The aim of this paper is to substantiate the view that historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) which is a... more The aim of this paper is to substantiate the view that historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) which is an epistemological presupposition of Gadamer's idea of 'concept history' (Begriffsgeschichte) violates the substance of philosophy considerably, i.e. its problems and conceptuality, because of the limits it sets to the reach of thoughtful consideration (Denken). I argue that if philosophy shall be possible as an epistemic activity intended for knowledge, a theory which defends the universality of thinking must be added to Gadamer's hermeneutics. This paper shows how his theory unjustly ignores 'thoughtful consideration' as a primordial phenomenon of consciousness which is present on higher levels of understanding. After the criticism of Gadamer's inadequate concept of knowledge the paper concludes with a suggestion to rehabilitate the classical notion of thoughtful consideration as the substantive and permanent presupposition of all philosophy. The paper demonstrates how the rise of knowledge from Verstehen to Denken on different levels of reflection must lead to a rehabilitation of the philosophy of subjectivity and of metaphysics and how this epistemological move must affect the idea of a 'destruction of metaphysics' which Gadamer shares with Heidegger. 1. Introduction. Unfolding the argument This paper examines the significance of the notion of historicity for philosophical thought with a critical view to Gadamer's idea of 'concept history' as philosophy. It is argued that the historical criticism of philosophy which Gadamer undertakes by tracking philosophical concepts to their historical context and by exposing them to the philosophical (Socratic) dialogue, does not finish the job. Concept history considered as philosophy leaves philosophy in trouble because it does not proceed to make its product a resource for systematical philosophical reasoning. Firstly, the paper addresses the criticism which Gadamer-by means of concept history-directs at the Neo-Kantian attempts to codify the problems of philosophy. Secondly, it shows how his criticism is based on his theory of the 'historicity of understanding' (Geschichtlichkeit des Verstehens) presented in Wahrheit und Methode.
This paper presents the philosopher Hans Jonas’s idea of an environmental ethics. Through an outl... more This paper presents the philosopher Hans Jonas’s idea of an environmental ethics. Through an outline of the development of man’s relation to nature from Greek antiquity to the present it is argued that science and technology in modernity favour a relation of exploitation which is partly the cause of fatal climate changes. Through Jonas’s philosophical notion of an ontology of man as an alternative to classical dualism and by means of a turn to an ontological interpretation of Kant’s categorical imperative, it is argued that mankind has a responsibility to both coming generations and to the biosphere as a whole. Not only does this ontological shift from philosophy of mind to an ontology of man transcend dualism in philosophy, it throws a new critical light on the technological development and suggests a new way of considering man’s place in the cosmos.
This paper examines Hegel’s idea of nation and its significance for his theory of the modern stat... more This paper examines Hegel’s idea of nation and its significance for his theory of the modern state, namely, the role that ‘the national’ plays for his justification of right in the Philosophy of Right. It is argued that Hegel strikes a balance between historicism and a rational justification of state and law. He bases the state on a notion of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) that is both national and subjected to a world historical development toward rationality and universal right. Consequently, ‘nation,’ in the sense of a group of people invoking identity and rights based on a primordial common language, culture, and territory, does not cover what Hegel means by the modern nation state. ‘Ethical life’ is national, but it also constitutes a historically changeable community of values supported by citizens’ conscious participation in communal life (patriotism). Today, Hegel’s idea undermines the legitimacy of nationalistic invocations of primordial ethnic cultures within politics.
Peter Wolsing anlaegger i sit bidrag forskellige refleksioner omkring sprog, virkelighed og speku... more Peter Wolsing anlaegger i sit bidrag forskellige refleksioner omkring sprog, virkelighed og spekulativ taenkning i Hegels logik. Hensigten er udfra nedslag i Hegels logik at bestemme den spekulative tankeform som alt andet end los og vilkarlig, men som et anliggende der er funderet i rationel taenkning. Derefter pavises det hvorledes det i kraft af en analyse af sproget er muligt for Hegel at fremhaeve netop dette grundlaeggende spekulative traek i erkendelsen, og sluttelig tematiseres problemet omkring bevaegelsen indenfor horisonten af en sakaldt subjekt-objekt model.
