Papers by Paul Gerard Horrigan
Occorre notare che la distinzione tra scienze descrittive e scienze esplicative non è da intender... more Occorre notare che la distinzione tra scienze descrittive e scienze esplicative non è da intendersi in senso di contrapposizione assoluta. Non si dà infatti analisi scientifica che mentre descrive la realtà non ne offra una qualche comprensione. Reciprocamente non vi è sapere che possa pervenire alla comprensione del proprio oggetto senza inglobare un momento descrittivo. 15 A. ALESSI, op. cit.,
Philosophy of Knowledge and Gnoseology. Various names have been given for the philosophical study... more Philosophy of Knowledge and Gnoseology. Various names have been given for the philosophical study of knowledge, names chosen as titles for manuals dealing with the theoretical philosophical science of human knowledge. The names "Philosophy of Knowledge" 1 and "Gnoseology" (from the Greek word γνῶσις, "from the Greek gnōsis, meaning knowledge in a quite general sense" 2 ) are very good titles for manuals dealing with the philosophy of knowledge since they are terms broad enough to embrace the whole sphere of philosophical questions regarding human knowledge. "Nel Novecento si è parlato di 'gnoseologia' (neologismo formato con il sostantivo greco gnosis = conoscenza), per indicare una disciplina che metteva a fuoco per la prima volta direttamente i processi conoscitivi, separandosi dalla psicologia e dall'antropologia." 3 "Gnoseology" was popularized in Italy by Giuseppe Zamboni
Hume's Determinism. Regarding the question as to whether we have free-will or not, which is exami... more Hume's Determinism. Regarding the question as to whether we have free-will or not, which is examined both in the 1739-1740 A Treatise of Human Nature (II, 3, 1 and 2) and in section VIII of his later Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding (first published in London, 1748, this title being changed in 1756 to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and kept in subsequent editions), David Hume (1711-1776) is firmly in the camp of determinism 1 (also called necessitarianism, which affirms that, in the final analysis, we have no free-will). Norman Kemp Smith states in his influential study The Philosophy of David Hume (1941): "Hume's Strict and Consistent Adherence to Necessitarian Thinking. Hume adheres, without qualification, to the necessitarian standpoint. Causal necessitation rules, he maintains, as rigorously in the psychical as in the physical domain." 2 Concerning Hume's peculiar description of the human will, Copleston writes: "Hume speaks of the will as one of the immediate effects of pleasure and pain. It is not, however, properly speaking, a passion. He describes it as 'the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind.' 3 " 4 Describing Hume's determinist position on free-will, Copleston writes: "According to Hume, the union between motive and action possesses the same constancy which we observe between cause and effect in physical operations. Further, this constancy influences the understanding in the same way that constant conjunction in physical operations influences the understanding, namely, by 'determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another.' 5 In fact, there is no known circumstance which enters into the production of purely material operations which is not also found in volition. Hence we have no good reason for attributing necessity to the former and denying it of the latter. True, human action often appears uncertain. Yet the more our knowledge is increased, the clearer become the connections between character, motive and choice. In any case we have no adequate reason for supposing that there is a privileged sphere of freedom, where necessary connection is wanting. "It is important to note that for Hume, as for some modern empiricists, absence of necessity spells chance, so that to assert liberty of indifference is to say that human choices are uncaused and are due simply to chance. 'According to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently liberty, by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing with chance. As chance is commonly thought to imply a contradiction, and is at least directly contrary to experience, there are always the same arguments against liberty or free will.' 6 It will be remembered that Hume recognized only one type of causal relation, in which constant conjunction forms the objective element and necessary connection the subjectively contributed element. Once given this restricted view of causality, it
