Using dynamic programming, the symmetric, closed loop equilibrium of an oligopolistic market with... more Using dynamic programming, the symmetric, closed loop equilibrium of an oligopolistic market with competition in R&D is derived. Numerical analysis indicates that increasing the number of market firms improves economic performance.
5 multinomial logit model focusing on economic and other Iocationai Factors is Formulated and app... more 5 multinomial logit model focusing on economic and other Iocationai Factors is Formulated and applied to data on place-to-place migration in IsraeI. Results iudic;lte the effects of expez-ieel industrial wage differentials, in accordance with the hypothesis of Ha!:+ and Todaso (1970& .;i:i: of disparities in. the structure of industrial employment, suggesting that perceived risk as wc'~ cl:l expected return enter into the decision to migrate, as Stark and Ievhari (19S2) have cr!~;r:-d. Other effects include those associated with regional differentials in a.menities and aggion~rz:ion associated with urbanization, population mobility by age group,, center-periphery r&;~+on trends, border security hazards, and the like. Implications of the anaiysis For the israeii ~ohcy of population dispersion are discussed.
Financial cooperation, through credit sharing and co-signing of debts, was a source of strength f... more Financial cooperation, through credit sharing and co-signing of debts, was a source of strength for Israel's semi-cooperative moshavim in the early decades of their development. But such cooperation entails a potential 'free-rider' problem when farmers' borrowings are uncoordinated, and recent events in Israel have demonstrated the severe implications it can have. This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the externalities generated by financial cooperation, and tests its conclusions empirically using Israeli data. Simulation results indicate that the potential instability of financial cooperation is aggravated when the moshav population is heterogeneous.
This study analyzes recent patterns of development of Israel's new towns through application of a... more This study analyzes recent patterns of development of Israel's new towns through application of a simultaneous-equations econometric model. This approach enables us to specify and test causal interactions among migration, industrial investment, employment, and other structural and policy variables affecting urban development. Our results affirm the importance of economic opportunity, agglomeration effects, population socioeconomic and ethnic composition, and access in determining migration flows. At the same time, unemployment and investment indices are affected by local labor-market conditions, government incentives, and regional development effects as well as by population composition and migration flows. Policy implications of the analysis are considered. 0 1987 Academic press. IIIC.
"A multinomial logit model of place-to-place migration focusing on economic, geo... more "A multinomial logit model of place-to-place migration focusing on economic, geographic and demographic factors is applied to empirical data on inter-regional migration in Israel in 1980. It explains 75% of the (cross-sectional) variance in the data. The results presented in this paper depart from previous empirical work due to its industrialized context and its focus on risk aversion as a determinant of the migration decision. The results support the Harris-Todaro (1970) hypothesis, and indicate that regional similarities in the structure of industrial employment promote migration."
... This paper explores the economic implications of these interdependencies, giving formal expre... more ... This paper explores the economic implications of these interdependencies, giving formal expression to a number of well-known themes in what Krugman (1992) has recently called "highdevelopment theory": the "interdependence of investment decisions" (Chenery (1959 ...
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competiton betwe... more Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competiton between regions over potential investors is then less direct, allowing them to realize greater benefits from external investors. The two polar cases of full and incomplete information about investors' needs are studied. In both cases, there is regional differentiation. However, fiscal competition is efficient in the former case but not in the latter. Finally, it is shown that free entry in the location market calls for some regulation because of the excessive number of competing regions that would prevail in equilibrium.
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competiton betwe... more Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competiton between regions over potential investors is then less direct, allowing them to realize greater benefits from external investors. The two polar cases of full and incomplete information about investors' needs are studied. In both cases, there is regional differentiation. However, fiscal competition is efficient in the former case but not in the latter. Finally, it is shown that free entry in the location market calls for some regulation because of the excessive number of competing regions that would prevail in equilibrium.
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality, thus ... more Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality, thus segmenting the market for industrial location. Regions that compete on infrastructure quality have an incentive to increase the degree of differentiation between them. This places an upper bound on the number of regions successfully able to participate in the location market, and limits the dissipation of regional surplus through Tiebout competition. It indicates a process of fiscal agglomeration, through which regional concentrations arise, which does not depend on the circular causation underlying much of the recent literature on economic geography. We are grateful to J. Brueckner and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Ministère de l'éducation, de la recherche et de la formation (Communauté française de Belgique), Convention 00/05-262.
