Marc Stier
Marc Stier is the director of the PA Budget and Policy Center, a public policy analysis and communications organization based in Harrisburg, PA. Before joining PBPC as director in 2015, Marc served as the executive director of Penn Action, where he worked to protect funding for education and women’s health care and expand Social Security
Phone: (215) 880-6142
Address: 6714 Wissahickon Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19119
Phone: (215) 880-6142
Address: 6714 Wissahickon Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19119
less
Related Authors
Interests
Uploads
Papers by Marc Stier
The philosopher who, on the standard interpretation, seeks above all others to escape ambiguity is Plato. The world of forms is, after all, portrayed as a attractive realm precisely because everything is just what it is and nothing else. Yet, at the same time, Plato presents his philosophy is a literary form that, if only we could recognize it as such, is highly ambiguous in nature. In recent years, the importance of the dramatic character of the Platonic dialogue has been widely recognized. Scholars have paid greater attention to who says what to whom and under what circumstances. The irony of having an ironist—Socrates—as one’s main spokesman has been duly noted.
This essay on Plato’s Symposium follows a very few contemporary philosophers in taking this new way of interpreting Plato one step further. He takes seriously the challenge that is put to Socrates in the Symposium, a challenge that touches not just or mainly his philosophy but his way of life. Along with other new interpreters of Plato, the essay suggests that Plato’s ideas may be found in not just in Socrates’ words but in the speeches of other characters in the Platonic dialogues. Stier, however, goes further in suggesting that, however noble it is, Socrates’ life may not be the Platonic model for the rest of us human beings. The picture presented of Socrates in the Symposium suggests that he is too different from even the best of other human beings to serve as a model for us. Socrates is a profoundly strange creature, whose qualities suggest that he has partly escaped from the usual circumstances of human life, circumstances that are best presented in Aristophanes account of how we were mutilated by the gods. As a result, Socrates escapes from human eros as well. Yet because he lives among us, and seeks to understand us in order to understand himself, Socrates must pretend to share a common nature with us. The ambiguity of Socrates position—and the danger that accompanies that ambiguity—is revealed when Alcibiades burst into the drinking party and tells tales about his mentor / tormentor. As the drama ends, the ambiguity of Socrates position is shown to parallel the ambiguous nature of the dialogue itself, in which tragedy and comedy are intertwined.
Pragmatism is typically thought of, or presented as, a skeptical or historicist view. This, for example, is Richard Rorty’s view of pragmatism. I argue, however, that properly understood, pragmatism transcends the debate between skepticism or historicism and foundationalism. On my view, a pragmatic philosophy legitimates the broadest range of political and moral theory both about the questions moderns often do not like to talk about—the human good and God—and those that they do like to talk about—rights, utility and tolerance. Pragmatists are not committed to skepticism but to fallibilism, the view that, with only a few exceptions, there are no theories or beliefs whose truth is unquestionable. I will argue that fallibilism, and the procedural account of rationality it leads to, provides the most powerful argument for freedom, equality, and democracy. This argument is very different, however, from that found in most versions of modern and post-modern political and moral theory. For it rests not on skepticism about reasoning about the good and God but, rather, on the possibility of such reasoning. At the same time, the fallibilism and proceduralism of pragmatism leads us to a vision of a free, egalitarian, and democratic community. Such a community, I suggest, can live and prosper without any but the most minimal theoretical consensus. Indeed, I argue that a pragmatic politics will be an agonistic politics. Pragmatism legitimates democratic political struggles of the deepest sorts as well as the broadest range of outcomes, provided that the minimal constraints of procedural rationality are respected in these disputes.
Thus, pragmatism (re-)opens old possibilities for political and moral theory while diminishing the central role of theory in guiding political life. It encourages theoretically engaged efforts to improve our political community without insisting that political and social reform and renewal requires ideological direction or agreement. It is open to historical development and change while denying that we can know that history will take a particular path. Pragmatism limits the roles of theory, ideology, and history in our communal life. In their place, it calls for political debate and engagement, without any expectation of, or necessity for, agreement and consensus. This, I suggest at the end of the paper, is a political philosophy appropriate for the diverse, yet global, society that is emerging as we approach the new millennium.
These arguments raise two serious problems for those of us who want to encourage both strong communities and participatory democracy. The first is that, under modern circumstances of life, homogeneous communities are becoming ever more difficult to find or create. The freedoms found in liberal market economies and the economic incentives they create undermine homogeneity. Liberal market economies encourage geographic and social mobility of all kind. And, even where, a community is fairly homogeneous—in, say, a rural hinterland or an exclusive suburb—contemporary forms of communication bring people in touch with other people and ideas very different from those familiar to themselves.
The second problem is that homogeneity raises concerns for those of us who would like to secure liberal freedoms. And that is why most liberal theorists have been suspicious of the call for homogeneity. Liberals insist on tolerance for those who have views of the good life different from that of the majority. They welcome this diversity as a spurt to developments of all sorts: moral, religious, political and scientific. They are dubious about any efforts to reduce the multiplicity of points of view found in the liberal political community. While they know that diversity may undermine the pursuit of the common good, many liberals think this is an acceptable trade-off. For the tolerance of difference that is central to the liberal project. Indeed, many theorists argued that liberal politics works best when citizens are diverted from public to private and from politics to economics. When that happens, the contentiousness of politics is reduced. Political decisionmaking is then left in the hands of a few professionals who, while ultimately responsible to the judgment of the people, are free to act as they think is best for the whole community.
