A speaker utters the grammatically correct phrase ‘x y’, and the hearer understands its meaning. ... more A speaker utters the grammatically correct phrase ‘x y’, and the hearer understands its meaning. The Naiyāyika claims that the only epistemic instrument (pramāṇa) that generates the semantic connection (anvaya) between the meaning of x (henceforth |x|) and the meaning of y (henceforth |y|) is testimony (śabda). This connection is essentially the phrase-meaning. The Vaiśeṣika wants inference (anumāna) to generate this connection. After presenting the Vaiśeṣika view on this topic, this paper will argue that, the hearer considers the generic categories of |x| and |y|, and infers their ontic relation which finally will figure in the testimonial cognition. For example, when John tells Smith that ‘Jones smokes’, Smith first cognizes the meanings of the words, i.e., the individual called Jones and the activity of smoking. Then Smith infers that ‘John intends to say that the activity of smoking inheres in Jones, since an activity inheres in an individual.’ Thus, inherence which appears as the sematic connection is inferred in this case. If John is a reliable speaker (āpta), Smith will have a piece of testimonial knowledge. This is how the Vaiśeṣika’s inference could possibly support linguistic creativity.
The strainer ( cālanī ) tests the strength of a definition of a particular kind. Suppose the defi... more The strainer ( cālanī ) tests the strength of a definition of a particular kind. Suppose the definition D is stated in terms of an absence, and x is a definiendum of D . The strainer collects each x -token or x -individual that dissatisfies D in a specific case. Then, all the x -individuals put together would be equivalent to the type x . Hence—one would be forced to conclude that—in a sense, x dissatisfies D . This is a case of under-application of D , since, despite being a definiendum of D , x dissatisfies D . Therefore, D would be too narrow. Similarly, the strainer may detect over-application too. By using the strainer, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi demonstrated that Gaṅgeśa’s conclusive definition of pervasion ( vyāpti ) had a defect, and redefined pervasion. The strainer test is based on intuitive principles. It may disqualify a definition that has an absence in its definiens. Therefore, strainer-proofing becomes an important consideration that must be borne in mind every time we formulate such a definition.
The Indian Epistemologist tries to discover the criteria of epistemic validity. The valid cogniti... more The Indian Epistemologist tries to discover the criteria of epistemic validity. The valid cognition of Indian Epistemology is the cognition that a normal rational agent considers to be un-accidentally true. This paper describes a three tier epistemic system (ES), an extension of Classical Indian Epistemology. In ES, cognitions are generated by epistemic tools such as sense organs. A cognition C1 invalidates another cognition C2 when C1 makes the cognizer disbelieve C2. At the intra-epistemic level, especially in the cases of inference, a cognition is invalidated when a valid cognition contradicts it. At the inter-epistemic level, the epistemic tools are arranged in the following hierarchical (descending) order: postulation, perception, inference etc. The cognition C1 generated by the tool T1 invalidates C2 generated by T2 when C1 contradicts C2 and T1 is stronger than T2. At the supra-epistemic level, when epistemic tools fail to capture an object O sufficiently, a cognitive act called tarka supports a cognition about O by demonstrating its logical fitness or rejects one by demonstrating its un-fitness. ES offers a theoretical framework that states the rules involved in the interplay between cognitions.
Arthāpatti (postulation) does not depend on observation of pervasion or background belief. It is ... more Arthāpatti (postulation) does not depend on observation of pervasion or background belief. It is certain in the sense that when S cognizes P through postulation, no other epistemic instrument (pramāṇa) would invalidate P. The Naiyāyika tries to reduce postulation to anumāna and/or tarka. I shall argue that it is neither. Due to its explanatory role, one may think that postulation plays an essential role in lakṣaṇā or indication. But this too is a misconception. Both tarka and lakṣaṇā depend on observation and background knowledge. Neither of them has the epistemic certainty postulation enjoys. I think, due to its observation-independent nature and certainty, postulation can be seen as the source of the knowledge of the truths of reason.
