Sasha Mudd

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Dr. Mudd received her PhD in the History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Cambridge in 2011, after having earned a master’s degree in Divinity from the University of Chicago. She was a lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Southampton for seven years, before becoming Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in 2017. Her research ranges over diverse aspects of Kant’s philosophy, with a special emphasis on the relation between practical and theoretical reason, and the foundations of normativity in Kant’s thought. She has published in the European Journal of Philosophy and the Kantian Review, among other journals, while her writing for a wider audience has appeared in the New York Times as well as in Prospect magazine. Her current research focuses on the philosophy of the moral emotions and on justice. She is particularly interested in the moral emotions generated by the climate crisis and the political opportunities and challenges they pose for effective collective action.
Supervisors: PhD Supervisor, Professor Onora O'Neill, University of Cambridge

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Jochen Bojanowski

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Jens Timmermann

Andrews Reath

University of California, Riverside

André Klaudat

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Darley Alves Fernandes

Jakub Szczepański

Jagiellonian University

Peter Wyss

University of Oxford

Michael Yudanin

The University of Georgia

Alexandra Newton

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Robinson Dos Santos

Universidade Federal de Pelotas (Federal University of Pelotas)

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Papers by Sasha Mudd

The Good Will and the Priority of the Right in Groundwork I

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The Good Will and the Priority of the Right in Groundwork I

Natur und Freiheit, 2018

In Groundwork I Kant seems to derive his conception of the moral law from a prior claim about the... more In Groundwork I Kant seems to derive his conception of the moral law from a prior claim about the value of the good will, contrary to the argument he puts forward elsewhere to the effect that any conception of moral worth must be derived from an antecedent recognition of the law. This suggests to some interpreters that a moral conception of worth in fact underlies the Categorical Imperative, securing its validity and providing its content. In this paper I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Kant&#39;s conception of the good will is not derived from an assumed moral value in Groundwork I, but rather follows analytically from the concept of a categorical imperative.

Practical', 'Dogmatism' and 'Wish

Review. Kristi E. Sweet, Kant on Practical Life: From Duty to History, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 223pp., $90.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781107037236

Kant on Reflection and Virtue

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The Demand for Systematicity and the Authority of Theoretical Reason in Kant

Kantian Review, 2017

Kant’s notoriously unclear attempt to defend the regulative principle of systematic unity as the ... more Kant’s notoriously unclear attempt to defend the regulative principle of systematic unity as the supreme principle of theoretical reason in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic has left its status a source of controversy. According to the dominant interpretation, the principle ought to be understood as a methodologically necessary device for extending our understanding of nature. I argue that this reading is flawed. While it may correctly affirm that the principle is normative in character, it wrongly implies that it binds with mere hypothetical necessity. I offer novel grounds for thinking that if reason’s principle is normative, then it binds agents categorically instead.

Book review. Kristi E. Sweet, Kant on Practical Life: From Duty to History, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 223pp., $90.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781107037236

Kant's 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant portrays the supreme moral principl... more In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant portrays the supreme moral principle as an unconditional imperative that applies to all of us because we freely choose to impose upon ourselves a law of pure practical reason. Morality is revealed to be a matter of autonomy. Today, this approach to ethical theory is as perplexing, controversial and inspiring as it was in 1785, when the Groundwork was first published. The essays in this volume, by international Kant scholars and moral philosophers, discuss Kant's philosophical development and his rejection of earlier moral theories, the role of happiness and inclination in the Groundwork, Kant's moral metaphysics and theory of value, and his attempt to justify the categorical imperative as a principle of freedom. They reflect the approach of several schools of interpretation and illustrate the lively diversity of Kantian ethics today.

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Epistemic autonomy: A criterion for virtue?

Theory and Research in Education, 2013

Catherine Elgin proposes a novel principle for identifying epistemic virtue. Based loosely on Kan... more Catherine Elgin proposes a novel principle for identifying epistemic virtue. Based loosely on Kant’s Categorical Imperative, it identifies autonomy as our fundamental epistemic responsibility, and defines the epistemic virtues as those traits of character needed to exercise epistemic autonomy. I argue that Elgin’s principle fails as a criterion of epistemic virtue because the instrumental conception of autonomy on which it relies leads to an untenable relativism. Despite this, I suggest that autonomy may yet furnish a plausible criterion for epistemic virtue, provided we construe autonomy as Kant does, as grounded in categorical rather than instrumental reason.

Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, by Robert Stern

Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 2013

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Rethinking the Priority of Practical Reason in Kant

European Journal of Philosophy, 2013

Throughout the critical period Kant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby sugge... more Throughout the critical period Kant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby suggesting that both our theoretical and practical endeavors are grounded in one and the same rational capacity. How Kant's unity thesis ought to be interpreted and whether it can be substantiated remain sources of controversy in the literature. According to the strong reading of this claim, reason is a ‘unity’ because all our reasoning, including our theoretical reasoning, functions practically. Although several prominent commentators endorse this view, it is widely thought to lack exegetical support. This paper seeks to strengthen the case for this reading by showing how theoretical reason's positive function, as Kant presents it in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, may be construed as fundamentally practical. I argue that reason's supreme regulative principle ought to be understood as a categorical practical imperative. This interpretation, I suggest, resolves the apparent inconsistencies that blight Kant's account of the principle in the Appendix, while bringing greater overall coherence to his account of theoretical reason's regulative function.

The Good Will and the Priority of the Right in Groundwork I

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The Good Will and the Priority of the Right in Groundwork I

Natur und Freiheit, 2018