Critique of Hegel's Rejection of the Objective Validity of the Principle of Non-Contradiction in ... more Critique of Hegel's Rejection of the Objective Validity of the Principle of Non-Contradiction in the Real Order (the Order of Being or Ontological Order) as Supreme Law of Being Defended by Actus Essendi Realist Metaphysics. Purely Indeterminate Being. For the absolute idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), the starting point of knowledge is purely indeterminate being, being as the indeterminate immediate or immediate indeterminate. 1 He describes his purely indeterminate being understood as pure objectivity, the most abstract and general idea of an object, as follows: "This simple immediacy is, in consequence, pure being. And just as pure knowledge should signify no more than knowledge as such, likewise pure being should not signify more than being in general: being, nothing more, with no other determinations or complements." 2 Such is being's emptiness that Hegel states that this being as mere object is, in fact, nothing. He writes in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline: "This being is pure abstraction and, therefore, is the absolutely negative which, also taken immediately, is nothingness." 3 In his Science of Logic, Hegel states: "…in this first stage, it can be affirmed that pure being and pure nothingness are the same." 4 Étienne Gilson writes that, for Hegel, "taken in itself, being is the immediate indetermination, that is to say, not that already determined indetermination which comes before a further determination, but absolute indetermination. Being is the indetermination which precedes all determinations. And that total indetermination is the very stuff which being is. How can it be grasped by thought? Since being is totally abstract, it cannot be perceived by any sensation; and, since it is completely void of content, it cannot become an object of any representation or of any intellectual intuition. Being is not even essence, for essence as such already entails many additional determinations of being. Now, if being is not perceived, nor represented, nor intuited, and yet is known, only one hypothesis still remains to be made about it, namely, that being is identical with thought. To think is to think being, or, if it seems clearer that way, being is thought when thought takes itself for its own object. This is why it can be said that the beginning of philosophy coincides with the beginning of the history of philosophy, for that history actually begins with Parmenides. By positing being as the absolute substance, Parmenides identified absolute reality with pure thought, which itself is thought about being ; and for us, too, who after so many centuries are recommencing the ever-present experiment of Parmenides, to think being simply and solely is to think simply and solely. Let us now proceed a little farther. This being, which is completely void of all determinations, is thereby absolute emptiness. Whatever else could be ascribed to it, we should have to deny it. In other words, since it is neither this nor that nor any other thing, it is nothing. Nothing is the absolute negative taken in its immediateness. That is, 'nothing' is not a relative negation, such as those which presuppose some preceding affirmation (a is not b); it is that negation which comes before any other negation. If it seems scandalous to say that being is nothingness, this is merely because we fail to realize that, since there is nothing which being is, being is nothing. Pure being and pure non-being are one, and no wonder, since 'these two 10
pages 530-537 (as regards the contemporary philosophy part [e.g., the section on analytic philoso... more pages 530-537 (as regards the contemporary philosophy part [e.g., the section on analytic philosophy] as well as the bibliography section), and in many places modified, with a number of difficult terms and phrases of Fabro's given clarification and explanation, as well as new additions given, like the positions of Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson on knowledge of esse that both contrast with the position of Fabro and his resolutio method with regard to knowledge of esse as actus essendi (which, together with essentia as the potentia essendi, are metaphysical principles of the finite being [ens]). 1 In pages 534-535, Fabro and Michele Paolini Paoletti write concerning intensive esse: "In the synthesis of esse and essentia that is ens, esse is the principle of actuality on two distinct levels. In the predicamental sense, esse is the activation of the essence, which itself is related to esse as potency (De Potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9). In the transcendental sense, to the extent that any other act or perfection presupposes and is founded on esse, the latter is the actualization of every act and the perfection of all perfections (
Being (ens) is that which is (ens est id quod est 1), that which has the act of being (quod habet... more Being (ens) is that which is (ens est id quod est 1), that which has the act of being (quod habet esse 2), that which participates in esse (quod participat esse 3). The principal element of a being (ens) is its act of being (esse as actus essendi). While essence (essentia) is that which makes a thing to be what it is (e.g., a cat, an owl, a horse, a shark), the act of being (esse as actus essendi) is that which makes a thing to be. Essence (essentia) is that by which a thing is what it is, whereas the act of being (esse as actus essendi) is that by which a thing is. The act of being (esse) is the actuality of all acts and therefore the perfection of all perfections («esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum» 4). Analogy Equivocal Terms. Equivocal terms are terms used with entirely different meanings. In univocal terms the same term, in at least two occurrences of the term, has meanings completely different from one another. Examples of equivocal terms: 1. "Pen" as in the writing instrument, that is, an implement for writing or drawing with ink or some similar fluid, and "pen," a small enclosure for animals (e.g., a pig pen) ; 2. "Bill" as in a statement of money owed for goods or services supplied, and "bill" as in the parts of a bird's jaws covered with a horny sheath ; and 3. "Seal" an emblem or figure used as evidence of authenticity, and "seal" the sea mammal that feeds on fish and has limbs reduced to flippers. The Angelic Doctor writes: "In the case of equivocity the same term is predicated of various things with an entirely different meaning. This is clear in the case of the term dog (canis), inasmuch as it is predicated both of a constellation and of a certain species of animal." 