Papers by Mark McLeod-Harrison
Ars Disputandi, 2006
Many traditional Christians hold that since God created the world, the world is noetically real, ... more Many traditional Christians hold that since God created the world, the world is noetically real, that is, not dependent, generally, on human noetic contributions for its ontological status. This essay argues that traditional Christianity only requires noetic realism about God. William Alston and Plantinga are taken as examples of two traditional Christian philosophers who hold to noetic realism and their arguments touching on the connection between the Christianity and realism are considered.
Essays in Philosophy, 2014
Can popular Christian apologetics be public philosophy? This paper argues that it can be partly b... more Can popular Christian apologetics be public philosophy? This paper argues that it can be partly because the criteria for what counts as public philosophy are so vague but also partly because popular Christian apologetics parallels much that counts as public philosophy both in terms of its historical roots in Socrates but also how public philosophy is practiced now. In particular, there are parallels on the role of amateurs vs. professionals, the sorts of topics, the quality of the discussions, and the passion vs. the neutrality of its practitioners.
Philosophia Christi, 2006
Philosophia Christi, 2009
McGill-Queen's University Press eBooks, Nov 10, 2009
Philosophia Christi, 2006
Philosophia Christi, 2008
is a self-described, if unhappy, relativist about philosophical propositions, holding that true p... more is a self-described, if unhappy, relativist about philosophical propositions, holding that true philosophical propositions are true only within a perspective. 1 So the beliefs of the Christian philosopher, the secular analytic philosopher, and the hallucinogenically induced beliefs of some Ecuadorian shamans, although conflicting, are all true. He also claims that philosophy has a foundational structure dependent on what he calls "rational intuition," which is self-justifYing and not any more or less likely to give us knowledge of philosophical propositions than either Christian revelation or the ritual use of hallucinogens. Thus, we must choose amongst nihilism, skepticism, and relativism. Hales opts for the last, since the others are, he believes, untenable. While there are a good many things to be learned from Hales's account of relativism, the argument he presents for it fails. I summarize aspects of his position and present two criticisms of his defense and one critical observation.
Studies in Christian Ethics, Mar 28, 2017
My goal is to explicate the ontological framework of the human self that is required for radical ... more My goal is to explicate the ontological framework of the human self that is required for radical discipleship. I do this through two notions: Christian love (agape) and Christian humility. To that end I explore the other-and the self-regarding aspects of humility and love, posing a problem for love and humility rooted in our typical notions of self-interest and phronesis. I then propose a way of rethinking humility and love in the context of a sketch of solidarity and an alternative ontology of the self.
BEING AT HOME IN THE WORLD range of students, not just those majoring in philosophy. GFU requires... more BEING AT HOME IN THE WORLD range of students, not just those majoring in philosophy. GFU requires all its students to take a class called Christian Foundations, so students from every discipline take the course. Experience teaching Christian Foundations-we both teach multiple sections most years-has led us to prepare this little book. We fondly hope Being at Home in the World will be useful not just to Christian Foundations students or college students generally, but to a wide population of readers. So if you're not one of the students envi sioned in the first paragraph, we welcome you too. Loosely speaking, this is a book of "apologetics:' In philosophy and theology, apologetics is the discipline of giving rational arguments for Christian beliefs. The field is called apologetics because it gives argu ments in defense of Christianity. In a similar way, Plato's Apology is really the account of Socrates's defense presented to an Athenian court. Apologetics has a long and honorable history, including such Christian thinkers as Justin Martyr in the second century, Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century, and C.S. Lewis, Dorothy Sayers, and Marilyn McCord Adams in the twentieth century. But this book differs signifi cantly from the work of many contemporary Christian apologists, which is why we say it is apologetics "loosely speaking:' With a little effort on the internet, students can find dozens of web sites and scores of books devoted to a rational defense of Christianity.
Forum Philosophicum, 2014
Christian feminist theory faces many stresses, some due directly to the apparent nature of Christ... more Christian feminist theory faces many stresses, some due directly to the apparent nature of Christianity and its seeming patriarchy. But feminism can also be thought inherent in Christianity. All people are made in God's image. Christians should view women and men as equals, just as they should see people of all races as equals. The basic question discussed, within a biblical and philosophical framework, is if it possible for Christian feminist theory to hold that there is an essence to being a woman, being a man or being human all the while recognizing vast differences among women, among men and among human persons? I propose a beginning solution to this problem. Keywords Christian; essence; feminism; human; men; women Christian feminist theory faces many stresses, some due directly to the apparent nature of Christianity and its seeming patriarchy. But feminism can also be thought inherent in Christianity. All people are made in God's image. Christians should view women and men as equals, just as they should see people of all races as equals. I assume the latter view below when dealing with a central stress found in Christian feminism: essentialism. This is a large stress, not easily summarized or described. The problem will be spelled out more clearly below, but the basic question is, is it possible for Christian feminist theory to hold that there is an essence to being a woman, being a man or being human all the while recognizing vast differences among women, among men and among human persons? The question is cast in terms of essences understood as capturing kinds of things rather than individual essences or unique essences. For Christian feminists, es-This essay was funded in part by the George Fox University Research program 2013.
