Papers by Marina Bakalova
De Gruyter eBooks, Dec 31, 2011
In a letter to Moore, Wittgenstein says about sentences of the form "I believe that p, but not-p"... more In a letter to Moore, Wittgenstein says about sentences of the form "I believe that p, but not-p" that they show "that logic isn't as simple as logicians think it is". This is surprising. Moore's paradox is commonly taken to reveal something about the nature of belief and not about the nature of logic. Wittgenstein's remark on Moore's paradox can be read, however, as an argument against the Fregean picture of judgment and assertion and its corresponding idea of logic. I will illustrate the connection between Moore's paradox and the nature of logic in the light of Wittgenstein's criticism of the Fregean picture.
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, Mar 1, 2005
cited works by ernest sosa xi I would like to thank Ernest Sosa and all of our contributors for t... more cited works by ernest sosa xi I would like to thank Ernest Sosa and all of our contributors for their participation in the project. Thanks also to Ernest LePore, the editor of the series, and to Daniel Breyer, who was a great help with various aspects of the book, including the index. It has been a pleasure working with such an outstanding group of philosophers. Volumes such as this one are always a kind of tribute to the philosopher under discussion-it goes without saying that not everyone's work merits or receives this sort of attention. This volume turned out to be a tribute to Ernest Sosa the person, as well. I say this on the basis of the wonderful response by our contributors. I can't imagine that it has ever been so easy to bring together such an outstanding group of philosophers, so eager to participate in the project and so generous in their efforts. This has been a great celebration of Ernie and his work. preface xiii introduction xv Introduction: Motivations for Sosa's Epistemology Over the last four decades, Ernest Sosa has defended a complex and penetrating theory of knowledge-one that has consequences for every important issue raised in recent epistemology, and for many related issues as well. The essays in this volume, for example, address Sosa's positions regarding the nature of knowledge, internalism and externalism about justification, skepticism, foundationalism and coherentism, and the nature of intellectual virtue, but also his positions regarding realism, internalism and externalism about mental states, and the nature of reference. I will not try to summarize Sosa's views here, or to otherwise give them adequate treatment. This I leave to the volume's capable contributors, who provide both useful summaries and critical discussions of many aspects of Sosa's work in their essays. Rather, in this introduction I will reconstruct what, it seems to me, are some of the most important arguments motivating Sosa's general position in epistemology. I take this general position to be "externalist," in that it makes positive epistemic status depend on factors relevantly external to the knower. Furthermore, Sosa's general view is correctly characterized as a virtue theory, in that it adopts a distinctive direction of analysis. Specifically, it defines the evaluative properties of beliefs in terms of the evaluative properties (or virtues) of believers. Finally, Sosa's view places central importance on the notion of an epistemic perspective, where this is understood as a set of second-order beliefs about one's first-order beliefs and the reliability of their sources. Hence the label "virtue perspectivism" for Sosa's view. 1 Three Options in Epistemology It is fair to say that Sosa sees three broad options available in epistemology-not in the sense that these are the only ones logically possible, but in the sense that these are the ones deemed most plausible by those, past and present, who have thought carefully about relevant matters. The options are these: Classical foundationalism. The central idea is that one knows only what is obvious and what can be deductively proved from the obvious. Descartes's rationalism is an example, xvi introduction since "he concludes that we know only what we intuit or deduce: that our acceptance of a true proposition can have the epistemic justification (authority, warrant, status, call it what you will) required for knowledge only if it is either itself a rational intuition or the outcome of a logical deduction from nothing but rational intuitions as ultimate premises." 1 Hume's theory also counts, however, since he accepts as knowledge only what can be proved "on the basis of what is obvious at any given moment through reason or experience" (KP, 166-7). Coherentism. The coherentist rejects the idea of foundational knowledge, or knowledge that is not dependent on further knowledge for its evidence. The central idea is that all knowledge (justified belief, warranted belief) depends on further beliefs for its status as such. More specifically, a belief qualifies as knowledge in virtue of its membership in a sufficiently coherent and comprehensive system of beliefs. Reliabilism. A belief qualifies as knowledge (justified, warranted) in virtue of its deriving from a reliable (truth-conducive) process. Since some reliable processes depend on further beliefs for their inputs and some do not, there is no bar in