The tensions between strong communities and liberal ideals can never be entirely resolved. But, in this paper I suggest a number of ways in which that tension can be moderated. In the first part of the paper I examine some traditional solutions to this difficulty and show how they can be modified to suit contemporary circumstances. These solutions mainly rely on pluralism and decentralization as a means of creating more or less homogenous local communities.
In the second, and more original, part of the paper, I reverse direction. The common approach is ask what characteristics must be found in a place and time if people are to have one kind of political community or another. This is a perfectly legitimate question. But to ask that question alone might blind us to the way in which certain kinds of political institutions and practices can shape or transform a whole political community. The central claim of this part of my paper is that establishing democratic institutions and practices can not only foster diversity but create the kinds of diverse communities that are communitarian in nature. In other words, I challenge the assumption that homogeneity is required for strong communities or for participatory democracy. Contemporary conditions of life not only create the conditions under which diversity is impossible to avoid, they also create conditions under which diversity is welcomed by many citizens, especially those in the middle classes.
The frisson and excitement of diverse communities is, in many places in the US and Europe, spurring the redevelopment of older urban communities. Yet, a barrier to the creation of such communities is that political institutions have not been developed to manage the conflicts that diversity inevitably creates. Local democratic institutions and practices, I suggest, can provide an institutional framework within which conflicts of these kinds can be resolved. More importantly, they provide a forum in which the members of a diverse community can strengthen their ties to one another; appreciate one another; and thereby create the political and social unity that holds their community together. In other words, opportunities for democratic practices can, on my view, shape a diversity of people community into a new kind of a strong community.
In the third part of the paper, I provide a concrete example of this kind of community. This part of my paper is drawn from my own practical political work as a community activist in the Mt. Airy section of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Mt. Airy is one of only ten fully racially integrated middle class communities in the United States. It is a community that was deliberately created forty years ago as an integrated community—in which half the residents are white and half black—by the organization I now head. And, for the last forty years, our organization has worked to create strength out of our diversity, primarily by encouraging broad participation and involvement in the resolution of community problems. While aspects of our community are distinct and unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, our experience suggests that diversity and democracy are, under the right institutional forms, are compatible with one another.
The philosopher who, on the standard interpretation, seeks above all others to escape ambiguity is Plato. The world of forms is, after all, portrayed as a attractive realm precisely because everything is just what it is and nothing else. Yet, at the same time, Plato presents his philosophy is a literary form that, if only we could recognize it as such, is highly ambiguous in nature. In recent years, the importance of the dramatic character of the Platonic dialogue has been widely recognized. Scholars have paid greater attention to who says what to whom and under what circumstances. The irony of having an ironist—Socrates—as one’s main spokesman has been duly noted.
This essay on Plato’s Symposium follows a very few contemporary philosophers in taking this new way of interpreting Plato one step further. He takes seriously the challenge that is put to Socrates in the Symposium, a challenge that touches not just or mainly his philosophy but his way of life. Along with other new interpreters of Plato, the essay suggests that Plato’s ideas may be found in not just in Socrates’ words but in the speeches of other characters in the Platonic dialogues. Stier, however, goes further in suggesting that, however noble it is, Socrates’ life may not be the Platonic model for the rest of us human beings. The picture presented of Socrates in the Symposium suggests that he is too different from even the best of other human beings to serve as a model for us. Socrates is a profoundly strange creature, whose qualities suggest that he has partly escaped from the usual circumstances of human life, circumstances that are best presented in Aristophanes account of how we were mutilated by the gods. As a result, Socrates escapes from human eros as well. Yet because he lives among us, and seeks to understand us in order to understand himself, Socrates must pretend to share a common nature with us. The ambiguity of Socrates position—and the danger that accompanies that ambiguity—is revealed when Alcibiades burst into the drinking party and tells tales about his mentor / tormentor. As the drama ends, the ambiguity of Socrates position is shown to parallel the ambiguous nature of the dialogue itself, in which tragedy and comedy are intertwined.
Pragmatism is typically thought of, or presented as, a skeptical or historicist view. This, for example, is Richard Rorty’s view of pragmatism. I argue, however, that properly understood, pragmatism transcends the debate between skepticism or historicism and foundationalism. On my view, a pragmatic philosophy legitimates the broadest range of political and moral theory both about the questions moderns often do not like to talk about—the human good and God—and those that they do like to talk about—rights, utility and tolerance. Pragmatists are not committed to skepticism but to fallibilism, the view that, with only a few exceptions, there are no theories or beliefs whose truth is unquestionable. I will argue that fallibilism, and the procedural account of rationality it leads to, provides the most powerful argument for freedom, equality, and democracy. This argument is very different, however, from that found in most versions of modern and post-modern political and moral theory. For it rests not on skepticism about reasoning about the good and God but, rather, on the possibility of such reasoning. At the same time, the fallibilism and proceduralism of pragmatism leads us to a vision of a free, egalitarian, and democratic community. Such a community, I suggest, can live and prosper without any but the most minimal theoretical consensus. Indeed, I argue that a pragmatic politics will be an agonistic politics. Pragmatism legitimates democratic political struggles of the deepest sorts as well as the broadest range of outcomes, provided that the minimal constraints of procedural rationality are respected in these disputes.