An absence and its locus are the same ontological entity. But the cognition of the absence is dif... more An absence and its locus are the same ontological entity. But the cognition of the absence is different from the cognition of the locus. The cognitive difference is caused by a query followed by a cognitive process of introspection. The moment one perceptually knows y that contains only one thing, z, one is in a position to conclude that y contains the absence of any non-z. After having a query as to whether y has x one revisits one's knowledge of y containing z and comes to know that x is absent from y. Thus the knowledge of the absence of x logically follows from the knowledge of y containing z through the mediation of a query. This analysis goes against the thesis according to which an absence is an irreducible entity that is to be known through senses, and is inspired by the Mīmāṁ sā views, especially the Prābhākara views, on absence and its cognition.
ABSTRACT When somebody speaks metaphorically, the primary meanings of their words cannot get sema... more ABSTRACT When somebody speaks metaphorically, the primary meanings of their words cannot get semantically connected. Still metaphorical uses succeed in conveying the message of the speaker, since lakṣaṇā, a meaning-generating faculty of language, yields the suitable secondary meanings. Gaṅgeśa claims that lakṣaṇā is a faculty of words themselves. One may argue: “Words have no such faculty. In these cases, the hearer uses observation-based inference. They have observed that sometimes competent speakers use the word w in order to mean s, when p, the primary meaning of w does not make any semantic sense. In all such cases, s is actually related to p. After having observed this, when the hearer hears the utterance of w, and realizes that w’s primary meaning p is semantically unfit for the sentence-meaning, they infer on the basis of their prior observation that ‘the competent speaker must mean s by uttering w’. Thus lakṣaṇā becomes a success.” This apparently well-argued reduction does not stand the critical examination; neither in Gaṅgeśa’s framework, nor even in the general theory of language. For one can compose and interpret potentially infinite novel sentences based on lakṣaṇā while the observational inferences one can make are finite. Gaṅgeśa says very clearly that as far as the secondary meaning is concerned, no prior observation is required. This paper will argue that not only does language yield secondary meanings through lakṣaṇā, but it also restricts the use of secondary meanings; for one cannot mean just anything by saying something. Lakṣaṇā is a creative function with infinite potential within the limits set up by the language faculty.
Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advait... more Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi : attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution (such as ‘x [is] y’) is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators ( upalakṣaṇa ). The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’ ( tādātmya ). This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the reverse. In the case of ‘the black pot’, the realist ontology prefers difference over identity. In the case of ‘the qualified object is the mere object’, the same ontology prefers identity over difference. Accordingly the ontological ‘entity’ gets projected. This is perhaps because the realist ontology is guided by Ockham’s razor and the grammatical classification of objects.
Two questions are addressed in this article: 1) How to make the students realize the importance o... more Two questions are addressed in this article: 1) How to make the students realize the importance of logic; and 2) how to teach the logical rules. The teacher may begin their logic class with an attempt to answer 1. Logic studies and records the basic moves of intelligence. When it analyses an argument A, it splits A into small steps. If each unit step seems to be intuitively right, then we accept A to be a valid argument. This “splitting” is the special skill of the logician. This skill helps one evaluate an ordinary argument in our day-to-day life. Question 2 is directly related to the didactics of logic. One may teach the rules of logic by demonstrating fallacies, i.e., by comparing the rules with their corresponding non-rules. If the teacher shows how the violation of a rule leads one to an intuitively undesired conclusion the student, learns the importance of rules.
A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally a... more A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally an omnipresent (kevalānvayin) property. Its Target (sādhya) is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no (relevant) case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference (satpratipakṣa) that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators.
We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing the... more We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing their intentions, agreeing or opposing their views and so on. These conceptual acts have phenomenological as well as formal richness. This paper attempts to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and formal approaches to conceptualization by claiming that we need to shift from the usual dichotomies of cognitive science and epistemology such as the formal/empirical and the rationalist/ empiricist divides—to a view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of " valid cognition ". Methodologically, our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; ontologically, it is an attempt at marrying the phenomenal and the formal.