principle to foundational knowledge. In fact, reliabilism is best understood as a kind of foundationalism. "Every bit of knowledge still lies atop a pyramid of knowledge. But the building requirements for pyramids are now less stringent. A belief may now join the base not only through perfectly reliable rational intuition but also through introspection, perception, or memory. And one may now erect a superstructure on such a basis not only by deduction but also by induction, both enumerative and hypothetical or explanatory" (KP, 89). Sosa levels several objections against the first two options, some of them quite traditional. For example, classical foundationalism is criticized for allowing too narrow a foundation to preserve the bulk of ordinary knowledge, and coherentism is criticized for failing to assign a proper role to experience in the justification of belief. Such objections can be both powerful and instructive, especially in the versions that Sosa formulates. I will ignore these here, however, and instead focus on a different series of objections raised by Sosa. These latter are aimed not so much at technical flaws or theoretical lacunae, but at the very motivations for the two positions. Properly understood, I believe, these objections help us to recognize, and to some extent reconceive, what is at issue in the dispute among competing options in epistemology. 2 Against the Argumentative Account of Justification Standing behind various arguments for coherentism, and behind various objections to foundationalism, is what Sosa calls the "argumentative account of justification" (KP, 253). According to Donald Davidson, "What distinguishes a coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief. Its partisan rejects as unintelligible the request for a ground or source of justification of another ilk." 2 According to Richard Rorty, "nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence." 3 Such reasoning at once makes foundational beliefs absurd and coherentism the only live option in sight. Right introduction xvii behind such reasoning, Sosa suggests, is the following argumentative conception of justification (AJ): (a) that for a belief to be justified is for the believer to justify it or to have justified it; and (b) that for one to justify a belief (really, successfully) is for one correctly and seriously to use considerations or reasons in its favor. But why accept (AJ)? Of course one can point to common usage, and insist that to justify is to bring reasons in favor. And if that does not work, one can simply stipulate accordingly. However, Sosa points out, neither of these strategies will give the coherentist what he wants. For in that case it remains possible that some knowledge is not justified, and so nothing so far counts against foundationalism or in favor of coherentism. The substantive issue is raised again by talking about epistemic authority (or warrant, or aptness), and by asking whether all epistemic authority requires argumentative justification. Moreover, Sosa argues, the argumentative account is in trouble as an account of epistemic authority in general. For to "correctly" use reasons in favor is surely to use justified reasons in favor, and in that case we are faced with a vicious regress. If a belief is knowledge only by being justified, and if being justified requires being based on further justified reasons, then there will be no end to the process of justifying. A natural response by the coherentist is to say that justification ends in coherence: that ultimately a belief is justified not by further reasons brought in its favor, but by its membership in a coherent system of reasons. An alternative response is to say that justification ends with what our peers let us say: that ultimately a belief is justified because it meets the standards that society plus context fix in place. But either response gives up the argumentative account of justification, and the idea that epistemic authority is always won by virtue of giving reasons. On the contrary, each response specifies an alternative basis for justification (coherence or social standards), and in doing so enters into a dispute with the foundationalist on equal footing. In other words, each response claims that something else, not justified reasons, is the ultimate source of epistemic authority. xviii introduction Suppose S and TwinS live lives indistinguishable physically or psychologically, indistinguishable both intrinsically and contextually, on Earth and Twin-Earth respectively. Surely there can then be no belief of S epistemically justified without a matching belief held by TwinS with equal epistemic justification. Epistemic justification must accordingly supervene upon or derive from physical or psychological properties of the subject of belief, properties either intrinsic or contextual. (KP, 110) An important aim of epistemology, Sosa reasons, is to specify the non-evaluative basis of supervenience, thus allowing a special sort of insight into the nature of justification and knowledge. In this respect, coherentists and foundationalists share a common goal: to specify such a basis in relatively simple and complete terms. It is from this perspective that the argumentative account of justification seems clearly hopeless. According to (AJ), for one to justify a belief is for one "correctly and...
Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 2018
Whitehead believed that education must give us ideas that are usable in our actual lives. This li... more Whitehead believed that education must give us ideas that are usable in our actual lives. This line of thought is naturally provoked by the significant abundance of inert ideas that people pile up though education. The main reason for that, I claim, is the wrong focus of traditional education. It aims at producing individuals that would deliver high results on exams and tests. I take Whitehead’s claim the education must put emphasis on usable ideas as my starting point. I give a specific interpretation of useable ideas as abilities or functions. This provides a ground for connecting Whiteheadian thought to an already existing educational platform, offered by Nel Noddings. Noddings develops a cognitive theory of education which places cognitive structures (I assume a robust analogy between structures, functions, and abilities) in the center of educational concern. At the end of the paper, I estimate some consequences from adopting the terminology of functions for connecting between human and machine learning.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu, 2016
Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 2021
This paper reveals the importance of learning emotion concepts due to the efficiency of emotional... more This paper reveals the importance of learning emotion concepts due to the efficiency of emotional granularity during the categorization of emotions. There are two ways of learning emotion concepts that can contribute to emotional granularity. First, we can learn emotion words. Second, we can learn the implicit content of our emotion concepts, i.e. how emotions feel to us. In order to complete the second task, we need to acquire vivid awareness and vivid memory of the implicit content of our emotion concept. I claim that only after completing the second task can we learn emotion words in a way that is efficient for the categorization of emotions. The problem with that claim is that we do not know how to study the implicit content of our emotions, and how to obtain vivid awareness of it. In this article, I sketch a basic solution to this problem. The article has three parts. In the first part, I outline Lisa Barrett’s Conceptual Act View in order to reveal the functional role of emoti...
Organon F, May 24, 2021
Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressivenes... more Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressiveness has epistemic value. The article has six parts. In the first part, I provide examples of what music can express. I suggest that it can express inner states with phenomenal character. In the second part, I build up an argument in favor of the claim that, granted its expressiveness, music can convey conceptual content which is not verbal, and which cannot be expressed verbally. This conclusion is limited to concepts like lyrical, nostalgic, melancholy, joyful, distressful etc. In the third part, I explain what musical expressive content is, in contrast and by analogy to, propositional content. In the fourth part, I apply Mitchell Green's multispace model of artistic expression to music. I argue that Green's theory of expression provides a powerful explanation of how a musical sequence can express states with phenomenal character. In the fifth part, I use that model to define adequacy conditions for musical expressive ascriptions. In the last part, I attempt to explain musical knowledge by combining Green's multi-space model with Sosa-style virtue epistemology.
Diogenes, 2019
This article is inspired by a long-lasting debate with a friend and colleague of mine Anna Ivanov... more This article is inspired by a long-lasting debate with a friend and colleague of mine Anna Ivanova about the role of evidence in a general analysis of knowledge. The article summarizes the key points in the debate between epistemic internalists and epistemic externalists, and highlights some of the major arguments undermining the epistemic internalism, according to which access to evidence is not a necessary condition for knowledge.
2020 International Conference Automatics and Informatics (ICAI), 2020
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model for implementing recognition of human qualia based ... more In this paper, we propose a theoretical model for implementing recognition of human qualia based on machine learning. Our model draws from the idea of mapping affects onto a multi-dimensional space of sensory stimuli. The idea has background in philosophy and cognitive science but we believe it can make a contribution to the fields of social robotics and social assistive robotics. The paper has two main parts. In the first part, we discuss some defining characteristics of consciousness referred to by contemporary scholars of robotics. We also explain the hard problem of qualia. In the second part, we present our own proposal of how to make qualia recognizable to a robot.
