Palle Leth

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Sinclair W Bell

Northern Illinois University

Mantha Zarmakoupi

University of Pennsylvania

Colleen Manassa Darnell

Yale University

Kristina Olson

George Mason University

José Ángel ZAMORA

CSIC (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas-Spanish National Research Council)

Lucia Novakova

Trnava University / Slovak Academy of Sciences

Dominik Maschek

Leibniz-Zentrum für Archäologie

Luca Peyronel

Università degli Studi di Milano - State University of Milan (Italy)

Juan-Pablo Vita

CSIC (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas-Spanish National Research Council)

Gunnel Ekroth

Uppsala University

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Papers by Palle Leth

The Possibility of Paraphrase

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

It is often claimed that, in at least some areas of language use, the relation between form and c... more It is often claimed that, in at least some areas of language use, the relation between form and content is such that any attempt at reformulation or paraphrase amounts to a distortion of the significance of the original wording. In this article, I set out to vindicate an undemanding yet nontrivial conception of paraphrase. According to the rhetorical relations account of textual cohesion proposed, the meaning specifications required by a collection of sentences in order to constitute a text pave the way for a kind of reformulation which is in solidarity with the possibility of paraphrase. I substantiate my approach with prosaic and poetic examples from Woolf and Dickinson, respectively.

The Lying/Misleading Distinction Belied

Utterance Interpretation without Utterance Meaning

The 10th International Conference on Modelling and Using Contexts, Paris, France, June 20, 2017, 2017

Speakers, Hearers and Demonstrative Reference

Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, 2020

In the debate on demonstrative reference it is taken for granted that there is such a thing as th... more In the debate on demonstrative reference it is taken for granted that there is such a thing as the semantic instance of determinacy for demonstratives. I argue that the interpretive interaction between the speaker and the hearer suggests that the notion of objective semantic reference in the case of demonstratives is dispensable. Either the speaker and the hearer do not have recourse to any such notion or, at least, there are no reasons for them to have recourse to any such notion. Looking at reactions and interactions does not of course settle the issue whether there is objective demonstrative reference. But it strongly suggests that the issue rather be dismissed.

When Juliet Was the Sun : Metaphor as Play

Speaker’s Referent and Semantic Referent in Interpretive Interaction

DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiv2.05 In this paper I argue that the notions of speaker’s re... more DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiv2.05 In this paper I argue that the notions of speaker’s reference and semantic reference—used by Kripke in order to counter the contentious consequences of Donnellan’s distinction between the referential use and the attributive use of definite descriptions—do not have any application in the interpretive interaction between speaker and hearer. Hearers are always concerned with speaker’s reference. Either, in cases of cooperation, as presented as such by the speaker or, in cases of conflict, as perceived as such by the hearer. Any claim as to semantic reference is irrelevant for the purposes of communication and conversation. To the extent that the purpose of semantic theory is to account for linguistic communication, there is no reason to take definite descriptions to have semantic reference.

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Is There any Use for a Notion of the Correct Interpretation of an Utterance?

Philosophical Insights into Pragmatics, 2019

Racist Language, Speaker Responsibility and Hearer Authority

Actual interpretive practice, whether colloquial or formal, is underdetermined with respect to wh... more Actual interpretive practice, whether colloquial or formal, is underdetermined with respect to whether qualifications of utterances as racist are based on the speaker’s attitude, communicative intention or the meaning of the utterance and whether in the latter case the racist meaning can be implicit or must be explicit. The focus on the speaker’s expression of evaluation and attitude in current theorizing about slurs involves a similar underdetermination. A common problem is that the speaker’s responsibility is referred to the speaker’s own authority. The interactional model of utterance interpretation which forms the theoretical background of the present paper permits us to elaborate a novel and robust conception of speaker responsibility which situates it within the hearer’s authority. The speaker’s responsibility depends on the hearer’s most reasonable interpretation of the utterance in such a way that the speaker’s actual attitude and intention are irrelevant and also whether th...

Métaphore et paraphrase

Archives de Philosophie, 2007

Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Centre Sèvres. © Centre Sèvres. Tous droits réservés po... more Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour Centre Sèvres. © Centre Sèvres. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit.

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Utterance Interpretation and Actual Intentions

Axiomathes, 2019

In this paper I argue, from the consideration of what I hope is the complete variety of a hearer’... more In this paper I argue, from the consideration of what I hope is the complete variety of a hearer’s approaches to a speaker’s utterance, that (1) the speaker’s intention does not settle the meaning of her utterance and (2) the hearer does not take a genuine interest in the speaker’s actual intention. The reason why the speaker’s intention does not settle utterance meaning is simply that no utterance meaning determination, as presupposed by intentionalists and anti-intentionalists alike, takes place. Moreover, in the regular course of interpretation the hearer does not care about the speaker’s actual intention, but only about what the speaker presents as her intention: the hearer’s goal is to come up with an interpretation which the speaker will accept rather than an interpretation which corresponds to the speaker’s intention. In cases of accountability, suspicion and lying, the speaker’s actual intention is irrelevant; it is at most the speaker’s hypothetical intention which is at st...

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Intentions in Utterance Interpretation

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015

In this paper I argue, from the consideration of what I hope is the complete variety of a hearer'... more In this paper I argue, from the consideration of what I hope is the complete variety of a hearer's approaches to a speaker's utterance, that (1) the speaker's intention does not settle the meaning of her utterance and (2) the hearer does not take a genuine interest in the speaker's actual intention. The reason why the speaker's intention does not settle utterance meaning is simply that no utterance meaning determination, as presupposed by intentionalists and anti-intentionalists alike, takes place. Moreover, in the regular course of interpretation the hearer does not care about the speaker's actual intention, but only about what the speaker presents as her intention: the hearer's goal is to come up with an interpretation which the speaker will accept rather than an interpretation which corresponds to the speaker's intention. In cases of accountability, suspicion and lying, the speaker's actual intention is irrelevant; it is at most the speaker's hypothetical intention which is at stake.

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On Frege's Notion of Predicate Reference

History and Philosophy of Logic, 2013

Frege's extension of his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung to predicate terms is widely ... more Frege's extension of his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung to predicate terms is widely considered to be problematic. Interpreters generally assume that the notion of Bedeutung comprises the name/bearer relation as a prototype and that the extension is justified only in so far as the relation of predicate terms to their alleged referents is analogous to the relation of names to their bearers. However, interpreters have generally paid insufficient attention to Frege's own dealing with the issue. By examining the relevant passages in Frege's writings, I show that the standard ways of talking about Frege's ascription of Bedeutung to predicates as optional, less evident than the ascription of Sinn, and in need of justification are not in accord with Frege's own conception of predicate reference. There is no textual evidence that the extension takes place for analogical reasons and, in particular, no evidence for the claim that the name/bearer relation is used as a prototype. Frege is visibly not concerned with the relation between predicate terms and their referents, but applies the notion of Bedeutung for reasons of principle. There is indeed the invocation of an analogy, but if we consider the argument in which it occurs it appears that it does not play the justificatory role interpreters attribute to it. In sum, Frege's ascription of Bedeutung to predicates does not imply any mysterious or dubious referentiality of predicate terms.