Two questions are addressed in this article: 1) How to make the students realize the importance o... more Two questions are addressed in this article: 1) How to make the students realize the importance of logic; and 2) how to teach the logical rules. The teacher may begin their logic class with an attempt to answer 1. Logic studies and records the basic moves of intelligence. When it analyses an argument A, it splits A into small steps. If each unit step seems to be intuitively right, then we accept A to be a valid argument. This "splitting" is the special skill of the logician. This skill helps one evaluate an ordinary argument in our day-to-day life. Question 2 is directly related to the didactics of logic. One may teach the rules of logic by demonstrating fallacies, i.e., by comparing the rules with their corresponding non-rules. If the teacher shows how the violation of a rule leads one to an intuitively undesired conclusion the student, learns the importance of rules.
Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +B... more Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".
We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing the... more We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing their intentions, agreeing or opposing their views and so on. These conceptual acts have phenomenological as well as formal richness. This paper attempts to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and formal approaches to conceptualization by claiming that we need to shift from the usual dichotomies of cognitive science and epistemology such as the formal/empirical and the rationalist/empiricist divides-to a view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of 'valid cognition'. Methodologically, our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; ontologically, it is an attempt at marrying the phenomenal and the formal.
The meaning of the term 'tarka' is not clear in the modern literature on Classical Indian Philoso... more The meaning of the term 'tarka' is not clear in the modern literature on Classical Indian Philosophy. This paper will review different modern readings of this term and try to show that what the Nyāyasūtra and its classical commentaries called a 'tarka' should be understood as the following: a tarka is a cognitive act that validates a content (of a doubt or a cognition or a speech-act) by demonstrating its logical fitness or invalidates a content by demonstrating its logical unfitness. A tarka can act as a metatheory too. Generating certainty is, according to the Classical Nyāya, a job assigned to an epistemic instrument (pramān : a). It fails to do so when there arises a doubt regarding it. The moment a tarka dispels the doubt, the epistemic instrument generates certainty. Tarkas of different types will be exemplified by critically analyzing Ga _ ngeśa's applications of tarka in his magnum opus Tattvacintāman : i. These examples will clarify the definition of tarka formulated in this paper.
A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally a... more A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally an omnipresent (kevalānvayin) property. Its Target (sādhya) is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no (relevant) case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference (satpratipakṣa) that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators.
We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing the... more We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing their intentions, agreeing or opposing their views and so on. These conceptual acts have phenomenological as well as formal richness. This paper attempts to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and formal approaches to conceptualization by claiming that we need to shift from the usual dichotomies of cognitive science and epistemology such as the formal/empirical and the rationalist/ empiricist divides—to a view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of “valid cognition”. Methodologically, our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; ontologically, it is an attempt at marrying the phenomenal and the formal.
A speaker utters the grammatically correct phrase ‘x y’, and the hearer understands its meaning. ... more A speaker utters the grammatically correct phrase ‘x y’, and the hearer understands its meaning. The Naiyāyika claims that the only epistemic instrument (pramāṇa) that generates the semantic connection (anvaya) between the meaning of x (henceforth |x|) and the meaning of y (henceforth |y|) is testimony (śabda). This connection is essentially the phrase-meaning. The Vaiśeṣika wants inference (anumāna) to generate this connection. After presenting the Vaiśeṣika view on this topic, this paper will argue that, the hearer considers the generic categories of |x| and |y|, and infers their ontic relation which finally will figure in the testimonial cognition. For example, when John tells Smith that ‘Jones smokes’, Smith first cognizes the meanings of the words, i.e., the individual called Jones and the activity of smoking. Then Smith infers that ‘John intends to say that the activity of smoking inheres in Jones, since an activity inheres in an individual.’ Thus, inherence which appears as the sematic connection is inferred in this case. If John is a reliable speaker (āpta), Smith will have a piece of testimonial knowledge. This is how the Vaiśeṣika’s inference could possibly support linguistic creativity.
