This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to ... more This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to gay marriage? To do that, it analyzes the theme from the perspective of the Philosophy and Political Morals, which demonstrates the need to conceptualize marriage before checking whether it constitutes a moral right or not. It starts with the conceptions of marriage made by John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin, analyzing them critically, and after proposing the treatment of marriage as an interpretive concept. Only then it is possible to verify if marriage represents a moral right of homosexuals, which is made primarily from the critiques developed by Herbert Hart and Dworkin to the position of Patrick Devlin, and the dworkinian conception of equality and human dignity. It concludes that the state's duty to treat individuals with equal respect and consideration implies the recognition of marriage as a moral right of homosexuals, and that the analysis of the issue from the standpoint of public morality involves the discussion of its limits in the wider debate about the rights of minorities in general as well.
This thesis aims to identify and defend the main rights of transgender people, particularly those... more This thesis aims to identify and defend the main rights of transgender people, particularly those related to the state's duty to treat all citizens with equal consideration and respect. To do that, this thesis is grounded on the different meanings of "right" presented by Ronald Dworkin, especially on the distinction between moral rights and policies. It is also based on a conception of the juridical concept of gender, which has two central dimensions: the expression of one's gender (on the masculinity/femininity spectrum) and the social recognition that one belongs to a certain gender category. It is argued that this conception of gender is fundamental for the proper interpretation and solution of legal issues involving gender, such as civil identification (name and sex/gender assignment), retirement scheme, protective laws and affirmative policies etc. These arguments are preceded by a brief explanation of transgenderism, which goes far beyond what is typically analyzed by jurists. An analysis of the state and sexual morality relations is offered as well, which is done mainly through the criticism of John Finnis and Christopher Tollefsen's conception of sex and gender. In short, Finnis and Tollefsen argue that one's gender should be determined by one's biological sex. Instead, this thesis defends the conceptual separation between biological sex and gender, considering gender the most relevant category for legal and social purposes. Moreover, based on Ronald Dworkin's theorization, it is argued that genders freedom of expression corresponds to one of the leading moral rights of transgender people, ensuring the autonomy and the ethical independence of such individuals. It concludes that the conceptions and theory defended in this thesis correspond to the rationale for answering legal problems of transgender people, even those that are not mentioned.
Laymen in general associate natural law theories to conservative moral conceptions, like traditio... more Laymen in general associate natural law theories to conservative moral conceptions, like traditional marriage of a man and a woman. That makes sense when we notice Catholic Church's position about matrimony or even academic marriage conceptions as the one claimed by John Finnis. But would be possible to defend the so called "marriage equality" in natural law grounds? This paper aims to answer this question affirmatively. Departing from a critical analysis of Finnis' natural law theory and his marriage conception, I argue that a better matrimony conception needs to be grounded on a wide vision of human sexuality, which encompasses lesbian and gay couples. Instead of procreation (which is one of the marriage points in Finnis' conception), human experience shows that sex is not limited to breeding-it is a way people can achieve pleasure and high levels of intimacy, regardless their sexual orientation. I conclude that this way of conceptualizing human sexuality is "far more evident" than the one suggested by Finnis and is also consistent with Germain Grisez's interpretation of Aquinas' first principle of practical reason-with which Finnis himself agrees. Keywords Same-sex marriage; concept of marriage; natural law; practical reason; John Finnis.
O presente artigo tem por objeto as principais críticas que Andrei Marmor, em seu livro Interpret... more O presente artigo tem por objeto as principais críticas que Andrei Marmor, em seu livro Interpretation and Legal Theory, apresenta à concepção de interpretação defendida por Ronald Dworkin. Em um primeiro momento, Marmor sugere que, para Dworkin, toda e qualquer conclusão sobre o Direito seria objeto de interpretação, o que não seria correto quando analisamos, por exemplo, o modo como seguimos certas regras e convenções. Em um segundo momento, Marmor argumenta que a perspectiva dworkiniana defende uma objetividade impossível de ser alcançada na interpretação: o fato de que compartilhamos valores de natureza incomensurável, por exemplo, implica na impossibilidade de se considerar que uma interpretação será, todas as coisas consideradas, melhor que outra. Analisando tais críticas à luz das respostas que Dworkin ofereceu ou poderia ter oferecido, conclui-se que a visão de Marmor sobre a concepção dworkiniana de interpretação é incorreta, na medida em que ignora distinções que lhe são centrais, como a diferença entre "conceitos criteriais" e "conceitos interpretativos", e sobre a natureza integrada dos valores que compartilhamos socialmente. Ainda assim, o debate entre ambos os autores ressalta sua clara natureza metodológica, sendo importante para a compreensão do "estado da arte" da Teoria do Direito contemporânea de vertente analítica.
