Contemporary philosophers interested in Fichte have more reason to rejoice.1 In the last few year... more Contemporary philosophers interested in Fichte have more reason to rejoice.1 In the last few years, a number of significant publications have appeared on J. G. Fichte, concerned primarily with his moral philosophy. Owen Ware’s new book Fichte’s Moral Philosophy is one of these. In this review, I shall say a few remarks about how Ware’s book fits into the territory being mapped by Fichte scholars, and then ask some questions of the content of the book itself. The overriding theme of Ware’s book is a welcome account of Fichte, presenting him as concerned with wholeness or unity. Humankind is originally one, but rational reflection makes us estranged from ourselves. Fichte, on Ware’s account, laments this condition, and articulates a moral philosophy, derived from the foundational principles of philosophical science (Wissenschaftslehre) which incorporates this insight into the human condition and shows us how to make sense of it. As Ware puts it, Fichte’s notion of an individual agent’s ethical vocation is spelled out in terms of ‘reuniting with our nature, which he views as a state of undivided wholeness’ (p. 12). Naturally, Ware does not mean that Fichte should be read as arguing for a return to a romantic golden age, but rather as thinking that our drives, or dispositions, to self-love and morality can be rendered harmonious through life-long moral effort. In setting out Fichte’s vision, Ware traces Fichte’s thoughts from the origins, in the discovery that Kant showed the way forward – exposing Fichte’s early dilemma, a mindless heart or heartless mind, as a false one (p. 6). He then guides the reader through a second chapter, a historically informed discussion on the nature of the free will, a third chapter on the nature and source of moral authority, a fourth on the theory of the drives, a fifth regarding the nature of conscience, especially paying attention to Fichte’s strong claim that conscience never errs, a sixth chapter on Fichte’s account of how evil is possible, a seventh focusing on the role of community in moral theory, and an eighth on perfection and the
In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Ficht... more In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is a near-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). "Naturalism and the idea of nature," Philosophy 92 (3): 333-349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte's key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte's conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte.
Philosophical journal of conflict and violence, 2022
Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Th... more Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Thomson's Spenglerian views on civilization and decline. I argue that Thomson in his first book is an orthodox Spenglerian who accepts that decline is inevitable and thinks that it is morally required to destroy civilization in its final stages. I argue that this suffers from conceptual issues which may have caused Thomson's change to a revised form of Spenglerianism, which is more authentically fascist. This authentically fascist view is then seen to fall prey into the problem inherent in the very idea of permanent rebirth.
It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, c... more It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, called the highest good. In this paper, I outline Kant's argument for why we ought to have faith in God and hope for the highest good, and argue that the Kantian argument can be extended in such a way as to show the unity of the theological virtues. This feature of the Kantian account can then have ramifications in further questions regarding the relationship of faith and moral action. Out of the three theological virtues, hope is the one often overlooked. 1 Much contemporary philosophy of religion is concerned with the claims of faith, and various controversies about the nature of faith. Love (or charity) is dealt with by moral philosophy and philosophy of the emotions. Hope, on the other hand, is the odd one out. 2 In this paper, I want to use a Kantian position in philosophy of religion to argue that faith essentially or ultimately requires hope. 3 I take this to be in line with Biblical views on the matter (though I will not directly argue from the Biblical sources), insofar as the theological virtues go together or fit into a unity. 4 Certainly, for example, the letter of James (2:14-17) (which I paraphrase in the title) claims that true faith and love (manifested as good works) must go together, as do the Johannine letters (e.g. 1 John 2:3-5). I will claim that hope is a Janus-faced attitude, which is at once theoretical and practical, and thus forms the bridge between faith and love. This essay then has two main aims. The first is to argue that a virtue of Kantian moral arguments for the existence of God is that they give directions for a good account of the theological virtues and their unity. The second claim I want to make is that a virtue of this facet of the Kantian arguments is that it shows how to make sense of hope as both a theoretical and a practical attitude. In particular, this essay is not an attempt to give a new interpretation of Kant's own views. There are many discussions of the Kant's argument for God and highest good and its role in Kant, and what kind of attitudes Kant thinks are involved-but many these interpretative issues can be set aside for the purposes of this paper, as I only intend to outline a Kantian position on the question of the theological virtues. 