
Pranab Panday
Pranab Kumar Panday is Professor at the Department of Public Administration, University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh. He was a Senior Fulbright Fellow at the Department of Development Sociology, Cornell University, the USA in 2012. He has a MPhil from the University of Bergen, Norway and PhD from the City University of Hong Kong. Panday's main areas of research include public administration, public management, NGOs, public policy, governance and gender studies. He is the author of several books. His last six books are (i) “Women’s Political Participation in Bangladesh: Institutional Reforms, Actors and Outcomes”, Springer, the USA, 2013
Supervisors: 1. Professor Shelley Feldman, Cornell University, the USA 2. Professor Linda Che-lan Li, City University of Hong Kong 3. Dr. Ishtiaq Jamil, University of Norway, bergen
Supervisors: 1. Professor Shelley Feldman, Cornell University, the USA 2. Professor Linda Che-lan Li, City University of Hong Kong 3. Dr. Ishtiaq Jamil, University of Norway, bergen
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Papers by Pranab Panday
women’s organizations in the process of change that has helped to increase participation of
women in local government political process of Bangladesh. While there is considerable support
for the presence of the women’s movement, there is much ambivalence as to the specifics
of such influence: its objects, means, and magnitude. The difficulty in assessing influence may
stem from the reliance on informal channels, which makes tracing and tracking influence
a great challenge, and calls for more grounded research to expose the intricate interactions
between actors.
in t h e g r i p of power politics. Coups have been common, the
military has infiltrated the political process, and the political
scene is marked by a patron-client culture, one in which black
money plays a major role in elections and mastans (goondas) are
extensively relied upon to do the bidding of their political masters.
Political leaders draw their strength by donning the mantles of
the slain charismatic leaders - Sheik Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur
Rahman; they care little for inner-party democracy, are distanced
from the people, and are caught up in an ‘enemy discourse’, in
which each political party reviles the other. Bangladesh’s political
leaders must work for a genuine democratic culture in the
country.
unprecedented, for a considerable time. Lawlessness,
misadministration, corruption at every level and smuggling had
brought the country to the brink of the abyss. It was not possible for
the police to restore law and order in the country for a number of
reasons, one among which was that a section of them are extremely
corrupt and reportedly connive in giving shelter to violent terrorists,
drug traders and smugglers. Finding no other alternative, the
Government of Bangladesh deployed the army on 17th October, 2002,
in a campaign against crime. The operation was given the
nomenclature ‘Operation Clean Heart’. ‘Operation Clean Heart’ sent
fear into the hearts of those who ruled our lives by fear and held us
captive in their reign of terror. It also brought us a sense of relief
that is comparable to that of the people when liberating forces enter
occupied territories. All said and done, the army campaign has
loosened the noose of crime around our necks, however short-lived
it may be. This goes counter to the view that programmes which
require major organisational changes will be difficult to carry out
and are unlikely to be successfully implemented
governance in Bangladesh by highlighting the issue of coordination. It addresses the
question of whether there is any mechanism through which urban government bodies can
ensure coordination on matters of dispute between different government organisations.
The paper is based on a review of secondary literature as well as on primary data drawn
from a case study on a city corporation. The available data substantiates the view that the
process of urban service delivery in Bangladesh has lacked proper coordination
mechanisms from its very inception. Successive governments since the independence of
Bangladesh have experimented with the structural design of urban government bodies
without considering the need for a proper mechanism to ensure sound coordination among
actors involved in implementing the various policies of these bodies. Although an attempt
was made by the then Awami League1 (1996–2001) government to establish a highpowered
coordination committee under the chairmanship of the minister in charge of the
Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (LGRD&C) Ministry for each
city corporation, in order to ensure better management of services and to settle disputes
between various government agencies, the initiative was perverted upon the change of state
power in 2001. As a result, these bodies continue to suffer from problems of coordination.
poverty alleviation strategies of the Hong Kong and China governments. It has
been found that the Comprehensive Social Security Allowance and the Minimum
Living Standard Scheme or Dibao are the main strategies adopted by both the
governments towards alleviation of urban poverty. The available data substantiates
that the Comprehensive Social Security Allowance is targeted to solve
immediate concrete social problems in the short term instead of solving the longterm
poverty problem. More specifically, the welfare policy is designed to
alleviate the political pressures and social conflicts and is a tool to avoid social
confusion. On the other hand, Dibao reflects the state’s general economic
orientation, which has emphasized rapid growth and neglected effective
redistribution measures. At best, Dibao is likely to provide short-term relief
from urban poverty and inequality, rather than make a significant impact on
poverty reduction.
in urban policy implementation in Bangladesh. Based on a study carried out in one of the
seven large cities in Bangladesh, the available data illustrate that there are major coordination
problems between the Rajshahi City Corporation (RCC) and other government departments.