5 Univocal Terms. A term is univocal if it signifies exactly the same concept, or essence, in (at least) two occurrences of the term. Univocal terms have one and only one meaning. They are constantly used in an identical sense. For example, when I say "A dog is an animal," and "A cat is an animal," "animal" in both propositions is univocal. Aquinas writes: "In the case of univocity one term is predicated of different things with absolutely one and the same meaning; for example, the term animal, which is predicated of a horse and of an ox, signifies a living, sensory substance." 6 Analogical Terms. Analogical terms, concepts, notions are predicated of their subjects in a way that is partly the same and partly different. "'Good,' for example, does not mean the same
Being (Latin: ens) is that which is (ens est id quod est). 1 The notion of being (ens) is not a s... more Being (Latin: ens) is that which is (ens est id quod est). 1 The notion of being (ens) is not a simple notion, but implies a composition of a subject (that 'something' which is and is the real subject to which the act of being belongs), and an act (the very act of being or esse of that 'something'). A cat, a dog, a rock are all beings (entia). They are all 'things' or 'realities.' However, strictly speaking, being (ens) does not have the same meaning as reality or 'thing' (res), for while the term res or 'thing' expresses the quiddity or essence (essentia) of the being (ens), 2 being (ens) is derived from the act of being (esse) 3 (dicitur res secundum quod habet quidditatem vel essentiam quamdam; ens vero secundum quod habet esse 4). Being (ens) is the present participle of the verb 'to be' (Latin: esse) and we say that being (ens) signifies a thing in so much as it is, somewhat in the same way that a 'swimmer' designates a person who swims, or a 'painter,' someone who paints, or a 'student,' designating someone who studies. Ens "è un participio presente del verbo essere, come 'vivente' lo è di vivere e 'sapiente' di sapere. Diciamo anche che l'amante è colui che ama, lo studente è colui che studia e il governante colui che governa. Il participio ('amante', studente') si può dunque indicare anche per mezzo di espressioni come 'colui che…' In questo modo s'esprimono le due dimensioni intrinseche al participio: qualcuno che svolge un'azione. "Allo stesso modo, ciò che è, è chiamato ente (anche se si potrebbe dire che ciò che esiste è esistente, di fatto questo termine è stato poco usato in metafisica). L'espressione 'ente' equivale pertanto a 'cio che è': significa la cosa che è, in quanto possiede l'essere. Tale espressione esprime perciò una nozione composta, che include un qualcosa (il soggetto dell'essere, che è sempre qualcosa dotata di un'essenza determinata) e il suo essere (ciò che fa che il soggetto esista). Per iniziare a capire la distinzione tra queste due dimensioni (il soggetto o sostanza, e il suo essere) basta pensare alla differenza tra queste due questioni: che cosa sono i dinosauri (questione dell'essenza di qualcosa) e se esistono dinosauri (questione dell'esistenza)." 5 "In metafisica denominano 'ente' tutto ciò che realizza l'essere, l'atto di essere. 'Ente' o 'essente' sono infatti il participio presente del verbo 'essere,' come 'cantante' è il participio presente del verbo 'cantare,' e 'attaccante' del verbo 'attaccare.' "Esiste tuttavia una differenza fondamentale fra gli esempi proposti e la realtà dell'ente. Una distinzione importante, che la mera grammatica non capta. Un cantante di professione,
In works such as Partecipazione e causalità secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino (Società Editrice Interna... more In works such as Partecipazione e causalità secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino (Società Editrice Internazionale [S.E.I.], Turin, 1960; see also the French version, Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas d'Aquin, Éditions Nauwelaerts, Paris-Louvain, 1961 and the Spanish edition, Participación y causalidad según Tomás de Aquino, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2009) and La problematica dell «esse» tomistico, published in the journal Aquinas (1959), Cornelio Fabro goes against a widespread formalist-essentialist position regarding the being of accidents which is linked to the obfuscation of the Aquinate's authentic compositio couplet essentia-esse (esse as actus essendi) by the un-Aquinas formalist-essentialist couplet esse essentiae-esse existentiae. The