Ontology, despite the relative newness of its name, goes back to Aristotle's principal definition... more Ontology, despite the relative newness of its name, goes back to Aristotle's principal definition of metaphysics as the science of being as being. Christian Wolff divided metaphysics into ontology or general metaphysics on the one hand and three branches of just slightly less general special metaphysics on the other. Husserl renamed the two sides as formal ontology (general) versus regional ontologies (special), while Donald Williams called the former analytic ontology and the latter speculative cosmology. Amid this terminological plethora it is sensible to stay with ontology as the name for the general part. But as the most general part of the most general discipline, how could ontology ever be useful? To see how useful it indeed is when understood sensibly and deployed as a general framework for database ontologies, it suffices to look at Barry Smith's work, not only
Philosophy and Engineering: Reflections on Practice, Principles and Process, 2013
We survey mereology, the ontological treatment of part and whole, distinguishing its uncontrovers... more We survey mereology, the ontological treatment of part and whole, distinguishing its uncontroversial from its controversial principles and lamenting the excesses to which too great an attraction to formal simplicity leads ontologists. As a partial remedy we recommend greater occupation with the range and variety of uses of the concept 'part' in engineering, where artefact parts and their confi gurations are of vital concern. We highlight some of the major linguistic and conceptual diffi culties surrounding the concept of part, and distinguish several more specifi c concepts of part, noting how distinctive enumeration of artefact parts at different phases in their life-cycle leads to the problem of multiple bills of materials. A related and important concept in engineering and elsewhere is that of a material feature. We discuss this and its partial affi nity with the part concept.
Marking the Centenary of Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and Deity, 2021
Metaphysics, as distinguished from particular sciences, may be regarded as an attempt to describe... more Metaphysics, as distinguished from particular sciences, may be regarded as an attempt to describe the ultimate nature of existence and the pervading or pervasive characters of things.-Alexander 1912, 5 1 Book II Samuel Alexander's Space, Time, and Deity (STD) is a long work: 856 pages of main text spread over two volumes. Each volume comprises two Books, and the second Book of Volume I is called "The Categories." It runs to 164 pages, which is unusually long. There are longer treatments of categories in ontological treatises, for example by Nicolai Hartmann and Reinhardt Grossmann, but not many. Nor, though Alexander's style tends at times to the discursive and leisurely, is there much superfluous material, though most of the allusions to other philosophers are dispensable from a modern perspective. Naturally enough, the discussion presupposes Alexander's treatment of space-time from Book I. Of this, we need to only
In the twentieth century three approaches to modality dominated. One denied its legitimacy (Russe... more In the twentieth century three approaches to modality dominated. One denied its legitimacy (Russell, Quine). A second made language the source of modality (Carnap). The third treats possible worlds as the source of truth for modal propositions (Kripke, Lewis et al.) Meinong’s account of modality is quite different from all of these. Like the last it has an ontological basis, but it eschews worlds in favour of a rich oneworld ontology of objects and states of affairs, many of which notoriously fail to exist and some even more notoriously fail to be possible. We lay out the ontological basis of Meinong’s system and show how he accommodates standard modal notions. Two peculiarities of his system are investigated: his preference of possibility over necessity, and his treatment of degrees of possibility, which allows him to subsume probability theory in his account.
