Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the postwar world is just that-it can be called "post... more Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the postwar world is just that-it can be called "postwar" because the major powers have not fought each other since 1945. Such a lengthy period of peace among the most powerful states is unprecedented.1 Almost as unusual is the caution with which each superpower has treated the other. Although we often model superpower relations as a game of chicken, in fact the U.S. and USSR have not behaved like reckless teenagers. Indeed, superpower crises are becoming at least as rare as wars were in the past. Unless one strains and counts 1973, we have gone over a quarter of a century without a severe crisis. Furthermore, in those that have occurred, each side has been willing to make concessions to avoid venturing too near the brink of war. Thus the more we see of the Cuban missile crisis, the more it appears as a compromise rather than an American victory. Kennedy was not willing to withhold all inducements and push the Russians as hard as he could if this required using force or even continuing the volatile confrontation.2 It has been common to attribute these effects to the existence of nuclear weapons. Because neither side could successfully protect itself in an all-out war, no one could win-or, to use John Mueller's phrase, profit from it.3 Of The author would like to thank John Mueller for comments.
BY ROBERT JERVIS X OLiTiCAL science is a very trendy discipline. Few books or articles are cited ... more BY ROBERT JERVIS X OLiTiCAL science is a very trendy discipline. Few books or articles are cited a decade, let alone a generation, after they are written. When scholars die, their ideas often die with them, although they may be reinvented later and trumpeted as new. Hans Morgenthau is a rare, if partial, exception to this generalization. Students still read his work, especially but not exclusively Politics Among Nations which to a large degree made the field; scholars still cite his work, even if they have not read it recently or carefully and even if their main objective is to attack it; and, perhaps more importantly, there is much to be gained by re-reading his books and thinking about what he has to say. Morgenthau wrote too much for me to even attempt a summary, and, like any subtle and supple thinker, he voiced too many contradictions to permit ready distillations. As both a detached scholar and a passionate observer of world politics, Morgenthau sought to have his general philosophy guide his views on specific issues and yet to remain open enough to allow his observations of the wisdom and folly-usually the latter-around him alter some of his most deeply-held beliefs. In a world in which scholarship and public policy are increasingly separate, in which highest academic prestige goes to those who construct the most abstract and apparently
Derek Leebaert, Magic and Mayhem: The Delusions of American Foreign Policy from Korea to Afghanistan. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. 336 pp. $26.00
Journal of Cold War Studies, 2011
Page 1. 205 Book Reviews SM Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace. New York: Viking, 2010. 451 pp. $2... more Page 1. 205 Book Reviews SM Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace. New York: Viking, 2010. 451 pp. $29.95. Reviewed by Warren F. Kimball, Rutgers University Whatever the shrill voices of believers in conspiracy, the Yalta Conference ...
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 09636412 2011 599189, Aug 25, 2011
... Dilemmas About Security Dilemmas. View full textDownload full text Full access. DOI: 10.1080/... more ... Dilemmas About Security Dilemmas. View full textDownload full text Full access. DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2011.599189 Robert Jervis a pages 416-423. ... 5 Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005), chap. ...
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 1990
Conspiring for democracyPeter Coleman:The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress For Cultural Freedom A... more Conspiring for democracyPeter Coleman:The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress For Cultural Freedom And The Struggle For The Mind Of Postwar Europe The Free Press, New York, 1989, 333 p., $22.95.The importance of doing homework!H. H. A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger:Catching Spies: Principles and Practice of Counterespionage Paladin Press, Boulder, Colo., 1988, 403 p., $19.95._____: Making Spies: A Talent Spotter's Handbook Paladin Press, Boulder, Colo., 1986, 272 p., $16.95.The CIA and intelligence policyLoch K. Johnson:America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, 344 p., $24.95.RAF Secret missions in southeast Asia during World War IITerence O'Brien:The Moonlight War: The Story of Clandestine Operations in Southeast Asia, 1944–45 Collins, London, 1987, 363 p., £12.95.Outside the inside storyErnest Volkman and Blaine Baggett:Secret Intelligence: The Inside Story of America's Espionage Empire Doubleday, New York, 1989, 229 p., $19.95.Prescribing caution on glasnostEdward Jay Epstein:Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989, 335 p., $19.95.U.S. intelligence: a long viewNathan Miller:Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence Paragon House, New York, 1989, 482 p., $24.95.
