1. Commentary. 1983;76(5):32-40. The famine the "Times" couldn't find.... more 1. Commentary. 1983;76(5):32-40. The famine the "Times" couldn't find. Carynnyk M. PMID: 11616853 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]. Publication Types: Historical Article. MeSH Terms: Food/history*; Food Supply/history*; History ...
... Kosyk and John A. Armstrong, for instance, ... The next was Michael Hanusiak, a contributor t... more ... Kosyk and John A. Armstrong, for instance, ... The next was Michael Hanusiak, a contributor to the pro-Soviet New York weekly Ukrai'ns'ki visti, whose semi-scholarly books Lest We Forget and Ukrainischer Nationalismus aimed to discredit any kind of Ukrainian nationalism. ...
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN, came into being in 1929 as an “integral natio... more The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN, came into being in 1929 as an “integral nationalist” movement that set itself the goal of driving Polish landowners and officials out of eastern Galicia and Volhynia, joining hands with Ukrainians in other countries, and establishing an independent state. The OUN defined Jews, along with Russians and Poles, as aliens and enemies. There was no need, wrote an OUN ideologist in 1929, to list all the injuries that Jews caused Ukrainians. “In addition to a number of external enemies Ukraine also has an internal enemy … Jewry and its negative consequences for our liberation cause can be liquidated only by an organized collective effort”. The article examines archival documents, publications by OUN members, and recent scholarly literature to trace the evolution of OUN thinking about Jews from 1929 through the war years, when the German occupation of Ukraine gave the OUN an opportunity to stage pogroms and persecute Jews, and the prime minister of the state that the OUN proclaimed wrote that he supported “the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine”.
The first number refers to the document, the second to the page. 6. "J'ai traverse I'Ukraine. Eh ... more The first number refers to the document, the second to the page. 6. "J'ai traverse I'Ukraine. Eh bien! je vous affirme que je 1'ai vue tel un jardin en plein rendement. On assure, me dites-vous, que cette contr6e vit & cette heure une 6poque attristle? Je ne peux parler de ce que je n'ai pas vu. Pourtant je me suis fait conduire dans des endroits qu'on disait 6prouv6s. Or, je n'ai constatl que la prosp6rit6...." Interview with Heniot in La Nouvelliste, 14 September 1933. Quoted in Fred Kupferman, Au pays des Soviets: le voyage franqais en Union soviitique 1917-1939 (Paris, 1979). 90. xlvi Union as a profitable market for the exports of its beleaguered industries and as a source of cheap food with which to feed its disgruntled popu¬ lace. Paul Scheffer described the British desire for Soviet markets in July 1926. The Foreign Office, the Bank of England, the City, and allied die-hards all believed that England and Europe would not be able to emerge from their difficulties unless the Soviet Union again became a "natural market'' that Europe could exploit. "A lavish opening of Rus¬ sian business," wrote Scheffer, "is an absolute and unavoidable neces¬ sity for Europe-the fact is becoming more and more apparent every day."62 The steady growth of Anglo-Soviet trade in the mid-1920s was inter¬ rupted by the Conservatives' break in official relations with Moscow in May 1927. The Soviet Union responded by minimizing purchases in Britain: of total Soviet orders for machinery and metal products placed abroad from 1926 to 1936 (72 per cent of all Soviet imports in that period), the United States received 34.1 percent, Germany 19.1 percent and Britain only 4.4 per cent. Under competitive conditions, each coun¬ try would have received about 20 per cent of the total. At the same time the Soviets maintained their sales to Britain at as high a level as possible, thereby shifting the balance of Anglo-Soviet trade in their favour. It was for this reason that Ovey wrote in a letter to Henderson in March 1930 that the encouraging of British exports to the Soviet Union was a "press¬ ing matter." Britain's policy, he gathered, was "to maintain correct and friendly relations with the Soviet Government, with a view to encour¬ aging trade as much as possible." Ovey then discussed ways of increas¬ ing exports to the Soviet Union. "That we buy commodities from Rus¬ sia," he wrote, "arises principally from the fact that it is the cheapest market." The Soviet ability to buy from Britain depended on its ability to sell to Britain. "The more Russia sells to us the more she should be sympathetically inclined ceteris paribus to buy from us," Ovey concluded.61 What the Soviet Union was selling to Britain, of course, was grain. Of the average annual exports of 142 million bushels of wheat from Russia in 1908-12, only 27.7 million had gone to Britain. In 1931-32, 51.4 million bushels