Background: Grenon and Smith (2004) propose a framework for the ontology of things in space and t... more Background: Grenon and Smith (2004) propose a framework for the ontology of things in space and time involving and invoking the distinction between continuants and occurrents, which has become a key element of Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). The terminology of SNAP (from "snapshot:" state of a continuant at a time) and SPAN (how an occurrent develops over an interval or timespan) occurs in that paper's title. While any commonsense ontology will have a place for both continuants and occurrents, there is much room for philosophical debate on whether one of them is more basic than the other, or can be reduced to the other, or whether they are equally fundamental, or whether they are two different perspectives on the same reality. Grenon and Smith opt for the last of these. They call the accounts of continuants (SNAP) and occurrents (SPAN) both "ontologies. " They do not have a single ontology of all that is in space and time. This dialog throws a few of the common arguments around a bit and comes to no sure conclusion. But one of the characters bears a faint resemblance to a certain Buffalonian philosopher. Abstract, Grenon and Smith (2004): We propose a modular ontology of the dynamic features of reality. This amounts, on the one hand, to a purely spatial ontology supporting snapshot views of the world at successive instants of time and, on the other hand, to a purely spatiotemporal ontology of change and process. We argue that dynamic spatial ontology brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
Many mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are entitled to ask why they are true... more Many mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are entitled to ask why they are true. One frequently given type of answer to such questions evokes truth-makers, that is, entities in virtue of whose existence the propositions in question are true. However, even without endorsing the extreme view that all contingent propositions have truth-makers, it turns out to be puzzlingly hard to provide intuitively convincing candidate truth-makers for even a core class of basic mereological propositions. Part of the problem is that the relation of part to whole is ontologically intimate in a way reminiscent of identity. Such intimacy bespeaks a formal or internal relation, which typically requires no truth-makers beyond its terms. But truth-makers are held to necessitate their truths, so whence the contingency when A is part of B but need not be, or B need not have A as part? This paper addresses and attempts to disentangle the conundrum.
In any field of research, especially a new one, the first step to philosophical groundedness is a... more In any field of research, especially a new one, the first step to philosophical groundedness is an ontology, a structured inventory of the objects of the field and an account of their principal kinds, interrelations and modes of operation. In respect to the emergence of new media, the two obvious places to begin are with the media themselves and with emergence. The concept of emergence was developed in the 19th century in connection with debates about the status of life and mind, and has been pursued with renewed vigor in recent years. While there are different varieties of emergence, and some inevitable debate about details, emergence is philosophically fairly well understood and we shall return to it at the end. By contrast the more specific notion of a medium and the taxonomy of the various media is less well defined and correspondingly its ontology is in need of more work. It is with this that we shall start, taking our philosophical cue from ideas in the ontology of objects in ...
In a recent article, Herbert Hochberg portrays my ontological position, that of a trope nominalis... more In a recent article, Herbert Hochberg portrays my ontological position, that of a trope nominalist who is sceptical about relational tropes, as deviating into idealism. Since there are few philosophical views I find more repugnant than idealism, I must either resist the accusation or recant. I choose to resist, by showing how relational tropes are not needed as truth-makers for a wide range of truths, and raising the real possibility that they may not be needed at all, without lapsing into either monism or idealism.
Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I a... more Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I argue that they are neither occurrents nor easily replaceable by them. The worst problem for continuants is the question in virtue of what a given continuant exists at a given time. For such truthmakers we must have recourse to occurrents, those vital to the continuant at that time. Continuants are, like abstract objects, invariants under equivalences over occurrents. But they are not abstract, and their being invariants enables us to infer both their lack of temporal parts and that non-invariant predications about them must be relativized to times.
Many mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are entitled to ask why they are true... more Many mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are entitled to ask why they are true. One frequently given type of answer to such questions evokes truth-makers, that is, entities in virtue of whose existence the propositions in question are true. However, even without endorsing the extreme view that all contingent propositions have truth-makers, it turns out to be puzzlingly hard to provide intuitively convincing candidate truth-makers for even a core class of basic mereological propositions. Part of the problem is that the relation of part to whole is ontologically intimate in a way reminiscent of identity. Such intimacy bespeaks a formal or internal relation, which typically requires no truth-makers beyond its terms. But truth-makers are held to necessitate their truths, so whence the contingency when A is part of B but need not be, or B need not have A as part? This paper addresses and attempts to disentangle the conundrum.
Wittgenstein's Tractatus still harbours valuable lessons for contemporary philosophy, but which o... more Wittgenstein's Tractatus still harbours valuable lessons for contemporary philosophy, but which ones? Wittgenstein's long list of things we cannot speak about is set aside, but his insistence that the logical constants do not represent is retained, as is the absolute distinction between names and sentences. We preserve his atomism of elementary sentences but discard the atomism of simple objects in states of affairs. The fundamental harmony between language and the world is rejected: it is the source of much that is wrong in the Tractatus. What remains is a clarified role for items in making elementary sentences true.
