The core claim of moral realism, one of the major approaches in contemporary meta-ethics, is that... more The core claim of moral realism, one of the major approaches in contemporary meta-ethics, is that moral or ethical 1 statements are true or false independently of what human beings think of them. That is to say, to almost any moral or ethical question that we may ask, say, whether letting someone die under certain circumstances in order to save our own life is morally permissible, or whether having a great career is sufficient to have a good life, there is a correct answer that is ''out there'' awaiting discovery, and the correctness of that answer has nothing to do with what we might think about the matter. Some realists articulate this core idea by positing a distinctively moral (i.e. non-natural) ''realm'' consisting of ''moral facts'', whereas others purport to locate the so-called objective ''moral facts'' in the natural world. Why would anyone be a realist? Well, many philosophers believe that some sort of realism is necessary to vindicate moral discourse and inquiry. We ask moral questions, and in many cases we take the answers to them very seriously (often acting against our interests, sometimes even risking our own lives, based on a moral judgment that it is the right thing to do). But, the realists argue, such moral inquiry would be pointless, or groundless, unless there were correct answers to our moral questions that held independently of our opinions about them. If there is nothing to & Melis Erdur
If what we want from moral inquiry were the obtainment of objective moral truths, as moral realis... more If what we want from moral inquiry were the obtainment of objective moral truths, as moral realism claims it is, then there would be nothing morally unsatisfactory or lacking in a situation, in which we somehow had access to all moral truths, and were fundamentally finished with morality. In fact, that seems to be the realists’ conception of moral heaven. In this essay, however, I argue that some sort of moral wakefulness – that is, always paying attention to the subtleties of life and people, and never taking for granted what their moral significance can possibly be – is an essential moral value, and, therefore, moral realism, which promotes a moral ideal that allows such moral lethargy and inattentiveness is morally objectionable.
If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then
even such rep... more If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then
even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral reality that exists independently of what anyone thinks. The notion of an independent moral reality has been subjected to meticulous metaphysical, epistemological and semantic criticism, but it is hardly ever examined from a moral point of view. In this essay I offer such a critique. I argue that the appeal to an independent moral reality as a ground for moral obligations constitutes a substantive moral mistake. However, I do not conclude from this that we must therefore embrace the opposite view that moral truths are ultimately dependent on our attitudes. Rather, I suggest that we reject both of these views and answer the classic meta-ethical question BIs what we morally ought to do ultimately a function of our actual attitudes, or determined independently of them?^ with Neither.
The core claim of moral realism, one of the major approaches in contemporary meta-ethics, is that... more The core claim of moral realism, one of the major approaches in contemporary meta-ethics, is that moral or ethical 1 statements are true or false independently of what human beings think of them. That is to say, to almost any moral or ethical question that we may ask, say, whether letting someone die under certain circumstances in order to save our own life is morally permissible, or whether having a great career is sufficient to have a good life, there is a correct answer that is ''out there'' awaiting discovery, and the correctness of that answer has nothing to do with what we might think about the matter. Some realists articulate this core idea by positing a distinctively moral (i.e. non-natural) ''realm'' consisting of ''moral facts'', whereas others purport to locate the so-called objective ''moral facts'' in the natural world. Why would anyone be a realist? Well, many philosophers believe that some sort of realism is necessary to vindicate moral discourse and inquiry. We ask moral questions, and in many cases we take the answers to them very seriously (often acting against our interests, sometimes even risking our own lives, based on a moral judgment that it is the right thing to do). But, the realists argue, such moral inquiry would be pointless, or groundless, unless there were correct answers to our moral questions that held independently of our opinions about them. If there is nothing to & Melis Erdur
If what we want from moral inquiry were the obtainment of objective moral truths, as moral realis... more If what we want from moral inquiry were the obtainment of objective moral truths, as moral realism claims it is, then there would be nothing morally unsatisfactory or lacking in a situation, in which we somehow had access to all moral truths, and were fundamentally finished with morality. In fact, that seems to be the realists’ conception of moral heaven. In this essay, however, I argue that some sort of moral wakefulness – that is, always paying attention to the subtleties of life and people, and never taking for granted what their moral significance can possibly be – is an essential moral value, and, therefore, moral realism, which promotes a moral ideal that allows such moral lethargy and inattentiveness is morally objectionable.
If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then
even such rep... more If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then
even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral reality that exists independently of what anyone thinks. The notion of an independent moral reality has been subjected to meticulous metaphysical, epistemological and semantic criticism, but it is hardly ever examined from a moral point of view. In this essay I offer such a critique. I argue that the appeal to an independent moral reality as a ground for moral obligations constitutes a substantive moral mistake. However, I do not conclude from this that we must therefore embrace the opposite view that moral truths are ultimately dependent on our attitudes. Rather, I suggest that we reject both of these views and answer the classic meta-ethical question BIs what we morally ought to do ultimately a function of our actual attitudes, or determined independently of them?^ with Neither.
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even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral reality that exists independently of what anyone thinks. The notion of an independent moral reality has been subjected to meticulous metaphysical, epistemological and semantic criticism, but it is hardly ever examined from a moral point of view. In this essay I offer such a critique. I argue that the appeal to an independent moral reality as a ground for moral obligations constitutes a substantive moral mistake. However, I do not conclude from this that we must therefore embrace the opposite view that moral truths are ultimately dependent on our attitudes. Rather, I suggest that we reject both of these views and answer the classic meta-ethical question BIs what we morally ought to do ultimately a function of our actual attitudes, or determined independently of them?^ with Neither.
even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral reality that exists independently of what anyone thinks. The notion of an independent moral reality has been subjected to meticulous metaphysical, epistemological and semantic criticism, but it is hardly ever examined from a moral point of view. In this essay I offer such a critique. I argue that the appeal to an independent moral reality as a ground for moral obligations constitutes a substantive moral mistake. However, I do not conclude from this that we must therefore embrace the opposite view that moral truths are ultimately dependent on our attitudes. Rather, I suggest that we reject both of these views and answer the classic meta-ethical question BIs what we morally ought to do ultimately a function of our actual attitudes, or determined independently of them?^ with Neither.