Papers by Massimiliano Vignolo
I defend the Fregean model of propositions: propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses an... more I defend the Fregean model of propositions: propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made of concepts. Schiffer (2003) has presented a group of arguments against the Fregean model and advanced an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is twofold: (i) to counter each of his arguments sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic constituents of propositions; (ii) to maintain that the notion of pleonastic entity is not robust enough for claiming the existence of propositions.
presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions, according to which propositions... more presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions, according to which propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made out of concepts. Schiffer advances an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is to argue in favour of the main tenets of the Fregean model by countering each of Schiffer’s arguments and sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic components of propositions. 1. Schiffer (2003: 24–27) presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions. The Fregean model holds three main theses: (A) That-clauses are singular terms referring to propositions. (B) Propositions are structured entities made out of the referents of the expressions forming the that-clauses and the syntactic structure of those clauses. (C) Expressions occurring in that-clauses have concepts 1 as their referents. Schiffer attacks the Fregean model by the following arguments: (1) We lack a theo...
Prendiamo in considerazione prima gli argomenti epistemici e poi quelli semantici. Affinché un so... more Prendiamo in considerazione prima gli argomenti epistemici e poi quelli semantici. Affinché un soggetto usi correttamente un nome proprio, afferma Kripke, non è necessario che sappia associare al nome una descrizione definita che ne determini il riferimento. A ...
In the rule-following considerations Kripke’s Wittgenstein raises the objection that dispositions... more In the rule-following considerations Kripke’s Wittgenstein raises the objection that dispositions cannot be the appropriate base for a reduction of meaning properties since they are finite, while meanings have an infinitary character. The objection charges any dispositionalist theory of meaning with indeterminacy. Paul Horwich (1995) has attempted a defence of dispositionalism pointing out that the argument for indeterminacy presupposes an inflationary conception of truth-theoretic notions. In his view a deflationary approach to truth-theoretic notions helps elude the sceptical conclusion. Alexander Miller (2000) has reacted to Horwich’s attempt and maintained that the distinction between inflationism and deflationism does not play any substantial role in the anti-dispositionalism argument. I agree with Miller on this point, nevertheless I argue that Miller’s criticism of Horwich’s defence of dispositionalism is question begging against the conception of meaning that Horwich espouses.
Lingua E Stile, 1999
I teorici del riferimento diretto sostengono che almeno alcune pro-posizioni-quelle che sono espr... more I teorici del riferimento diretto sostengono che almeno alcune pro-posizioni-quelle che sono esprimibili per mezzo di asserzioni contenenti degli indicali-sono proposizioni singolari. Al fine di evitare le difficoltà che le proposizioni singolari sollevano quando diventano og-...
Rivista di filosofia, 2004
... parlante che si rifiutasse di asserire «questo è rosso» in certe condizioni favorevoli di sti... more ... parlante che si rifiutasse di asserire «questo è rosso» in certe condizioni favorevoli di stimolazione sensoriale o di inferire «questo non è verde» da «questo è rosso» diremmo che non conosce il significato di «rosso». In breve, secondo Cozzo, un uso inferenziale o referenziale ...
… -ANNO XXI NUOVA SERIE-N. 62- …, 2007
Citeseer
Abstract. The paper tries to build a bridge between results in commonsense reasoning and inferent... more Abstract. The paper tries to build a bridge between results in commonsense reasoning and inferential theories of meaning. We focus on the problem of communication and the contrast between two views of communication, the expressive view and the convergence view. According to ...
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Since Machery et al. Cognition 92, B1-B12 (2004) attacked Kripke’s refutation of classical descri... more Since Machery et al. Cognition 92, B1-B12 (2004) attacked Kripke’s refutation of classical descriptivism, their experiment has been repeated several times, in its original version or in some revised ones, by theorists with contrasting intents. Some repeated the experiment for confirming its results, others for proving them unreliable. One striking characteristic of those surveys is that they mostly replicated the data collected in Machery et al.’s Cognition 92, B1-B12, 2004 experiment: less than 60% of Westerners showed preference for the causal-historical response. We side with the critics of Machery et al.’s experiment. In this paper, we present the results of a survey that tests some hypotheses for explaining that percentage of Westerners’ preferences without taking it as evidence that more than 40% of Westerners have descriptivist intuitions on semantic reference. The aim of our paper is not merely to question the reliability of Machery et al.’s experiment. In sections 4 and 5 w...
Mind & Language, 2019
Martí argued that referential intuitions are not the right kind of empirical evidence for testing... more Martí argued that referential intuitions are not the right kind of empirical evidence for testing theories of reference. Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc replied with a survey aimed at providing evidence that referential intuitions are in sync with truth-value judgments and argued that truth-value judgments provide empirical data from linguistic usage. We present the results of a survey indicating that Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc's experiment fails to overcome Martí's objection: The truth-value judgements tested by Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc do not provide data relevant for testing theories of reference.