The most famous achievement of Jan Łukasiewicz (1878–1956) was to give the first rigorous formula... more The most famous achievement of Jan Łukasiewicz (1878–1956) was to give the first rigorous formulation of many-valued logic. In this paper I discuss his motivations for this, which were philosophical, and the legacy of his work.
Salzburg [W]hen we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone,... more Salzburg [W]hen we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone, etc. though the Idea, we have of either of them, be but the Complication, or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities, which Ae find united in the thing called Horse or Stone, yet because we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; which Support we denote by the name Substance, though it be certain, we have no clear, or distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support.
Dans cet article, l’auteur présente la théorie bolzanienne du nombre. Il établit, sur la base d’u... more Dans cet article, l’auteur présente la théorie bolzanienne du nombre. Il établit, sur la base d’une comparaison avec Frege, que la conception bolzanienne rencontre toutes les exigences d’une telle théorie tout en présentant plusieurs traits originaux, comme par exemple le fait qu’elle s’articule sur la base d’une théorie des « collections » (Inbegriffe), qui lui confèrent un intérêt philosophique certain. Tout en indiquant au passage un problème inhérent à la notion bolzanienne de Reihe, l’auteur présente la conception bolzanienne des nombres naturels, reconstruit sa théorie des nombres abstraits et montre comment Bolzano est en mesure d’établir le lien entre ces derniers et leur application aux ensembles concrets d’objets.
In mathematics, like in everything else, it is the Darwinian struggle for life of ideas that lead... more In mathematics, like in everything else, it is the Darwinian struggle for life of ideas that leads to the survival of the concepts which we actually use, often believed to have come to us fully armed with goodness from some mysterious Platonic repository of truths.
When first reading Husserl's Logical Invesligationsit is very e<lsy to pass by the third as a min... more When first reading Husserl's Logical Invesligationsit is very e<lsy to pass by the third as a minor detour from the high road of Husserl's major concerns. In common with many other readers, I initially held this view: the many distinctions Husserl makes seemed to me to be, to use his own words about Twardowski, 'as subtle as they are queer'. To anyone accustomed only to the extensional whole-part theories of Lesniewski or Goodman this is a natural reaction. My change of view was influenced partly by Kevin Mulligan's insistence on the pivotal role of the third investigation in Husserl's work, and also by the increasing recognition of the themes of unity, dependence and self-sufficiency treated by Husserl, as concepts echoing loudly throughout the history of ontology. It was also Kevin Mulligan who unearthed Ginsberg's 1929 article on Husserl's six theorems, and discontent with her criticisms spurred me to attempt a formalised reconstruction of Husserl's ideas, which met with various difficulties on the way to the first of these essays. At the same time I was attempting to use mereological considerations to offer an alternative to what I consider the unacceptable account of number put forward by Frege, using Schroderian and Husserlian ideas suggested to me by Barry Smith. My original view was that numbers are properties of what I then called manifolds, i.e. aggregates considered as composed in some determinate way. This is what I should now call a group or aggregate theory of number. In the second essay I present the considerations which forced me to abandon such a view and to recognise the distinctive nature of pluralities as against aggregated individuals. This in turn led me to reappraise the notions of reference and set, with the result seen in the third essay, where a fonnal theory of mani-III folds, now reconstrued as comprising both individuals and pluralities, is developed. Some manifolds are aggregable: to such aggregates mereological considerations still apply. These issues are dealt with in the second essay, where the opposition to Frege is also explicitly set out. At each tum I found voices of encouragement from the past, some from unexpected quarters. Hearkening to these has convinced me that the logical and philosophical harvest of the fecund years between Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetik in 1891 and Russell's Principles of Mathematics in 1903 is yet far from being reaped in full.
