This paper takes as a starting point a recent development in privacy-debates: the emphasis on soc... more This paper takes as a starting point a recent development in privacy-debates: the emphasis on social and institutional environments in the definition and the defence of privacy. Recognizing the merits of this approach I supplement it in two respects. First, an analysis of the relation between privacy and autonomy teaches that in the digital age more than ever individual autonomy is threatened. The striking contrast between on the one hand offline vocabulary, where autonomy and individual decision making prevail, and on the other online practices is a challenge that cannot be met in a social approach. Secondly, I elucidate the background of the social approach. Its importance is not exclusively related to the digital age. In public life we regularly face privacy-moments, when in a small distinguished social domain few people are commonly involved in common experiences. In the digital age the contextual integrity model of Helen Nissenbaum has become very influential. However this model has some problems. Nissenbaum refers to a variety of sources and uses several terms to explain the normativity in her model. The notion 'context' is not specific and faces the reproach of conservatism. We elaborate on the most promising suggestion: an elaboration on the notion 'goods' as it can be found in the works of Michael Walzer and Alisdair Macintyre. Developing criteria for defining a normative framework requires making explicit the substantive goods that are at stake in a context, and take them as the starting point for decisions about the flow of information. Doing so delivers stronger and more specific orientations that are indispensible in discussions about digital privacy.
Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een ge... more Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen of enige andere manier, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uitgever. Participanten aan het woord 71 7.1 Samenwerken en opbouwen van vertrouwen 72 7.2 Vertegenwoordiging 80 7.3 Algemeen belang en eigenbelang 87 7.4 De 'vaste aanspreekpunten' en hun motieven 90 Trustees in de praktijk: duidingen 97 8.1 Collectieve probleemaanpak in een gedepolitiseerde setting 97 8.2 Vertegenwoordiging 100 8.3 Vier typen van actieve burgers 101 8.4 Kenmerken van trustees 103 Conclusies 107 Discussie 113
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this p... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a speci fi c statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.
In eval u at ing the mer its and short com ings of vir tue eth ics I fo cus on some cen tral dif ... more In eval u at ing the mer its and short com ings of vir tue eth ics I fo cus on some cen tral dif fer ences be tween vir tue eth ics and ri val the o ries such as deontology and util i tar i an ism. Vir tue eth ics does not pre scribe strict rules of con duct. In stead, the vir tue eth i cal ap proach can be un der stood as an in vi tation to search for stan dards, as op posed to strict rules, that ought to guide the con duct of our in di vid ual lives. This re quires a par tic u lar method. The im portance of this ap proach in pres ent times will be come clear when we in ves tigate the re la tion be tween vir tue eth ics and postmodernity. In our postmodern age moral con cepts are no lon ger per ceived as de riv ing their mean ing from larger frame works. In stead, their mean ings are perceived as be ing de rived from the con tin gen cies that de fine our par tic u lar existences. Thus on go ing grass roots moral en gage ment is re quired, and vir tue eth ics is the ap pro pri ate moral frame work for do ing this. This re sults in a broad en ing of ra tio nal ity inso far as the full rich ness of our sit u ated lives are fac tored into our ac counts of ra tio nal ity. At the same time vir tue eth ics pre vents rel a tiv ism, mainly because it does jus tice to the so cial embeddedness of hu man ac tiv i ties. In or der to il lus trate the vir tue eth i cal ap proach I will dis cuss two key con cepts in our moral vo cab u lary: re spon si bil ity and in teg rity. We will see how these ba sic con cepts can be prop erly un der stood only if one takes into con sid er ation the con tin gen cies, in her ent par a doxes and ten sions in hu man life. A young man of twenty-three is phys i cally and men tally ma ture, which is to say that he has just com menced his ac tive in volve ment in so ci ety. He is, one might say, full of dreams and ex pec ta tions which are yet to be ful filled. Much the same can be said about the pro ject started twenty-three years ago by Alisdair Mac In tyre's Af ter Vir tue. The book is an in trigu ing ex po si tion of all kinds of in tu itions and in sights, but they de mand fur ther elab o ra tion and elu ci da tion. It turned out to be the start ing point of what could be char ac ter ized as the 're vi tal iza tion or rebirth of vir tue eth ics'. This an cient tra di tion had started with Ar is totle and was the dom i nant eth i cal frame work in Chris tian Me di eval phi los o phy and mo der nity un til Imman uel Kant. In the 19 th and 20 th cen tury vir tue eth ics played a mi nor role. Worth
This paper takes as a starting point a recent development in privacy-debates: the emphasis on soc... more This paper takes as a starting point a recent development in privacy-debates: the emphasis on social and institutional environments in the definition and the defence of privacy. Recognizing the merits of this approach I supplement it in two respects. First, an analysis of the relation between privacy and autonomy teaches that in the digital age more than ever individual autonomy is threatened. The striking contrast between on the one hand offline vocabulary, where autonomy and individual decision making prevail, and on the other online practices is a challenge that cannot be met in a social approach. Secondly, I elucidate the background of the social approach. Its importance is not exclusively related to the digital age. In public life we regularly face privacy-moments, when in a small distinguished social domain few people are commonly involved in common experiences. In the digital age the contextual integrity model of Helen Nissenbaum has become very influential. However this model has some problems. Nissenbaum refers to a variety of sources and uses several terms to explain the normativity in her model. The notion 'context' is not specific and faces the reproach of conservatism. We elaborate on the most promising suggestion: an elaboration on the notion 'goods' as it can be found in the works of Michael Walzer and Alisdair Macintyre. Developing criteria for defining a normative framework requires making explicit the substantive goods that are at stake in a context, and take them as the starting point for decisions about the flow of information. Doing so delivers stronger and more specific orientations that are indispensible in discussions about digital privacy.
Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een ge... more Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen of enige andere manier, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de uitgever. Participanten aan het woord 71 7.1 Samenwerken en opbouwen van vertrouwen 72 7.2 Vertegenwoordiging 80 7.3 Algemeen belang en eigenbelang 87 7.4 De 'vaste aanspreekpunten' en hun motieven 90 Trustees in de praktijk: duidingen 97 8.1 Collectieve probleemaanpak in een gedepolitiseerde setting 97 8.2 Vertegenwoordiging 100 8.3 Vier typen van actieve burgers 101 8.4 Kenmerken van trustees 103 Conclusies 107 Discussie 113
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this p... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a speci fi c statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.
In eval u at ing the mer its and short com ings of vir tue eth ics I fo cus on some cen tral dif ... more In eval u at ing the mer its and short com ings of vir tue eth ics I fo cus on some cen tral dif fer ences be tween vir tue eth ics and ri val the o ries such as deontology and util i tar i an ism. Vir tue eth ics does not pre scribe strict rules of con duct. In stead, the vir tue eth i cal ap proach can be un der stood as an in vi tation to search for stan dards, as op posed to strict rules, that ought to guide the con duct of our in di vid ual lives. This re quires a par tic u lar method. The im portance of this ap proach in pres ent times will be come clear when we in ves tigate the re la tion be tween vir tue eth ics and postmodernity. In our postmodern age moral con cepts are no lon ger per ceived as de riv ing their mean ing from larger frame works. In stead, their mean ings are perceived as be ing de rived from the con tin gen cies that de fine our par tic u lar existences. Thus on go ing grass roots moral en gage ment is re quired, and vir tue eth ics is the ap pro pri ate moral frame work for do ing this. This re sults in a broad en ing of ra tio nal ity inso far as the full rich ness of our sit u ated lives are fac tored into our ac counts of ra tio nal ity. At the same time vir tue eth ics pre vents rel a tiv ism, mainly because it does jus tice to the so cial embeddedness of hu man ac tiv i ties. In or der to il lus trate the vir tue eth i cal ap proach I will dis cuss two key con cepts in our moral vo cab u lary: re spon si bil ity and in teg rity. We will see how these ba sic con cepts can be prop erly un der stood only if one takes into con sid er ation the con tin gen cies, in her ent par a doxes and ten sions in hu man life. A young man of twenty-three is phys i cally and men tally ma ture, which is to say that he has just com menced his ac tive in volve ment in so ci ety. He is, one might say, full of dreams and ex pec ta tions which are yet to be ful filled. Much the same can be said about the pro ject started twenty-three years ago by Alisdair Mac In tyre's Af ter Vir tue. The book is an in trigu ing ex po si tion of all kinds of in tu itions and in sights, but they de mand fur ther elab o ra tion and elu ci da tion. It turned out to be the start ing point of what could be char ac ter ized as the 're vi tal iza tion or rebirth of vir tue eth ics'. This an cient tra di tion had started with Ar is totle and was the dom i nant eth i cal frame work in Chris tian Me di eval phi los o phy and mo der nity un til Imman uel Kant. In the 19 th and 20 th cen tury vir tue eth ics played a mi nor role. Worth
Uploads
Papers by Marcel Becker