5 This essay is in 3 parts. In the first, I give an outline of the Kantian position that I intend to take. In the second, I show how this position can be used to give hope its proper place, with reference to the Kantian position outlined in section 1, but also with reference to Pieper's classic On Hope. 6 In the third, I anticipate and respond to some potential objections. The Kantian position The Kantian framework within which I shall be working mainly involves Kant's moral argument(s) for the existence of God. 7 This argument-cluster is designed to begin from the fact of morality or of our moral obligation and move to the necessity of positing God to account for this fact, or some derivative fact. It is important to note that this Kantian argument is not simply a moral argument that states: A) Moral values/obligations/facts exist B) If moral values/obligations/facts exist then God exists C) Therefore God exists This is a valid argument, but the inference is too quick to pass muster for Kant, partly because he denies that the mere existence of moral values or obligations would be sufficient to imply God's existence, and partly because it makes a knowledge-claim that has been shown to be, in Kantian jargon 'a dialectical use of reason'-an inference which goes beyond knowledge and into the realm of faith. 8 So we are going to have to move more slowly from morality to God, and also frame the claim so as not to violate the bounds of knowledge Kant thinks he has shown with the Critique of Pure Reason and the system of transcendental idealism. The arguments thus share a form of the following: Firstly there is an assertion of some rational commitments regarding morality or the rationality of morality. Secondly, these rational commitments are
In this paper, I will investigate the early work of William Temple (1881-1944). My contention is ... more In this paper, I will investigate the early work of William Temple (1881-1944). My contention is that Temple's systematic philosophy contains resources for an interesting variant of a desire argument for God's existence and for the truth of Christianity. This desire argument moves from claims about the nature of human reason to the conditions for its satisfaction and how that satisfaction might be achieved. In constructing this argument, Temple confronts the problem of evil, and so I will also outline his response to the problem here. Temple is often overlooked in histories of philosophy, though he was conversant with philosophical classics, including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Lotze, and, to list a few of the contemporaries or nearcontemporaries: Balfour, Haldane, F. H. Bradley, A. C. Bradley, Moore, Bosanquet, Joachim, and Croce. He also acknowledges, in the preface to his main philosophical work Mens Creatrix, a special debt to Bergson, but also signals distance from him in the same place. Temple presents an interesting case of a philosopher and theologian (most of his books are a mixture of the two, some being more predominantly one or the other) because of his commitment to philosophical system in the midst of early analytic philosophy.
Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2022
Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Th... more Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Thomson's Spenglerian views on civilization and decline. I argue that Thomson in his first book is an orthodox Spenglerian who accepts that decline is inevitable and thinks that it is morally required to destroy civilization in its final stages. I argue that this suffers from conceptual issues which may have caused Thomson's change to a revised form of Spenglerianism, which is more authentically fascist. This authentically fascist view is then seen to fall prey into the problem inherent in the very idea of permanent rebirth.
In this paper, I will investigate the early work of William Temple (1881–1944). My contention is ... more In this paper, I will investigate the early work of William Temple (1881–1944). My contention is that Temple’s systematic philosophy contains resources for an interesting variant of a desire argument for God’s existence and for the truth of Christianity. This desire argument moves from claims about the nature of human reason to the conditions for its satisfaction and how that satisfaction might be achieved. In constructing this argument, Temple confronts the problem of evil, and so I will also outline his response to the problem here. Temple is often overlooked in histories of philosophy, though he was conversant with philosophical classics, including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Lotze, and, to list a few of the contemporaries or near-contemporaries: Balfour, Haldane, F. H. Bradley, A. C. Bradley, Moore, Bosanquet, Joachim, and Croce. He also acknowledges, in the preface to his main philosophical work Mens Creatrix, a special debt to Bergson, but also signals distance from him...
It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, c... more It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, called the highest good. In this article, I outline Kant's argument for why we ought to have faith in God and hope for the highest good, and argue that the Kantian argument can be extended in such a way as to show the unity of the theological virtues. This feature of the Kantian account can then have ramifications in further questions regarding the relationship of faith and moral action.
In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Ficht... more In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is anear-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). “Naturalism and the idea of nature,” Philosophy 92 (3): 333–349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte’s key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte’s conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte.
