Books by Pierce Marks
Quoir, 2024
Despite many warnings, the larger public has just now become aware that moderns are suffering fro... more Despite many warnings, the larger public has just now become aware that moderns are suffering from a crisis of meaning, in which everything we do and are can come to seem meaningless, futile, and absurd. We may doubt not only the meaningfulness of our lives, but whether meaning, value, and goodness exist at all.
That is where this book comes in. Within, forgotten elements of the Christian moral paradigm are described in their most basic details, and offered as a solution to the meaning crisis. Far from being rare, meaning and value in life are, if Christianity is true, unavoidable. For all of creation—all of reality—is good, beautiful, loveable, meaningful and even divine. Our perception that life is meaningless is, then, merely a self-centered blindness, an inability to see what is right in front of us.
Papers by Pierce Marks
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2024
Many contemporary philosophers have presumed that the doctrine of evil as privation simply means ... more Many contemporary philosophers have presumed that the doctrine of evil as privation simply means that there can be no evils that count as positive realities. However, this interpretation is naive, and does not cohere well with the Christian theological tradition, especially the work of Augustine, who is widely regarded as the touchstone proponent of the doctrine. The goal of this paper is to clarify the more nuanced, teleological meaning of the doctrine of “evil as privation,” as well as to establish a useful conceptual division between genuine evils of privation (“depraved privations”) and harmless privations (“mere privations”). Additionally, I discuss four challenges to evil as privation: that it entails the inherent evil of all creatures, that the normative property “evil” is itself a positive reality, that it makes no sense to speak of non-existence as a deprivation, and that any attempt to refine the doctrine renders it trivial and vacuous. Finally, I close out the paper by showing that there is still a fifth, unresolved problem facing the more nuanced, teleological version of the doctrine: that it requires us to make significant recalibrations to very tender-hearted and loving moral intuitions.
Oklahoma State University Thesis Collection (ProQuest), 2020
The purpose of this essay will be to set out an analysis of a certain
philosophical, metaethical ... more The purpose of this essay will be to set out an analysis of a certain
philosophical, metaethical angst, which I call “absurd angst,” defend angsty thinking (to
the extent it can be), and offer up hopeful suggestions regarding consolation of this
angst. In short, I take absurd angst to be a painful worry that there are no normative,
non-instrumental reasons to act. This worry, it seems to me, can only come about under
a certain moral conceptual scheme, and I will devote a large amount of time here to
understanding it. This moral conceptual scheme leads the angsty to accept several nontrivial
beliefs about the relationships between moral concepts and their application in
true/accurate moral ascriptions. The angsty are led to these beliefs by, I think, a strongly
ingrained set of moral concepts which form the basis of their moral system(s). Ultimately,
I argue that absurd angst arises in some because the angsty possess moral concepts
which lead them to believe either that normative reasons require external reasons
(reasons which do not depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of
agents), or that normative reasons require external sources of normativity (grounds or
explanations for the normative force and authority of reasons which do not depend, in
some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of agents) (these possibilities are not
exclusive). This worries the angsty. First, because external sources of normativity are
theoretically problematic, and this is felt to, in some way, make moral claims
problematic. Second, because a host of painful consequences are thought to follow from
a lack of these external sources and a denial of normative reasons to act.
Pan-Orthodox Concern for Animals, 2020
That creation will be renewed and delivered from corruption is uncontroversial; what it means for... more That creation will be renewed and delivered from corruption is uncontroversial; what it means for creation to be renewed and delivered is, strangely, a heated topic. Here, I briefly explicate the views of St. Athanasius (approx. 296-373AD) regarding human corruption (what God saves from) and divine mercy (why God saves) as developed in On the Incarnation of the Word (OIW from here), with an eye towards adapting his central argument to the salvation of non-human creatures. Ultimately, I suggest that the reasons given by Athanasius for divine mercy towards mankind apply equally well to the entire creation, providing us with good reason to think that God will bodily resurrect at least some non-human animals despite the metaphysical difficulties surrounding animal immortality.
Undergraduate courses featuring Descartes typically cast him as the “archinternalist,” and, more ... more Undergraduate courses featuring Descartes typically cast him as the “archinternalist,” and, more egregiously, some champions of reliabilist-epistemology have decided that he offers a totally alien view. Here, I attempt to show that Descartes is--contrary to common interpretations-- a sort of virtue-reliabilist.
Conference Presentations by Pierce Marks
39th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics Rocky Mountain Division, 2023
In this paper I hope to show how buck-passing theories of ethics can be applied to aesthetics in ... more In this paper I hope to show how buck-passing theories of ethics can be applied to aesthetics in the hopes of reunifying aesthetics and ethics, and for reviving medieval and classical theories of beauty. To do so, I will briefly survey the buck-passing metaethical account (as developed by Scanlon and Parfit), show how it might be used to construct a general definition of beauty, and illustrate how this definition (and its implications) capture the core elements of Aquinas and Augustine's conceptions of beauty. The overall goal of the paper is that the "reasons" language buck-passing accounts employ to refer to fundamental ethical truths provides, at the very least, a neat and coherent way for discussing the normativity of aesthetic value.
