The existence of multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics appears to pose a serious challeng... more The existence of multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics appears to pose a serious challenge for knowledge claims about the quantum domain. Hoefer (2020) argues that a scientific realist epistemology must be abandoned in this context, while Callender (2020) argues that the realist's only option is to break the underdetermination between rival interpretations by appealing to extraempirical virtues. We develop a different response to the quantum underdetermination problem based on identifying statements about the unobservable which all the major ontic interpretations of quantum mechanics agree on. It is commonly believed that Everettian, Bohmian and GRW quantum mechanics share nothing but empirical content. We argue that, while they say very different things about the fundamental nature of quantum systems, they can be understood as agreeing on a plethora of more abstract theoretical claims. In our view, focusing on this descriptive overlap represents the most promising strategy for defending knowledge claims in the quantum domain. We close by considering how this overlap strategy relates to working posits formulations of scientific realism.
Astrobiology is a scientific endeavour involving great uncertainties. This could justify intellec... more Astrobiology is a scientific endeavour involving great uncertainties. This could justify intellectual risk-taking associated with research that significantly deviates from the mainstream, to explore new avenues. However, little is known regarding the effect of such maverick endeavours. To better understand the need for more or less risk in astrobiology, we investigate to what extent high-risk / high-impact research contributes to breakthrough results in the discipline. We gathered a sample of the most impactful astrobiology papers of the past 20 years and explored the degree of risk of the research projects behind these papers via contact with the corresponding authors. We carried out interviews to explore how attitudes towards risk have played out in their work, and to ascertain their opinions on risk-taking in astrobiology. We show the majority of the selected breakthrough results derive from endeavours considered medium- or high-risk, risk is significantly correlated with impact,...
Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theor... more Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) of Kirchhoff’s case is considered. The sole virtue of Kirchhoff’s theory of diffraction lies in its correct predictions and not in its false assumptions.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2009
This paper follows up a debate as to the consistency of Newtonian cosmology. Whereas Malament (19... more This paper follows up a debate as to the consistency of Newtonian cosmology. Whereas Malament (1995) has shown that Newtonian cosmology is not inconsistent, to date there has been no analysis of Norton's claim (1995) that Newtonian cosmology was inconsistent prior to certain advances in the 1930s, and in particular prior to Seeliger's seminal paper of 1895. In this paper I agree that there are assumptions, Newtonian and cosmological in character, and relevant to the real history of science, which are inconsistent. But there are some important corrections to make to Norton's account. Here I display for the first time the inconsistencies-four in total-in all their detail. Although this extra detail shows there to be several different inconsistencies, it also goes some way towards explaining why they went unnoticed for two hundred years.
Pluralist and eliminativist positions have proliferated within both science and philosophy of sci... more Pluralist and eliminativist positions have proliferated within both science and philosophy of science in recent decades. This paper asks the question why this shift of thinking has occurred, and where it is leading us. We provide an explanation which, if correct, entails that we should expect pluralism and eliminativism to transform other debates currently unaffected, and for good reasons. We then consider the question under what circumstances eliminativism will be appropriate, arguing that it depends not only on the term in question, but also on the context of discussion and details of the debate at hand. The resultant selective eliminativism is an appealing compromise for various 'pluralists' and 'eliminativists' who are currently locking horns.
