Papers by Rafael La Porta
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exac... more In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
Recent research has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in ... more Recent research has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a ...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find lit... more We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in... more We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries.
... The two alternative hypotheses differ in how much government intervention such a framework wo... more ... The two alternative hypotheses differ in how much government intervention such a framework would optimally call for. ... In conformity with the law on annual accounts, the (consolidated)financial statements included in the prospectus omitted 214 affiliated ...
for help with the project. We would also like to thank William Easterly and Luigi Zingales and pa... more for help with the project. We would also like to thank William Easterly and Luigi Zingales and participants at the seminars of the Universities of Amsterdam, Brown, EDHEC, Harvard, La Sorbonne, Tilburg, and Toulouse for extremely useful suggestions. Shleifer is grateful to the Kauffman Foundation for the support of this research. The full data set, disclosure blank forms, and a legal appendix for each country can be found at
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003
Abstract In many countries, banks lend to firms controlled by the bank's owners. We ... more Abstract In many countries, banks lend to firms controlled by the bank's owners. We examine the benefits of related lending using a newly assembled data set for Mexico. Related lending is prevalent (20 percent of commercial loans) and takes place on better terms than arm's-...
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004
... JUAN C. BOTERO SIMEON DJANKOV RAFAEL LA PORTA FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANES ANDREI SHLEIFER ... ... more ... JUAN C. BOTERO SIMEON DJANKOV RAFAEL LA PORTA FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANES ANDREI SHLEIFER ... Garcia-Huitron, Eidelman Gonzalez, Mag-dalena Lopez-Morton, Camila Madrinan, Christian Pfirrmann, Alejandro Ponce-Rodriguez, Kumar Rakhi ...
The Journal of Finance, 2002
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow o... more We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders, and weaker evidence of the benefits of higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders for corporate valuation.
The Journal of Finance, 1999
We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the... more We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash f low rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.
The Journal of Finance, 2000
The Journal of Finance, 1997
The Journal of Finance, 1997
This article examines the hypothesis that the superior return to so-called value stocks is the re... more This article examines the hypothesis that the superior return to so-called value stocks is the result of expectational errors made by investors. We study stock price reactions around earnings announcements for value and glamour stocks over a 5-year period after portfolio formation. The announcement returns suggest that a significant portion of the return difference between value and glamour stocks is attributable to earnings surprises that are systematically more positive for value stocks. The evidence is inconsistent with a risk-based explanation for the return differential.
The Journal of Finance, 2006
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find lit... more We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.
The Journal of Finance, 2002
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such owner... more We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
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Papers by Rafael La Porta