Thus, pragmatism (re-)opens old possibilities for political and moral theory while diminishing the central role of theory in guiding political life. It encourages theoretically engaged efforts to improve our political community without insisting that political and social reform and renewal requires ideological direction or agreement. It is open to historical development and change while denying that we can know that history will take a particular path. Pragmatism limits the roles of theory, ideology, and history in our communal life. In their place, it calls for political debate and engagement, without any expectation of, or necessity for, agreement and consensus. This, I suggest at the end of the paper, is a political philosophy appropriate for the diverse, yet global, society that is emerging as we approach the new millennium.
These arguments raise two serious problems for those of us who want to encourage both strong communities and participatory democracy. The first is that, under modern circumstances of life, homogeneous communities are becoming ever more difficult to find or create. The freedoms found in liberal market economies and the economic incentives they create undermine homogeneity. Liberal market economies encourage geographic and social mobility of all kind. And, even where, a community is fairly homogeneous—in, say, a rural hinterland or an exclusive suburb—contemporary forms of communication bring people in touch with other people and ideas very different from those familiar to themselves.
The second problem is that homogeneity raises concerns for those of us who would like to secure liberal freedoms. And that is why most liberal theorists have been suspicious of the call for homogeneity. Liberals insist on tolerance for those who have views of the good life different from that of the majority. They welcome this diversity as a spurt to developments of all sorts: moral, religious, political and scientific. They are dubious about any efforts to reduce the multiplicity of points of view found in the liberal political community. While they know that diversity may undermine the pursuit of the common good, many liberals think this is an acceptable trade-off. For the tolerance of difference that is central to the liberal project. Indeed, many theorists argued that liberal politics works best when citizens are diverted from public to private and from politics to economics. When that happens, the contentiousness of politics is reduced. Political decisionmaking is then left in the hands of a few professionals who, while ultimately responsible to the judgment of the people, are free to act as they think is best for the whole community.
The tensions between strong communities and liberal ideals can never be entirely resolved. But, in this paper I suggest a number of ways in which that tension can be moderated. In the first part of the paper I examine some traditional solutions to this difficulty and show how they can be modified to suit contemporary circumstances. These solutions mainly rely on pluralism and decentralization as a means of creating more or less homogenous local communities.
In the second, and more original, part of the paper, I reverse direction. The common approach is ask what characteristics must be found in a place and time if people are to have one kind of political community or another. This is a perfectly legitimate question. But to ask that question alone might blind us to the way in which certain kinds of political institutions and practices can shape or transform a whole political community. The central claim of this part of my paper is that establishing democratic institutions and practices can not only foster diversity but create the kinds of diverse communities that are communitarian in nature. In other words, I challenge the assumption that homogeneity is required for strong communities or for participatory democracy. Contemporary conditions of life not only create the conditions under which diversity is impossible to avoid, they also create conditions under which diversity is welcomed by many citizens, especially those in the middle classes.
The frisson and excitement of diverse communities is, in many places in the US and Europe, spurring the redevelopment of older urban communities. Yet, a barrier to the creation of such communities is that political institutions have not been developed to manage the conflicts that diversity inevitably creates. Local democratic institutions and practices, I suggest, can provide an institutional framework within which conflicts of these kinds can be resolved. More importantly, they provide a forum in which the members of a diverse community can strengthen their ties to one another; appreciate one another; and thereby create the political and social unity that holds their community together. In other words, opportunities for democratic practices can, on my view, shape a diversity of people community into a new kind of a strong community.
In the third part of the paper, I provide a concrete example of this kind of community. This part of my paper is drawn from my own practical political work as a community activist in the Mt. Airy section of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Mt. Airy is one of only ten fully racially integrated middle class communities in the United States. It is a community that was deliberately created forty years ago as an integrated community—in which half the residents are white and half black—by the organization I now head. And, for the last forty years, our organization has worked to create strength out of our diversity, primarily by encouraging broad participation and involvement in the resolution of community problems. While aspects of our community are distinct and unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, our experience suggests that diversity and democracy are, under the right institutional forms, are compatible with one another.
Second, Miles Davis was well aware of these post-modern currents in Western intellectual and artistic life and that they influenced him by the 1970s, and perhaps as early as the 1950s where there is perhaps some influence on his turn to modal music.
And third, that we can fruitfully point to the ways in which On The Corner is a revolutionary and ground breaking album in by identifying key features of post-modern philosophical and atheistic approaches.
or
The Best Offense is a Good Defense:
A critique of Rorty's Philosophy and Politics