of the total wheat exports of 65.7 million bushels went to Britain. In 1930-31 and 1932-33, Britain imported 40 per cent of her wheat from the USSR as compared with less than 20 per cent in prewar days. To put it a different way, in 1926 Britain's imports of Soviet wheat amounted to only £1,493,728. By 1930 the value had increased to £5,751,955, and wheat was the single largest item imported from the Soviet Union.64 In the first three or four months of the 1931 harvest season alone, Cairns pointed out, the Soviet Union sold to Britain xlvii about half of all the wheat she exported. (10: 122) Between 1929 and 1933 the British market absorbed an average of 25 per cent (by value) of annual Soviet exports and 40 per cent of Soviet grain.65 The British government's wish to assure continuing exports of Soviet wheat was not motivated solely by a desire to keep the MacDonald gov¬ ernment in office by feeding the people in the breadlines and making Manchester manufacturers happy. Moscow had borrowed a great deal of money in the West, especially in Germany, to finance its industrializa¬ tion, and it could repay its loans only by selling grain. The Soviets were financing their programme of industrialization with short-term loans which they paid off by exporting wheat. Between 1926 and 1930 Britain lent between thirty and forty million pounds to Germany. The Germans kept a percentage for themselves and passed the credits on to the Soviet Union, which used them to purchase goods, principally heavy machin¬ ery, in Germany. Britain was thus financing Germany's export trade with the Soviet Union.66 A serious public campaign to alleviate the famine by returning the grain to those who needed it most would, therefore, have brought about a reduction of Soviet grain exports, and that, in turn, would have upset the international banking system, in which London had such a great stake.67 These documents, then, support the thesis that Britain kept quiet about the famine for several reasons. There was the indifference that is the usual response to a catastrophe in a remote and little known land. There was the misleading and sometimes simply mendacious reporting that confused the public and prevented the few who were genuinely con¬ cerned from mounting an effective campaign. There was the effect of Nazi propaganda, which cited the famine as an example of the "Bol¬ shevik menace" and thus discredited Ukrainian aspirations for inde¬ pendence for decades to come. Above all, there was a desire not to disrupt trade with the Soviet Union. Cheap wheat was more important than human life. It was a decade, Vansittart observed in his memoirs, when it was fashionable to do nothing.68 Humanitarian duty was irrel¬ evant. Starved by their rulers, the Ukrainians nonetheless had no claim upon British compassion. The Soviet authorities had done all they could to conceal the facts. The British had chosen, with equal determination, not to see what they did not want to see.69 *The Foreign Office referred-interchangeably and often misleadingly-to famine in "Ukraine," "South Russia," "Russia" and the "Soviet Union." The political geography of the famine of 1932-1933 is still poorly understood. And little progress has been made in determining xlviii how many victims the famine claimed. Estimates by observers-the reader will find some of them in these documents-range from one to ten million (and in one case even fifteen million) victims. The range of present-day calculations is only slightly narrower, although many schol¬ ars speak of a figure between five and eight million. The difficulty, of course, lies in the absence of reliable data. The first Soviet census, held in 1926, gave a detailed picture of the population before collectivization, famine and purges began to take their toll. But the results of the next census, held in 1937, never appeared in print, apparently because they would have revealed a population of 158 million, about 10 per cent less than could have been expected given a normal rate of increase.70 A new census, taken in 1939, was published in the form of less than ten pages of tables.71 We therefore drew on the Soviet census of 1959-the first full census after the famine-to estimate the intensity of population losses in Ukraine and adjacent regions.72 Following Sergei Maksudov, we restricted our calculations to the rural female cohort because of its "quasi-stable" nature, thus avoiding the problems of the volatile mortality rate among men and the greater geographic mobility of rural men and urban men and women.73 By comparing the number of rural women bom between 1929 and 1933 with the number bom between 1934 and 1938 we were able to calculate rates of decline, which include mortality, especially that of infants and foetuses not carried to term or aborted, and failure to conceive because of prevailing conditions. Having calculated a mean for the western Ukrainian regions annexed in 1939 and for the RSFSR