[Extract from Introduction] The coherence of Kant’s socalled third Critique is ambiguous despite ... more [Extract from Introduction] The coherence of Kant’s socalled third Critique is ambiguous despite the task that Kant undertakes to solve in it. As the title suggests and Kant’s analyses show it is the aim of the work to determine the transcendental conditions of reflective judgment including the application of its principles on aesthetic and natural phenomena which do not fall under scientific investigations but which are still based on the cognitive powers of the mind. It is commonly agreed that an inner connection of the two parts of the work – the critique of aesthetic and teleological judgment respectively - is unlikely and that any attempt to argue that they form a unity is risque2. Despite its relation to the powers of cognition (imagination and understanding) the reflective judgment excersises its activity in two respects, namely in relation to aesthetic phenomena – the beauty of nature and of fines arts – and in relation to organic nature. These phenomena belong to strictly separate areas. Judgments about organic nature are teleological in the sense that they project a concept of purpose at the basis of the object for cognitive reasons; they aim at knowledge of how organic processes work. Against that, the aesthetic judgment is – Kant says – indifferent to the knowledge of its object; it concerns the beauty of the object just focusing on the object’s sensible form in so far as the judgment of this form occasions a feeling of delight in us. Whereas the teleological judgment thus claims to be objective (though Kant’s critique shows that it fails to be so), the aesthetic judgment expresses the subjective affection we experience via the judgment of the (aesthetically relevant) form of the object. It is this separation that I intend to question. I suggest that both aesthetic and teleological judgment respectively express ways of cognizing the world that do not exclude but rather supplement each other. More specifically, I argue that all through his third Critique Kant tries to keep separate what are really two different aspects of one and the same issue, namely the cognition of organic nature through a conceptual (scientific) and through a sensous (aesthetical) approach.
The aim of this paper is to substantiate the view that historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) which is a... more The aim of this paper is to substantiate the view that historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) which is an epistemological presupposition of Gadamer's idea of 'concept history' (Begriffsgeschichte) violates the substance of philosophy considerably, i.e. its problems and conceptuality, because of the limits it sets to the reach of thoughtful consideration (Denken). I argue that if philosophy shall be possible as an epistemic activity intended for knowledge, a theory which defends the universality of thinking must be added to Gadamer's hermeneutics. This paper shows how his theory unjustly ignores 'thoughtful consideration' as a primordial phenomenon of consciousness which is present on higher levels of understanding. After the criticism of Gadamer's inadequate concept of knowledge the paper concludes with a suggestion to rehabilitate the classical notion of thoughtful consideration as the substantive and permanent presupposition of all philosophy. The paper demonstrates how the rise of knowledge from Verstehen to Denken on different levels of reflection must lead to a rehabilitation of the philosophy of subjectivity and of metaphysics and how this epistemological move must affect the idea of a 'destruction of metaphysics' which Gadamer shares with Heidegger. 1. Introduction. Unfolding the argument This paper examines the significance of the notion of historicity for philosophical thought with a critical view to Gadamer's idea of 'concept history' as philosophy. It is argued that the historical criticism of philosophy which Gadamer undertakes by tracking philosophical concepts to their historical context and by exposing them to the philosophical (Socratic) dialogue, does not finish the job. Concept history considered as philosophy leaves philosophy in trouble because it does not proceed to make its product a resource for systematical philosophical reasoning. Firstly, the paper addresses the criticism which Gadamer-by means of concept history-directs at the Neo-Kantian attempts to codify the problems of philosophy. Secondly, it shows how his criticism is based on his theory of the 'historicity of understanding' (Geschichtlichkeit des Verstehens) presented in Wahrheit und Methode.