Contemporary philosophers interested in Fichte have more reason to rejoice.1 In the last few year... more Contemporary philosophers interested in Fichte have more reason to rejoice.1 In the last few years, a number of significant publications have appeared on J. G. Fichte, concerned primarily with his moral philosophy. Owen Ware’s new book Fichte’s Moral Philosophy is one of these. In this review, I shall say a few remarks about how Ware’s book fits into the territory being mapped by Fichte scholars, and then ask some questions of the content of the book itself. The overriding theme of Ware’s book is a welcome account of Fichte, presenting him as concerned with wholeness or unity. Humankind is originally one, but rational reflection makes us estranged from ourselves. Fichte, on Ware’s account, laments this condition, and articulates a moral philosophy, derived from the foundational principles of philosophical science (Wissenschaftslehre) which incorporates this insight into the human condition and shows us how to make sense of it. As Ware puts it, Fichte’s notion of an individual agent’s ethical vocation is spelled out in terms of ‘reuniting with our nature, which he views as a state of undivided wholeness’ (p. 12). Naturally, Ware does not mean that Fichte should be read as arguing for a return to a romantic golden age, but rather as thinking that our drives, or dispositions, to self-love and morality can be rendered harmonious through life-long moral effort. In setting out Fichte’s vision, Ware traces Fichte’s thoughts from the origins, in the discovery that Kant showed the way forward – exposing Fichte’s early dilemma, a mindless heart or heartless mind, as a false one (p. 6). He then guides the reader through a second chapter, a historically informed discussion on the nature of the free will, a third chapter on the nature and source of moral authority, a fourth on the theory of the drives, a fifth regarding the nature of conscience, especially paying attention to Fichte’s strong claim that conscience never errs, a sixth chapter on Fichte’s account of how evil is possible, a seventh focusing on the role of community in moral theory, and an eighth on perfection and the
In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Ficht... more In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is a near-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). "Naturalism and the idea of nature," Philosophy 92 (3): 333-349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte's key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte's conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte.
Philosophical journal of conflict and violence, 2022
Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Th... more Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Thomson's Spenglerian views on civilization and decline. I argue that Thomson in his first book is an orthodox Spenglerian who accepts that decline is inevitable and thinks that it is morally required to destroy civilization in its final stages. I argue that this suffers from conceptual issues which may have caused Thomson's change to a revised form of Spenglerianism, which is more authentically fascist. This authentically fascist view is then seen to fall prey into the problem inherent in the very idea of permanent rebirth.
It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, c... more It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, called the highest good. In this paper, I outline Kant's argument for why we ought to have faith in God and hope for the highest good, and argue that the Kantian argument can be extended in such a way as to show the unity of the theological virtues. This feature of the Kantian account can then have ramifications in further questions regarding the relationship of faith and moral action. Out of the three theological virtues, hope is the one often overlooked. 1 Much contemporary philosophy of religion is concerned with the claims of faith, and various controversies about the nature of faith. Love (or charity) is dealt with by moral philosophy and philosophy of the emotions. Hope, on the other hand, is the odd one out. 2 In this paper, I want to use a Kantian position in philosophy of religion to argue that faith essentially or ultimately requires hope. 3 I take this to be in line with Biblical views on the matter (though I will not directly argue from the Biblical sources), insofar as the theological virtues go together or fit into a unity. 4 Certainly, for example, the letter of James (2:14-17) (which I paraphrase in the title) claims that true faith and love (manifested as good works) must go together, as do the Johannine letters (e.g. 1 John 2:3-5). I will claim that hope is a Janus-faced attitude, which is at once theoretical and practical, and thus forms the bridge between faith and love. This essay then has two main aims. The first is to argue that a virtue of Kantian moral arguments for the existence of God is that they give directions for a good account of the theological virtues and their unity. The second claim I want to make is that a virtue of this facet of the Kantian arguments is that it shows how to make sense of hope as both a theoretical and a practical attitude. In particular, this essay is not an attempt to give a new interpretation of Kant's own views. There are many discussions of the Kant's argument for God and highest good and its role in Kant, and what kind of attitudes Kant thinks are involved-but many these interpretative issues can be set aside for the purposes of this paper, as I only intend to outline a Kantian position on the question of the theological virtues. 