This is due to a lack of formal coordination mechanisms, partisan leadership, and a fragmented
organizational culture of patron-clientage, which dispenses undue favor and involves
nepotism. These pathologies breed corruption and seriously impede inter-organizational
coordination. Ordinary citizens suffer as a result.
women’s organizations in the process of change that has helped to increase participation of
women in local government political process of Bangladesh. While there is considerable support
for the presence of the women’s movement, there is much ambivalence as to the specifics
of such influence: its objects, means, and magnitude. The difficulty in assessing influence may
stem from the reliance on informal channels, which makes tracing and tracking influence
a great challenge, and calls for more grounded research to expose the intricate interactions
between actors.
in t h e g r i p of power politics. Coups have been common, the
military has infiltrated the political process, and the political
scene is marked by a patron-client culture, one in which black
money plays a major role in elections and mastans (goondas) are
extensively relied upon to do the bidding of their political masters.
Political leaders draw their strength by donning the mantles of
the slain charismatic leaders - Sheik Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur
Rahman; they care little for inner-party democracy, are distanced
from the people, and are caught up in an ‘enemy discourse’, in
which each political party reviles the other. Bangladesh’s political
leaders must work for a genuine democratic culture in the
country.
unprecedented, for a considerable time. Lawlessness,
misadministration, corruption at every level and smuggling had
brought the country to the brink of the abyss. It was not possible for
the police to restore law and order in the country for a number of
reasons, one among which was that a section of them are extremely
corrupt and reportedly connive in giving shelter to violent terrorists,
drug traders and smugglers. Finding no other alternative, the
Government of Bangladesh deployed the army on 17th October, 2002,
in a campaign against crime. The operation was given the
nomenclature ‘Operation Clean Heart’. ‘Operation Clean Heart’ sent
fear into the hearts of those who ruled our lives by fear and held us
captive in their reign of terror. It also brought us a sense of relief
that is comparable to that of the people when liberating forces enter
occupied territories. All said and done, the army campaign has
loosened the noose of crime around our necks, however short-lived
it may be. This goes counter to the view that programmes which
require major organisational changes will be difficult to carry out
and are unlikely to be successfully implemented
governance in Bangladesh by highlighting the issue of coordination. It addresses the
question of whether there is any mechanism through which urban government bodies can
ensure coordination on matters of dispute between different government organisations.
The paper is based on a review of secondary literature as well as on primary data drawn
from a case study on a city corporation. The available data substantiates the view that the
process of urban service delivery in Bangladesh has lacked proper coordination
mechanisms from its very inception. Successive governments since the independence of
Bangladesh have experimented with the structural design of urban government bodies
without considering the need for a proper mechanism to ensure sound coordination among
actors involved in implementing the various policies of these bodies. Although an attempt
was made by the then Awami League1 (1996–2001) government to establish a highpowered
coordination committee under the chairmanship of the minister in charge of the
Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (LGRD&C) Ministry for each
city corporation, in order to ensure better management of services and to settle disputes
between various government agencies, the initiative was perverted upon the change of state
power in 2001. As a result, these bodies continue to suffer from problems of coordination.
poverty alleviation strategies of the Hong Kong and China governments. It has
been found that the Comprehensive Social Security Allowance and the Minimum
Living Standard Scheme or Dibao are the main strategies adopted by both the
governments towards alleviation of urban poverty. The available data substantiates
that the Comprehensive Social Security Allowance is targeted to solve
immediate concrete social problems in the short term instead of solving the longterm
poverty problem. More specifically, the welfare policy is designed to
alleviate the political pressures and social conflicts and is a tool to avoid social
confusion. On the other hand, Dibao reflects the state’s general economic
orientation, which has emphasized rapid growth and neglected effective
redistribution measures. At best, Dibao is likely to provide short-term relief
from urban poverty and inequality, rather than make a significant impact on
poverty reduction.
in urban policy implementation in Bangladesh. Based on a study carried out in one of the
seven large cities in Bangladesh, the available data illustrate that there are major coordination
problems between the Rajshahi City Corporation (RCC) and other government departments.
This is due to a lack of formal coordination mechanisms, partisan leadership, and a fragmented
organizational culture of patron-clientage, which dispenses undue favor and involves
nepotism. These pathologies breed corruption and seriously impede inter-organizational
coordination. Ordinary citizens suffer as a result.