Between Crown and Swastika: The impact of the radical right on the Afrikaner nationalist movement... more Between Crown and Swastika: The impact of the radical right on the Afrikaner nationalist movement in the Facist era, by Patrick J. Furlong. Wesleyan University Press, HanoverandLondon. xxxi+344pp. £30.00hardback. ISBN 08195 52291.
Britain and America, 1920–60. Now the in-depth historical study is available in a more affordable... more Britain and America, 1920–60. Now the in-depth historical study is available in a more affordable paperback edition. Like the other books in Manchester University Press’s “Studies in Popular Culture” book series, of which Richards himself is the series editor, this volume seeks primarily to frame its media of choice as interconnected sets of social practices. Cinema and Radio represents an attempt to bridge the genres of cultural studies and cultural history through a creative bit of methodological architecture. The first paragraph of the book declares that the importance of cinema cannot be understood without “fan magazines, cigarette cards, postcards, cheap biographies, the book of the film, the sheet music of the film, and, above all, radio” (1). This is an almost beat-forbeat reiteration of Harold Aram Veeser’s methodology from The New Historicism (Routledge 1989), setting us up for a fairly straightforward cultural history. However, the book’s ingenuity comes from its insistenc...
German courts of law during the Hitler dictatorship, of course, showed little interest in such in... more German courts of law during the Hitler dictatorship, of course, showed little interest in such intent on the part of the regime's enemies. This carefully researched, remarkably empathetic, and insightful book has some unfortunate errors, a few of which should be noted. It was President Hindenburg's appointment of the National Socialist leader as Reich Chancellor on January 30, 1933, not the March 5, 1933, "elections that brought Hitler to power" (p. 87). Helmuth James von Moltke led his own resistance group, later called the Kreisau Circle; he was not "a member of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's resistance circles" (p. 125). Contrary to Nelson's view that the Americans "were still trying to steer clear of war" in summer and fall 1941 (p. 228), President Roosevelt told Churchill during their meeting in Placentia Bay in August 1941 (as Martin Gilbert in Churchill VI, p. 1,168, quotes Churchill) that "he would wage war, but not declare it, and that he would become more and more provocative," and that "he would look for an 'incident' which would justify him in opening hostilities." Nelson's book was "born of a human rights perspective"; she modestly calls it a "good-faith effort in making sense of this complicated tale" with the material she could find (p. 339). But in some respects her work is exemplary, as a balanced addition to existing literature for English-and German-language readers (a German translation, Die Rote Kapelle. Die Geschichte der legendären Widerstandsgruppe, Munich: C. Bertelsmann, was published in 2010). This moving account of the convictions, motivations, lives, and deaths of the Berlin group of intellectuals and working-class resisters supersedes the biased and distorting cold-war accounts, the eastern version of which presented the Rote Kapelle as a purely communist-directed organization, while in the west the view of the group as contemptible traitors prevailed. Nelson presents a balanced account of the Berlin group's heterodox antifascism, its priorities and actions, and its involuntarily limited involvement in the transmission of intelligence to Moscow.
In the fall of 1939, the German army (Wehrmacht) began a run of decisive victories that was quite... more In the fall of 1939, the German army (Wehrmacht) began a run of decisive victories that was quite unlike anything in living military memory. With their fearsome tank (Panzer) formations operating as an apparently irresistible spearhead, and with a powerful air force (Luftwaffe) circling overhead, the Wehrmacht ran through or around every defensive position thrown in its path. The opening campaign in Poland (Case White) smashed the Polish army in 18 days, although a bit more fighting was necessary to reduce the capital, Warsaw. 1 Equally 1 For Case White, begin with the belated "official history" commissioned by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Das Deutsche Reich und Der Zweite Weltkrieg, volume 2, Die Errichtung der hegemonie auf dem Europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979), especially "Hitler's Erster 'Blitzkrieg' und seine Auswirkungen auf Nordosteuropa," pp. 79-156. Labeling this "official history" is misleading-it is far more a meticulously researched critical history by a team of crack scholars.