Achieving Knowledge
This dissertation attempts to offer an analysis of knowledge. The investigation is centered on a ... more This dissertation attempts to offer an analysis of knowledge. The investigation is centered on a minimal sufficient condition for knowledge, a condition that is also supposed to account for knowledge in its full generality at a basic level (not including levels of epistemic ascent). My starting points are the theories of virtue epistemology developed by Ernest Sosa and John Greco. I defend the view that knowledge is success from intelligent ability (the KSA thesis), including both practical and theoretical abilities. I argue that KSA is a sustainable definition of knowledge. The following elements in my analysis of knowledge are crucial: knowledge is a broad mental state; knowledge is analyzable into internal and external components; knowledge entails credit; knowledge is compatible with various forms of epistemic luck. I consider each one of these points separately. The last chapter examines the application of the view to the problem of perception.
International Philosophical Quarterly, 2005
Background: Previous studies suggest genome structure is largely conserved between Eucalyptus spe... more Background: Previous studies suggest genome structure is largely conserved between Eucalyptus species. However, it is unknown if this conservation extends to more divergent eucalypt taxa. We performed comparative genomics between the eucalypt genera Eucalyptus and Corymbia. Our results will facilitate transfer of genomic information between these important taxa and provide further insights into the rate of structural change in tree genomes. Results: We constructed three high density linkage maps for two Corymbia species (Corymbia citriodora subsp. variegata and Corymbia torelliana) which were used to compare genome structure between both species and Eucalyptus grandis. Genome structure was highly conserved between the Corymbia species. However, the comparison of Corymbia and E. grandis suggests large (from 1-13 MB) intra-chromosomal rearrangements have occurred on seven of the 11 chromosomes. Most rearrangements were supported through comparisons of the three independent Corymbia maps to the E. grandis genome sequence, and to other independently constructed Eucalyptus linkage maps. Conclusions: These are the first large scale chromosomal rearrangements discovered between eucalypts. Nonetheless, in the general context of plants, the genomic structure of the two genera was remarkably conserved; adding to a growing body of evidence that conservation of genome structure is common amongst woody angiosperms.
Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressivenes... more Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressiveness has epistemic value. The article has six parts. In the first part, I provide examples of what music can express. I suggest that it can express inner states with phenomenal character. In the second part, I build up an argument in favor of the claim that, granted its expressiveness, music can convey conceptual content which is not verbal, and which cannot be expressed verbally. This conclusion is limited to concepts like lyrical, nostalgic, melancholy, joyful, distressful etc. In the third part, I explain what musical expressive content is, in contrast and by analogy to, propositional content. In the fourth part, I apply Mitchell Green’s multispace model of artistic expression to music. I argue that Green’s theory of expression provides a powerful explanation of how a musical sequence can express states with phenomenal character. In the fifth part, I use that model to define adequacy con...
In situations of peer disagreement there are two kinds of factors that matter. These are the fact... more In situations of peer disagreement there are two kinds of factors that matter. These are the factors internal to the discussion, such as evidence exposed and arguments presented by both sides and there are also factors external to the discussion, also called “independent factors”. The external factors include mainly virtues and competences of the participants. There are two main theories about epistemic disagreement, “the steadfast view” and “the conciliationism”, and each of them stresses the importance of one group of these factors over the other. This paper is a defense of the greater epistemic significance of independent factors over internal factors. However, it is not a defense of the conciliationism which takes independent factors to be systematically the ultimate arbiter in situations of peer disagreement. The argument in the paper goes like this. Although the steadfast view receives strong intuitive support from two cases presented by Thomas Kelly: “Right and Wrong” and “Wr...
