... general, that the value 0 must be assigned to (y,x). For instance, if we consider two version... more ... general, that the value 0 must be assigned to (y,x). For instance, if we consider two versions of Beethoven's Grosse Fuge, say, by ... transitivity and choice that will not be introduced (see, for instance, (see, for instance, Barrett, Pattanaik, and Salles 1990, Basu, Deb, and Pattanaik ...
This issue is not conference proceedings. Instead, the conference served as a springboard for thi... more This issue is not conference proceedings. Instead, the conference served as a springboard for this project and an invitation to colleagues to submit papers in honour of John. We are delighted that so many of them chose to do so. It is obvious that Social Choice and Welfare is the perfect outlet for such a tribute to John. The scope of John's contributions is impressive, going well beyond economics with incursions in other academic domains such as philosophy and biology. Incidentally, according to his CV, his first published article appeared in Philosophical Studies, a respected journal of analytic philosophy. Regarding economics, John's research interests have not been limited to social choice and welfare theory, although most of his papers deal with what can be broadly defined as normative economics. His thesis, under Karl Shell's supervision, was on public economics. He wrote contributions in the field from the end of the 1970s onwards. Several important papers on optimal taxation were published in 1986 and 1987, and more recently (with co-authors-a paper on this topic appeared as recently as 2020). One can also mention that one of his most cited publication is a joint paper in industrial economics on cartel stability (developed while he was at CORE, the renowned research center of the Catholic University of Louvain) which appeared in the Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Économique in 1983. Concerning social choice theory, he made fundamental developments in the literature about Harsanyi's utilitarianism theorems, providing precise mathematical formulations and rigorous proofs which greatly clarified the subject. He wrote several papers on Arrovian aggregation, considering incomplete social preferences and studying
In 2016, on two occasions, humanity witnessed major changes in the organization of the world due ... more In 2016, on two occasions, humanity witnessed major changes in the organization of the world due to the outcomes of voting. First, on June 23, 2016, the U.K. electorate (in fact 52% of this electorate) voted to leave the E.U. In my view, contrary to a common belief, referenda are a threat against democracy because the statements on which voters must take a decision are often ambiguous (if not totally irrelevant, as in the case of the previous U.K. referendum regarding Alternative Vote on May 5, 2011, where the choice was only between Plurality Rule-a.k.a. "First Past The Post"-and "Alternative Vote" method, leaving aside all other possible voting methods) and, equally often, voters make their decisions on the basis of facts entirely foreign to these statements (for instance, in the so-called Brexit referendum, on the basis of their degree of fear and hatred of immigrants). Second, on November 8, 2016, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States of America. It was a surprise win and Trump was the fifth person in U.S. history to be elected in spite of having less votes than some other candidate. The cause of this paradox is the so-called "Electoral College" system. This system is a two-stage system, the President being in fact elected by members of the Electoral College. In most states, the State Electoral College is not reflecting the results of the "popular vote": it is uniquely composed of members who are supposed to be in favour of the given State plurality winner. So while Hillary Clinton received 2.9 million more votes than Trump, she was defeated by 304 votes against 227. In these two cases, it is obvious that something is deeply wrong. Trump's election prompted a number of
This paper describes an unknown episode in the development of the theory of social choice. In the... more This paper describes an unknown episode in the development of the theory of social choice. In the Summer 1949, while at RAND, Quine worked on Arrow's (im)possibility theorem. This work was eventually published as a paper on (applied) set theory totally disconnected from social choice. The working paper directly linked to Arrow's work was never published.
The local core of voting games is investigated from a genericity point of view. There exist prefe... more The local core of voting games is investigated from a genericity point of view. There exist preference profiles for which it is empty and there exist preference profiles for which the local core and its complement are both dense in the set of alternatives. Furthermore the subset of profiles having an empty local core is dense in the whole set of profiles: Some remarks on the choice of the topology are provided. * We are grateful to the French Commissariat G6n6ral du Plan for financial support and to Norman Schofield for having the opportunity to read McKelvey and Schofield (1986) before the publication. We are indebted to two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and to Jerry Kelly for important comments and for correcting our English.
In a previous paper, we established necessary and sufficient conditions for a given binary fuzzy ... more In a previous paper, we established necessary and sufficient conditions for a given binary fuzzy relation to be representable by a utility function. In this article, we construct a crisp order topology associated to a given weakly complete fuzzy pre-order and introduce the notion of "continuous fuzzy pre-order." We show that this new condition and the conditions introduced in the previous paper are together necessary and sufficient for a numerical representation of a given weakly complete fuzzy pre-order by a continuous utility function.