Philosophia, 2015
The purpose of this paper is to present a theory of referential uses of definite descriptions tha... more The purpose of this paper is to present a theory of referential uses of definite descriptions that is alternative to Neale’s theory of Gödelian completions but nonetheless assumes two tenets of Neale’s view: (i) the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions is basically correct, i.e. definite descriptions are quantified NPs and (ii) referential uses are not to be explained in terms of the Gricean distinction between what is said and what is meant (Here I draw on Neale Descriptions and Beyond, 68–182, (2004). The proposition said is the intuitive content of an assertion as opposed to contents that are conversational implicatures. The compositional system computes the proposition said taking into account the semantic information encoded in a sentence and all relevant contextual information. The proposition said is the input for processing the proposition meant as the result of Gricean conversational implicatures. The computation of the proposition said involves linguistic decoding as well as pragmatic inferences. Notice that Neale Philosophical Perspectives, 22, 375–442, (2008) uses ‘implied’ instead of ‘meant’). Neale’s Russellian approach to referential uses is assumed. I give no direct argument to prove that Neale’s approach is superior to a Gricean approach and no direct argument to prove that it is superior to an approach such as Devitt’s one that introduces a semantic ambiguity between referential and attributive definite descriptions. Contrary to Neale’s theory of Gödelian completions, the theory I present preserves the uniqueness condition of the orthodox quantificational meaning of definite descriptions as a contribution to what is said on referential uses. I argue that from the orthodox Russellian point of view this is a remarkable advantage over Neale’s theory of Gödelian completions (I wish to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions).
Ratio, 2013
Cappelen and Lepore (2005) maintain that Incompleteness Arguments for context sensitivity are fal... more Cappelen and Lepore (2005) maintain that Incompleteness Arguments for context sensitivity are fallacious. In their view, Incompleteness Arguments are non sequitur fallacies whose conclusions are not logically related to premises. They affirm that the conclusions of Incompleteness Arguments are metaphysical claims about the existence of entities that might be constituents of propositions, while their premises concern psychological data about speakers' dispositions to truth evaluate sentences in contexts of utterance. Cappelen and Lepore reject Incompleteness Arguments because psychological data have no bearing on metaphysical issues. I do not dispute Cappelen and Lepore's claim that psychological data have no relevance to metaphysics. Nonetheless, I argue that Cappelen and Lepore's criticism is vitiated by a misunderstanding of the nature of Incompleteness Arguments that makes them overlook the link between semantics and linguistic competence. I try to shed light on the real nature of Incompleteness Arguments by pointing at the failure of Cappelen and Lepore's criticism. My aim is not to defend Semantic Contextualism, but to bring to attention the link between semantics and linguistic competence that should never be overlooked in debates in the field of semantics.
Prolegomena, 2010
ABSTRACT: I argue that there are two ways of construing Wittgenstein's slogan that meaning i... more ABSTRACT: I argue that there are two ways of construing Wittgenstein's slogan that meaning is use. One accepts the view that the notion of meaning must be explained in terms of truth-theoretic notions and is committed to the epistemic conception of truth. The other ...
Vittorio Villa (2010) argues that the pragmatist view in semantics is the one that is suitable fo... more Vittorio Villa (2010) argues that the pragmatist view in semantics is the one that is suitable for contemporary theories of legal interpretation that accord a constitutive role to the notion of interpretation. In this critical note I raise two difficulties in Villa\u2019s theory, not from a point of view internal to the debate among legal theories but from that point of view of the philosophy of language. The first difficulty concerns whether illocutionary acts (and propositional attitudes) can be ascribed to legislators. The second difficulty concerns the kind of attitude that relates legislators, who lay down legal dispositions, and jurists, judges and public officers, who create legal norms by interpreting legal dispositions. The difficulties I raise are not meant to be knockdown arguments but evidence that some aspects in Villa\u2019s theory still need to be worked out. Finally, I consider the possibility that another theory in semantics\u2014semantic relativism\u2014is the one ...
Synthese
One recurrent objection against minimalism is that minimal contents have no theoretical role. It ... more One recurrent objection against minimalism is that minimal contents have no theoretical role. It has recently been argued that minimal contents serve to draw the distinction between lying and misleading. In Sect. 1 and Sect. 2 I summarise the main argument in support of that claim and contend that it is inconclusive. In Sect. 3 I discuss some cases of lying and some of misleading that raise difficulties for minimalism. In Sect. 4 I make a diagnosis of the failure of minimalism with those cases. In Sect. 5 I strengthen the case against minimal contents by addressing two received says-based definitions of lying. My analysis of the failure of minimalism suggests that the distinction between lying and misleading, at least in some important cases, calls for a kind of utterance content that is grounded on conventions of language.
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Papers by Massimiliano Vignolo