One of the popular realist responses to the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) is the 'selective' m... more One of the popular realist responses to the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) is the 'selective' move, where a realist only commits to the 'working posits' of a successful theory, and withholds commitment to 'idle posits'. Antirealists often criticise selective realists for not being able to articulate exactly what is meant by 'working' and/or not being able to identify the working posits except in hindsight. This paper aims to establish two results: (i) sometimes a proposition is, in an important sense, 'doing work', and yet does not warrant realist commitment, and (ii) the realist will be able to respond to PMI-style historical challenges if she can merely show that certain selected posits do not require realist commitment (ignoring the question of which posits do). These two results act to significantly adjust the dialectic vis-à-vis PMI-style challenges to selective realism. 1 I follow the convention of using 'approximate truth' as shorthand for 'approximate truth or truth'.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2008
This paper follows up a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is inconsistent. Mathias F... more This paper follows up a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is inconsistent. Mathias Frisch makes the claim in Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-Locality ([2005]), but this has been quickly countered by Fred Muller ([2007]) and Gordon Belot ([2007]). Here I argue that both Muller and Belot fail to connect with the background assumptions which support Frisch's claim. Responding to Belot I explicate Frisch's position in more detail, before providing my own criticisms. Correcting Frisch's position, I find that I can present the theory in a way both authors can agree upon. Differences then manifest themselves purely within the reasoning methods employed.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2011
The ontological status of theories themselves has recently re-emerged as a live topic in the phil... more The ontological status of theories themselves has recently re-emerged as a live topic in the philosophy of science. We consider whether a recent approach within the philosophy of art can shed some light on this issue. For many years philosophers of aesthetics have debated a paradox in the (meta)ontology of musical works (eg. Levinson 1980). Taken individually, there are good reasons to accept each of the following three propositions: (i) musical works are created; (ii) musical works are abstract objects; (iii) abstract objects cannot be created. However it seems clear that, if one wants to avoid inconsistency, one cannot commit to all three. Following up recent developments courtesy of Cameron (2008a), we consider how one might respond to the corresponding set of propositions in the (meta)ontology of scientific theories.
Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 2009
The semantic approach to scientific representation is now long established as a favourite amongst... more The semantic approach to scientific representation is now long established as a favourite amongst philosophers of science. One of the foremost strains of this approach-the modeltheoretic approach (MTA)-is to represent scientific theories as families of models, all of which satisfy or 'make true' a given set of constraints. However some authors (Brown 2002, Frisch 2005) have criticised the approach on the grounds that certain scientific theories are logically inconsistent, and there can be no models of an inconsistent set of constraints. Thus it would seem that the MTA fails to represent inconsistent scientific theories at all, and this raises concerns about the way it represents in general. In a series of papers (1990, 1993, 1995) and a recent book (2003) da Costa and French have developed a variant of the MTA approach which they call 'partial structures', and which they claim can accommodate inconsistent theories. I assess this claim, looking to two theories which have been called 'inconsistent': Bohr's theory of the atom and classical electrodynamics. 1 Introduction 2 Partial structures and inconsistency 3 Application to scientific theories 3.1 Classical electrodynamics 3.2 Bohr's theory of the atom 4 Two concerns 4.1 Different types of inconsistent theory 4.2 When is a theory inconsistent? 5 Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________ '. This is made partially true by a structure with a domain of one element 'a', and an extension of P which puts 'a' in R 3 :
For many years—and with some energy since Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism” (1981)—the... more For many years—and with some energy since Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism” (1981)—the scientific realist has sought to accommodate examples of false-yet-successful theories in the history of science. One of the most prominent strategies is to identify ‘success fueling’ components of false theories that themselves are at least approximately true (judging by our current understanding). In this article I develop both sides of the debate, introducing new challenges from the history of science as well as suggesting adjustments to the divide et impera realist strategy. A new ‘recipe’ for the prospective identification of (at least some) working/idle posits is considered.
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, ... more The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
The philosopher of science faces overwhelming disagreement in the literature on the definition, n... more The philosopher of science faces overwhelming disagreement in the literature on the definition, nature, structure, ontology, and content of scientific theories. These disagreements are at least partly responsible for disagreements in many of the debates in the discipline which put weight on the concept scientific theory. I argue that available theories of theories and conceptual analyses of theory are ineffectual options for addressing this difficulty: they do not move debates forward in a significant way. Directing my attention to debates about the properties of particular, named theories, I introduce 'theory eliminativism' as a certain type of debate-reformulation. As a methodological tool it has the potential to be a highly effective way to make progress in the face of the noted problem: post-reformulation disagreements about theory cannot compromise the debate, and the questions that really matter can still be asked and answered. In addition the reformulation process demands that philosophers engage with science and the history of science in a more serious way than is usual in order to answer important questions about the justification for targeting a particular set of propositions (say) in a given context. All things considered, we should expect the benefits of a theory-eliminating debate-reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant number of debates of the relevant type.
The ubiquitous assertion that the early calculus of Newton and Leibniz was an inconsistent theory... more The ubiquitous assertion that the early calculus of Newton and Leibniz was an inconsistent theory is examined. Two different objects of a possible inconsistency claim are distinguished: (i) the calculus as an algorithm; (ii) proposed explanations of the moves made within the ...