O presente artigo tem por objeto as principais críticas que Andrei Marmor, em seu livro Interpret... more O presente artigo tem por objeto as principais críticas que Andrei Marmor, em seu livro Interpretation and Legal Theory, apresenta à concepção de interpretação defendida por Ronald Dworkin. Em um primeiro momento, Marmor sugere que, para Dworkin, toda e qualquer conclusão sobre o Direito seria objeto de interpretação, o que não seria correto quando analisamos, por exemplo, o modo como seguimos certas regras e convenções. Em um segundo momento, Marmor argumenta que a perspectiva dworkiniana defende uma objetividade impossível de ser alcançada na interpretação: o fato de que compartilhamos valores de natureza incomensurável, por exemplo, implica na impossibilidade de se considerar que uma interpretação será, todas as coisas consideradas, melhor que outra. Analisando tais críticas à luz das respostas que Dworkin ofereceu ou poderia ter oferecido, conclui-se que a visão de Marmor sobre a concepção dworkiniana de interpretação é incorreta, na medida em que ignora distinções que lhe são centrais, como a diferença entre "conceitos criteriais" e "conceitos interpretativos", e sobre a natureza integrada dos valores que compartilhamos socialmente. Ainda assim, o debate entre ambos os autores ressalta sua clara natureza metodológica, sendo importante para a compreensão do "estado da arte" da Teoria do Direito contemporânea de vertente analítica.
Laymen in general associate natural law theories to conservative moral conceptions, like traditio... more Laymen in general associate natural law theories to conservative moral conceptions, like traditional marriage of a man and a woman. That makes sense when we notice Catholic Church's position about matrimony or even academic marriage conceptions as the one claimed by John Finnis. But would be possible to defend the so called “marriage equality” in natural law grounds? This paper aims to answer this question affirmatively. Departing from a critical analysis of Finnis’ natural law theory and his marriage conception, I argue that a better matrimony conception needs to be grounded on a wide vision of human sexuality, which encompasses lesbian and gay couples. Instead of procreation (which is one of the marriage points in Finnis’ conception), human experience shows that sex is not limited to breeding - it is a way people can achieve pleasure and high levels of intimacy, regardless their sexual orientation. I conclude that this way of conceptualizing human sexuality is “far more eviden...
This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to ... more This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to gay marriage? To do that, it analyzes the theme from the perspective of the Philosophy and Political Morals, which demonstrates the need to conceptualize marriage before checking whether it constitutes a moral right or not. It starts with the conceptions of marriage made by John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin, analyzing them critically, and after proposing the treatment of marriage as an interpretive concept. Only then it is possible to verify if marriage represents a moral right of homosexuals, which is made primarily from the critiques developed by Herbert Hart and Dworkin to the position of Patrick Devlin, and the dworkinian conception of equality and human dignity. It concludes that the state's duty to treat individuals with equal respect and consideration implies the recognition of marriage as a moral right of homosexuals, and that the analysis of the issue from the standpoint of public morality involves the discussion of its limits in the wider debate about the rights of minorities in general as well.
This thesis aims to identify and defend the main rights of transgender people, particularly those... more This thesis aims to identify and defend the main rights of transgender people, particularly those related to the state's duty to treat all citizens with equal consideration and respect. To do that, this thesis is grounded on the different meanings of "right" presented by Ronald Dworkin, especially on the distinction between moral rights and policies. It is also based on a conception of the juridical concept of gender, which has two central dimensions: the expression of one's gender (on the masculinity/femininity spectrum) and the social recognition that one belongs to a certain gender category. It is argued that this conception of gender is fundamental for the proper interpretation and solution of legal issues involving gender, such as civil identification (name and sex/gender assignment), retirement scheme, protective laws and affirmative policies etc. These arguments are preceded by a brief explanation of transgenderism, which goes far beyond what is typically analyzed by jurists. An analysis of the state and sexual morality relations is offered as well, which is done mainly through the criticism of John Finnis and Christopher Tollefsen's conception of sex and gender. In short, Finnis and Tollefsen argue that one's gender should be determined by one's biological sex. Instead, this thesis defends the conceptual separation between biological sex and gender, considering gender the most relevant category for legal and social purposes. Moreover, based on Ronald Dworkin's theorization, it is argued that genders freedom of expression corresponds to one of the leading moral rights of transgender people, ensuring the autonomy and the ethical independence of such individuals. It concludes that the conceptions and theory defended in this thesis correspond to the rationale for answering legal problems of transgender people, even those that are not mentioned.
