Papers by Marcella LUCCHETTA
Annals of finance, Apr 26, 2024
University of Chicago Press eBooks, 2013
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views express... more This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. This paper presents a modeling framework that delivers joint forecasts of indicators of systemic real risk and systemic financial risk, as well as stress-tests of these indicators as impulse responses to structural shocks identified by standard macroeconomic and banking theory. This framework is implemented using large sets of quarterly time series of indicators of financial and real activity for the G-7 economies for the 1980Q1-2009Q3 period. We obtain two main results. First, there is evidence of out-of sample forecasting power for tail risk realizations of real activity for several countries, suggesting the usefulness of the model as a risk monitoring tool. Second, in all countries aggregate demand shocks are the main drivers of the real cycle, and bank credit demand shocks are the main drivers of the bank lending cycle. These results challenge the common wisdom that constraints in the aggregate supply of credit have been a key driver of the sharp downturn in real activity experienced by the G-7 economies in 2008Q4-2009Q1.
Social Science Research Network, 2009
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views express... more This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically relevant, and demonstrate the need of general equilibrium modeling to design financial policies aimed at attaining socially optimal levels of systemic risk in the economy.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2013
This paper studies the quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending an... more This paper studies the quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending and value metrics of e ciency and welfare in a dynamic model of banks that are financed by debt and equity, undertake maturity transformation, are exposed to credit and liquidity risks, and face financing frictions. We show that: (a) there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between bank lending, welfare, and capital requirements; (b) liquidity requirements unambiguously reduce lending, e ciency and welfare; and (c) resolution policies contingent on observed capital, such as prompt corrective action, dominate in e ciency and welfare terms (non-contingent) capital and liquidity requirements.
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views express... more This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically relevant, and demonstrate the need of general equilibrium modeling to design financial policies aimed at attaining socially optimal levels of systemic risk in the economy.
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant ... more We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relatively efficient, then perfect competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results are empirically relevant and carry significant implications for financial policy.
Social Science Research Network, 2011
This paper formulates a novel modeling framework that delivers: (a) forecasts of indicators of sy... more This paper formulates a novel modeling framework that delivers: (a) forecasts of indicators of systemic real risk and systemic financial risk based on density forecasts of indicators of real activity and financial health; (b) stress-tests as measures of the dynamics of responses of systemic risk indicators to structural shocks identified by standard macroeconomic and banking theory. Using a large number of quarterly time series of the G-7 economies in 1980Q1-2010Q2, we show that the model exhibits significant out-of sample forecasting power for tail real and financial risk realizations, and that stress testing provides useful early warnings on the build-up of real and financial vulnerabilities.
Review of Financial Studies, Apr 1, 2014
This paper studies the quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending an... more This paper studies the quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending and value metrics of efficiency and welfare in a dynamic model of banks that are financed by debt and equity, undertake maturity transformation, are exposed to credit and liquidity risks, and face financing frictions. We show that (1) there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between bank lending, welfare, and capital requirements, (2) liquidity requirements unambiguously reduce lending, efficiency, and welfare, and (3) resolution policies contingent on observed capital, such as prompt corrective action, dominate in efficiency and welfare terms (noncontingent) capital and liquidity requirements.
Social Science Research Network, 2012
This paper studies the impact of bank regulation and taxation in a dynamic model with banks expos... more This paper studies the impact of bank regulation and taxation in a dynamic model with banks exposed to credit and liquidity risk. We find an inverted U-shaped relationship between capital requirements and bank lending, efficiency, and welfare, with their benefits turning into costs beyond a certain requirement threshold. By contrast, liquidity requirements reduce lending, efficiency and welfare significantly. The costs of high capital and liquidity requirements represent a lower bound on the benefits of these regulations in abating systemic risks. On taxation, corporate income taxes generate higher government revenues and entail lower efficiency and welfare costs than taxes on non-deposit liabilities.
NBER/Fed Cleveland Research Conference on "Quantifying Systemic Risk" for comments and suggestion... more NBER/Fed Cleveland Research Conference on "Quantifying Systemic Risk" for comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the International Monetary Fund or the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.
Social Science Research Network, 2010
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views express... more This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. We study a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium. Importantly, they are empirically relevant, and demonstrate the need of general equilibrium modeling to design financial policies aimed at attaining socially optimal levels of systemic risk in the economy.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2015
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2012
This paper studies the dynamics of emerging excess returns in a industry-by-industry context. Dif... more This paper studies the dynamics of emerging excess returns in a industry-by-industry context. Differently from the recent financial literature, which mainly focuses on "total market indexes", we perform a standard ex-post empirical analysis aimed at capturing the industries' contribution to country stock performances. We obtain three key empirical findings. First, at industry level, we confirm the "high performance-high volatile nature" as well as the timevarying component of emerging excess returns. Second, at country level and in a dynamic context, we detect those industries that mainly contribute to the presence of emerging stock premia. Third, we show that some industries are much more exposed to global factors than others. We argue that these results display relevant implications for portfolio diversification and reflect consumption smoothing motive
Journal of Financial Stability, Aug 1, 2023
Social Science Research Network, 2023
This paper shows theoretically the linkages among monetary policy rate, the real sector demand fo... more This paper shows theoretically the linkages among monetary policy rate, the real sector demand for loans with supply shocks, aggregate risks, and social welfare. We prove that a) when the loans' demand is elastic bank competition and the policy rate decrease risks and increase the amount of lending to firms b) these effects are reinforced as the number of banks in the banking market raises. We provide theoretical support to the empirical findings that a competitive environment, or an elastic demand for investments, renders the monetary policy more effective and increases welfare (Aghion et al 2019), on the contrary, uncompetitive structures obtain opposite effects (Wang et all 2022). The policy implications are that the welfare maximizing policy rate can be lower it could be lower than set by the Central Bank when there is high inflation (Rogoff, 2017). c) As in this economic phase of perfect diversification difficulties because of aggregate risks, the policy rate is more effective in welfare increasing if the banking sector is competitive. Keywords Monetary policy, bank competition, risk-taking and banking market structure, investment demand elasticity, aggregate risk and social welfare.
Social Science Research Network, 2018
We show that the impact of government bailouts (liquidity injections) on a representative bank's ... more We show that the impact of government bailouts (liquidity injections) on a representative bank's risk taking depends on the level of systematic risk of its loans portfolio. In a model where bank's output follows a geometric Brownian motion and the government guarantees bank's liabilities, we show first that more generous bailouts may or may not induce banks to take on more risk depending on the level of systematic risk; if systematic risk is high (low), a more generous bailout decreases (increases) bank's risk taking. Second, the optimal liquidity policy itself depends on systematic risk. Third, the relationship between bailouts and bank's risk taking is not monotonic. When systematic risk is low, the optimal liquidity policy is loose and more generous bailouts induce banks to take on more risk. If systematic risk is high and the optimal liquidity policy is tight, less generous bailouts induce banks to take on less risk. However, when high systematic risk makes a very tight liquidity policy optimal, a less generous bailout could increase bank's risk taking. While in this model there is only one representative bank, in an economy with many banks, a higher level of systematic risk could also be a source of systemic risk if a tighter liquidity policy induces correlated risk taking choices by banks.
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Papers by Marcella LUCCHETTA