We examine the impact of age similarity between independent directors and the CEO on earnings man... more We examine the impact of age similarity between independent directors and the CEO on earnings management. Using changes in independent director composition due to sameaged director deaths and retirements for identification, we find that firms with the presence of independent directors who have the same age with the CEO are more likely to manage earnings. We further find that age similarity between these two parties increases earnings management through lowering the effectiveness of board monitoring. Additionally, this positive impact decreases as the age gap widens, but intensifies if independent directors share other characteristics with the CEO, if independent directors sit on audit or nomination committees, if firms with lower information asymmetry and if CEOs are older. Our results are robust to alternative proxies of earnings management.
Journal of International Business Studies, Nov 18, 2020
We develop an international model of the design of institutions for regulating innovative activit... more We develop an international model of the design of institutions for regulating innovative activities of private corporations. Informational limitations faced by the social planner preclude complete contracting with private firms. Corporate innovation creates positive and negative externalities. The social planner in each country takes into account the legal system in place, and designs an umbrella of institutions that include a menu of organizational forms, liability structures, corporate taxes, and subsidies. We show that limited liability may be accompanied by excessive innovation. However, when the nonmonetized benefits are very high, private firms may be too conservative in innovation policies. Firms choose their organizational form and level of innovation consistent with private optimality. With the optimal institutional design for each country, we demonstrate that private innovation choices are aligned with social optimality. In particular, we show that the optimally designed corporate tax rate in each country is a decreasing function of its legal effectiveness. Using data from 63 countries over 2003-2018, we document supporting evidence. MNCs can take advantage of differential liability and corporate tax structures across national boundaries to circumvent institutional design constraints. However, when MNCs generate positive externalities to host countries, their governments may provide subsidies and incentives.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Mar 27, 2023
We exploit the arrival of industry-wide synergistic merger waves to identify whether classified b... more We exploit the arrival of industry-wide synergistic merger waves to identify whether classified boards deter takeover bids. In a stylized model, we show that when target classified boards are costly to bidders, their negative effect on takeover likelihood should be more pronounced during merger waves. Using a sample of takeover bids in the United States between 1990 and 2016, we find strong evidence supporting this prediction. The results are robust to accounting for the benefits of classified boards and controlling for other antitakeover provisions. Our findings suggest that classified boards effectively reduce a firm’s exposure to the takeover market.
We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers' incentives to take v... more We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers' incentives to take value-enhancing risks. In our model, the manager chooses higher perk consumption when investor protection is low. Since perks represent a priority claim held by the manager, lower investor protection leads the manager to implement a sub-optimally conservative investment policy, effectively aligning her risk-taking incentives with those of the debt holders. By the same token, higher investor protection is associated with riskier investment policy and faster firm growth. We test these predictions in a large Global Vantage panel. We find strong empirical confirmation that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Dec 1, 2016
An underlying assumption in the executive compensation literature is that there is a national lab... more An underlying assumption in the executive compensation literature is that there is a national labor market for CEOs. The urban economics literature, however, documents higher ability among workers in large metropolitans, which results in a real and stable urban wage premium. In this paper, we investigate the link between the spatial clustering of firms in big, central cities (i.e., urban agglomeration) and the level and structure of CEO compensation. Using CEO compensation data for the period 1992-2004, we document a positive relation between the size and centrality of the city in which the firm is headquartered and the total, as well as the equity based portion of CEO pay. Our results are robust to a host of control variables, sensitivity and endogeneity tests, indicating that urban agglomeration may reflect positive externalities, such as knowledge spillovers, business connections and improved access to private information that have a positive effect on CEO pay and incentive driven compensation for good performance. We document gradual human capital gains acquired from big city work experience that are transferable to the rural area, and rewarded for, once the CEO relocates into a smaller, less central community. Our tests provide novel evidence of information spillovers and networking opportunities in big cities that can directly affect how CEOs are compensated. Such sources of information and influence represent something for which firms are willing to pay higher and more incentive driven pay, evidence in favor of a market-based explanation for CEO compensation.