Mountain Plains Philosophy Conference , 2019
A response to Zak Kopeikin's paper given at the Mountain Plains Philosophy Conference on October ... more A response to Zak Kopeikin's paper given at the Mountain Plains Philosophy Conference on October 11th, 2019.
National Conference for Undergraduate Research (NCUR), 2018
Here I will differ from Dennett in saying that, if determinism is true, the agent still could not... more Here I will differ from Dennett in saying that, if determinism is true, the agent still could not be morally responsible as a result of what I call the “Strong Control Principle.” Finally, I will conclude that determinism is probably false, given my intuition that there has been at least one instance of moral responsibility.
22nd Annual Southwestern Symposium for Undergraduate Philosophers, 2018
Response to “The Role of Authority and Prejudice in Understanding:
A Primer on a Gadamerian Appro... more Response to “The Role of Authority and Prejudice in Understanding:
A Primer on a Gadamerian Approach to Hermeneutics”
Delivered at the 22nd Annual Southwestern Symposium for Undergraduate Philosophers
University of Central Oklahoma Undergrad. Phil. Conference, 2017
Teaching Documents by Pierce Marks
Some collected quotes and brief notes on how Aquinas saw God as the solution to the problem of be... more Some collected quotes and brief notes on how Aquinas saw God as the solution to the problem of being. In sum, God is three of the four Aristotelian causes.
A brief appendix discussing Aristotle's notion of form in general; meant as part of "Aquinas' Und... more A brief appendix discussing Aristotle's notion of form in general; meant as part of "Aquinas' Understanding of Form," but, due to burnout, I am putting this project to the side. On re-reading the Metaphysics, something stuck out to me: the word 'form' is used to translate three different terms (morphe, eidos, idea). Aristotle's discussion of form is not contrary to Plato; they have distinct metaphysical accounts, but acknowledge one phenomena: the formal aspects of objects, particularly compounds. The appendix describes how Aquinas was aware of this as well. In short, as you can see with Aquinas' taxonomy, 'form' just refers to the formal aspect of things, and then Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas develop hypotheses about what these aspects consist in. This is essentially what Joe Sachs argues (he's a very good translator of Aristotle), but I've never seen this in print outside of his translation notes.
There are, for Aquinas, many different kinds of entities which might today be called 'forms.' Her... more There are, for Aquinas, many different kinds of entities which might today be called 'forms.' Here, I survey Aquinas' taxonomy of forms.
Lecture Notes/Synopsis on Richard Swinburne's Teleological Argument for Theism
This is Pt. 1 of a short textbook introducing the notion of inquiry. Pt. 1 lightly covers theoret... more This is Pt. 1 of a short textbook introducing the notion of inquiry. Pt. 1 lightly covers theoretical reasoning, including both explanation, prediction, confirmation, and Inference to the Best Explanation, relating each of these to a greater whole: inquiry.
Pt. 2 will develop a basic Bayesian confirmation calculus, and address difficulties with confirmation theory (such as the raven paradox, and the notion of probability as related to epistemology).
Pt. 3 will be an anthology of relevant readings, including the role of explanation in Biology, the use of modeling, Kuhnian paradigms, Inference to the Best Explanation in ethics, etc.
The textbook seeks to be published open source.
What differentiates Malcolm's variants of the Anselmian OA is the sense of "existence" appealed t... more What differentiates Malcolm's variants of the Anselmian OA is the sense of "existence" appealed to in the first premise. In the first variant (version 1), existence simpliciter (as actuality) is taken to be a perfection. Malcolm rejects this on the intuitive grounds of Kant's (E~P) (p. 46). The second variant (version 2), however, appeals to metaphysical independence, which in turn implies necessary existence. This sort of metaphysical independence and necessary existence, in turn, are used to make OA go through.
Undergrad/Grad School Papers (Useful as Notes) by Pierce Marks
The interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language ... more The interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is lucid: a skeptical problem is posed, criteria for a straight solution is set down, all possible straight solutions are (supposedly) ruled out, and a skeptical solution is given as all that remains. Here, I attempt to show Kripke’s criteria to be faulty, and offer up both an indirect and straight (direct) solution to the skeptical problem, despite Kripke’s denial of the possibility of such a solution.
Categorizing the different senses of "doubt" in Descartes.
My goal in this paper is to establish that the truth (or probable truth) of interactionism in its... more My goal in this paper is to establish that the truth (or probable truth) of interactionism in its most general form is epistemically prior to theories of mind, interaction, and other metaphysical/ scientific theories. I will attempt to do so on the basis of some basic epistemic principles that, when paired with intuitions arising from our conscious experiences, result in the conclusion that we are probably correct in identifying causal relations between mental and physical events barring counter evidence or defeaters. I will also argue that our justified belief in interactionism
Uploads
Books by Pierce Marks
That is where this book comes in. Within, forgotten elements of the Christian moral paradigm are described in their most basic details, and offered as a solution to the meaning crisis. Far from being rare, meaning and value in life are, if Christianity is true, unavoidable. For all of creation—all of reality—is good, beautiful, loveable, meaningful and even divine. Our perception that life is meaningless is, then, merely a self-centered blindness, an inability to see what is right in front of us.