This paper presents the philosopher Hans Jonas’s idea of an environmental ethics. Through an outl... more This paper presents the philosopher Hans Jonas’s idea of an environmental ethics. Through an outline of the development of man’s relation to nature from Greek antiquity to the present it is argued that science and technology in modernity favour a relation of exploitation which is partly the cause of fatal climate changes. Through Jonas’s philosophical notion of an ontology of man as an alternative to classical dualism and by means of a turn to an ontological interpretation of Kant’s categorical imperative, it is argued that mankind has a responsibility to both coming generations and to the biosphere as a whole. Not only does this ontological shift from philosophy of mind to an ontology of man transcend dualism in philosophy, it throws a new critical light on the technological development and suggests a new way of considering man’s place in the cosmos.
This paper examines Hegel’s idea of nation and its significance for his theory of the modern stat... more This paper examines Hegel’s idea of nation and its significance for his theory of the modern state, namely, the role that ‘the national’ plays for his justification of right in the Philosophy of Right. It is argued that Hegel strikes a balance between historicism and a rational justification of state and law. He bases the state on a notion of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) that is both national and subjected to a world historical development toward rationality and universal right. Consequently, ‘nation,’ in the sense of a group of people invoking identity and rights based on a primordial common language, culture, and territory, does not cover what Hegel means by the modern nation state. ‘Ethical life’ is national, but it also constitutes a historically changeable community of values supported by citizens’ conscious participation in communal life (patriotism). Today, Hegel’s idea undermines the legitimacy of nationalistic invocations of primordial ethnic cultures within politics.
Peter Wolsing anlaegger i sit bidrag forskellige refleksioner omkring sprog, virkelighed og speku... more Peter Wolsing anlaegger i sit bidrag forskellige refleksioner omkring sprog, virkelighed og spekulativ taenkning i Hegels logik. Hensigten er udfra nedslag i Hegels logik at bestemme den spekulative tankeform som alt andet end los og vilkarlig, men som et anliggende der er funderet i rationel taenkning. Derefter pavises det hvorledes det i kraft af en analyse af sproget er muligt for Hegel at fremhaeve netop dette grundlaeggende spekulative traek i erkendelsen, og sluttelig tematiseres problemet omkring bevaegelsen indenfor horisonten af en sakaldt subjekt-objekt model.
[Extract from Introduction] The coherence of Kant’s socalled third Critique is ambiguous despite ... more [Extract from Introduction] The coherence of Kant’s socalled third Critique is ambiguous despite the task that Kant undertakes to solve in it. As the title suggests and Kant’s analyses show it is the aim of the work to determine the transcendental conditions of reflective judgment including the application of its principles on aesthetic and natural phenomena which do not fall under scientific investigations but which are still based on the cognitive powers of the mind. It is commonly agreed that an inner connection of the two parts of the work – the critique of aesthetic and teleological judgment respectively - is unlikely and that any attempt to argue that they form a unity is risque2. Despite its relation to the powers of cognition (imagination and understanding) the reflective judgment excersises its activity in two respects, namely in relation to aesthetic phenomena – the beauty of nature and of fines arts – and in relation to organic nature. These phenomena belong to strictly separate areas. Judgments about organic nature are teleological in the sense that they project a concept of purpose at the basis of the object for cognitive reasons; they aim at knowledge of how organic processes work. Against that, the aesthetic judgment is – Kant says – indifferent to the knowledge of its object; it concerns the beauty of the object just focusing on the object’s sensible form in so far as the judgment of this form occasions a feeling of delight in us. Whereas the teleological judgment thus claims to be objective (though Kant’s critique shows that it fails to be so), the aesthetic judgment expresses the subjective affection we experience via the judgment of the (aesthetically relevant) form of the object. It is this separation that I intend to question. I suggest that both aesthetic and teleological judgment respectively express ways of cognizing the world that do not exclude but rather supplement each other. More specifically, I argue that all through his third Critique Kant tries to keep separate what are really two different aspects of one and the same issue, namely the cognition of organic nature through a conceptual (scientific) and through a sensous (aesthetical) approach.
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