Papers by Matthew Levinger
The Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon By Glenda Sluga. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021. Pp. xvi + 369. Cloth $35.00. ISBN: 978-0691208213
Central European History, Jun 1, 2023
The Thirty Years' War and German Memory in the Nineteenth Century. By Kevin Cramer. Studies in War, Society, and the Military. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. Pp. 448. $55.00
The Journal of Modern History, Jun 1, 2009
German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back
German Studies Review, Oct 1, 1997
The Journal of Modern History, Jun 1, 1995
Karl August von Hardenberg, 1750�1822: Tageb�cher und autobiographische Aufzeichnungen
J Mod Hist, 2003
Der Schatten des Volkes: Benjamin Constant und die Anfänge liberaler Repräsentationskultur im Frankreich der Restaurationszeit 1814–1830 . By Peter Geiss . Pariser Historische Studien, volume 95. Edited by the Deutsches Historisches Institut Paris. Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011. Pp. 368. €49.80
The Journal of Modern History, 2013
Das preuSSische Gymnasium in Staat und Gesellschaft
History of Education Quarterly, 1998
Karl vom und zum Stein: Der Akteur, der Autor, seine Wirkungs‐ und Rezeptionsgeschichte
The Journal of Modern History, 2005
La rh�torique protestataire du Parlement de Rouen (1753-1763)
Annales Histoire Sciences Sociales, 1990
The Revolutionary Era, 1789-1850
Thoroughly revised and updated in light of recent scholarship, the text introduces compelling per... more Thoroughly revised and updated in light of recent scholarship, the text introduces compelling perspectives on the French and Industrial Revolutions, integrates new discussions of cultural and social history, and expands coverage of southern and eastern Europe. While preserving the integrity of earlier editions, new coauthor Matthew Levinger broadens the analysis by exploring the everyday experiences of the working classes with those of the political and social elites.
The Prussian Reform Movement and the rise of enlightened nationalism
Why, at the present historical moment, are divisive nationalist narratives more powerful than inc... more Why, at the present historical moment, are divisive nationalist narratives more powerful than inclusive ones seeking to advance transnational integration? This essay examines four case studies of “nationalist storytelling”: the rhetoric of Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) during the Leave campaign leading up to the Brexit referendum of June 2016 in the United Kingdom, the 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump in the United States, the 2017 campaign of Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party in the Netherlands, and the 2017 campaign of Marine Le Pen’s National Front in France. In each of these countries, populist leaders have deployed rhetoric that traces a three-stage emotional arc, emphasizing love for the homeland, fear of the foreigner, and righteous anger against corrupt elites who have endangered the nation’s well-being. The powerful emotional response aroused by this rhetoric has been a key factor in these movements’ recent electoral success.
Â?Por quA©, en este momento histA³rico, las narrativas nacionalistas separatistas son mAis ponder... more Â?Por quA©, en este momento histA³rico, las narrativas nacionalistas separatistas son mAis ponderosas que aquellas inclusivas que favorecen la integraciA³n transnacional? Este ensayo examina cuatro casos de ârelatos nacionalistasâ: la retA³rica del Partido Independiente del Reino Unido (UKIP) de Nigel Farage durante la campaA±a de âsepararseâ (de la UE) en Gran BretaA±a, de la campaA±a presidencial de Donald Trump en los Estados Unidos en 2016, de la campaA±a del Partido de la Libertad de Geert Wilders en Holanda en 2017, y de la campaA±a del Frente Nacional de Marine Le Pen en Francia en 2017. En cada uno de esos paAses los lAderes populistas han desplegado retoricas que trazan un arco emocional en tres partes, enfatizando el amor a la patria, el miedo a los extranjeros, y la indignaciA³n moralista en contra de las elites corruptas que han puesto en peligro el bienestar de la naciA³n. La poderosa respuesta emocional que engendra esa retA³rica ha sido un factor central en ...
The change in the patterns and nature of deadly conflicts since the end of the Cold War has spurr... more The change in the patterns and nature of deadly conflicts since the end of the Cold War has spurred many organizations in and outside governments to develop robust strategies to anticipate, prevent, and respond to these conflicts. Conflict analysis is the critical first step toward meeting these objectives. Conflict Analysis: Understanding Causes, Unlocking Solutions is a guide for practitioners seeking to prevent deadly conflict or mitigate political instability. Governments, nongovernmental organizations, and businesses operating in conflict zones will find this volume to be a practical, accessible reference for understanding and communicating persuasively about threats of organized violence. This handbook integrates theory and practice and emphasizes the importance of analyzing the causes of peace as well as the causes of conflict. It stresses that conflict analysis is a social as well as an intellectual process, helping practitioners translate analysis into effective action. To ...
