Is Buddhist philosophy properly thought of as philosophy? The work of Buddhist thinkers such as V... more Is Buddhist philosophy properly thought of as philosophy? The work of Buddhist thinkers such as Vasubandhu, Nāgārjuna, and Dharmakīrti is widely recognized as deploying the same sorts of tools to investigate the same sorts of topics as what one finds in the practices of academic philosophers in the early 21st century. Still there is resistance to incorporating Buddhist philosophical texts into the philosophy canon, and this both from “mainstream” academic philosophers and from Buddhologists (scholars of the Buddhist tradition). Current resistance can be traced to concerns over the soteriological context of Buddhist philosophizing. Those who wish to maintain the present Eurocentric focus of the philosophy canon suspect that the soteriological ends to which philosophical inquiry is put by Buddhists must compromise philosophy’s commitment to rationality and Buddhism’s commitment to its goal of salvation. Resistance from both sides thus presupposes that a spiritual practice necessarily ...
Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy, 2021
In "What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self", Karsten Struhl brings up an important ques... more In "What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self", Karsten Struhl brings up an important question, and develops an interesting answer. There is much here that I agree with. There are, though, two questions raised by his paper that I believe may warrant further investigation. These are: (1) is the self a phenomenal illusion? and if so, (2) is its being a feature of human psychology a straightforward result of natural selection? How the second question should be addressed might seem to depend on how the first is answered. But in part because it will prove difficult to work out just how to approach (1), I shall start with (2). To say that the self is a phenomenal illusion is to say at least this much: that something that is readily mistaken as evidence for the existence of a self commonly appears in the experience of ordinary humans. Let us suppose we understand what this comes to-perhaps that there is a raw "what-it-is-like"-ness to our experience that gives rise to the belief that we have selves. 1 At least one such belief is that the experiences presently occurring are had by a subject. So if the self is a phenomenal illusion, then ordinary sensory experience would be given to us in a way that leads us to spontaneously affirm that they are given to or for a particular experiencing subject, me. Let us similarly suppose that features of our experience render it difficult not to judge that this me is an enduring substance located in my head, something that serves to ground certain synchronic and diachronic unities and is the author of my actions. Let us suppose, that is, that the standard characterization of a self-as the persisting substance that grounds the synchronic and diachronic identity of the person in the guise of experiencing subject and agent-is supported, albeit misleadingly, by the felt ________________________
... do SOPHIA (2008) 47:2942 DOI 10.1007/s11841-008-0043-x M. Siderits (*) Department of Philoso... more ... do SOPHIA (2008) 47:2942 DOI 10.1007/s11841-008-0043-x M. Siderits (*) Department of Philosophy, Illinois State University, Campus Box 4540, Normal, IL 617904540, USA e-mail: [email protected] Page 2. their will. Incompatibilists ...
Just as some Buddhists deny that the external world is ultimately real, so other Buddhists deny t... more Just as some Buddhists deny that the external world is ultimately real, so other Buddhists deny the ultimate reality of consciousness. This chapter examines the debate among different Buddhist schools over the status of cognition. This grows out of a debate over the problem of meta-cognition: if there is no self, then what is it that cognizes cognition? Momentariness and the irreflexivity principle pose obstacles to a satisfactory account. This leads the Yogācāra-Sautrāntika philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to develop the theory that every cognition is self-cognizing, but that irreflexivity is not violated since noetic and noematic poles of a cognition are non-distinct. Their reflexivity account is challenged by a higher-order thought account developed in the Madhyamaka school. According to this account, cognition is posited as a useful way of explaining bodily and verbal behavior, and so is not to be thought of as ultimately real. There is also some discussion of the difficulty...
This chapter examines the Buddhist version of the eternalism-presentism dispute. While all Buddhi... more This chapter examines the Buddhist version of the eternalism-presentism dispute. While all Buddhists hold that no existing thing is eternal, some did claim that past and future things are existent in the same sense in which presently existing things are, while other Buddhists denied that past and future things may be said to exist. The chapter begins by discussing the question of whether time is itself a real entity, examining an argument developed by Nāgārjuna against the view that time serves as the container that makes temporal relations possible. The bulk of the chapter is given over to a prolonged examination of the arguments given for and against eternalism. A major difficulty for the eternalist is to reconcile their view with the Buddhist orthodoxy that all is impermanent. The presentist is faced with the problem of explaining just what the present is if there is no past or future.
In this short reply to Levine's critique, I defend the enterprise of 'fusion philosophy.&... more In this short reply to Levine's critique, I defend the enterprise of 'fusion philosophy.' I agree that the sort of careful scholarly examination of Asian philosophical traditions that is often done under the banner of 'comparative philosophy' is of great importance. But it is a separate question whether those traditions have resources that would help us solve philosophical problems of current interest. This is the question fusion philosophy tries to answer.
