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Dritan Osmani

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Dritan Osmani completed his PhD on the modelling of coalitions for environmental protection by using game theory at the Hamburg University. He is an Alumni of International Max-Plank Research School of Earth System Modelling. He currently works in as a Post-Doctoral researcher at Department of Computer Engineering and Mathematics, University Rovira i Virgili, Catalonia, Spain. .

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Bianca Rundshagen

University of Bath

Università degli Studi di Napoli "Federico II"

Richard S J Tol

University of Sussex

francesco bosello

Università degli Studi di Milano - State University of Milan (Italy)

Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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Papers by Dritan Osmani

Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two

Research Papers in Economics, Oct 1, 2007

The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. T... more The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-benefit payoff functions of pollution abatement for sixteen different world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and solved by combinatorial algorithms. The farsighted stability captures the perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when

The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries

Computational Economics, 2010

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements ... more Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of D'Aspremont et al. (Can J Econ 16:17-25, 1983) frequently assume that countries are identical, and they can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs and also two types of asymmetric countries. Extending a model of Barrett (Oxford Econ Pap 46:878-894, 1994), we demonstrate that there are similarities between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental quality. Our

Munich Personal RePEc Archive

The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection

Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements. Environmental Economics and Management

The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. T... more

Integrated Climate System Analysis and Prediction (CliSAP)

Valuing equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries in a Post-Kyoto world.

KlimaCampus, Integrated Climate System Analysis and Prediction (CliSAP)

Farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) is discussed while attention is played on the computational f... more Farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) is discussed while attention is played on the computational framework of finding farsightedly stable coalition structures. The idea of farsightedness means that one should check for multi-step stability by comparing the profits of a coalition member after a series of deviations has come to an end. The deviation is possible only if players display a cooperate attitude by forming a coalition in order to increase their payoffs. The connections of farsighted stability with a positive, negative spillover property and profitability condition are shown. Algorithms are developed, which can find all farsighted stable coalition structures.

Burden Sharing Emissions and Climate Change: A Theoretic Welfare Approach

The approximated cost-benefit function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment mode... more The approximated cost-benefit function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment models are employed in constructing of social welfare functions (SWF). Following a normative approach and evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries, furthermore using distributional weights, a relation between elasticity of marginal utility e and inequality aversion parameter γ is established. By maximizing the global social welfare, the optimal pollution abatement level are found. The relation between the income elasticity of marginal utility e and the inequality aversion parameter γ allow to narrow the variation of e for a particular value of γ. As a consequence, smaller variation for optimal abatement levels are obtained, which allows to inspect if the Kyoto abatement objectives respect the requirement of evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries.

From D’Aspremont to Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements or what should we expect from Game Theory without Side Payments

We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game the... more We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game theory. The paper extends further our previous research on farsightedly stable coalitions and preferred farsightedly stable coalitions (Osmani & Tol 2009). The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-benefit payoff functions of pollution abatement for sixteen different world regions. The stability concept of D’Aspremont et al. (1983) and farsighted sta-bility of Chwe (1994) are compared. D’Aspremont stability assumes that players are myopic while farsighted stability assumes perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted. The D’Aspremont stable coalitions are frequently subsets of farsightedly stable coalitions. Furthermore, farsightedly stable coalitions can be frequently the largest size stable coalition, that game theory without side payments can reach. Additionally, they bring always the biggest improvement in environm...

A Short Note on Joint Welfare Maximization Assumption

The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, 2007

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of International Environmental Agreements (lEAs) use the ... more Non-cooperative game theoretical models of International Environmental Agreements (lEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximizes their joint welfare. In this paper, the joint maximization assumption is compared to different welfare sharing schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and consensus value. The results show that the joint welfare maximization assumption is similar to the Nash bargaining solution.

Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two

We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game the... more We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game theory. The paper extends further our previous research on farsightedly stable coalitions and preferred farsightedly stable coalitions (Osmani & Tol 2007). The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-bene¯t payo® functions of pollution abatement for sixteen di®erent world regions. The stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) and farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) are compared. The d'Aspremont stability assumes that players are myopic while the farsighted stability concept captures the perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted. All farsightedly stable and D'Aspremont stable coalitions are found and their improvement to environment and welfare are computed.