On p. 10 of the 2018 National Academies Exoplanet Science Strategy document (NASEM 2018), ‘Expect... more On p. 10 of the 2018 National Academies Exoplanet Science Strategy document (NASEM 2018), ‘Expect the unexpected’ is described as a general principle of the exoplanet field. But for the next 150 pages, this principle is apparently forgotten, as strategy decisions are repeatedly put forward based on our expectations. This paper explores what exactly it might mean to ‘expect the unexpected’, and how this could possibly be achieved by the space science community. An analogy with financial investment strategies is considered, where a balanced portfolio of low/medium/high-risk investments is recommended. Whilst this kind of strategy would certainly be advisable in many scientific contexts (past and present), in certain contexts – especially exploratory science – a significant disanalogy needs to be factored in: financial investors cannot choose low-risk high-reward investments, but sometimes scientists can. The existence of low-risk high-impact projects in cutting-edge space science sign...
For several decades now philosophers have discussed apparent examples of internally inconsistent ... more For several decades now philosophers have discussed apparent examples of internally inconsistent scientific theories. However, there is still much controversy over how exactly we should conceive of scientific theories in the first place. Here I argue for a new approach, whereby all of the truly important questions about inconsistency in science can be asked and answered without disagreements about theories and theory-content getting in the way. Three examples commonly described as 'internally inconsistent theories' are analysed in the light of this approach. In the process, the question 'Is the theory inconsistent or not?' is identified as a bad, or at least unimportant, question.
Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics – those who spread doubt about science – often empl... more Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics – those who spread doubt about science – often employ a simple argument: scientists were sure in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Such sceptics draw on dramatic quotes from eminent scientists such as Lord Kelvin, who reportedly stated at the turn of the 20th century “There is nothing new to be discovered in physics now,” shortly before physics was dramatically transformed. They ask: given the history of science, wouldn’t it be naïve to think that current scientific theories reveal ‘the truth’, and will never be discarded in favour of other theories? Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against such potentially dangerous scepticism. It is argued that we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appe...
The existence of multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics appears to pose a serious challeng... more The existence of multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics appears to pose a serious challenge for knowledge claims about the quantum domain. Hoefer (2020) argues that a scientific realist epistemology must be abandoned in this context, while Callender (2020) argues that the realist's only option is to break the underdetermination between rival interpretations by appealing to extraempirical virtues. We develop a different response to the quantum underdetermination problem based on identifying statements about the unobservable which all the major ontic interpretations of quantum mechanics agree on. It is commonly believed that Everettian, Bohmian and GRW quantum mechanics share nothing but empirical content. We argue that, while they say very different things about the fundamental nature of quantum systems, they can be understood as agreeing on a plethora of more abstract theoretical claims. In our view, focusing on this descriptive overlap represents the most promising strategy for defending knowledge claims in the quantum domain. We close by considering how this overlap strategy relates to working posits formulations of scientific realism.
Astrobiology is a scientific endeavour involving great uncertainties. This could justify intellec... more Astrobiology is a scientific endeavour involving great uncertainties. This could justify intellectual risk-taking associated with research that significantly deviates from the mainstream, to explore new avenues. However, little is known regarding the effect of such maverick endeavours. To better understand the need for more or less risk in astrobiology, we investigate to what extent high-risk / high-impact research contributes to breakthrough results in the discipline. We gathered a sample of the most impactful astrobiology papers of the past 20 years and explored the degree of risk of the research projects behind these papers via contact with the corresponding authors. We carried out interviews to explore how attitudes towards risk have played out in their work, and to ascertain their opinions on risk-taking in astrobiology. We show the majority of the selected breakthrough results derive from endeavours considered medium- or high-risk, risk is significantly correlated with impact,...
Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theor... more Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) of Kirchhoff’s case is considered. The sole virtue of Kirchhoff’s theory of diffraction lies in its correct predictions and not in its false assumptions.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2009
This paper follows up a debate as to the consistency of Newtonian cosmology. Whereas Malament (19... more This paper follows up a debate as to the consistency of Newtonian cosmology. Whereas Malament (1995) has shown that Newtonian cosmology is not inconsistent, to date there has been no analysis of Norton's claim (1995) that Newtonian cosmology was inconsistent prior to certain advances in the 1930s, and in particular prior to Seeliger's seminal paper of 1895. In this paper I agree that there are assumptions, Newtonian and cosmological in character, and relevant to the real history of science, which are inconsistent. But there are some important corrections to make to Norton's account. Here I display for the first time the inconsistencies-four in total-in all their detail. Although this extra detail shows there to be several different inconsistencies, it also goes some way towards explaining why they went unnoticed for two hundred years.
Pluralist and eliminativist positions have proliferated within both science and philosophy of sci... more Pluralist and eliminativist positions have proliferated within both science and philosophy of science in recent decades. This paper asks the question why this shift of thinking has occurred, and where it is leading us. We provide an explanation which, if correct, entails that we should expect pluralism and eliminativism to transform other debates currently unaffected, and for good reasons. We then consider the question under what circumstances eliminativism will be appropriate, arguing that it depends not only on the term in question, but also on the context of discussion and details of the debate at hand. The resultant selective eliminativism is an appealing compromise for various 'pluralists' and 'eliminativists' who are currently locking horns.
One of the popular realist responses to the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) is the 'selective' m... more One of the popular realist responses to the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) is the 'selective' move, where a realist only commits to the 'working posits' of a successful theory, and withholds commitment to 'idle posits'. Antirealists often criticise selective realists for not being able to articulate exactly what is meant by 'working' and/or not being able to identify the working posits except in hindsight. This paper aims to establish two results: (i) sometimes a proposition is, in an important sense, 'doing work', and yet does not warrant realist commitment, and (ii) the realist will be able to respond to PMI-style historical challenges if she can merely show that certain selected posits do not require realist commitment (ignoring the question of which posits do). These two results act to significantly adjust the dialectic vis-à-vis PMI-style challenges to selective realism. 1 I follow the convention of using 'approximate truth' as shorthand for 'approximate truth or truth'.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2008
This paper follows up a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is inconsistent. Mathias F... more This paper follows up a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is inconsistent. Mathias Frisch makes the claim in Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-Locality ([2005]), but this has been quickly countered by Fred Muller ([2007]) and Gordon Belot ([2007]). Here I argue that both Muller and Belot fail to connect with the background assumptions which support Frisch's claim. Responding to Belot I explicate Frisch's position in more detail, before providing my own criticisms. Correcting Frisch's position, I find that I can present the theory in a way both authors can agree upon. Differences then manifest themselves purely within the reasoning methods employed.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2011
The ontological status of theories themselves has recently re-emerged as a live topic in the phil... more The ontological status of theories themselves has recently re-emerged as a live topic in the philosophy of science. We consider whether a recent approach within the philosophy of art can shed some light on this issue. For many years philosophers of aesthetics have debated a paradox in the (meta)ontology of musical works (eg. Levinson 1980). Taken individually, there are good reasons to accept each of the following three propositions: (i) musical works are created; (ii) musical works are abstract objects; (iii) abstract objects cannot be created. However it seems clear that, if one wants to avoid inconsistency, one cannot commit to all three. Following up recent developments courtesy of Cameron (2008a), we consider how one might respond to the corresponding set of propositions in the (meta)ontology of scientific theories.
Principia: an international journal of epistemology, 2009
The semantic approach to scientific representation is now long established as a favourite amongst... more The semantic approach to scientific representation is now long established as a favourite amongst philosophers of science. One of the foremost strains of this approach-the modeltheoretic approach (MTA)-is to represent scientific theories as families of models, all of which satisfy or 'make true' a given set of constraints. However some authors (Brown 2002, Frisch 2005) have criticised the approach on the grounds that certain scientific theories are logically inconsistent, and there can be no models of an inconsistent set of constraints. Thus it would seem that the MTA fails to represent inconsistent scientific theories at all, and this raises concerns about the way it represents in general. In a series of papers (1990, 1993, 1995) and a recent book (2003) da Costa and French have developed a variant of the MTA approach which they call 'partial structures', and which they claim can accommodate inconsistent theories. I assess this claim, looking to two theories which have been called 'inconsistent': Bohr's theory of the atom and classical electrodynamics. 1 Introduction 2 Partial structures and inconsistency 3 Application to scientific theories 3.1 Classical electrodynamics 3.2 Bohr's theory of the atom 4 Two concerns 4.1 Different types of inconsistent theory 4.2 When is a theory inconsistent? 5 Conclusion ____________________________________________________________________ '. This is made partially true by a structure with a domain of one element 'a', and an extension of P which puts 'a' in R 3 :
For many years—and with some energy since Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism” (1981)—the... more For many years—and with some energy since Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism” (1981)—the scientific realist has sought to accommodate examples of false-yet-successful theories in the history of science. One of the most prominent strategies is to identify ‘success fueling’ components of false theories that themselves are at least approximately true (judging by our current understanding). In this article I develop both sides of the debate, introducing new challenges from the history of science as well as suggesting adjustments to the divide et impera realist strategy. A new ‘recipe’ for the prospective identification of (at least some) working/idle posits is considered.