This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to ... more This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to gay marriage? To do that, it analyzes the theme from the perspective of the Philosophy and Political Morals, which demonstrates the need to conceptualize marriage before checking whether it constitutes a moral right or not. It starts with the conceptions of marriage made by John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin, analyzing them critically, and after proposing the treatment of marriage as an interpretive concept. Only then it is possible to verify if marriage represents a moral right of homosexuals, which is made primarily from the critiques developed by Herbert Hart and Dworkin to the position of Patrick Devlin, and the dworkinian conception of equality and human dignity. It concludes that the state's duty to treat individuals with equal respect and consideration implies the recognition of marriage as a moral right of homosexuals, and that the analysis of the issue from the standpoint of public morality involves the discussion of its limits in the wider debate about the rights of minorities in general as well.
This thesis aims to identify and defend the main rights of transgender people, particularly those... more This thesis aims to identify and defend the main rights of transgender people, particularly those related to the state's duty to treat all citizens with equal consideration and respect. To do that, this thesis is grounded on the different meanings of "right" presented by Ronald Dworkin, especially on the distinction between moral rights and policies. It is also based on a conception of the juridical concept of gender, which has two central dimensions: the expression of one's gender (on the masculinity/femininity spectrum) and the social recognition that one belongs to a certain gender category. It is argued that this conception of gender is fundamental for the proper interpretation and solution of legal issues involving gender, such as civil identification (name and sex/gender assignment), retirement scheme, protective laws and affirmative policies etc. These arguments are preceded by a brief explanation of transgenderism, which goes far beyond what is typically analyzed by jurists. An analysis of the state and sexual morality relations is offered as well, which is done mainly through the criticism of John Finnis and Christopher Tollefsen's conception of sex and gender. In short, Finnis and Tollefsen argue that one's gender should be determined by one's biological sex. Instead, this thesis defends the conceptual separation between biological sex and gender, considering gender the most relevant category for legal and social purposes. Moreover, based on Ronald Dworkin's theorization, it is argued that genders freedom of expression corresponds to one of the leading moral rights of transgender people, ensuring the autonomy and the ethical independence of such individuals. It concludes that the conceptions and theory defended in this thesis correspond to the rationale for answering legal problems of transgender people, even those that are not mentioned.
Laymen in general associate natural law theories to conservative moral conceptions, like traditio... more Laymen in general associate natural law theories to conservative moral conceptions, like traditional marriage of a man and a woman. That makes sense when we notice Catholic Church's position about matrimony or even academic marriage conceptions as the one claimed by John Finnis. But would be possible to defend the so called "marriage equality" in natural law grounds? This paper aims to answer this question affirmatively. Departing from a critical analysis of Finnis' natural law theory and his marriage conception, I argue that a better matrimony conception needs to be grounded on a wide vision of human sexuality, which encompasses lesbian and gay couples. Instead of procreation (which is one of the marriage points in Finnis' conception), human experience shows that sex is not limited to breeding-it is a way people can achieve pleasure and high levels of intimacy, regardless their sexual orientation. I conclude that this way of conceptualizing human sexuality is "far more evident" than the one suggested by Finnis and is also consistent with Germain Grisez's interpretation of Aquinas' first principle of practical reason-with which Finnis himself agrees. Keywords Same-sex marriage; concept of marriage; natural law; practical reason; John Finnis.
O presente artigo tem por objeto as principais críticas que Andrei Marmor, em seu livro Interpret... more O presente artigo tem por objeto as principais críticas que Andrei Marmor, em seu livro Interpretation and Legal Theory, apresenta à concepção de interpretação defendida por Ronald Dworkin. Em um primeiro momento, Marmor sugere que, para Dworkin, toda e qualquer conclusão sobre o Direito seria objeto de interpretação, o que não seria correto quando analisamos, por exemplo, o modo como seguimos certas regras e convenções. Em um segundo momento, Marmor argumenta que a perspectiva dworkiniana defende uma objetividade impossível de ser alcançada na interpretação: o fato de que compartilhamos valores de natureza incomensurável, por exemplo, implica na impossibilidade de se considerar que uma interpretação será, todas as coisas consideradas, melhor que outra. Analisando tais críticas à luz das respostas que Dworkin ofereceu ou poderia ter oferecido, conclui-se que a visão de Marmor sobre a concepção dworkiniana de interpretação é incorreta, na medida em que ignora distinções que lhe são centrais, como a diferença entre "conceitos criteriais" e "conceitos interpretativos", e sobre a natureza integrada dos valores que compartilhamos socialmente. Ainda assim, o debate entre ambos os autores ressalta sua clara natureza metodológica, sendo importante para a compreensão do "estado da arte" da Teoria do Direito contemporânea de vertente analítica.