Everything is post these days, as if we' re all just a footnote to something earlier that was rea... more Everything is post these days, as if we' re all just a footnote to something earlier that was real enough to have a name of its own.n -Elaine Risley 1 Just as every past age had its cultural and intellectual story to tell, so do we. It is the tale of a postmodern world where nothing is real, a fable where everything depends on nostalgia, a rumor in which everyone's beliefs are acceptable. Thus, evangelical Christians tend to think that postmodernism opposes the truth, and in particular, the absolute truth of the gospel. But it is far from dear that postmodernism is treacherous. That we live in a postmodern world is evident in how academics work in their various disciplines. Even though evangelical sc.holars tend to disparage postmodernism, we ourselves are often caught up in postmodern thinking. In times past, the cultural and intellectual climate of the age molded Christian truth, so our being influenced by the spirit of the present age ought to be no surprise. Being thus shaped is not an evil, or at least it need not be if we become aware of what we are doing. Being postmodern need not entail that we give up on the objectivity of the gospel. It is time to take postmodernism seriously and allow its positive aspects to influence Christian higher education. Postmodernism is rooted in a set of philosophical influences that run contrary to the philosophical position most evangelicals hold on the nature of theorizing. In order to understand postmodernism and its influence, one needs to understand these philosophical positions. My goals are thus to explain briefly the standard evangelical philosophy of theorizing as well as a corresponding postmodernist position, to illustrate with some examples how postmodernist In this essay, Mark S. McLeod describes and advocates a postmodern model of theorizing which he calls "multi-world realismn as an alternative to "common sense realismn and the "correspondence theory of truth" which dominate, he maintains, both the Western philosophical tradition and current evangelical thinking. Objectivity is preserved and relativism avoided, he argues, by turning to "what is of interest to God, to that in which God delights or takes pleasure." He concludes by developing the implications of this view . for the various aspects of Christian higher education, noting that a "Christian-Postmodern college would be an exciting place to work for the kingdom." Mr. McLeod, until recently a faculty member at Westmont College, teaches philosophy and humanities at the University of Texas at San Antonio.
Why do you realists think there is a singular, real world? REALIST: By "real" we mean that there ... more Why do you realists think there is a singular, real world? REALIST: By "real" we mean that there exists a world and that it is what completely independent of how I (or we) think about it, cognize about it, b about it, know about it, and so forth. The relationship between the worl our cognitive dealings with it, although not worked out in some final sen basically one of the world's existing in some mind-independent manner and causing or influencing our thinking, believing, cognizing, and so forth about IRREALIST: You've told me what you believe, but not why. The assum • you make in what you just said are typically taken to be common sense, what argument is there for them? REALIST: I don't need an argument to defend common sense since the other•• sition, antirealism, is so counterintuitive and itself without any decent argum IRREALIST: Counterintuitive it is. I agree. But it's not without argument. C sider this one, for example. Take any two apparently contradictory metaph cal claims. Suppose, for the moment, each claim is equally well epistem• justified (warranted, known, etc.). Add to those claims the additional pr that contradictions are impossible. What metaphysical conclusion should reach? The most straightforward result is that there is more than one world that truth is world-relative. For example: ( r) Contradictions are impossible. (2) Metaphysical freedom exists. (3) Metaphysical freedom does not exist. (4) Therefore, there are at least two worlds, one in which metaphysical free• dom exists, one in which it does not. ( 5) Therefore, truth is world-relative. REALIST: Before I give you what I take to be the obvious solution to the pr !em, let me ask what you mean by "world." How can there be two or worlds? For example, is the action I'm now performing both free and not f
Typically theologians take the image of God rather metaphorically and reduce the metaphor to a se... more Typically theologians take the image of God rather metaphorically and reduce the metaphor to a set of properties in virtue of which we are humans. This emphasis on the common features shared among humans supports the doctrine of shared sin and the provision of salvation by another human, Jesus. By analyzing three separate notions of image and applying them to the image of God, this paper argues that humans as God's image can be taken more literally then it typically is. The result is that the uniqueness of each human is a significant aspect of the human person, grounding our value. Doing so, however, does not entail that we lose the common features of humans supporting theological accounts of shared sin and salvation. Suppose two painters go to northern California, set up their easels and paint images of Mt. Shasta. While there is a very good chance the two paintings will appear similar, sharing certain properties, they need not. Suppose one painter is a realist and his painting "looks like the mountain" whereas the other painter is a cubist and her painting looks (virtually) nothing like the mountain. Both, however, label their paintings "Mt. Shasta at Morning Light" and both mean their labels to be taken literally. The resulting paintings, although both images of Mt. Shasta, appear to share little in common. It is hard to see how any property of one is a property of the other except at a trivial level (say, both are painted on canvass, with oils, and the like). One might be black and grey, portraying various angles of the mountain (the cubist) and the other (the realist) might be bright red and orange, portraying a "true to life" single angle, and so forth. Images are not only unique but sometimes hardly rooted in "the way things are." It's perhaps curious then, that when we think of humans as the image of God, we typically don't think of uniqueness. If we think of the image of God as pictures at all (which isn't, I think, common), we tend to think of cookie cutter images, each of us being enough like God that we are recognizably the same. The notion of cookie cutter images is then standardly understood in (traditional) Christian thinking by taking a platonic approach to what it is to be human. It thus cashes out the nature of humanity in terms of (essential) properties such as rationality, emotional richness,
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Papers by Mark McLeod-Harrison