Employment protection increases labor adjustment costs and hence the expected costs of financial ... more Employment protection increases labor adjustment costs and hence the expected costs of financial distress for labor-intensive firms. It follows that these firms are likely to increase their cash holdings to reduce the risk of financial distress when employment protection is strengthened. Consistent with this prediction, we find that labor-intensive firms in China significantly increase their cash holdings following the enactment of China's Labor Contract Law; other contemporaneous shocks do not seem to drive the finding. We also find that two events prior to the enactment that increase the likelihood of enacting the law have a similar effect. Further analysis shows that the impact of the law is concentrated on areas with strict law enforcement, state-owned enterprises, and industries that employ large numbers of migrant workers.
With 12,500 members from nearly 90 countries, INFORMS is the largest international association of... more With 12,500 members from nearly 90 countries, INFORMS is the largest international association of operations research (O.R.) and analytics professionals and students. INFORMS provides unique networking and learning opportunities for individual professionals, and organizations of all types and sizes, to better understand and use O.R. and analytics tools and methods to transform strategic visions and achieve better outcomes. For more information on INFORMS, its publications, membership, or meetings visit
We study the effects of country-level creditor protections on the firm-level choice of debt struc... more We study the effects of country-level creditor protections on the firm-level choice of debt structure. Using data from 46 countries, we show that firms have more concentrated debt structures in countries with stronger creditor protection. Firms choose debt structure concentrations by trading-off between the probability of a strategic default against an inefficient liquidation by creditors. In countries with strong creditor protections, managers are less likely to strategically default thus the trade-off shifts toward preventing inefficient liquidation. Firms, therefore, choose more concentrated debt structures to facilitate coordination among creditors thereby reduce the probability of inefficient liquidation. Firms with ex-ante higher bankruptcy costs, including those with more intangible assets and higher cash-flow volatilities, exhibit stronger effects. A difference-in-differences analysis of firms' debt structure responses to creditor rights reforms confirms the cross-country results. Our findings are robust to alternative settings and a battery of robustness checks.
... Schnatterly and Paul J. Seguin 41 INTERNAL CASH FLOWS AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT DECISIONS Raj ... more ... Schnatterly and Paul J. Seguin 41 INTERNAL CASH FLOWS AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT DECISIONS Raj Agganval and Sijing Zong 73 PREFERENCES ON RELATIVE RETURN: A POTENTIAL EXPLANATION FOR SOME PRICING ANOMALIES Beni Lauterbach and ...
This paper examines the economic implications of scaling blockchains under two different consensu... more This paper examines the economic implications of scaling blockchains under two different consensus protocols: Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS). We study an economic model whereby agents can store wealth through the blockchain's cryptocurrency but may face a costly delay when liquidating due to the blockchain's finite transaction rate. Agents may expedite processing by paying fees to the blockchain's validators. Within such a model, we study the ability of a malicious agent to compromise the security of the blockchain. We show how improved scaling alleviates congestion, leading to a decrease in equilibrium fees. Under a PoW protocol, this leads validators to earn less revenue and thus spend less on computational power, lowering the cost of a successful attack and therefore the security of the PoW blockchain. Scaling has the opposite effect for the PoS protocol as alleviating congestion increases the demand and therefore the market value of the blockchain's cryptocurrency. That increased market value increases the cost of acquiring enough cryptocurrency necessary for a successful attack and thereby improves PoS blockchain security.
This paper examines corporate payout and debt policies from an agency perspective. We argue that ... more This paper examines corporate payout and debt policies from an agency perspective. We argue that corporate governance and precommitment to cash distributions are alternative methods of addressing manager-shareholder conflicts. We find that total cash distributions, total payouts to shareholders, cash dividends, share repurchases, and interest payments to debtholders are decreasing in corporate governance. Corporate governance also affects the structure of cash distributions. Among different forms of payout to shareholders, irregular payouts such as repurchases or special dividends have the weakest precommitment effect, whereas regular quarterly cash dividends have the strongest effect. Firms with weak governance combine debt and dividends, set high interest and dividend payments, and include short-term debt. Firms affected by the passage of state antitakeover laws increase cash dividends, total payouts to shareholders, and total distributions committed to shareholders and debtholders (dividends and interest).