Using dynamic programming, the symmetric, closed loop equilibrium of an oligopolistic market with... more Using dynamic programming, the symmetric, closed loop equilibrium of an oligopolistic market with competition in R&D is derived. Numerical analysis indicates that increasing the number of market firms improves economic performance.
5 multinomial logit model focusing on economic and other Iocationai Factors is Formulated and app... more 5 multinomial logit model focusing on economic and other Iocationai Factors is Formulated and applied to data on place-to-place migration in IsraeI. Results iudic;lte the effects of expez-ieel industrial wage differentials, in accordance with the hypothesis of Ha!:+ and Todaso (1970& .;i:i: of disparities in. the structure of industrial employment, suggesting that perceived risk as wc'~ cl:l expected return enter into the decision to migrate, as Stark and Ievhari (19S2) have cr!~;r:-d. Other effects include those associated with regional differentials in a.menities and aggion~rz:ion associated with urbanization, population mobility by age group,, center-periphery r&;~+on trends, border security hazards, and the like. Implications of the anaiysis For the israeii ~ohcy of population dispersion are discussed.
Financial cooperation, through credit sharing and co-signing of debts, was a source of strength f... more Financial cooperation, through credit sharing and co-signing of debts, was a source of strength for Israel's semi-cooperative moshavim in the early decades of their development. But such cooperation entails a potential 'free-rider' problem when farmers' borrowings are uncoordinated, and recent events in Israel have demonstrated the severe implications it can have. This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the externalities generated by financial cooperation, and tests its conclusions empirically using Israeli data. Simulation results indicate that the potential instability of financial cooperation is aggravated when the moshav population is heterogeneous.
This study analyzes recent patterns of development of Israel's new towns through application of a... more This study analyzes recent patterns of development of Israel's new towns through application of a simultaneous-equations econometric model. This approach enables us to specify and test causal interactions among migration, industrial investment, employment, and other structural and policy variables affecting urban development. Our results affirm the importance of economic opportunity, agglomeration effects, population socioeconomic and ethnic composition, and access in determining migration flows. At the same time, unemployment and investment indices are affected by local labor-market conditions, government incentives, and regional development effects as well as by population composition and migration flows. Policy implications of the analysis are considered. 0 1987 Academic press. IIIC.
"A multinomial logit model of place-to-place migration focusing on economic, geo... more "A multinomial logit model of place-to-place migration focusing on economic, geographic and demographic factors is applied to empirical data on inter-regional migration in Israel in 1980. It explains 75% of the (cross-sectional) variance in the data. The results presented in this paper depart from previous empirical work due to its industrialized context and its focus on risk aversion as a determinant of the migration decision. The results support the Harris-Todaro (1970) hypothesis, and indicate that regional similarities in the structure of industrial employment promote migration."
... This paper explores the economic implications of these interdependencies, giving formal expre... more ... This paper explores the economic implications of these interdependencies, giving formal expression to a number of well-known themes in what Krugman (1992) has recently called "highdevelopment theory": the "interdependence of investment decisions" (Chenery (1959 ...
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competiton betwe... more Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competiton between regions over potential investors is then less direct, allowing them to realize greater benefits from external investors. The two polar cases of full and incomplete information about investors' needs are studied. In both cases, there is regional differentiation. However, fiscal competition is efficient in the former case but not in the latter. Finally, it is shown that free entry in the location market calls for some regulation because of the excessive number of competing regions that would prevail in equilibrium.
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competiton betwe... more Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competiton between regions over potential investors is then less direct, allowing them to realize greater benefits from external investors. The two polar cases of full and incomplete information about investors' needs are studied. In both cases, there is regional differentiation. However, fiscal competition is efficient in the former case but not in the latter. Finally, it is shown that free entry in the location market calls for some regulation because of the excessive number of competing regions that would prevail in equilibrium.
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality, thus ... more Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality, thus segmenting the market for industrial location. Regions that compete on infrastructure quality have an incentive to increase the degree of differentiation between them. This places an upper bound on the number of regions successfully able to participate in the location market, and limits the dissipation of regional surplus through Tiebout competition. It indicates a process of fiscal agglomeration, through which regional concentrations arise, which does not depend on the circular causation underlying much of the recent literature on economic geography. We are grateful to J. Brueckner and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Ministère de l'éducation, de la recherche et de la formation (Communauté française de Belgique), Convention 00/05-262.
Uploads
Papers by Moshe Justman