victory at Gallipoli. It is curious that he does not compare in greater depth the strategic impac... more victory at Gallipoli. It is curious that he does not compare in greater depth the strategic impact of Middle Eastern operations on both world wars: Martin Kitchen and John Keegan have pointed out the strategic benefits that the Wehrmacht reaped from tying down British military resources in Egypt through the Afrika Korps. The same argument could be usefully applied to the Great War. Sean McMeekin’s study gives the historian of the First World much to consider. More controversial is the neoconservative tone of the epilogue, which links German fantasies of fomenting jihad with radical Islamic activity today. This book is nevertheless an enjoyable read, as well as a provocative contribution to the historiography of World War I. Larry L. Ping, Southern Utah University
reflected Germany’s bitter determination to continue the war in defiance of the changing balance ... more reflected Germany’s bitter determination to continue the war in defiance of the changing balance of forces. Efforts to establish a European imperium gridlocked in the face of metastasizing resistance. As the tide of the air war changed, the Reich became a fortress without a roof. Above all, Hitler’s determination to resume the offensive in Russia led to the Stalingrad catastrophe and its aftermath at Kursk: the permanent crippling of Germany’s ground-offensive capabilities, the system’s only trump card. As the noose around Germany’s neck tightened during 1943, the Wehrmacht and the people continued to follow their Führer. Hitler had dismantled the traditional state apparatus and the secondary social institutions. The “Führer myth” and its accompanying terror machine combined to limit any form of resistance and isolate the resisters. July 20 may have been an “uprising of conscience.” It was also too little and far too late. June 1944 initiated the war’s final stage. D-Day in the west and Operation Bagration in the east caught the shrinking Reich in the jaws of a giant vise, not to be stopped by local counterattacks such as the Ardennes offensive. Hitler’s suicide on April 30, 1944, symbolized the downfall of the Third Reich and the German society that had acclaimed and supported it to the finish. The German threat was ended. So was Europe’s global dominance. But in ends lay a beginning: Germany’s liberation from the structures and mentalities that had turned Europe into a wilderness of ruins and corpses.
European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire, 2013
Ewers (who attempted to kick-start his literary career by latching onto the Wessel cult), Wessel’... more Ewers (who attempted to kick-start his literary career by latching onto the Wessel cult), Wessel’s family (who tried to turn the newfound fame of their late relative into profit) and local initiatives (each claiming Wessel as their own native, and attempting to derive economic gain from the case). We are treated to a detailed history of the particulars of the ‘Wessel archetype’, as narrated by literature, films and political discourses. The Wessel cult is shown to be key to the understanding of the Nazi idea of ‘New Man’, and also to ideas regarding heroism, sacrifice and the mortuary cult of German National Socialism. Siemens’ argument seems to be supporting the theory regarding fascism as a political religion, as he accurately describes the rituals and liturgy surrounding the dead SA man. The second Wessel trial, which took revenge on the remaining accessories, and the subsequent illegal sentencing and murders of Wessel’s killers, are shown to be a form of ritual retribution conducted by the Nazis on their enemies. The last chapter of the work follows the genealogies of all those involved in the Horst Wessel case after 1945. From victims to perpetrators (in many cases they were both), and those who profited from the issue, their evolution is meticulously described, ending with the symbolic solution of the case by a German court in recent years, at the behest of Siemens. This is perhaps the only part which may be criticised in an otherwise excellent book: there is very little said about the continuation of the Horst Wessel cult in post-war German and international neo-Nazi ideology. The work is also very detailed at times, which may lead the casual reader to skip important passages. However, I still consider the book a solid read for any person interested in fascist studies, inter-war European history or the study of radical ideologies, as it makes a vital contribution to the better understanding of some seminal, albeit dark, chapters of European history.
ted-complements my own study of Bock's Army Group Center in the same period (Operation Barbarossa... more ted-complements my own study of Bock's Army Group Center in the same period (Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.). This is not to say the two studies agree on everything, which to an extent reflects the differences in using German and Soviet archival material. One example is Glantz's branding of Kuntzen's LVII Motorized Corps' withdrawal from Velikie Luki in July as "premature and ill-advised" (p. 269), a judgment which is not supported by the difficulties graphically set out in German corps and divisional files from 18-20 July. Nevertheless, quibbles aside, there can be no question Glantz is on the road to another towering achievement in the history of the German-Soviet war. I await volume two with eager anticipation.
riage politics, co-optation of rituals and maneuvering for ritual hegemony. Kings and Clans is a ... more riage politics, co-optation of rituals and maneuvering for ritual hegemony. Kings and Clans is a dense study with a moderately difficult style and extensive endnotes, bibliography, glossaries and other lists. It is made more difficult to read by small print. However, the reader's patience is rewarded by sharing Newbury's deep understanding of the subtle complexities of a central African society.