Papers by Pierce Marks
philosophical, metaethical angst, which I call “absurd angst,” defend angsty thinking (to
the extent it can be), and offer up hopeful suggestions regarding consolation of this
angst. In short, I take absurd angst to be a painful worry that there are no normative,
non-instrumental reasons to act. This worry, it seems to me, can only come about under
a certain moral conceptual scheme, and I will devote a large amount of time here to
understanding it. This moral conceptual scheme leads the angsty to accept several nontrivial
beliefs about the relationships between moral concepts and their application in
true/accurate moral ascriptions. The angsty are led to these beliefs by, I think, a strongly
ingrained set of moral concepts which form the basis of their moral system(s). Ultimately,
I argue that absurd angst arises in some because the angsty possess moral concepts
which lead them to believe either that normative reasons require external reasons
(reasons which do not depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of
agents), or that normative reasons require external sources of normativity (grounds or
explanations for the normative force and authority of reasons which do not depend, in
some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of agents) (these possibilities are not
exclusive). This worries the angsty. First, because external sources of normativity are
theoretically problematic, and this is felt to, in some way, make moral claims
problematic. Second, because a host of painful consequences are thought to follow from
a lack of these external sources and a denial of normative reasons to act.
Conference Presentations by Pierce Marks
A Primer on a Gadamerian Approach to Hermeneutics”
Delivered at the 22nd Annual Southwestern Symposium for Undergraduate Philosophers
Teaching Documents by Pierce Marks
Pt. 2 will develop a basic Bayesian confirmation calculus, and address difficulties with confirmation theory (such as the raven paradox, and the notion of probability as related to epistemology).
Pt. 3 will be an anthology of relevant readings, including the role of explanation in Biology, the use of modeling, Kuhnian paradigms, Inference to the Best Explanation in ethics, etc.
The textbook seeks to be published open source.
Undergrad/Grad School Papers (Useful as Notes) by Pierce Marks
That is where this book comes in. Within, forgotten elements of the Christian moral paradigm are described in their most basic details, and offered as a solution to the meaning crisis. Far from being rare, meaning and value in life are, if Christianity is true, unavoidable. For all of creation—all of reality—is good, beautiful, loveable, meaningful and even divine. Our perception that life is meaningless is, then, merely a self-centered blindness, an inability to see what is right in front of us.
philosophical, metaethical angst, which I call “absurd angst,” defend angsty thinking (to
the extent it can be), and offer up hopeful suggestions regarding consolation of this
angst. In short, I take absurd angst to be a painful worry that there are no normative,
non-instrumental reasons to act. This worry, it seems to me, can only come about under
a certain moral conceptual scheme, and I will devote a large amount of time here to
understanding it. This moral conceptual scheme leads the angsty to accept several nontrivial
beliefs about the relationships between moral concepts and their application in
true/accurate moral ascriptions. The angsty are led to these beliefs by, I think, a strongly
ingrained set of moral concepts which form the basis of their moral system(s). Ultimately,
I argue that absurd angst arises in some because the angsty possess moral concepts
which lead them to believe either that normative reasons require external reasons
(reasons which do not depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of
agents), or that normative reasons require external sources of normativity (grounds or
explanations for the normative force and authority of reasons which do not depend, in
some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of agents) (these possibilities are not
exclusive). This worries the angsty. First, because external sources of normativity are
theoretically problematic, and this is felt to, in some way, make moral claims
problematic. Second, because a host of painful consequences are thought to follow from
a lack of these external sources and a denial of normative reasons to act.
A Primer on a Gadamerian Approach to Hermeneutics”
Delivered at the 22nd Annual Southwestern Symposium for Undergraduate Philosophers
Pt. 2 will develop a basic Bayesian confirmation calculus, and address difficulties with confirmation theory (such as the raven paradox, and the notion of probability as related to epistemology).
Pt. 3 will be an anthology of relevant readings, including the role of explanation in Biology, the use of modeling, Kuhnian paradigms, Inference to the Best Explanation in ethics, etc.
The textbook seeks to be published open source.
This paper will consist of several stages. First, I will (very briefly) adopt and explicate Kitcher’s view of Darwinian theory, including the Darwinian contributions of adaptationist explanatory form and “Speciation by Natural Selection” (SNS). Second, I will exposit a common methodological objection to (or concerns regarding) Darwin’s explanatory form (selectionist/adaptationist explanations). I will not, to be clear, cover all objections put forward against them, but only what I take to be the most egregious. Third, I will attempt to show that this family of objections is wrongheaded or unnuanced, for it overlooks how generalizable the problems of confirmation raised against adaptationism are. Fourth, and finally, I will show how Darwin had already, to some extent, internalized and dealt with a key aspect of this criticism explicated via an appeal to what I call “Lyellian Simplicity.” This final section will suggest that Darwin’s argument for SNS conforms well with the form of Inference to the Best Explanation on the results of abduction.