The strainer ( cālanī ) tests the strength of a definition of a particular kind. Suppose the defi... more The strainer ( cālanī ) tests the strength of a definition of a particular kind. Suppose the definition D is stated in terms of an absence, and x is a definiendum of D . The strainer collects each x -token or x -individual that dissatisfies D in a specific case. Then, all the x -individuals put together would be equivalent to the type x . Hence—one would be forced to conclude that—in a sense, x dissatisfies D . This is a case of under-application of D , since, despite being a definiendum of D , x dissatisfies D . Therefore, D would be too narrow. Similarly, the strainer may detect over-application too. By using the strainer, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi demonstrated that Gaṅgeśa’s conclusive definition of pervasion ( vyāpti ) had a defect, and redefined pervasion. The strainer test is based on intuitive principles. It may disqualify a definition that has an absence in its definiens. Therefore, strainer-proofing becomes an important consideration that must be borne in mind every time we formulate such a definition.
The Indian Epistemologist tries to discover the criteria of epistemic validity. The valid cogniti... more The Indian Epistemologist tries to discover the criteria of epistemic validity. The valid cognition of Indian Epistemology is the cognition that a normal rational agent considers to be un-accidentally true. This paper describes a three tier epistemic system (ES), an extension of Classical Indian Epistemology. In ES, cognitions are generated by epistemic tools such as sense organs. A cognition C1 invalidates another cognition C2 when C1 makes the cognizer disbelieve C2. At the intra-epistemic level, especially in the cases of inference, a cognition is invalidated when a valid cognition contradicts it. At the inter-epistemic level, the epistemic tools are arranged in the following hierarchical (descending) order: postulation, perception, inference etc. The cognition C1 generated by the tool T1 invalidates C2 generated by T2 when C1 contradicts C2 and T1 is stronger than T2. At the supra-epistemic level, when epistemic tools fail to capture an object O sufficiently, a cognitive act called tarka supports a cognition about O by demonstrating its logical fitness or rejects one by demonstrating its un-fitness. ES offers a theoretical framework that states the rules involved in the interplay between cognitions.
Arthāpatti (postulation) does not depend on observation of pervasion or background belief. It is ... more Arthāpatti (postulation) does not depend on observation of pervasion or background belief. It is certain in the sense that when S cognizes P through postulation, no other epistemic instrument (pramāṇa) would invalidate P. The Naiyāyika tries to reduce postulation to anumāna and/or tarka. I shall argue that it is neither. Due to its explanatory role, one may think that postulation plays an essential role in lakṣaṇā or indication. But this too is a misconception. Both tarka and lakṣaṇā depend on observation and background knowledge. Neither of them has the epistemic certainty postulation enjoys. I think, due to its observation-independent nature and certainty, postulation can be seen as the source of the knowledge of the truths of reason.
An absence and its locus are the same ontological entity. But the cognition of the absence is dif... more An absence and its locus are the same ontological entity. But the cognition of the absence is different from the cognition of the locus. The cognitive difference is caused by a query followed by a cognitive process of introspection. The moment one perceptually knows y that contains only one thing, z, one is in a position to conclude that y contains the absence of any non-z. After having a query as to whether y has x one revisits one's knowledge of y containing z and comes to know that x is absent from y. Thus the knowledge of the absence of x logically follows from the knowledge of y containing z through the mediation of a query. This analysis goes against the thesis according to which an absence is an irreducible entity that is to be known through senses, and is inspired by the Mīmāṁ sā views, especially the Prābhākara views, on absence and its cognition.