The politics of genocide prevention and the limits of humanitarian neutrality
The Humanitarian Machine, 2021
Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2018
Introduction The prevention of genocide and mass atrocities involves normative as well as practic... more Introduction The prevention of genocide and mass atrocities involves normative as well as practical challenges. To motivate effective action to deter or halt mass killings of civilians, it is first necessary to persuade the relevant actors of the legitimacy and necessity of such a policy. The struggle to implement robust atrocity prevention measures is often lost at the normative level. Key government decision-makers may decide that the prevention of atrocities is peripheral, or even antithetical, to "core national security interests." 1 Conversely, when the United States or other great powers do intervene to protect civilians, they may arouse suspicion from other parties. As the Albright-Cohen Genocide Prevention Task Force observed in 2008, many governments "regard assertive U.S. policies as ultimately self-interested, even or perhaps especially when framed in terms of humanitarian purposes." 2 Comprising fifty-seven participating States "from Vancouver to Vladivostok," 3 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) provides a particularly salient case study of the normative dimension of atrocity prevention efforts. The OSCE is the successor to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), established by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 with the goal of finding "common ground through a process of dialogue, norm-setting, and consensus" among the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The CSCE was "designed as a process, with an informal structure that could provide flexibility" in promoting "common and comprehensive" security. 4 In the words of former OSCE Secretary-General Wilhelm Höynck, "[T] he Final Act affirmed that the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential factor for the peace, justice, and well-being, necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation." 5 The end of the Cold War brought fundamental changes both to the structure and mission of the CSCE. Between 1990 and 1992, the organization established a formal institutional structure including a Secretariat, a Permanent Council of ambassadors from all participating States, the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), the Office for Free Elections (later to become the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights or ODIHR), the Forum for Security Cooperation , and the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). 6 In 1995, the CSCE was renamed the OSCE, reflecting this formalization of its institutional structure. With an annual operating budget for 2017 of EUR 139 million (including EUR 4.7 million for Conflict Prevention and EUR 3.4 million for the HCNM), the OSCE has been described as a "flea" in comparison to the "elephant" of the European Union (EU), whose 2017 budget was more than a thousand times larger. 7 Despite its limited resources and lack of coercive power, the OSCE has
Politics and Governance, 2017
This thematic issue addresses how strategic narratives affect international order. Strategic narr... more This thematic issue addresses how strategic narratives affect international order. Strategic narratives are conceived of as stories with a political purpose or narratives used by political actors to affect the behavior of others. The articles in this issue address two significant areas important to the study of international relations: how strategic narratives support or undermine alliances, and how they affect norm formation and contestation. Within a post-Cold War world and in the midst of a changing media environment, strategic narratives affect how the world and its complex issues are understood. This special issue speaks to the difficulties associated with creating creative and committed international cooperation by noting how strategic narratives are working to shape the Post-Cold War international context.
Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2016
During the months leading up to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, cognitive biases obstructed the cap... more During the months leading up to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, cognitive biases obstructed the capacity of U.S. government analysts and policymakers to anticipate mass violence against the country's Tutsi minority. Drawing on declassified U.S. government documents and on interviews with key current and former officials, this essay shows that most U.S. government reporting on Rwanda before April 1994 utilized a faulty cognitive frame that failed to differentiate between threats of civil war and genocide. Because U.S. officials framed the crisis in Rwanda as a potential civil war, they underestimated the virulence of the threat to Tutsi civilians and discounted the risk of catastrophic violence. The "civil war frame" also justified rigid U.S. policy guidance that may have exacerbated ethnic and political conflicts in Rwanda on the eve of the genocide. The phenomenon of faulty cognitive framing remains a challenge for contemporary atrocity prevention and response efforts toward countries including Libya and South Sudan.
Politics and Governance, 2015
This essay analyzes President Barack Obama’s communication strategies in his speeches and preside... more This essay analyzes President Barack Obama’s communication strategies in his speeches and presidential statements concerning threats of mass atrocities in Libya, Syria, and Iraq from 2011 through 2015. It examines how he has used three rhetorical “frames” to explain events in these countries and to advocate specific U.S. policy responses: the “legalistic” (or “liberal internationalist”), the “moralistic,” and the “security” frame. Obama utilized primarily the legalistic frame to justify U.S. military intervention in Libya in 2011, and he relied mainly on the security frame (focusing on terrorist threats against U.S. nationals) to justify the deployment of U.S. military forces against ISIL in Iraq and Syria in 2014−2015. Obama’s rhetorical framing of the violence perpetrated by the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad since 2011 has been less consistent. Hardly ever in these speeches did Obama suggest that mass atrocities per se constituted a threat to U.S. national security—despite the ...
Book ReviewsThe Impact of Napoleon: Prussian High Politics, Foreign Policy, and the Crisis of the Executive, 1797–1806.By Brendan Simms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xvi+390. $69.95
The Journal of Modern History, 1999
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Papers by Matthew Levinger