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the postwar world is just that-it can be called "post... more Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the postwar world is just that-it can be called "postwar" because the major powers have not fought each other since 1945. Such a lengthy period of peace among the most powerful states is unprecedented.1 Almost as unusual is the caution with which each superpower has treated the other. Although we often model superpower relations as a game of chicken, in fact the U.S. and USSR have not behaved like reckless teenagers. Indeed, superpower crises are becoming at least as rare as wars were in the past. Unless one strains and counts 1973, we have gone over a quarter of a century without a severe crisis. Furthermore, in those that have occurred, each side has been willing to make concessions to avoid venturing too near the brink of war. Thus the more we see of the Cuban missile crisis, the more it appears as a compromise rather than an American victory. Kennedy was not willing to withhold all inducements and push the Russians as hard as he could if this required using force or even continuing the volatile confrontation.2 It has been common to attribute these effects to the existence of nuclear weapons. Because neither side could successfully protect itself in an all-out war, no one could win-or, to use John Mueller's phrase, profit from it.3 Of The author would like to thank John Mueller for comments.
BY ROBERT JERVIS X OLiTiCAL science is a very trendy discipline. Few books or articles are cited ... more BY ROBERT JERVIS X OLiTiCAL science is a very trendy discipline. Few books or articles are cited a decade, let alone a generation, after they are written. When scholars die, their ideas often die with them, although they may be reinvented later and trumpeted as new. Hans Morgenthau is a rare, if partial, exception to this generalization. Students still read his work, especially but not exclusively Politics Among Nations which to a large degree made the field; scholars still cite his work, even if they have not read it recently or carefully and even if their main objective is to attack it; and, perhaps more importantly, there is much to be gained by re-reading his books and thinking about what he has to say. Morgenthau wrote too much for me to even attempt a summary, and, like any subtle and supple thinker, he voiced too many contradictions to permit ready distillations. As both a detached scholar and a passionate observer of world politics, Morgenthau sought to have his general philosophy guide his views on specific issues and yet to remain open enough to allow his observations of the wisdom and folly-usually the latter-around him alter some of his most deeply-held beliefs. In a world in which scholarship and public policy are increasingly separate, in which highest academic prestige goes to those who construct the most abstract and apparently
Derek Leebaert, Magic and Mayhem: The Delusions of American Foreign Policy from Korea to Afghanistan. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. 336 pp. $26.00
Journal of Cold War Studies, 2011
Page 1. 205 Book Reviews SM Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace. New York: Viking, 2010. 451 pp. $2... more Page 1. 205 Book Reviews SM Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace. New York: Viking, 2010. 451 pp. $29.95. Reviewed by Warren F. Kimball, Rutgers University Whatever the shrill voices of believers in conspiracy, the Yalta Conference ...
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 09636412 2011 599189, Aug 25, 2011
... Dilemmas About Security Dilemmas. View full textDownload full text Full access. DOI: 10.1080/... more ... Dilemmas About Security Dilemmas. View full textDownload full text Full access. DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2011.599189 Robert Jervis a pages 416-423. ... 5 Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005), chap. ...
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 1990
Conspiring for democracyPeter Coleman:The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress For Cultural Freedom A... more Conspiring for democracyPeter Coleman:The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress For Cultural Freedom And The Struggle For The Mind Of Postwar Europe The Free Press, New York, 1989, 333 p., $22.95.The importance of doing homework!H. H. A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger:Catching Spies: Principles and Practice of Counterespionage Paladin Press, Boulder, Colo., 1988, 403 p., $19.95._____: Making Spies: A Talent Spotter's Handbook Paladin Press, Boulder, Colo., 1986, 272 p., $16.95.The CIA and intelligence policyLoch K. Johnson:America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, 344 p., $24.95.RAF Secret missions in southeast Asia during World War IITerence O'Brien:The Moonlight War: The Story of Clandestine Operations in Southeast Asia, 1944–45 Collins, London, 1987, 363 p., £12.95.Outside the inside storyErnest Volkman and Blaine Baggett:Secret Intelligence: The Inside Story of America's Espionage Empire Doubleday, New York, 1989, 229 p., $19.95.Prescribing caution on glasnostEdward Jay Epstein:Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989, 335 p., $19.95.U.S. intelligence: a long viewNathan Miller:Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence Paragon House, New York, 1989, 482 p., $24.95.
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