... general, that the value 0 must be assigned to (y,x). For instance, if we consider two version... more ... general, that the value 0 must be assigned to (y,x). For instance, if we consider two versions of Beethoven's Grosse Fuge, say, by ... transitivity and choice that will not be introduced (see, for instance, (see, for instance, Barrett, Pattanaik, and Salles 1990, Basu, Deb, and Pattanaik ...
This issue is not conference proceedings. Instead, the conference served as a springboard for thi... more This issue is not conference proceedings. Instead, the conference served as a springboard for this project and an invitation to colleagues to submit papers in honour of John. We are delighted that so many of them chose to do so. It is obvious that Social Choice and Welfare is the perfect outlet for such a tribute to John. The scope of John's contributions is impressive, going well beyond economics with incursions in other academic domains such as philosophy and biology. Incidentally, according to his CV, his first published article appeared in Philosophical Studies, a respected journal of analytic philosophy. Regarding economics, John's research interests have not been limited to social choice and welfare theory, although most of his papers deal with what can be broadly defined as normative economics. His thesis, under Karl Shell's supervision, was on public economics. He wrote contributions in the field from the end of the 1970s onwards. Several important papers on optimal taxation were published in 1986 and 1987, and more recently (with co-authors-a paper on this topic appeared as recently as 2020). One can also mention that one of his most cited publication is a joint paper in industrial economics on cartel stability (developed while he was at CORE, the renowned research center of the Catholic University of Louvain) which appeared in the Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Économique in 1983. Concerning social choice theory, he made fundamental developments in the literature about Harsanyi's utilitarianism theorems, providing precise mathematical formulations and rigorous proofs which greatly clarified the subject. He wrote several papers on Arrovian aggregation, considering incomplete social preferences and studying
In 2016, on two occasions, humanity witnessed major changes in the organization of the world due ... more In 2016, on two occasions, humanity witnessed major changes in the organization of the world due to the outcomes of voting. First, on June 23, 2016, the U.K. electorate (in fact 52% of this electorate) voted to leave the E.U. In my view, contrary to a common belief, referenda are a threat against democracy because the statements on which voters must take a decision are often ambiguous (if not totally irrelevant, as in the case of the previous U.K. referendum regarding Alternative Vote on May 5, 2011, where the choice was only between Plurality Rule-a.k.a. "First Past The Post"-and "Alternative Vote" method, leaving aside all other possible voting methods) and, equally often, voters make their decisions on the basis of facts entirely foreign to these statements (for instance, in the so-called Brexit referendum, on the basis of their degree of fear and hatred of immigrants). Second, on November 8, 2016, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States of America. It was a surprise win and Trump was the fifth person in U.S. history to be elected in spite of having less votes than some other candidate. The cause of this paradox is the so-called "Electoral College" system. This system is a two-stage system, the President being in fact elected by members of the Electoral College. In most states, the State Electoral College is not reflecting the results of the "popular vote": it is uniquely composed of members who are supposed to be in favour of the given State plurality winner. So while Hillary Clinton received 2.9 million more votes than Trump, she was defeated by 304 votes against 227. In these two cases, it is obvious that something is deeply wrong. Trump's election prompted a number of
This paper describes an unknown episode in the development of the theory of social choice. In the... more This paper describes an unknown episode in the development of the theory of social choice. In the Summer 1949, while at RAND, Quine worked on Arrow's (im)possibility theorem. This work was eventually published as a paper on (applied) set theory totally disconnected from social choice. The working paper directly linked to Arrow's work was never published.
The local core of voting games is investigated from a genericity point of view. There exist prefe... more The local core of voting games is investigated from a genericity point of view. There exist preference profiles for which it is empty and there exist preference profiles for which the local core and its complement are both dense in the set of alternatives. Furthermore the subset of profiles having an empty local core is dense in the whole set of profiles: Some remarks on the choice of the topology are provided. * We are grateful to the French Commissariat G6n6ral du Plan for financial support and to Norman Schofield for having the opportunity to read McKelvey and Schofield (1986) before the publication. We are indebted to two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and to Jerry Kelly for important comments and for correcting our English.
In a previous paper, we established necessary and sufficient conditions for a given binary fuzzy ... more In a previous paper, we established necessary and sufficient conditions for a given binary fuzzy relation to be representable by a utility function. In this article, we construct a crisp order topology associated to a given weakly complete fuzzy pre-order and introduce the notion of "continuous fuzzy pre-order." We show that this new condition and the conditions introduced in the previous paper are together necessary and sufficient for a numerical representation of a given weakly complete fuzzy pre-order by a continuous utility function.
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Papers by Maurice Salles