ABSTRACT When somebody speaks metaphorically, the primary meanings of their words cannot get sema... more ABSTRACT When somebody speaks metaphorically, the primary meanings of their words cannot get semantically connected. Still metaphorical uses succeed in conveying the message of the speaker, since lakṣaṇā, a meaning-generating faculty of language, yields the suitable secondary meanings. Gaṅgeśa claims that lakṣaṇā is a faculty of words themselves. One may argue: “Words have no such faculty. In these cases, the hearer uses observation-based inference. They have observed that sometimes competent speakers use the word w in order to mean s, when p, the primary meaning of w does not make any semantic sense. In all such cases, s is actually related to p. After having observed this, when the hearer hears the utterance of w, and realizes that w’s primary meaning p is semantically unfit for the sentence-meaning, they infer on the basis of their prior observation that ‘the competent speaker must mean s by uttering w’. Thus lakṣaṇā becomes a success.” This apparently well-argued reduction does not stand the critical examination; neither in Gaṅgeśa’s framework, nor even in the general theory of language. For one can compose and interpret potentially infinite novel sentences based on lakṣaṇā while the observational inferences one can make are finite. Gaṅgeśa says very clearly that as far as the secondary meaning is concerned, no prior observation is required. This paper will argue that not only does language yield secondary meanings through lakṣaṇā, but it also restricts the use of secondary meanings; for one cannot mean just anything by saying something. Lakṣaṇā is a creative function with infinite potential within the limits set up by the language faculty.
Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advait... more Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi : attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution (such as ‘x [is] y’) is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators ( upalakṣaṇa ). The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’ ( tādātmya ). This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the reverse. In the case of ‘the black pot’, the realist ontology prefers difference over identity. In the case of ‘the qualified object is the mere object’, the same ontology prefers identity over difference. Accordingly the ontological ‘entity’ gets projected. This is perhaps because the realist ontology is guided by Ockham’s razor and the grammatical classification of objects.
Two questions are addressed in this article: 1) How to make the students realize the importance o... more Two questions are addressed in this article: 1) How to make the students realize the importance of logic; and 2) how to teach the logical rules. The teacher may begin their logic class with an attempt to answer 1. Logic studies and records the basic moves of intelligence. When it analyses an argument A, it splits A into small steps. If each unit step seems to be intuitively right, then we accept A to be a valid argument. This “splitting” is the special skill of the logician. This skill helps one evaluate an ordinary argument in our day-to-day life. Question 2 is directly related to the didactics of logic. One may teach the rules of logic by demonstrating fallacies, i.e., by comparing the rules with their corresponding non-rules. If the teacher shows how the violation of a rule leads one to an intuitively undesired conclusion the student, learns the importance of rules.
A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally a... more A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally an omnipresent (kevalānvayin) property. Its Target (sādhya) is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no (relevant) case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference (satpratipakṣa) that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators.
We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing the... more We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing their intentions, agreeing or opposing their views and so on. These conceptual acts have phenomenological as well as formal richness. This paper attempts to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and formal approaches to conceptualization by claiming that we need to shift from the usual dichotomies of cognitive science and epistemology such as the formal/empirical and the rationalist/ empiricist divides—to a view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of " valid cognition ". Methodologically, our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; ontologically, it is an attempt at marrying the phenomenal and the formal.
Two questions are addressed in this article: 1) How to make the students realize the importance o... more Two questions are addressed in this article: 1) How to make the students realize the importance of logic; and 2) how to teach the logical rules. The teacher may begin their logic class with an attempt to answer 1. Logic studies and records the basic moves of intelligence. When it analyses an argument A, it splits A into small steps. If each unit step seems to be intuitively right, then we accept A to be a valid argument. This "splitting" is the special skill of the logician. This skill helps one evaluate an ordinary argument in our day-to-day life. Question 2 is directly related to the didactics of logic. One may teach the rules of logic by demonstrating fallacies, i.e., by comparing the rules with their corresponding non-rules. If the teacher shows how the violation of a rule leads one to an intuitively undesired conclusion the student, learns the importance of rules.
Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +B... more Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".
We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing the... more We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing their intentions, agreeing or opposing their views and so on. These conceptual acts have phenomenological as well as formal richness. This paper attempts to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and formal approaches to conceptualization by claiming that we need to shift from the usual dichotomies of cognitive science and epistemology such as the formal/empirical and the rationalist/empiricist divides-to a view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of 'valid cognition'. Methodologically, our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; ontologically, it is an attempt at marrying the phenomenal and the formal.