Matrices with the consecutive ones property, interval graphs and their applications

Matrices with the consecutive ones property and interval graphs are important notations in the fi... more Matrices with the consecutive ones property and interval graphs are important notations in the field of applied mathematics. We give a theoretical picture of them in first part. We present the earliest work in interval graphs and matrices with the consecutive ones property pointing out the close relation between them. We pay attention to Tucker's structure theorem on matrices with the consecutive ones property as an essential step that requires a deep considerations. Later on we concentrate on some recent work characterizing the matrices with the consecutive ones property and matrices related to them in the terms of interval digraphs as the latest and most interesting outlook on our topic. Within this framework we introduce a classiffcation of matrices with consecutive ones property and matrices related to them. We describe the applications of matrices with the consecutive ones property and interval graphs in different fields. We make sure to give a general view of application a...

Aspects of Coalitions for Environmental Protection Under Co-utility

The game theoretic modeling of coalitions for environmental protection within the framework of a ... more The game theoretic modeling of coalitions for environmental protection within the framework of a new concept of co-utility [8] is analysed. The co-utility concept can be described by two elements. Firstly, agents can improve their payoffs by collaborating with each other. Secondly, the outcome of collaboration is stable. The similarity of co-utility with common concepts of coalition stability for environmental protection is shown. But the co-utility concept is more extensive and can serve as an umbrella in all applications where agents have room for simultaneous improvements of payoffs. The development from a myopically stable outcome to a farsightedly stable outcome is discussed.

Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental

The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. T... more The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-beneflt payofi functions of pollution abatement for sixteen difierent world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and solved by combinatorial algorithms. The farsighted stability captures the perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when

A Note on Computational Aspects of Farsighted Coalitional Stability

Farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) is discussed while attention is played on the computational f... more Farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) is discussed while attention is played on the computational framework of finding farsightedly stable coalition structures. The idea of farsightedness means that one should check for multi-step stability by comparing the profits of a coalition member after a series of deviations has come to an end. The deviation is possible only if players display a cooperate attitude by forming a coalition in order to increase their payoffs. The connections of farsighted stability with a positive, negative spillover property and profitability condition are shown. Algorithms are developed, which can find all farsighted stable coalition structures.

Burden Sharing Emissions and Climate Change: A Theoretic Welfare Approach

The approximated cost-beneflt function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment mode... more The approximated cost-beneflt function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment models are employed in constructing of social welfare functions (SWF). Following a normative approach and evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries, furthermore using distributional weights, a relation between elasticity of marginal utility e and inequality aversion parameter ∞ is established. By maximizing the global social welfare, the optimal pollution abatement level are found. The relation between the income elasticity of marginal utility e and the inequality aversion parameter ∞ allow to narrow the variation of e for a particular value of ∞. As a consequence, smaller variation for optimal abatement levels are obtained, which allows to inspect if the Kyoto abatement objectives respect the requirement of evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries.

Valuing Equally the Environmental Goods in Rich and Poor Countries in a Post-Kyoto World

The Czech Economic Review, 2013

The optimal pollution abatement levels are found by maximizing global social welfare in a permits... more The optimal pollution abatement levels are found by maximizing global social welfare in a permits trade system under the constraint that environmental goods are evaluated equally in rich and poor countries. Evaluating equally environmental goods in poor and rich countries makes possible to build a relation between the income elasticity of marginal utility e and the inequality aversion parameter gamma (Fankhauser et al. 1997; Johansson-Stenman 2000), which narrows the variation of e for a particular value of gamma. As a result, smaller variation for optimal abatement levels is obtained, which allows to inspect what Post-Kyoto abatement levels for poor and rich countries respect the requirement of evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries. One finding is that in a Post-Kyoto world, the optimal abatement levels of poor countries are always different from zero, if we aim to evaluate equally the environmental goods in poor and rich countries. Furthermore, in a...

Comparison of Farsightedly Stable Climate Coalitions in Different Time Horizons

Environmental Modeling & Assessment

On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements

Natural Resource Modeling

The modeling of coalition for environmental protection within co-utility framework

Optimization

A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint welfare maximization assumption

Transfers play an important role in modeling International Environmental Agreements (IEA). We exa... more Transfers play an important role in modeling International Environmental Agreements (IEA). We examine the implementation mechanism of Optimal Transfer Sharing Scheme (Carraro et al., 2006) which try to enable the existence of stable coalitions for environmental protection by side transfers. There are many coalitions where the OPTS can possibly be implemented. However, the implementation mechanism is almost impossible as it requests the flow of welfare from a few countries to the rest of coalition members, which is unrealistic. If the joint welfare maximization assumption is replaced with the assumption that the emission levels of coalition members are uniformly deceased by a constant percentage in comparison to fully non-cooperative coalition structure, then the free riding incentives are significantly weakened. As a consequence there are possibilities to implement an OPTS and enable existence of stable coalitions.

Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two

Research Papers in Economics, Oct 1, 2007

The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. T... more The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-benefit payoff functions of pollution abatement for sixteen different world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and solved by combinatorial algorithms. The farsighted stability captures the perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when

The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries

Computational Economics, 2010

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements ... more Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of D'Aspremont et al. (Can J Econ 16:17-25, 1983) frequently assume that countries are identical, and they can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs and also two types of asymmetric countries. Extending a model of Barrett (Oxford Econ Pap 46:878-894, 1994), we demonstrate that there are similarities between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental quality. Our

Munich Personal RePEc Archive

The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection

Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements. Environmental Economics and Management

The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. T... more

Integrated Climate System Analysis and Prediction (CliSAP)

Valuing equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries in a Post-Kyoto world.

KlimaCampus, Integrated Climate System Analysis and Prediction (CliSAP)

Farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) is discussed while attention is played on the computational f... more Farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) is discussed while attention is played on the computational framework of finding farsightedly stable coalition structures. The idea of farsightedness means that one should check for multi-step stability by comparing the profits of a coalition member after a series of deviations has come to an end. The deviation is possible only if players display a cooperate attitude by forming a coalition in order to increase their payoffs. The connections of farsighted stability with a positive, negative spillover property and profitability condition are shown. Algorithms are developed, which can find all farsighted stable coalition structures.

Burden Sharing Emissions and Climate Change: A Theoretic Welfare Approach

The approximated cost-benefit function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment mode... more The approximated cost-benefit function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment models are employed in constructing of social welfare functions (SWF). Following a normative approach and evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries, furthermore using distributional weights, a relation between elasticity of marginal utility e and inequality aversion parameter γ is established. By maximizing the global social welfare, the optimal pollution abatement level are found. The relation between the income elasticity of marginal utility e and the inequality aversion parameter γ allow to narrow the variation of e for a particular value of γ. As a consequence, smaller variation for optimal abatement levels are obtained, which allows to inspect if the Kyoto abatement objectives respect the requirement of evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries.

From D’Aspremont to Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements or what should we expect from Game Theory without Side Payments

We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game the... more We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game theory. The paper extends further our previous research on farsightedly stable coalitions and preferred farsightedly stable coalitions (Osmani & Tol 2009). The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-benefit payoff functions of pollution abatement for sixteen different world regions. The stability concept of D’Aspremont et al. (1983) and farsighted sta-bility of Chwe (1994) are compared. D’Aspremont stability assumes that players are myopic while farsighted stability assumes perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted. The D’Aspremont stable coalitions are frequently subsets of farsightedly stable coalitions. Furthermore, farsightedly stable coalitions can be frequently the largest size stable coalition, that game theory without side payments can reach. Additionally, they bring always the biggest improvement in environm...

A Short Note on Joint Welfare Maximization Assumption

The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, 2007

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of International Environmental Agreements (lEAs) use the ... more Non-cooperative game theoretical models of International Environmental Agreements (lEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximizes their joint welfare. In this paper, the joint maximization assumption is compared to different welfare sharing schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and consensus value. The results show that the joint welfare maximization assumption is similar to the Nash bargaining solution.

Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two

We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game the... more We investigate the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) by applying game theory. The paper extends further our previous research on farsightedly stable coalitions and preferred farsightedly stable coalitions (Osmani & Tol 2007). The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-bene¯t payo® functions of pollution abatement for sixteen di®erent world regions. The stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) and farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) are compared. The d'Aspremont stability assumes that players are myopic while the farsighted stability concept captures the perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when players are farsighted. All farsightedly stable and D'Aspremont stable coalitions are found and their improvement to environment and welfare are computed.

Matrices with the consecutive ones property, interval graphs and their applications

Matrices with the consecutive ones property and interval graphs are important notations in the fi... more Matrices with the consecutive ones property and interval graphs are important notations in the field of applied mathematics. We give a theoretical picture of them in first part. We present the earliest work in interval graphs and matrices with the consecutive ones property pointing out the close relation between them. We pay attention to Tucker's structure theorem on matrices with the consecutive ones property as an essential step that requires a deep considerations. Later on we concentrate on some recent work characterizing the matrices with the consecutive ones property and matrices related to them in the terms of interval digraphs as the latest and most interesting outlook on our topic. Within this framework we introduce a classiffcation of matrices with consecutive ones property and matrices related to them. We describe the applications of matrices with the consecutive ones property and interval graphs in different fields. We make sure to give a general view of application a...