Is Buddhist philosophy properly thought of as philosophy? The work of Buddhist thinkers such as V... more Is Buddhist philosophy properly thought of as philosophy? The work of Buddhist thinkers such as Vasubandhu, Nāgārjuna, and Dharmakīrti is widely recognized as deploying the same sorts of tools to investigate the same sorts of topics as what one finds in the practices of academic philosophers in the early 21st century. Still there is resistance to incorporating Buddhist philosophical texts into the philosophy canon, and this both from “mainstream” academic philosophers and from Buddhologists (scholars of the Buddhist tradition). Current resistance can be traced to concerns over the soteriological context of Buddhist philosophizing. Those who wish to maintain the present Eurocentric focus of the philosophy canon suspect that the soteriological ends to which philosophical inquiry is put by Buddhists must compromise philosophy’s commitment to rationality and Buddhism’s commitment to its goal of salvation. Resistance from both sides thus presupposes that a spiritual practice necessarily ...
Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy, 2021
In "What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self", Karsten Struhl brings up an important ques... more In "What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self", Karsten Struhl brings up an important question, and develops an interesting answer. There is much here that I agree with. There are, though, two questions raised by his paper that I believe may warrant further investigation. These are: (1) is the self a phenomenal illusion? and if so, (2) is its being a feature of human psychology a straightforward result of natural selection? How the second question should be addressed might seem to depend on how the first is answered. But in part because it will prove difficult to work out just how to approach (1), I shall start with (2). To say that the self is a phenomenal illusion is to say at least this much: that something that is readily mistaken as evidence for the existence of a self commonly appears in the experience of ordinary humans. Let us suppose we understand what this comes to-perhaps that there is a raw "what-it-is-like"-ness to our experience that gives rise to the belief that we have selves. 1 At least one such belief is that the experiences presently occurring are had by a subject. So if the self is a phenomenal illusion, then ordinary sensory experience would be given to us in a way that leads us to spontaneously affirm that they are given to or for a particular experiencing subject, me. Let us similarly suppose that features of our experience render it difficult not to judge that this me is an enduring substance located in my head, something that serves to ground certain synchronic and diachronic unities and is the author of my actions. Let us suppose, that is, that the standard characterization of a self-as the persisting substance that grounds the synchronic and diachronic identity of the person in the guise of experiencing subject and agent-is supported, albeit misleadingly, by the felt ________________________
... do SOPHIA (2008) 47:2942 DOI 10.1007/s11841-008-0043-x M. Siderits (*) Department of Philoso... more ... do SOPHIA (2008) 47:2942 DOI 10.1007/s11841-008-0043-x M. Siderits (*) Department of Philosophy, Illinois State University, Campus Box 4540, Normal, IL 617904540, USA e-mail: [email protected] Page 2. their will. Incompatibilists ...
Just as some Buddhists deny that the external world is ultimately real, so other Buddhists deny t... more Just as some Buddhists deny that the external world is ultimately real, so other Buddhists deny the ultimate reality of consciousness. This chapter examines the debate among different Buddhist schools over the status of cognition. This grows out of a debate over the problem of meta-cognition: if there is no self, then what is it that cognizes cognition? Momentariness and the irreflexivity principle pose obstacles to a satisfactory account. This leads the Yogācāra-Sautrāntika philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to develop the theory that every cognition is self-cognizing, but that irreflexivity is not violated since noetic and noematic poles of a cognition are non-distinct. Their reflexivity account is challenged by a higher-order thought account developed in the Madhyamaka school. According to this account, cognition is posited as a useful way of explaining bodily and verbal behavior, and so is not to be thought of as ultimately real. There is also some discussion of the difficulty...
This chapter examines the Buddhist version of the eternalism-presentism dispute. While all Buddhi... more This chapter examines the Buddhist version of the eternalism-presentism dispute. While all Buddhists hold that no existing thing is eternal, some did claim that past and future things are existent in the same sense in which presently existing things are, while other Buddhists denied that past and future things may be said to exist. The chapter begins by discussing the question of whether time is itself a real entity, examining an argument developed by Nāgārjuna against the view that time serves as the container that makes temporal relations possible. The bulk of the chapter is given over to a prolonged examination of the arguments given for and against eternalism. A major difficulty for the eternalist is to reconcile their view with the Buddhist orthodoxy that all is impermanent. The presentist is faced with the problem of explaining just what the present is if there is no past or future.
In this short reply to Levine's critique, I defend the enterprise of 'fusion philosophy.&... more In this short reply to Levine's critique, I defend the enterprise of 'fusion philosophy.' I agree that the sort of careful scholarly examination of Asian philosophical traditions that is often done under the banner of 'comparative philosophy' is of great importance. But it is a separate question whether those traditions have resources that would help us solve philosophical problems of current interest. This is the question fusion philosophy tries to answer.
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