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, ... more The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
The philosopher of science faces overwhelming disagreement in the literature on the definition, n... more The philosopher of science faces overwhelming disagreement in the literature on the definition, nature, structure, ontology, and content of scientific theories. These disagreements are at least partly responsible for disagreements in many of the debates in the discipline which put weight on the concept scientific theory. I argue that available theories of theories and conceptual analyses of theory are ineffectual options for addressing this difficulty: they do not move debates forward in a significant way. Directing my attention to debates about the properties of particular, named theories, I introduce 'theory eliminativism' as a certain type of debate-reformulation. As a methodological tool it has the potential to be a highly effective way to make progress in the face of the noted problem: post-reformulation disagreements about theory cannot compromise the debate, and the questions that really matter can still be asked and answered. In addition the reformulation process demands that philosophers engage with science and the history of science in a more serious way than is usual in order to answer important questions about the justification for targeting a particular set of propositions (say) in a given context. All things considered, we should expect the benefits of a theory-eliminating debate-reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant number of debates of the relevant type.
The ubiquitous assertion that the early calculus of Newton and Leibniz was an inconsistent theory... more The ubiquitous assertion that the early calculus of Newton and Leibniz was an inconsistent theory is examined. Two different objects of a possible inconsistency claim are distinguished: (i) the calculus as an algorithm; (ii) proposed explanations of the moves made within the ...
On p. 10 of the 2018 National Academies Exoplanet Science Strategy document (NASEM 2018), ‘Expect... more On p. 10 of the 2018 National Academies Exoplanet Science Strategy document (NASEM 2018), ‘Expect the unexpected’ is described as a general principle of the exoplanet field. But for the next 150 pages, this principle is apparently forgotten, as strategy decisions are repeatedly put forward based on our expectations. This paper explores what exactly it might mean to ‘expect the unexpected’, and how this could possibly be achieved by the space science community. An analogy with financial investment strategies is considered, where a balanced portfolio of low/medium/high-risk investments is recommended. Whilst this kind of strategy would certainly be advisable in many scientific contexts (past and present), in certain contexts – especially exploratory science – a significant disanalogy needs to be factored in: financial investors cannot choose low-risk high-reward investments, but sometimes scientists can. The existence of low-risk high-impact projects in cutting-edge space science sign...
For several decades now philosophers have discussed apparent examples of internally inconsistent ... more For several decades now philosophers have discussed apparent examples of internally inconsistent scientific theories. However, there is still much controversy over how exactly we should conceive of scientific theories in the first place. Here I argue for a new approach, whereby all of the truly important questions about inconsistency in science can be asked and answered without disagreements about theories and theory-content getting in the way. Three examples commonly described as 'internally inconsistent theories' are analysed in the light of this approach. In the process, the question 'Is the theory inconsistent or not?' is identified as a bad, or at least unimportant, question.
Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics – those who spread doubt about science – often empl... more Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics – those who spread doubt about science – often employ a simple argument: scientists were sure in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Such sceptics draw on dramatic quotes from eminent scientists such as Lord Kelvin, who reportedly stated at the turn of the 20th century “There is nothing new to be discovered in physics now,” shortly before physics was dramatically transformed. They ask: given the history of science, wouldn’t it be naïve to think that current scientific theories reveal ‘the truth’, and will never be discarded in favour of other theories? Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against such potentially dangerous scepticism. It is argued that we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appe...
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