Aspects of Coalitions for Environmental Protection Under Co-utility

The game theoretic modeling of coalitions for environmental protection within the framework of a ... more The game theoretic modeling of coalitions for environmental protection within the framework of a new concept of co-utility [8] is analysed. The co-utility concept can be described by two elements. Firstly, agents can improve their payoffs by collaborating with each other. Secondly, the outcome of collaboration is stable. The similarity of co-utility with common concepts of coalition stability for environmental protection is shown. But the co-utility concept is more extensive and can serve as an umbrella in all applications where agents have room for simultaneous improvements of payoffs. The development from a myopically stable outcome to a farsightedly stable outcome is discussed.

Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental

The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. T... more The stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) is analyzed by using game theory. The integrated assessment model FUND provides the cost-beneflt payofi functions of pollution abatement for sixteen difierent world regions. The farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994) is used and solved by combinatorial algorithms. The farsighted stability captures the perfect foresight of the players and predicts which coalitions can be formed when

A Note on Computational Aspects of Farsighted Coalitional Stability

Farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) is discussed while attention is played on the computational f... more Farsighted stability of Chwe (1994) is discussed while attention is played on the computational framework of finding farsightedly stable coalition structures. The idea of farsightedness means that one should check for multi-step stability by comparing the profits of a coalition member after a series of deviations has come to an end. The deviation is possible only if players display a cooperate attitude by forming a coalition in order to increase their payoffs. The connections of farsighted stability with a positive, negative spillover property and profitability condition are shown. Algorithms are developed, which can find all farsighted stable coalition structures.

Burden Sharing Emissions and Climate Change: A Theoretic Welfare Approach

The approximated cost-beneflt function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment mode... more The approximated cost-beneflt function of pollution abatement from two integrated assessment models are employed in constructing of social welfare functions (SWF). Following a normative approach and evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries, furthermore using distributional weights, a relation between elasticity of marginal utility e and inequality aversion parameter ∞ is established. By maximizing the global social welfare, the optimal pollution abatement level are found. The relation between the income elasticity of marginal utility e and the inequality aversion parameter ∞ allow to narrow the variation of e for a particular value of ∞. As a consequence, smaller variation for optimal abatement levels are obtained, which allows to inspect if the Kyoto abatement objectives respect the requirement of evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries.

Valuing Equally the Environmental Goods in Rich and Poor Countries in a Post-Kyoto World

The Czech Economic Review, 2013

The optimal pollution abatement levels are found by maximizing global social welfare in a permits... more The optimal pollution abatement levels are found by maximizing global social welfare in a permits trade system under the constraint that environmental goods are evaluated equally in rich and poor countries. Evaluating equally environmental goods in poor and rich countries makes possible to build a relation between the income elasticity of marginal utility e and the inequality aversion parameter gamma (Fankhauser et al. 1997; Johansson-Stenman 2000), which narrows the variation of e for a particular value of gamma. As a result, smaller variation for optimal abatement levels is obtained, which allows to inspect what Post-Kyoto abatement levels for poor and rich countries respect the requirement of evaluating equally the environmental goods in rich and poor countries. One finding is that in a Post-Kyoto world, the optimal abatement levels of poor countries are always different from zero, if we aim to evaluate equally the environmental goods in poor and rich countries. Furthermore, in a...

Comparison of Farsightedly Stable Climate Coalitions in Different Time Horizons

Environmental Modeling & Assessment

On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements

Natural Resource Modeling

The modeling of coalition for environmental protection within co-utility framework

Optimization

A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint welfare maximization assumption

Transfers play an important role in modeling International Environmental Agreements (IEA). We exa... more Transfers play an important role in modeling International Environmental Agreements (IEA). We examine the implementation mechanism of Optimal Transfer Sharing Scheme (Carraro et al., 2006) which try to enable the existence of stable coalitions for environmental protection by side transfers. There are many coalitions where the OPTS can possibly be implemented. However, the implementation mechanism is almost impossible as it requests the flow of welfare from a few countries to the rest of coalition members, which is unrealistic. If the joint welfare maximization assumption is replaced with the assumption that the emission levels of coalition members are uniformly deceased by a constant percentage in comparison to fully non-cooperative coalition structure, then the free riding incentives are significantly weakened. As a consequence there are possibilities to implement an OPTS and enable existence of stable coalitions.