5 This essay is in 3 parts. In the first, I give an outline of the Kantian position that I intend to take. In the second, I show how this position can be used to give hope its proper place, with reference to the Kantian position outlined in section 1, but also with reference to Pieper's classic On Hope. 6 In the third, I anticipate and respond to some potential objections. The Kantian position The Kantian framework within which I shall be working mainly involves Kant's moral argument(s) for the existence of God. 7 This argument-cluster is designed to begin from the fact of morality or of our moral obligation and move to the necessity of positing God to account for this fact, or some derivative fact. It is important to note that this Kantian argument is not simply a moral argument that states: A) Moral values/obligations/facts exist B) If moral values/obligations/facts exist then God exists C) Therefore God exists This is a valid argument, but the inference is too quick to pass muster for Kant, partly because he denies that the mere existence of moral values or obligations would be sufficient to imply God's existence, and partly because it makes a knowledge-claim that has been shown to be, in Kantian jargon 'a dialectical use of reason'-an inference which goes beyond knowledge and into the realm of faith. 8 So we are going to have to move more slowly from morality to God, and also frame the claim so as not to violate the bounds of knowledge Kant thinks he has shown with the Critique of Pure Reason and the system of transcendental idealism. The arguments thus share a form of the following: Firstly there is an assertion of some rational commitments regarding morality or the rationality of morality. Secondly, these rational commitments are
In this paper, I will investigate the early work of William Temple (1881-1944). My contention is ... more In this paper, I will investigate the early work of William Temple (1881-1944). My contention is that Temple's systematic philosophy contains resources for an interesting variant of a desire argument for God's existence and for the truth of Christianity. This desire argument moves from claims about the nature of human reason to the conditions for its satisfaction and how that satisfaction might be achieved. In constructing this argument, Temple confronts the problem of evil, and so I will also outline his response to the problem here. Temple is often overlooked in histories of philosophy, though he was conversant with philosophical classics, including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Lotze, and, to list a few of the contemporaries or nearcontemporaries: Balfour, Haldane, F. H. Bradley, A. C. Bradley, Moore, Bosanquet, Joachim, and Croce. He also acknowledges, in the preface to his main philosophical work Mens Creatrix, a special debt to Bergson, but also signals distance from him in the same place. Temple presents an interesting case of a philosopher and theologian (most of his books are a mixture of the two, some being more predominantly one or the other) because of his commitment to philosophical system in the midst of early analytic philosophy.
Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2022
Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Th... more Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Thomson's Spenglerian views on civilization and decline. I argue that Thomson in his first book is an orthodox Spenglerian who accepts that decline is inevitable and thinks that it is morally required to destroy civilization in its final stages. I argue that this suffers from conceptual issues which may have caused Thomson's change to a revised form of Spenglerianism, which is more authentically fascist. This authentically fascist view is then seen to fall prey into the problem inherent in the very idea of permanent rebirth.
In this paper, I will investigate the early work of William Temple (1881–1944). My contention is ... more In this paper, I will investigate the early work of William Temple (1881–1944). My contention is that Temple’s systematic philosophy contains resources for an interesting variant of a desire argument for God’s existence and for the truth of Christianity. This desire argument moves from claims about the nature of human reason to the conditions for its satisfaction and how that satisfaction might be achieved. In constructing this argument, Temple confronts the problem of evil, and so I will also outline his response to the problem here. Temple is often overlooked in histories of philosophy, though he was conversant with philosophical classics, including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Lotze, and, to list a few of the contemporaries or near-contemporaries: Balfour, Haldane, F. H. Bradley, A. C. Bradley, Moore, Bosanquet, Joachim, and Croce. He also acknowledges, in the preface to his main philosophical work Mens Creatrix, a special debt to Bergson, but also signals distance from him...
It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, c... more It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, called the highest good. In this article, I outline Kant's argument for why we ought to have faith in God and hope for the highest good, and argue that the Kantian argument can be extended in such a way as to show the unity of the theological virtues. This feature of the Kantian account can then have ramifications in further questions regarding the relationship of faith and moral action.
In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Ficht... more In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is anear-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). “Naturalism and the idea of nature,” Philosophy 92 (3): 333–349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte’s key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte’s conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte.
Uploads
Papers by Rory Phillips