regions adjacent to Ukraine, we standardized the rates of decline for the regions located within Soviet Ukraine before 1939. We then arranged these rates of decline according to rank, grouped them in the table below to show both the regional intensities and their territorial character and then plotted the data on the map headed "Geography of the 1932-33 Famine." Of the other two maps, "Ukraine in Europe" shows the Ukrainian SSR at the time of the famine. "The Chernozem Belt" indi¬ cates the region of fertile black earth that runs through central Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Volga region. The conclusions that can be drawn from the table and maps are clear. First, no region of Ukraine within the pre-1939 borders entirely escaped the famine. Even the Proskuriv/Khmelnytskyi region, the only area within Soviet Ukraine before 1939 that shows a zero rate of decline, had famine losses, although they did not affect the comparative size of the generations.74 Second, Moldavia, Belorussia and the Russian regions immediately to the north of Ukraine did not experience significant rates of decline, although their climate, soil and agriculture are similar to those xlix in adjacent regions of Ukraine. Third, declines were greatest in central Ukraine and the North Caucasus, where there were extensive Ukrainian settlements.75 Fourth, the areas of greatest decline coincide with the fer¬ tile chernozem belt. The famine was less severe in the podzolized soil regions of the forest steppe, the intrazonal regions and the chestnut soil regions along the Black Sea.76 This suggests that the famine was the result of a decision to extract from the most fertile regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus the maximum amount of grain in order to finance industrialization. The famine, in other words, was not a natural phe¬ nomenon but a politically engineered cataclysm.
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN, came into being in 1929 as an “integral natio... more The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN, came into being in 1929 as an “integral nationalist” movement that set itself the goal of driving Polish landowners and officials out of eastern Galicia and Volhynia, joining hands with Ukrainians in other countries, and establishing an independent state. The OUN defined Jews, along with Russians and Poles, as aliens and enemies. There was no need, wrote an OUN ideologist in 1929, to list all the injuries that Jews caused Ukrainians. “In addition to a number of external enemies Ukraine also has an internal enemy … Jewry and its negative consequences for our liberation cause can be liquidated only by an organized collective effort”. The article examines archival documents, publications by OUN members, and recent scholarly literature to trace the evolution of OUN thinking about Jews from 1929 through the war years, when the German occupation of Ukraine gave the OUN an opportunity to stage pogroms and persecute Jews, and the prime min...
Deciphering the history of the factious, secretive, and until the late 1940s violent Organization... more Deciphering the history of the factious, secretive, and until the late 1940s violent Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia UkrainsTcykh Natsionalistiv, OUN), has been difficult. The voluminous memoirs and polemics that both its friends and foes have written evade crucial issues. Many of the papers that the OUN itself produced ended up in Soviet repositories, and few researchers were allowed to see them. When the authorities occasionally released documents concerning the OUN, they made politically motivated omissions. In the West, the OUN-Mthose members who remained loyal to Andrii Mel'nyk when the OUN split into two factions in 1940rarely divulged documents. The OUN-B those who supported Stepan Bandera and its sympathizers published documents more frequently, but censored passages that contradicted the image of a heroic organization that had noble aims and methods and enjoyed overwhelming support.1 Thus the Paris scholar Wolodymyr Kosyk cut the words, "The l...
I van has ensconced himself, on this festive summer day, at the very centre of the formation. Hal... more I van has ensconced himself, on this festive summer day, at the very centre of the formation. Half a dozen of his comrades nestle against him. Twenty-one tower behind him. Except for one fellow who is making do with a jacket and trousers they are all arrayed in suits and white shirts. Most are also wearing ties, but a few, following the fashion of the day, have laid their shirt collars open over their jackets. Two men are holding straw hats in their hands; one grasps a cane, and one, in a dapper light-coloured suit, flaunts both a hat and a cane. The starched shirts, ties, suits, and canes are talismans, signs of status. These gentlement are students. They have earned the right to devote themselves to higher education and politics.
