Papers by Manuel Lechthaler
Synthese, 2019
Philosophers disagree whether composition as identity entails mereological universalism. Bricker ... more Philosophers disagree whether composition as identity entails mereological universalism. Bricker (Inquiry 59(3):264-294, 2016) has recently considered an argument which concludes that composition as identity supports universalism. The key step in this argument is the thesis that any objects are identical to some object, which Bricker justifies with the principle of the universality of identity. I will spell out this principle in more detail and argue that it has an unexpected consequence. If the universality of identity holds, then composition as identity not only leads us to universalism, but also leads to the view that there are no mereological atoms. Keywords Composition as identity • Universalism • Gunk • Universality of identity • Mereology 1 A mereological atom is an object with no proper part (Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 39). A gunky object is an object whose parts all have at least one proper part (Lewis 1991, p. 20).
Philosophia, 2018
Mereological universalists and nihilists disagree on the conditions for composition. In this pape... more Mereological universalists and nihilists disagree on the conditions for composition. In this paper, we show how this debate is a function of one's chosen semantics for plural quantifiers. Debating mereologists have failed to appreciate this point because of the complexity of the debate and extraneous theoretical commitments. We eliminate this by framing the debate between universalists and nihilists in a formal model where these two theses about composition are contradictory. The examination of the two theories in the model brings clarity to a debate in which opponents frequently talk past one another. With the two views stated precisely, our investigation reveals the dependence of the mereologists' ontological commitments on the semantics of plural quantifiers. Though we discuss the debate with respect to a simplified and idealized model, the insights provided will make more complex debates on composition more productive and deflationist criticisms of the debate less substantial.
Podría parecer paradójico reseñar como novedad la publicación de un autor clásico fallecido en 18... more Podría parecer paradójico reseñar como novedad la publicación de un autor clásico fallecido en 1857. En este caso, sin embargo, la traducción al
Composition as Identity is the view that an object is identical to its parts taken collectively. ... more Composition as Identity is the view that an object is identical to its parts taken collectively. I elaborate and defend a theory based on this idea: composition is a kind of identity. Since this claim is best presented within a plural logic, I develop a formal system of plural logic. The principles of this system differ from the standard views on plural logic because one of my central claims is that identity is a relation which comes in a variety of forms and only one of them obeys substitution unrestrictedly. I justify this departure from orthodoxy by showing some problems which result from attempts to avoid inconsistencies within plural logic by means of postulating other non-singular terms besides plural terms. Thereby, some of the main criticisms raised against Composition as Identity can be addressed. Further, I argue that the way objects are arranged is relevant with respect to the question which object they compose, i.e. to which object they are identical to. This helps to me...
History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis
Grazer Philosophische Studien
Composition as Identity claims that a composite object is identical to its parts taken collective... more Composition as Identity claims that a composite object is identical to its parts taken collectively. This is often understood as reducing the identity of composite objects to the identity of their parts. The author argues that Composition as Identity is not such a reduction. His central claim is that an intensional notion of composition, which is sensitive to the arrangement of the composing objects, avoids criticisms based on an extensional understanding of composition. The key is to understand composition as an intensional kind of identity relation, many-one identity. Eventually, the author suggests an arrangement condition for many-one identity that allows him to distinguish between composite objects, even if they have the same parts.
The Philosophical Quarterly
Teorema Revista Internacional De Filosofia, 2014
The Philosophical Quarterly
Synthese
Philosophers disagree whether Composition as Identity entails mereological universalism. Bricker ... more Philosophers disagree whether Composition as Identity entails mereological universalism. Bricker (2016) has recently considered an argument which concludes that Composition as Identity supports universalism. The key step in this argument is the thesis that any objects are identical to some object, which Bricker justifies with the principle of the universality of identity. I will spell out this principle in more detail and argue that it has an unexpected consequence. If the universality of identity holds, then Composition as Identity not only leads us to universalism, but also leads to the view that there are no mereological atoms.
Mereological universalists and nihilists disagree on the conditions for composition. In this pape... more Mereological universalists and nihilists disagree on the conditions for composition. In this paper, we show how this debate is a function of one's chosen semantics for plural quantifiers. Debating mereologists have failed to appreciate this point because of the complexity of the debate and extraneous theoretical commitments. We eliminate this by framing the debate between universalists and nihilists in a formal model where these two theses about composition are contradictory. The examination of the two theories in the model brings clarity to a debate in which opponents frequently talk past one another. With the two views stated precisely, our investigation reveals the dependence of the mereologists' ontological commitments on the semantics of plural quantifiers. Though we discuss the debate with respect to a simplified and idealized model, the insights provided will make more complex debates on composition more productive and deflationist criticisms of the debate less substantial.
Many philosophical discussions are about relations where an entity or some entities, in the most ... more Many philosophical discussions are about relations where an entity or some entities, in the most general sense of the terms, give rise others: two oxygen atoms give rise to the oxygen molecule they compose; Socrates and the number 2 give rise to the set they form, {Socrates, 2}; the facts that p is true and that q is true give rise to the fact that p ∧ q is true. Bennett calls such relations "building relations". The central, and very ambitious, aim of Making Things Up is to present necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to this 'unified family of building relations' (p. 2) and to give an account of the phenomenon of fundamentality with the means of building.
Teaching Documents by Manuel Lechthaler
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Papers by Manuel Lechthaler
Teaching Documents by Manuel Lechthaler