Ontology, despite the relative newness of its name, goes back to Aristotle's principal definition... more Ontology, despite the relative newness of its name, goes back to Aristotle's principal definition of metaphysics as the science of being as being. Christian Wolff divided metaphysics into ontology or general metaphysics on the one hand and three branches of just slightly less general special metaphysics on the other. Husserl renamed the two sides as formal ontology (general) versus regional ontologies (special), while Donald Williams called the former analytic ontology and the latter speculative cosmology. Amid this terminological plethora it is sensible to stay with ontology as the name for the general part. But as the most general part of the most general discipline, how could ontology ever be useful? To see how useful it indeed is when understood sensibly and deployed as a general framework for database ontologies, it suffices to look at Barry Smith's work, not only
Philosophy and Engineering: Reflections on Practice, Principles and Process, 2013
We survey mereology, the ontological treatment of part and whole, distinguishing its uncontrovers... more We survey mereology, the ontological treatment of part and whole, distinguishing its uncontroversial from its controversial principles and lamenting the excesses to which too great an attraction to formal simplicity leads ontologists. As a partial remedy we recommend greater occupation with the range and variety of uses of the concept 'part' in engineering, where artefact parts and their confi gurations are of vital concern. We highlight some of the major linguistic and conceptual diffi culties surrounding the concept of part, and distinguish several more specifi c concepts of part, noting how distinctive enumeration of artefact parts at different phases in their life-cycle leads to the problem of multiple bills of materials. A related and important concept in engineering and elsewhere is that of a material feature. We discuss this and its partial affi nity with the part concept.
Marking the Centenary of Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and Deity, 2021
Metaphysics, as distinguished from particular sciences, may be regarded as an attempt to describe... more Metaphysics, as distinguished from particular sciences, may be regarded as an attempt to describe the ultimate nature of existence and the pervading or pervasive characters of things.-Alexander 1912, 5 1 Book II Samuel Alexander's Space, Time, and Deity (STD) is a long work: 856 pages of main text spread over two volumes. Each volume comprises two Books, and the second Book of Volume I is called "The Categories." It runs to 164 pages, which is unusually long. There are longer treatments of categories in ontological treatises, for example by Nicolai Hartmann and Reinhardt Grossmann, but not many. Nor, though Alexander's style tends at times to the discursive and leisurely, is there much superfluous material, though most of the allusions to other philosophers are dispensable from a modern perspective. Naturally enough, the discussion presupposes Alexander's treatment of space-time from Book I. Of this, we need to only
In the twentieth century three approaches to modality dominated. One denied its legitimacy (Russe... more In the twentieth century three approaches to modality dominated. One denied its legitimacy (Russell, Quine). A second made language the source of modality (Carnap). The third treats possible worlds as the source of truth for modal propositions (Kripke, Lewis et al.) Meinong’s account of modality is quite different from all of these. Like the last it has an ontological basis, but it eschews worlds in favour of a rich oneworld ontology of objects and states of affairs, many of which notoriously fail to exist and some even more notoriously fail to be possible. We lay out the ontological basis of Meinong’s system and show how he accommodates standard modal notions. Two peculiarities of his system are investigated: his preference of possibility over necessity, and his treatment of degrees of possibility, which allows him to subsume probability theory in his account.