1. Commentary. 1983;76(5):32-40. The famine the "Times" couldn't find.... more 1. Commentary. 1983;76(5):32-40. The famine the "Times" couldn't find. Carynnyk M. PMID: 11616853 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]. Publication Types: Historical Article. MeSH Terms: Food/history*; Food Supply/history*; History ...
... Kosyk and John A. Armstrong, for instance, ... The next was Michael Hanusiak, a contributor t... more ... Kosyk and John A. Armstrong, for instance, ... The next was Michael Hanusiak, a contributor to the pro-Soviet New York weekly Ukrai'ns'ki visti, whose semi-scholarly books Lest We Forget and Ukrainischer Nationalismus aimed to discredit any kind of Ukrainian nationalism. ...
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN, came into being in 1929 as an “integral natio... more The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN, came into being in 1929 as an “integral nationalist” movement that set itself the goal of driving Polish landowners and officials out of eastern Galicia and Volhynia, joining hands with Ukrainians in other countries, and establishing an independent state. The OUN defined Jews, along with Russians and Poles, as aliens and enemies. There was no need, wrote an OUN ideologist in 1929, to list all the injuries that Jews caused Ukrainians. “In addition to a number of external enemies Ukraine also has an internal enemy … Jewry and its negative consequences for our liberation cause can be liquidated only by an organized collective effort”. The article examines archival documents, publications by OUN members, and recent scholarly literature to trace the evolution of OUN thinking about Jews from 1929 through the war years, when the German occupation of Ukraine gave the OUN an opportunity to stage pogroms and persecute Jews, and the prime minister of the state that the OUN proclaimed wrote that he supported “the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine”.
The first number refers to the document, the second to the page. 6. "J'ai traverse I'Ukraine. Eh ... more The first number refers to the document, the second to the page. 6. "J'ai traverse I'Ukraine. Eh bien! je vous affirme que je 1'ai vue tel un jardin en plein rendement. On assure, me dites-vous, que cette contr6e vit & cette heure une 6poque attristle? Je ne peux parler de ce que je n'ai pas vu. Pourtant je me suis fait conduire dans des endroits qu'on disait 6prouv6s. Or, je n'ai constatl que la prosp6rit6...." Interview with Heniot in La Nouvelliste, 14 September 1933. Quoted in Fred Kupferman, Au pays des Soviets: le voyage franqais en Union soviitique 1917-1939 (Paris, 1979). 90. xlvi Union as a profitable market for the exports of its beleaguered industries and as a source of cheap food with which to feed its disgruntled popu¬ lace. Paul Scheffer described the British desire for Soviet markets in July 1926. The Foreign Office, the Bank of England, the City, and allied die-hards all believed that England and Europe would not be able to emerge from their difficulties unless the Soviet Union again became a "natural market'' that Europe could exploit. "A lavish opening of Rus¬ sian business," wrote Scheffer, "is an absolute and unavoidable neces¬ sity for Europe-the fact is becoming more and more apparent every day."62 The steady growth of Anglo-Soviet trade in the mid-1920s was inter¬ rupted by the Conservatives' break in official relations with Moscow in May 1927. The Soviet Union responded by minimizing purchases in Britain: of total Soviet orders for machinery and metal products placed abroad from 1926 to 1936 (72 per cent of all Soviet imports in that period), the United States received 34.1 percent, Germany 19.1 percent and Britain only 4.4 per cent. Under competitive conditions, each coun¬ try would have received about 20 per cent of the total. At the same time the Soviets maintained their sales to Britain at as high a level as possible, thereby shifting the balance of Anglo-Soviet trade in their favour. It was for this reason that Ovey wrote in a letter to Henderson in March 1930 that the encouraging of British exports to the Soviet Union was a "press¬ ing matter." Britain's policy, he gathered, was "to maintain correct and friendly relations with the Soviet Government, with a view to encour¬ aging trade as much as possible." Ovey then discussed ways of increas¬ ing exports to the Soviet Union. "That we buy commodities from Rus¬ sia," he wrote, "arises principally from the fact that it is the cheapest market." The Soviet ability to buy from Britain depended on its ability to sell to Britain. "The more Russia sells to us the more she should be sympathetically inclined ceteris paribus to buy from us," Ovey concluded.61 What the Soviet Union was selling to Britain, of course, was grain. Of the average annual exports of 142 million bushels of wheat from Russia in 1908-12, only 27.7 million had gone to Britain. In 1931-32, 51.4 million bushels of the total wheat exports