formalist-essentialist thesis maintains a multiplicity of acts of being in accidents distinct from that of the substance, where there is attribution of a proper esse as actus essendi to accidents distinct from that of the substance. This thesis reveals, says Fabro, a typical formalistessentialist mixing of the formal sphere with the real sphere. Fabro critiques this formalistessentialist thesis concerning the being of accidents and defends, instead, a Thomistic metaphysics of intensive esse which holds that although accidents do have esse in actu, they do not have an act of being 1 (esse as actus essendi) of their own distinct from that of the substance. Fabro explains that, although accidents do indeed have esse in actu, a secondary existence (existentia), they do not have an act of being (esse as actus essendi) of their own, but rather are by reason of the act of being (esse as actus essendi) which belongs to the substance. Esse in actu corresponds to esse essentiae. Accidental esse (esse accidentale) is the esse in actu in the whole which is first substance (substantia prima), esse accidentale being a secondary existence derived from the real substance. Fabro explains that "accidental being (esse accidentale) would indicate the reality of the accidents insofar as they are properties and acts or perfections of the individuated substance from which they proceed and in which they are received; […]. In other words, the accidents have and give a 'modus essendi' according to a proper content and this 'esse accidentale,' which is actuated according to that temporal-plexus, can be called existentia." Although accidents have esse in actu, have existentia, "they do not have a proper esse as actus essendi of their own." 2 Concerning the act of being (esse as actus essendi), Fabro writes in his Partecipazione e causalità: "Esse ut actus essendi is the principium subsistendi of the substance, thanks to which both the essence of the substance as well as that of the accidents are in act…" "…esse in the proper sense is only actus essendi which gives subsistence to the substance. There is, therefore, esse essentiae and esse which is actus essendi; …the actualizing esse which is non
wrongly interpreted this aspect when he wrote in his Theoremata de esse et essentia that essentia... more wrongly interpreted this aspect when he wrote in his Theoremata de esse et essentia that essentia and esse are truly distinct like two things (distinguuntur ut res et res).
The Difference Between Existence (Existentia) and the Act of Being (Esse as Actus Essendi). In hi... more The Difference Between Existence (Existentia) and the Act of Being (Esse as Actus Essendi). In his La metafisica di S. Tommaso d'Aquino e i suoi interpreti (2002), Battista Mondin explains that St. Thomas Aquinas does indeed utilize the term existence (existentia) in passages of his works (e.g.,
Author of numerous articles in the journal Revue Thomiste, such as Saint Thomas et l'action trans... more Author of numerous articles in the journal Revue Thomiste, such as Saint Thomas et l'action transitive, "Revue Thomiste," 30 (1925), pp. 130-163, Aristote n'a-t-il affirmé qu'une distinction logique entre l'essence et l'existence? Notes et discussions, "Revue Thomiste," 31 (1926), pp. 62-72, Autour du sacrement de l'ordre -Notes et discussions, "Revue Thomiste," 31 (1926), pp. 263-276, L'image dans l'oeuvre de Saint Thomas, et spécialement dans l'exposé doctrinal sur l'intelligence humaine -Études critiques, "
Method. The term method designates any precise, rigorous and systematic way of proceeding in the ... more Method. The term method designates any precise, rigorous and systematic way of proceeding in the conducting of a determinate study. The method of a science is the way in which it renders its object intelligible. "Il termine 'metodo' proviene dal greco (methodos) ed etimologicamente significa 'proseguimento,' 'via,' 'percorso' e quindi sforzo per raggiungere un fine. In Aristotele methodos vuol dire semplicemente 'ricerca'; talvolta viene usato anche come sinonimo di theoria. Nell'uso che ne fa il linguaggio comune la parola 'metodo' indica il modo di procedere secondo cui vengono eseguite attività di pensiero o delle serie di azioni. Nella parola 'metodo' è sempre implicita l'idea di «una direzione definibile e regolarmente seguita in un'operazione intellettuale». 1 Un procedimento metodico interessa sempre un processo complesso, che viene condotto in modo consequenziale e con uno scopo prefissato in tutti i suoi singoli stadi. Nel caso di azioni compiute involontariamente e condotte in modo arbitrario e incontrollato si può dunque parlare di metodo solo in senso metaforico. In senso rigoroso si deve dunque intendere per 'metodo' un modo di procedere coerente che viene applicato per raggiungere un fine determinato. La scienza, qualsiasi scienza, è per definizione metodica: si tratta infatti di uno studio metodico e sistematico di qualche sfera della realtà." 