Background: Grenon and Smith (2004) propose a framework for the ontology of things in space and t... more Background: Grenon and Smith (2004) propose a framework for the ontology of things in space and time involving and invoking the distinction between continuants and occurrents, which has become a key element of Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). The terminology of SNAP (from "snapshot:" state of a continuant at a time) and SPAN (how an occurrent develops over an interval or timespan) occurs in that paper's title. While any commonsense ontology will have a place for both continuants and occurrents, there is much room for philosophical debate on whether one of them is more basic than the other, or can be reduced to the other, or whether they are equally fundamental, or whether they are two different perspectives on the same reality. Grenon and Smith opt for the last of these. They call the accounts of continuants (SNAP) and occurrents (SPAN) both "ontologies. " They do not have a single ontology of all that is in space and time. This dialog throws a few of the common arguments around a bit and comes to no sure conclusion. But one of the characters bears a faint resemblance to a certain Buffalonian philosopher. Abstract, Grenon and Smith (2004): We propose a modular ontology of the dynamic features of reality. This amounts, on the one hand, to a purely spatial ontology supporting snapshot views of the world at successive instants of time and, on the other hand, to a purely spatiotemporal ontology of change and process. We argue that dynamic spatial ontology brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
Many mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are entitled to ask why they are true... more Many mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are entitled to ask why they are true. One frequently given type of answer to such questions evokes truth-makers, that is, entities in virtue of whose existence the propositions in question are true. However, even without endorsing the extreme view that all contingent propositions have truth-makers, it turns out to be puzzlingly hard to provide intuitively convincing candidate truth-makers for even a core class of basic mereological propositions. Part of the problem is that the relation of part to whole is ontologically intimate in a way reminiscent of identity. Such intimacy bespeaks a formal or internal relation, which typically requires no truth-makers beyond its terms. But truth-makers are held to necessitate their truths, so whence the contingency when A is part of B but need not be, or B need not have A as part? This paper addresses and attempts to disentangle the conundrum.
In any field of research, especially a new one, the first step to philosophical groundedness is a... more In any field of research, especially a new one, the first step to philosophical groundedness is an ontology, a structured inventory of the objects of the field and an account of their principal kinds, interrelations and modes of operation. In respect to the emergence of new media, the two obvious places to begin are with the media themselves and with emergence. The concept of emergence was developed in the 19th century in connection with debates about the status of life and mind, and has been pursued with renewed vigor in recent years. While there are different varieties of emergence, and some inevitable debate about details, emergence is philosophically fairly well understood and we shall return to it at the end. By contrast the more specific notion of a medium and the taxonomy of the various media is less well defined and correspondingly its ontology is in need of more work. It is with this that we shall start, taking our philosophical cue from ideas in the ontology of objects in ...
In a recent article, Herbert Hochberg portrays my ontological position, that of a trope nominalis... more In a recent article, Herbert Hochberg portrays my ontological position, that of a trope nominalist who is sceptical about relational tropes, as deviating into idealism. Since there are few philosophical views I find more repugnant than idealism, I must either resist the accusation or recant. I choose to resist, by showing how relational tropes are not needed as truth-makers for a wide range of truths, and raising the real possibility that they may not be needed at all, without lapsing into either monism or idealism.
Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I a... more Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I argue that they are neither occurrents nor easily replaceable by them. The worst problem for continuants is the question in virtue of what a given continuant exists at a given time. For such truthmakers we must have recourse to occurrents, those vital to the continuant at that time. Continuants are, like abstract objects, invariants under equivalences over occurrents. But they are not abstract, and their being invariants enables us to infer both their lack of temporal parts and that non-invariant predications about them must be relativized to times.
Many mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are entitled to ask why they are true... more Many mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are entitled to ask why they are true. One frequently given type of answer to such questions evokes truth-makers, that is, entities in virtue of whose existence the propositions in question are true. However, even without endorsing the extreme view that all contingent propositions have truth-makers, it turns out to be puzzlingly hard to provide intuitively convincing candidate truth-makers for even a core class of basic mereological propositions. Part of the problem is that the relation of part to whole is ontologically intimate in a way reminiscent of identity. Such intimacy bespeaks a formal or internal relation, which typically requires no truth-makers beyond its terms. But truth-makers are held to necessitate their truths, so whence the contingency when A is part of B but need not be, or B need not have A as part? This paper addresses and attempts to disentangle the conundrum.
Wittgenstein's Tractatus still harbours valuable lessons for contemporary philosophy, but which o... more Wittgenstein's Tractatus still harbours valuable lessons for contemporary philosophy, but which ones? Wittgenstein's long list of things we cannot speak about is set aside, but his insistence that the logical constants do not represent is retained, as is the absolute distinction between names and sentences. We preserve his atomism of elementary sentences but discard the atomism of simple objects in states of affairs. The fundamental harmony between language and the world is rejected: it is the source of much that is wrong in the Tractatus. What remains is a clarified role for items in making elementary sentences true.