of 65.7 million bushels went to Britain. In 1930-31 and 1932-33, Britain imported 40 per cent of her wheat from the USSR as compared with less than 20 per cent in prewar days. To put it a different way, in 1926 Britain's imports of Soviet wheat amounted to only £1,493,728. By 1930 the value had increased to £5,751,955, and wheat was the single largest item imported from the Soviet Union.64 In the first three or four months of the 1931 harvest season alone, Cairns pointed out, the Soviet Union sold to Britain xlvii about half of all the wheat she exported. (10: 122) Between 1929 and 1933 the British market absorbed an average of 25 per cent (by value) of annual Soviet exports and 40 per cent of Soviet grain.65 The British government's wish to assure continuing exports of Soviet wheat was not motivated solely by a desire to keep the MacDonald gov¬ ernment in office by feeding the people in the breadlines and making Manchester manufacturers happy. Moscow had borrowed a great deal of money in the West, especially in Germany, to finance its industrializa¬ tion, and it could repay its loans only by selling grain. The Soviets were financing their programme of industrialization with short-term loans which they paid off by exporting wheat. Between 1926 and 1930 Britain lent between thirty and forty million pounds to Germany. The Germans kept a percentage for themselves and passed the credits on to the Soviet Union, which used them to purchase goods, principally heavy machin¬ ery, in Germany. Britain was thus financing Germany's export trade with the Soviet Union.66 A serious public campaign to alleviate the famine by returning the grain to those who needed it most would, therefore, have brought about a reduction of Soviet grain exports, and that, in turn, would have upset the international banking system, in which London had such a great stake.67 These documents, then, support the thesis that Britain kept quiet about the famine for several reasons. There was the indifference that is the usual response to a catastrophe in a remote and little known land. There was the misleading and sometimes simply mendacious reporting that confused the public and prevented the few who were genuinely con¬ cerned from mounting an effective campaign. There was the effect of Nazi propaganda, which cited the famine as an example of the "Bol¬ shevik menace" and thus discredited Ukrainian aspirations for inde¬ pendence for decades to come. Above all, there was a desire not to disrupt trade with the Soviet Union. Cheap wheat was more important than human life. It was a decade, Vansittart observed in his memoirs, when it was fashionable to do nothing.68 Humanitarian duty was irrel¬ evant. Starved by their rulers, the Ukrainians nonetheless had no claim upon British compassion. The Soviet authorities had done all they could to conceal the facts. The British had chosen, with equal determination, not to see what they did not want to see.69 *The Foreign Office referred-interchangeably and often misleadingly-to famine in "Ukraine," "South Russia," "Russia" and the "Soviet Union." The political geography of the famine of 1932-1933 is still poorly understood. And little progress has been made in determining xlviii how many victims the famine claimed. Estimates by observers-the reader will find some of them in these documents-range from one to ten million (and in one case even fifteen million) victims. The range of present-day calculations is only slightly narrower, although many schol¬ ars speak of a figure between five and eight million. The difficulty, of course, lies in the absence of reliable data. The first Soviet census, held in 1926, gave a detailed picture of the population before collectivization, famine and purges began to take their toll. But the results of the next census, held in 1937, never appeared in print, apparently because they would have revealed a population of 158 million, about 10 per cent less than could have been expected given a normal rate of increase.70 A new census, taken in 1939, was published in the form of less than ten pages of tables.71 We therefore drew on the Soviet census of 1959-the first full census after the famine-to estimate the intensity of population losses in Ukraine and adjacent regions.72 Following Sergei Maksudov, we restricted our calculations to the rural female cohort because of its "quasi-stable" nature, thus avoiding the problems of the volatile mortality rate among men and the greater geographic mobility of rural men and urban men and women.73 By comparing the number of rural women bom between 1929 and 1933 with the number bom between 1934 and 1938 we were able to calculate rates of decline, which include mortality, especially that of infants and foetuses not carried to term or aborted, and failure to conceive because of prevailing conditions. Having calculated a mean for the western Ukrainian regions annexed in 1939 and for the RSFSR regions adjacent to Ukraine, we standardized the rates