O presente artigo tem por objeto as principais críticas que Andrei Marmor, em seu livro Interpret... more O presente artigo tem por objeto as principais críticas que Andrei Marmor, em seu livro Interpretation and Legal Theory, apresenta à concepção de interpretação defendida por Ronald Dworkin. Em um primeiro momento, Marmor sugere que, para Dworkin, toda e qualquer conclusão sobre o Direito seria objeto de interpretação, o que não seria correto quando analisamos, por exemplo, o modo como seguimos certas regras e convenções. Em um segundo momento, Marmor argumenta que a perspectiva dworkiniana defende uma objetividade impossível de ser alcançada na interpretação: o fato de que compartilhamos valores de natureza incomensurável, por exemplo, implica na impossibilidade de se considerar que uma interpretação será, todas as coisas consideradas, melhor que outra. Analisando tais críticas à luz das respostas que Dworkin ofereceu ou poderia ter oferecido, conclui-se que a visão de Marmor sobre a concepção dworkiniana de interpretação é incorreta, na medida em que ignora distinções que lhe são centrais, como a diferença entre "conceitos criteriais" e "conceitos interpretativos", e sobre a natureza integrada dos valores que compartilhamos socialmente. Ainda assim, o debate entre ambos os autores ressalta sua clara natureza metodológica, sendo importante para a compreensão do "estado da arte" da Teoria do Direito contemporânea de vertente analítica.
Laymen in general associate natural law theories to conservative moral conceptions, like traditio... more Laymen in general associate natural law theories to conservative moral conceptions, like traditional marriage of a man and a woman. That makes sense when we notice Catholic Church's position about matrimony or even academic marriage conceptions as the one claimed by John Finnis. But would be possible to defend the so called “marriage equality” in natural law grounds? This paper aims to answer this question affirmatively. Departing from a critical analysis of Finnis’ natural law theory and his marriage conception, I argue that a better matrimony conception needs to be grounded on a wide vision of human sexuality, which encompasses lesbian and gay couples. Instead of procreation (which is one of the marriage points in Finnis’ conception), human experience shows that sex is not limited to breeding - it is a way people can achieve pleasure and high levels of intimacy, regardless their sexual orientation. I conclude that this way of conceptualizing human sexuality is “far more eviden...
This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to ... more This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to gay marriage? To do that, it analyzes the theme from the perspective of the Philosophy and Political Morals, which demonstrates the need to conceptualize marriage before checking whether it constitutes a moral right or not. It starts with the conceptions of marriage made by John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin, analyzing them critically, and after proposing the treatment of marriage as an interpretive concept. Only then it is possible to verify if marriage represents a moral right of homosexuals, which is made primarily from the critiques developed by Herbert Hart and Dworkin to the position of Patrick Devlin, and the dworkinian conception of equality and human dignity. It concludes that the state's duty to treat individuals with equal respect and consideration implies the recognition of marriage as a moral right of homosexuals, and that the analysis of the issue from the standpoint of public morality involves the discussion of its limits in the wider debate about the rights of minorities in general as well.
This thesis aims to identify and defend the main rights of transgender people, particularly those... more This thesis aims to identify and defend the main rights of transgender people, particularly those related to the state's duty to treat all citizens with equal consideration and respect. To do that, this thesis is grounded on the different meanings of "right" presented by Ronald Dworkin, especially on the distinction between moral rights and policies. It is also based on a conception of the juridical concept of gender, which has two central dimensions: the expression of one's gender (on the masculinity/femininity spectrum) and the social recognition that one belongs to a certain gender category. It is argued that this conception of gender is fundamental for the proper interpretation and solution of legal issues involving gender, such as civil identification (name and sex/gender assignment), retirement scheme, protective laws and affirmative policies etc. These arguments are preceded by a brief explanation of transgenderism, which goes far beyond what is typically analyzed by jurists. An analysis of the state and sexual morality relations is offered as well, which is done mainly through the criticism of John Finnis and Christopher Tollefsen's conception of sex and gender. In short, Finnis and Tollefsen argue that one's gender should be determined by one's biological sex. Instead, this thesis defends the conceptual separation between biological sex and gender, considering gender the most relevant category for legal and social purposes. Moreover, based on Ronald Dworkin's theorization, it is argued that genders freedom of expression corresponds to one of the leading moral rights of transgender people, ensuring the autonomy and the ethical independence of such individuals. It concludes that the conceptions and theory defended in this thesis correspond to the rationale for answering legal problems of transgender people, even those that are not mentioned.
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