The most famous achievement of Jan Łukasiewicz (1878–1956) was to give the first rigorous formula... more The most famous achievement of Jan Łukasiewicz (1878–1956) was to give the first rigorous formulation of many-valued logic. In this paper I discuss his motivations for this, which were philosophical, and the legacy of his work.
Salzburg [W]hen we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone,... more Salzburg [W]hen we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone, etc. though the Idea, we have of either of them, be but the Complication, or Collection of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities, which Ae find united in the thing called Horse or Stone, yet because we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; which Support we denote by the name Substance, though it be certain, we have no clear, or distinct Idea of that thing we suppose a Support.
Dans cet article, l’auteur présente la théorie bolzanienne du nombre. Il établit, sur la base d’u... more Dans cet article, l’auteur présente la théorie bolzanienne du nombre. Il établit, sur la base d’une comparaison avec Frege, que la conception bolzanienne rencontre toutes les exigences d’une telle théorie tout en présentant plusieurs traits originaux, comme par exemple le fait qu’elle s’articule sur la base d’une théorie des « collections » (Inbegriffe), qui lui confèrent un intérêt philosophique certain. Tout en indiquant au passage un problème inhérent à la notion bolzanienne de Reihe, l’auteur présente la conception bolzanienne des nombres naturels, reconstruit sa théorie des nombres abstraits et montre comment Bolzano est en mesure d’établir le lien entre ces derniers et leur application aux ensembles concrets d’objets.
In mathematics, like in everything else, it is the Darwinian struggle for life of ideas that lead... more In mathematics, like in everything else, it is the Darwinian struggle for life of ideas that leads to the survival of the concepts which we actually use, often believed to have come to us fully armed with goodness from some mysterious Platonic repository of truths.
When first reading Husserl's Logical Invesligationsit is very e<lsy to pass by the third as a min... more When first reading Husserl's Logical Invesligationsit is very e<lsy to pass by the third as a minor detour from the high road of Husserl's major concerns. In common with many other readers, I initially held this view: the many distinctions Husserl makes seemed to me to be, to use his own words about Twardowski, 'as subtle as they are queer'. To anyone accustomed only to the extensional whole-part theories of Lesniewski or Goodman this is a natural reaction. My change of view was influenced partly by Kevin Mulligan's insistence on the pivotal role of the third investigation in Husserl's work, and also by the increasing recognition of the themes of unity, dependence and self-sufficiency treated by Husserl, as concepts echoing loudly throughout the history of ontology. It was also Kevin Mulligan who unearthed Ginsberg's 1929 article on Husserl's six theorems, and discontent with her criticisms spurred me to attempt a formalised reconstruction of Husserl's ideas, which met with various difficulties on the way to the first of these essays. At the same time I was attempting to use mereological considerations to offer an alternative to what I consider the unacceptable account of number put forward by Frege, using Schroderian and Husserlian ideas suggested to me by Barry Smith. My original view was that numbers are properties of what I then called manifolds, i.e. aggregates considered as composed in some determinate way. This is what I should now call a group or aggregate theory of number. In the second essay I present the considerations which forced me to abandon such a view and to recognise the distinctive nature of pluralities as against aggregated individuals. This in turn led me to reappraise the notions of reference and set, with the result seen in the third essay, where a fonnal theory of mani-III folds, now reconstrued as comprising both individuals and pluralities, is developed. Some manifolds are aggregable: to such aggregates mereological considerations still apply. These issues are dealt with in the second essay, where the opposition to Frege is also explicitly set out. At each tum I found voices of encouragement from the past, some from unexpected quarters. Hearkening to these has convinced me that the logical and philosophical harvest of the fecund years between Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetik in 1891 and Russell's Principles of Mathematics in 1903 is yet far from being reaped in full.
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