2 The Method of Metaphysics. Metaphysics, the science of being as being (ens qua ens), utilizes both resolutio and compositio, the former being utilized first before the latter. The method of metaphysics is a resolutio-compositio (although it is primarily a resolutio, priority is given to the resolutio). The via resolutionis is a movement of analysis, in which the reason proceeds from effect to cause, from the particular to the universal, from the multiple to the simple. The via compositionis, on the other hand, proceeds in the opposite direction and is a movement of synthesis, in which the reason goes from cause to effect, from the universal to the particular, from the simple to the multiple. 3 "Del problema del metodo della metafisica S. Tommaso si occupa espressamente nel suo Commento al De Trinitate di Boezio e dice che esso si articola in due momenti principali: il momento risolutivo e il momento compositivo. Il primo pratica la via ascendente: risale dagli effetti alle cause, oppure dalle cause meno universali a quelle più universali e risolve gli enti nell'essere. Il secondo, quello compositivo, procede in senso inverso, cioè discende dalle cause agli effetti, dall'essere agli enti. Ecco come si esprime San Tommaso su questo argomento: «Il pensare che è termine di tutto il ragionare umano è, dunque, pensiero sommamente intelletuale; d'altra parte, il processo razionale di risoluzione di tutte le scienze ha il suo compimento nella considerazione della scienza divina (la metafisica). "Infatti la ragione talvolta procede da una cosa a un'altra realmente distinta, come nel caso della dimostrazione mediante cause o effetti estrinseci: per via sintetica o compositiva, quando procede dalle cause agli effetti; per via analitica o quasi risolutiva, quando si risale dagli effetti alle cause. Le cause infatti sono più semplici, immutabili e uniformemente costanti degli
Metaphysics is the science of being as being (ens qua ens). Science here is not understood in the... more Metaphysics is the science of being as being (ens qua ens). Science here is not understood in the reductionistic-positivistic sense as referring solely to the experimental particular sciences, like biology and chemistry, but in the classical sense of "certain knowledge through causes." 1 The notion of science is analogical, la noción de ciencia es analógica, la nozione di scienza è analogica, so we can affirm-to give some examples-that geology is a science, chemistry is a science, physics is a science, mathematics is a science, philosophy is a science, and sacred theology is a science. "Philosophy, for example, seeks to understand the deepest principles of things; on the other hand, particular sciences investigate the proximate causes. Some sciences are principally deductive (mathematics), while others are descriptive and experimental (biology, geography). Theology is also a science, but it is not based on principles which are knowable using the natural light of reason but upon the truths of the faith. There are significant differences, therefore, between the various scientific disciplines. It would be a mistake to narrow down the meaning of science (by identifying it, for example, with mathematical physics or with deductive logic); historically, this error has led some people to impose on a number of fields of knowledge, methods which were not suited to their nature. The analogical meaning of science applies most perfectly to God, who is Wisdom-by-essence. …It is a rather widespread prejudice today to regard mathematical physics as the only genuine science, and to think that all other types of knowledge become scientific to the extent that they adopt the method proper to mathematical physics. This error is partly the result of philosophies which inadequately explain the nature of knowledge. It is also the offshoot of materialism: if man is incapable of knowing spiritual realities, or if everything is material, then the sciences of matter naturally become normative for all other scientific disciplines." 2 "La filosofía, por ejemplo, busca conocer las cosas en sus principios más profundos; las ciencias particulares van a las causas próximas. Algunas ciencias son principalmente deductivas (matemáticas), y otras descriptivas y experimentales (biología, geografía). La teología también es ciencia, pero no se basa en principios cognoscibles racionalmente, sino en las verdades de la fe. Las diferencias entre las diversas disciplinas científicas son, pues, grandes, y sería un error adoptar una noción estrecha de ciencia (reduciéndola, por ejemplo, a la físico-matemática, al saber deductivo, etc.), error que históricamente ha llevado a imponer a algunos saberes un método que les era inadecuado. Por otra parte, la analogía del concepto de ciencia culmina en Dios, que es la Sabiduría por esencia. …Hoy existe una tendencia más o menos difusa a considerar que la auténtica ciencia sería sólo la físico-matemática, y que las demás llegarán a serlo cuando adopten su método. Estas ideas se deben en parte al influjo de filosofías que no han resuelto correctamente el problema del conocimiento. Son consecuentes también con el materialismo, ya que si el hombre no puede conocer las realidades espirituales, o si todo es material, es lógica la preeminencia de la ciencias de la materia." 3 "La filosofia, ad esempio, mira a conoscere le cose nei loro principi più profondi; le scienze particolari, invece, ne cercano le cause prossime. Alcune scienze sono soprattutto deduttive (le matematiche), altre descrittive e sperimentali (biologia, geografia).
