, where host countries share the burden according to appropriate criteria, but member states never reached a common agreement. In this paper we offer a vision of the European asylum system as a non-cooperative game where states compete to reduce their asylum burden. As the two different systems (Dublin-like or quotas) lead to different equilibriums, according to the Pareto criterion the preferred system is the one where all states are better able to achieve their national objectives. We examine the conditions under which a relocation system based on quotas may be preferable to the Dublin rules, and why greater consideration of the humanitarian aspects of asylum can favour its adoption and reinforce cohesion of the system.
The attitude of European states towards asylum seekers is in restraining overall. The review of t... more The attitude of European states towards asylum seekers is in restraining overall. The review of the European rules
We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (fro... more We asked a representative sample of European banks to judge messages released by ECB members (from February 1999 to February 2000) in terms of their ambiguity. In this paper, we use our survey to derive a definition of ambiguity and to evaluate ECB communication. A Structural Vector Autoregression model is estimated and the results show that ambiguous messages were able to affect agents' expectations for a limited period after a speech by ECB members; moreover, they show that ambiguity had temporary effects also on volatility and moved rates away from the policy rate.
This study explores the results of a survey conducted in some reception centers for refugees in I... more This study explores the results of a survey conducted in some reception centers for refugees in Italy to assess the perceptions of asylum seekers about the administrative procedures following their application and the general conditions of reception. Our findings are also corroborated by the views of social workers, managers of the centers, officials of Italian Agencies for refugees and UNHCR representatives. We discuss the push-pull factors underlying the choice of leaving their homeland and the perils they went through during the journey to Europe. Safety emerges as the main concern of asylum seekers. The pull factors and the presence of networks of fellow countrymen turn out to be not very significant in determining the country of destination of refugees, in contrast with previous studies. Some remarks about the design of the reception system in Europe follow, since the distribution of the burden among States is far from efficient and refugees human rights might be, at times, undermined.
The deficit bias, inherent in the single European democracies and magnified in the framework of a... more The deficit bias, inherent in the single European democracies and magnified in the framework of a monetary union, calls for additional budget discipline to be enforced throughout Europe. In the terms in which it has been signed, however, the Growth and Stability Pact does not ...
E. Rossi, Lemma on relative stability 77 relations (3) hold for solutions ut, starting from any u... more E. Rossi, Lemma on relative stability 77 relations (3) hold for solutions ut, starting from any uo belonging to some neighbourhood of uo in S. Observe that Definition 2 of relative stability coincides with the one usually found in the literature where m 1. Indeed, in this case, any trajectory ...
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Papers by Enzo Rossi