of decline for the regions located within Soviet Ukraine before 1939. We then arranged these rates of decline according to rank, grouped them in the table below to show both the regional intensities and their territorial character and then plotted the data on the map headed "Geography of the 1932-33 Famine." Of the other two maps, "Ukraine in Europe" shows the Ukrainian SSR at the time of the famine. "The Chernozem Belt" indi¬ cates the region of fertile black earth that runs through central Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Volga region. The conclusions that can be drawn from the table and maps are clear. First, no region of Ukraine within the pre-1939 borders entirely escaped the famine. Even the Proskuriv/Khmelnytskyi region, the only area within Soviet Ukraine before 1939 that shows a zero rate of decline, had famine losses, although they did not affect the comparative size of the generations.74 Second, Moldavia, Belorussia and the Russian regions immediately to the north of Ukraine did not experience significant rates of decline, although their climate, soil and agriculture are similar to those xlix in adjacent regions of Ukraine. Third, declines were greatest in central Ukraine and the North Caucasus, where there were extensive Ukrainian settlements.75 Fourth, the areas of greatest decline coincide with the fer¬ tile chernozem belt. The famine was less severe in the podzolized soil regions of the forest steppe, the intrazonal regions and the chestnut soil regions along the Black Sea.76 This suggests that the famine was the result of a decision to extract from the most fertile regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus the maximum amount of grain in order to finance industrialization. The famine, in other words, was not a natural phe¬ nomenon but a politically engineered cataclysm.
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN, came into being in 1929 as an “integral natio... more The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN, came into being in 1929 as an “integral nationalist” movement that set itself the goal of driving Polish landowners and officials out of eastern Galicia and Volhynia, joining hands with Ukrainians in other countries, and establishing an independent state. The OUN defined Jews, along with Russians and Poles, as aliens and enemies. There was no need, wrote an OUN ideologist in 1929, to list all the injuries that Jews caused Ukrainians. “In addition to a number of external enemies Ukraine also has an internal enemy … Jewry and its negative consequences for our liberation cause can be liquidated only by an organized collective effort”. The article examines archival documents, publications by OUN members, and recent scholarly literature to trace the evolution of OUN thinking about Jews from 1929 through the war years, when the German occupation of Ukraine gave the OUN an opportunity to stage pogroms and persecute Jews, and the prime min...
Deciphering the history of the factious, secretive, and until the late 1940s violent Organization... more Deciphering the history of the factious, secretive, and until the late 1940s violent Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia UkrainsTcykh Natsionalistiv, OUN), has been difficult. The voluminous memoirs and polemics that both its friends and foes have written evade crucial issues. Many of the papers that the OUN itself produced ended up in Soviet repositories, and few researchers were allowed to see them. When the authorities occasionally released documents concerning the OUN, they made politically motivated omissions. In the West, the OUN-Mthose members who remained loyal to Andrii Mel'nyk when the OUN split into two factions in 1940rarely divulged documents. The OUN-B those who supported Stepan Bandera and its sympathizers published documents more frequently, but censored passages that contradicted the image of a heroic organization that had noble aims and methods and enjoyed overwhelming support.1 Thus the Paris scholar Wolodymyr Kosyk cut the words, "The l...
I van has ensconced himself, on this festive summer day, at the very centre of the formation. Hal... more I van has ensconced himself, on this festive summer day, at the very centre of the formation. Half a dozen of his comrades nestle against him. Twenty-one tower behind him. Except for one fellow who is making do with a jacket and trousers they are all arrayed in suits and white shirts. Most are also wearing ties, but a few, following the fashion of the day, have laid their shirt collars open over their jackets. Two men are holding straw hats in their hands; one grasps a cane, and one, in a dapper light-coloured suit, flaunts both a hat and a cane. The starched shirts, ties, suits, and canes are talismans, signs of status. These gentlement are students. They have earned the right to devote themselves to higher education and politics.
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Papers by Marco Carynnyk