Aside from his invalid immanentist-rationalist-essentialist ontological argument, his invalid imm... more Aside from his invalid immanentist-rationalist-essentialist ontological argument, his invalid immanentist-rationalist-essentialist version of the cosmological proof a contingentia mundi, and his invalid immanentist-rationalist-essentialist proof of the existence of God from pre-established harmony (his version of the teleological proof), Leibniz also has his own immanentist-rationalist-essentialist formulations of the proof from eternal truths or argument ex veritatibus aeternis, for example, in De rerum originatione radicali (1697), seven-volume C. I.
states that "in his nominalism Spinoza belongs to the tradition of William of Ockham and, more pa... more states that "in his nominalism Spinoza belongs to the tradition of William of Ockham and, more particularly, of Hobbes (1588-1679)." 1 Spinoza's gnoseological views as regards his lowest level of knowledge, his cognitio primi generis, is clearly nominalistic: "Nessun valore ha per Spinoza la conoscenza per concetti astratti; gli universali astratti non sono che immagine confuse: 2 per quel che riguarda i concetti astratti Spinoza è nominalista." 3 For the author of the Ethics Demonstrated According to the Geometrical Order (Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, 1677), "la prima forma di conoscenza è quella empirica, legata alle percezioni sensoriali e alle immagini, che, secondo Spinoza, sono sempre 'confuse e vaghe.' Curiosamente Spinoza riporta a questa prima forma di conoscenza anche le idee universali (albero, uomo, animale)…Egli, evidentemente, a suo modo, condivide l'interpretazione nominalistica degli universali, riducendoli appunto a una sorta di immagine sbiadita, a rappresentazioni vaghe e imprecise." 4 In the gnoseology of Spinoza as regards his cognitio primi generis, "a questa conoscenza (la conoscenza adeguata) si contrappone la conoscenza per universali…come sono le nozioni di uomo, cavallo, cane (Prop. 40, Scol. I). Tali nozioni non sono idee chiare e distinte, ma immagini confuse, che nascono dalla ripetizione di percezioni sensibili…Nello Scolio II a questa stessa Prop. 40 della seconda parte Spinoza riassume ciò che ha detto sulla conoscenza distinguendone tre generi: il primo comprende le immagini confuse che ci vengono dall'esperienza sensibile, dall'«esperienza vaga» (immagini alle quali si riducono, come abbiamo visto, anche i così detti concetti universali) e il loro ricordo suscitato dalle parole che le significano…" 5 For Spinoza, "the human body is affected by other bodies, and every modification or state so produced is reflected in an idea. Ideas of this kind are more or less equivalent, therefore, to ideas derived from sensation, and Spinoza calls them ideas of imagination. They are not derived by logical deduction from other ideas, 6 and in so far as the mind consists of such ideas it is passive and not active. For these ideas do not spring from the active power of the mind but reflect bodily changes and states produced by other bodies. There is a certain 'casualness' about them: they reflect experience, indeed, but this experience is 'vague.' An individual body is affected by other individual bodies, and its changing states are reflected in ideas which do not represent any scientific and coherent knowledge. On the level of senseperception the human being has knowledge of other human beings, but its knowledge is knowledge of them as individual things which affect it in some way. It has no scientific knowledge of them, and its ideas are inadequate. When I know an external body through sense perception I know it only in so far as it affects my own body. I know that it exists, at least as long as it is affecting my body, and I know something of its nature; but I have no adequate
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Papers by Paul Gerard Horrigan