The meaning of the term 'tarka' is not clear in the modern literature on Classical Indian Philoso... more The meaning of the term 'tarka' is not clear in the modern literature on Classical Indian Philosophy. This paper will review different modern readings of this term and try to show that what the Nyāyasūtra and its classical commentaries called a 'tarka' should be understood as the following: a tarka is a cognitive act that validates a content (of a doubt or a cognition or a speech-act) by demonstrating its logical fitness or invalidates a content by demonstrating its logical unfitness. A tarka can act as a metatheory too. Generating certainty is, according to the Classical Nyāya, a job assigned to an epistemic instrument (pramān : a). It fails to do so when there arises a doubt regarding it. The moment a tarka dispels the doubt, the epistemic instrument generates certainty. Tarkas of different types will be exemplified by critically analyzing Ga _ ngeśa's applications of tarka in his magnum opus Tattvacintāman : i. These examples will clarify the definition of tarka formulated in this paper.
A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally a... more A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally an omnipresent (kevalānvayin) property. Its Target (sādhya) is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no (relevant) case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference (satpratipakṣa) that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators.
We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing the... more We perform conceptual acts throughout our daily lives; we are always judging others, guessing their intentions, agreeing or opposing their views and so on. These conceptual acts have phenomenological as well as formal richness. This paper attempts to correct the imbalance between the phenomenal and formal approaches to conceptualization by claiming that we need to shift from the usual dichotomies of cognitive science and epistemology such as the formal/empirical and the rationalist/ empiricist divides—to a view of conceptualization grounded in the Indian philosophical notion of “valid cognition”. Methodologically, our paper is an attempt at cross-cultural philosophy and cognitive science; ontologically, it is an attempt at marrying the phenomenal and the formal.
The Indian Epistemologist tries to discover the criteria of epistemic validity. The valid cogniti... more The Indian Epistemologist tries to discover the criteria of epistemic validity. The valid cognition of Indian Epistemology is the cognition that a normal rational agent considers to be un-accidentally true. This paper describes a three tier epistemic system (ES), an extension of Classical Indian Epistemology. In ES, cognitions are generated by epistemic tools such as sense organs. A cognition C1 invalidates another cognition C2 when C1 makes the cognizer disbelieve C2. At the intra-epistemic level, especially in the cases of inference, a cognition is invalidated when a valid cognition contradicts it. At the inter-epistemic level, the epistemic tools are arranged in the follow-ing hierarchical (descending) order: postulation, perception, infer-ence etc. The cognition C1 generated by the tool T1 invalidates C2 generated by T2 when C1 contradicts C2 and T1 is stronger than T2. At the supra-epistemic level, when epistemic tools fail to capture an object O sufficiently, a cognitive act called tarka supports a cognition about O by demonstrating its logical fitness or rejects one by dem-onstrating its un-fitness. ES offers a theoretical framework that states the rules involved in the interplay between cognitions. / El epistemólogo indio intenta descubrir el criterio de la validez epistémica. La cognición válida de la epistemología india es la que un agente racional normal considera como verdadera sin acciden-te. Este ensayo describe un sistema epistémico (SE) de tres niveles y una extensión de la epistemología india clásica. En un SE, las cogniciones son generadas por herramientas epistémicas como órganos del sentido. Una cognición C1 revoca la validez de otra cognición C2 cuando C1 hace que él que percibe deje de creer en C2. Al nivel intra-epistémico, particularmente en casos de inferen-cia, la validez de una cognición se revoca cuando otra cognición válida la contradiga. Al nivel inter-epistémico, las herramientas epistémicas se ordenan de manera jerárquica descendiente: postu-lación, percepción, inferencia, etcétera. La cognición C1, generada por la herramienta T1, invalida a C2, generada por la herramienta T2, cuando C1 contradice a C2 y T1 está más fuerte que T2. Al nivel supra-epistémico, cuando las herramientas epistémicas no logran capturar un objeto O, un acto cognitivo llamado tarka apoya una cognición acerca de O al demostrar su aptitud lógica o la rechaza al demostrar lo contrario. El SE ofrece un marco teórico que dicta las reglas involucradas en la interacción entre cogniciones.
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Papers by Nirmalya Guha