Between Crown and Swastika: The impact of the radical right on the Afrikaner nationalist movement... more Between Crown and Swastika: The impact of the radical right on the Afrikaner nationalist movement in the Facist era, by Patrick J. Furlong. Wesleyan University Press, HanoverandLondon. xxxi+344pp. £30.00hardback. ISBN 08195 52291.
Britain and America, 1920–60. Now the in-depth historical study is available in a more affordable... more Britain and America, 1920–60. Now the in-depth historical study is available in a more affordable paperback edition. Like the other books in Manchester University Press’s “Studies in Popular Culture” book series, of which Richards himself is the series editor, this volume seeks primarily to frame its media of choice as interconnected sets of social practices. Cinema and Radio represents an attempt to bridge the genres of cultural studies and cultural history through a creative bit of methodological architecture. The first paragraph of the book declares that the importance of cinema cannot be understood without “fan magazines, cigarette cards, postcards, cheap biographies, the book of the film, the sheet music of the film, and, above all, radio” (1). This is an almost beat-forbeat reiteration of Harold Aram Veeser’s methodology from The New Historicism (Routledge 1989), setting us up for a fairly straightforward cultural history. However, the book’s ingenuity comes from its insistenc...
German courts of law during the Hitler dictatorship, of course, showed little interest in such in... more German courts of law during the Hitler dictatorship, of course, showed little interest in such intent on the part of the regime's enemies. This carefully researched, remarkably empathetic, and insightful book has some unfortunate errors, a few of which should be noted. It was President Hindenburg's appointment of the National Socialist leader as Reich Chancellor on January 30, 1933, not the March 5, 1933, "elections that brought Hitler to power" (p. 87). Helmuth James von Moltke led his own resistance group, later called the Kreisau Circle; he was not "a member of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's resistance circles" (p. 125). Contrary to Nelson's view that the Americans "were still trying to steer clear of war" in summer and fall 1941 (p. 228), President Roosevelt told Churchill during their meeting in Placentia Bay in August 1941 (as Martin Gilbert in Churchill VI, p. 1,168, quotes Churchill) that "he would wage war, but not declare it, and that he would become more and more provocative," and that "he would look for an 'incident' which would justify him in opening hostilities." Nelson's book was "born of a human rights perspective"; she modestly calls it a "good-faith effort in making sense of this complicated tale" with the material she could find (p. 339). But in some respects her work is exemplary, as a balanced addition to existing literature for English-and German-language readers (a German translation, Die Rote Kapelle. Die Geschichte der legendären Widerstandsgruppe, Munich: C. Bertelsmann, was published in 2010). This moving account of the convictions, motivations, lives, and deaths of the Berlin group of intellectuals and working-class resisters supersedes the biased and distorting cold-war accounts, the eastern version of which presented the Rote Kapelle as a purely communist-directed organization, while in the west the view of the group as contemptible traitors prevailed. Nelson presents a balanced account of the Berlin group's heterodox antifascism, its priorities and actions, and its involuntarily limited involvement in the transmission of intelligence to Moscow.
In the fall of 1939, the German army (Wehrmacht) began a run of decisive victories that was quite... more In the fall of 1939, the German army (Wehrmacht) began a run of decisive victories that was quite unlike anything in living military memory. With their fearsome tank (Panzer) formations operating as an apparently irresistible spearhead, and with a powerful air force (Luftwaffe) circling overhead, the Wehrmacht ran through or around every defensive position thrown in its path. The opening campaign in Poland (Case White) smashed the Polish army in 18 days, although a bit more fighting was necessary to reduce the capital, Warsaw. 1 Equally 1 For Case White, begin with the belated "official history" commissioned by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Das Deutsche Reich und Der Zweite Weltkrieg, volume 2, Die Errichtung der hegemonie auf dem Europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979), especially "Hitler's Erster 'Blitzkrieg' und seine Auswirkungen auf Nordosteuropa," pp. 79-156. Labeling this "official history" is misleading-it is far more a meticulously researched critical history by a team of crack scholars.