In his scattered remarks on music, Wittgenstein adopts a rule-based account of musical understand... more In his scattered remarks on music, Wittgenstein adopts a rule-based account of musical understanding also known as musical formalism. This is the view that understanding a piece of music does not presuppose matching the musical sequence with one’s own mental states. It entails instead, recognizing the proper use of conventions and theoretical terminology of a given musical system, such as the Western musical system. I argue that Wittgenstein’s musical formalism is misguided. It raises important questions that it has no resources to answer. The opposite view, according to which musical understanding is tightly related to cognitive, emotional or imaginative states of the listener, can answer these questions better. We have to take into account that if Wittgenstein were to witness the cognitive revolution he would most probably have changed his mind concerning scientific potential of psychology and our grasp of the mental realm. In particular, he may have to accept that certain psychol...
Balkan Journal of Philosophy
Whitehead believed that education must give us ideas that are usable in our actual lives. This li... more Whitehead believed that education must give us ideas that are usable in our actual lives. This line of thought is naturally provoked by the significant abundance of inert ideas that people pile up though education. The main reason for that, I claim, is the wrong focus of traditional education. It aims at producing individuals that would deliver high results on exams and tests. I take Whitehead’s claim the education must put emphasis on usable ideas as my starting point. I give a specific interpretation of useable ideas as abilities or functions. This provides a ground for connecting Whiteheadian thought to an already existing educational platform, offered by Nel Noddings. Noddings develops a cognitive theory of education which places cognitive structures (I assume a robust analogy between structures, functions, and abilities) in the center of educational concern. At the end of the paper, I estimate some consequences from adopting the terminology of functions for connecting between h...
Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressivenes... more Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressiveness has epistemic value. The article has six parts. In the first part, I provide examples of what music can express. I suggest that it can express inner states with phenomenal character. In the second part, I build up an argument in favor of the claim that, granted its expressiveness, music can convey conceptual content which is not verbal, and which cannot be expressed verbally. This conclusion is limited to concepts like lyrical, nostalgic, melancholy, joyful, distressful etc. In the third part, I explain what musical expressive content is, in contrast and by analogy to, propositional content. In the fourth part, I apply Mitchell Green's multispace model of artistic expression to music. I argue that Green's theory of expression provides a powerful explanation of how a musical sequence can express states with phenomenal character. In the fifth part, I use that model to define adequacy conditions for musical expressive ascriptions. In the last part, I attempt to explain musical knowledge by combining Green's multi-space model with Sosa-style virtue epistemology.
Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressivenes... more Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressiveness has epistemic value. The article has six parts. In the first part, I provide examples of what music can express. I suggest that it can express inner states with phenomenal character. In the second part, I build up an argument in favor of the claim that, granted its expressiveness, music can convey conceptual content which is not verbal, and which cannot be expressed verbally. This conclusion is limited to concepts like lyrical, nostalgic, melancholy, joyful, distressful etc. In the third part, I explain what musical expressive content is, in contrast and by analogy to, propositional content. In the fourth part, I apply Mitchell Green's multispace model of artistic expression to music. I argue that Green's theory of expression provides a powerful explanation of how a musical sequence can express states with phenomenal character. In the fifth part, I use that model to define adequacy conditions for musical expressive ascriptions. In the last part, I attempt to explain musical knowledge by combining Green's multi-space model with Sosa-style virtue epistemology.
Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressivenes... more Assuming that music can be expressive, I try to answer the question whether musical expressiveness has epistemic value. The article has six parts. In the first part, I provide examples of what music can express. I suggest that it can express inner states with phenomenal character. In the second part, I build up an argument in favor of the claim that, granted its expressiveness, music can convey conceptual content which is not verbal, and which cannot be expressed verbally. This conclusion is limited to concepts like lyrical, nostalgic, melancholy, joyful, distressful etc. In the third part, I explain what musical expressive content is, in contrast and by analogy to, propositional content. In the fourth part, I apply Mitchell Green's multispace model of artistic expression to music. I argue that Green's theory of expression provides a powerful explanation of how a musical sequence can express states with phenomenal character. In the fifth part, I use that model to define adequacy conditions for musical expressive ascriptions. In the last part, I attempt to explain musical knowledge by combining Green's multi-space model with Sosa-style virtue epistemology.
Uploads
Papers by Marina Bakalova