victory at Gallipoli. It is curious that he does not compare in greater depth the strategic impac... more victory at Gallipoli. It is curious that he does not compare in greater depth the strategic impact of Middle Eastern operations on both world wars: Martin Kitchen and John Keegan have pointed out the strategic benefits that the Wehrmacht reaped from tying down British military resources in Egypt through the Afrika Korps. The same argument could be usefully applied to the Great War. Sean McMeekin’s study gives the historian of the First World much to consider. More controversial is the neoconservative tone of the epilogue, which links German fantasies of fomenting jihad with radical Islamic activity today. This book is nevertheless an enjoyable read, as well as a provocative contribution to the historiography of World War I. Larry L. Ping, Southern Utah University
reflected Germany’s bitter determination to continue the war in defiance of the changing balance ... more reflected Germany’s bitter determination to continue the war in defiance of the changing balance of forces. Efforts to establish a European imperium gridlocked in the face of metastasizing resistance. As the tide of the air war changed, the Reich became a fortress without a roof. Above all, Hitler’s determination to resume the offensive in Russia led to the Stalingrad catastrophe and its aftermath at Kursk: the permanent crippling of Germany’s ground-offensive capabilities, the system’s only trump card. As the noose around Germany’s neck tightened during 1943, the Wehrmacht and the people continued to follow their Führer. Hitler had dismantled the traditional state apparatus and the secondary social institutions. The “Führer myth” and its accompanying terror machine combined to limit any form of resistance and isolate the resisters. July 20 may have been an “uprising of conscience.” It was also too little and far too late. June 1944 initiated the war’s final stage. D-Day in the west and Operation Bagration in the east caught the shrinking Reich in the jaws of a giant vise, not to be stopped by local counterattacks such as the Ardennes offensive. Hitler’s suicide on April 30, 1944, symbolized the downfall of the Third Reich and the German society that had acclaimed and supported it to the finish. The German threat was ended. So was Europe’s global dominance. But in ends lay a beginning: Germany’s liberation from the structures and mentalities that had turned Europe into a wilderness of ruins and corpses.
European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire, 2013
Ewers (who attempted to kick-start his literary career by latching onto the Wessel cult), Wessel’... more Ewers (who attempted to kick-start his literary career by latching onto the Wessel cult), Wessel’s family (who tried to turn the newfound fame of their late relative into profit) and local initiatives (each claiming Wessel as their own native, and attempting to derive economic gain from the case). We are treated to a detailed history of the particulars of the ‘Wessel archetype’, as narrated by literature, films and political discourses. The Wessel cult is shown to be key to the understanding of the Nazi idea of ‘New Man’, and also to ideas regarding heroism, sacrifice and the mortuary cult of German National Socialism. Siemens’ argument seems to be supporting the theory regarding fascism as a political religion, as he accurately describes the rituals and liturgy surrounding the dead SA man. The second Wessel trial, which took revenge on the remaining accessories, and the subsequent illegal sentencing and murders of Wessel’s killers, are shown to be a form of ritual retribution conducted by the Nazis on their enemies. The last chapter of the work follows the genealogies of all those involved in the Horst Wessel case after 1945. From victims to perpetrators (in many cases they were both), and those who profited from the issue, their evolution is meticulously described, ending with the symbolic solution of the case by a German court in recent years, at the behest of Siemens. This is perhaps the only part which may be criticised in an otherwise excellent book: there is very little said about the continuation of the Horst Wessel cult in post-war German and international neo-Nazi ideology. The work is also very detailed at times, which may lead the casual reader to skip important passages. However, I still consider the book a solid read for any person interested in fascist studies, inter-war European history or the study of radical ideologies, as it makes a vital contribution to the better understanding of some seminal, albeit dark, chapters of European history.
ted-complements my own study of Bock's Army Group Center in the same period (Operation Barbarossa... more ted-complements my own study of Bock's Army Group Center in the same period (Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.). This is not to say the two studies agree on everything, which to an extent reflects the differences in using German and Soviet archival material. One example is Glantz's branding of Kuntzen's LVII Motorized Corps' withdrawal from Velikie Luki in July as "premature and ill-advised" (p. 269), a judgment which is not supported by the difficulties graphically set out in German corps and divisional files from 18-20 July. Nevertheless, quibbles aside, there can be no question Glantz is on the road to another towering achievement in the history of the German-Soviet war. I await volume two with eager anticipation.
riage politics, co-optation of rituals and maneuvering for ritual hegemony. Kings and Clans is a ... more riage politics, co-optation of rituals and maneuvering for ritual hegemony. Kings and Clans is a dense study with a moderately difficult style and extensive endnotes, bibliography, glossaries and other lists. It is made more difficult to read by small print. However, the reader's patience is rewarded by sharing Newbury's deep understanding of the subtle complexities of a central African society.
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