In this study, we evaluate the effects of natural disasters on the stock (market) values of firms... more In this study, we evaluate the effects of natural disasters on the stock (market) values of firms located in the affected counties. We are able to measure the change in stock prices of the firms affected by the 2021 Texas winter storm. To measure the abnormal return due to the storm, we use four different benchmark models: (1) the market-adjusted model, (2) the market model, (3) the Fama-French three-factor model, and (4) the Fama French plus momentum model. These statistical models in finance characterize the normal risk-return trade-off.
This paper discusses a decentralized finance (DeFi) application called MakerDAO. The Maker Protoc... more This paper discusses a decentralized finance (DeFi) application called MakerDAO. The Maker Protocol, built on the Ethereum blockchain, enables users to create and hold currency. Current elements of the Maker Protocol are the Dai stable coin, Maker Vaults, and Voting. MakerDAO governs the Maker Protocol by deciding on key parameters (e.g., stability fees, collateral types and rates, etc.) through the voting power of Maker (MKR) holders. The Maker Protocol is one of the largest decentralized applications (DApps) on the Ethereum blockchain and is the first decentralized finance (DeFi) application to earn significant adoption. The objective of this paper is to analyze and discuss the significance, uses, and functions of this DeFi application.
We examine the impact of age similarity between independent directors and the CEO on earnings man... more We examine the impact of age similarity between independent directors and the CEO on earnings management. Using changes in independent director composition due to sameaged director deaths and retirements for identification, we find that firms with the presence of independent directors who have the same age with the CEO are more likely to manage earnings. We further find that age similarity between these two parties increases earnings management through lowering the effectiveness of board monitoring. Additionally, this positive impact decreases as the age gap widens, but intensifies if independent directors share other characteristics with the CEO, if independent directors sit on audit or nomination committees, if firms with lower information asymmetry and if CEOs are older. Our results are robust to alternative proxies of earnings management.
Journal of International Business Studies, Nov 18, 2020
We develop an international model of the design of institutions for regulating innovative activit... more We develop an international model of the design of institutions for regulating innovative activities of private corporations. Informational limitations faced by the social planner preclude complete contracting with private firms. Corporate innovation creates positive and negative externalities. The social planner in each country takes into account the legal system in place, and designs an umbrella of institutions that include a menu of organizational forms, liability structures, corporate taxes, and subsidies. We show that limited liability may be accompanied by excessive innovation. However, when the nonmonetized benefits are very high, private firms may be too conservative in innovation policies. Firms choose their organizational form and level of innovation consistent with private optimality. With the optimal institutional design for each country, we demonstrate that private innovation choices are aligned with social optimality. In particular, we show that the optimally designed corporate tax rate in each country is a decreasing function of its legal effectiveness. Using data from 63 countries over 2003-2018, we document supporting evidence. MNCs can take advantage of differential liability and corporate tax structures across national boundaries to circumvent institutional design constraints. However, when MNCs generate positive externalities to host countries, their governments may provide subsidies and incentives.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Mar 27, 2023
We exploit the arrival of industry-wide synergistic merger waves to identify whether classified b... more We exploit the arrival of industry-wide synergistic merger waves to identify whether classified boards deter takeover bids. In a stylized model, we show that when target classified boards are costly to bidders, their negative effect on takeover likelihood should be more pronounced during merger waves. Using a sample of takeover bids in the United States between 1990 and 2016, we find strong evidence supporting this prediction. The results are robust to accounting for the benefits of classified boards and controlling for other antitakeover provisions. Our findings suggest that classified boards effectively reduce a firm’s exposure to the takeover market.
We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers' incentives to take v... more We study how the investor protection environment affects corporate managers' incentives to take value-enhancing risks. In our model, the manager chooses higher perk consumption when investor protection is low. Since perks represent a priority claim held by the manager, lower investor protection leads the manager to implement a sub-optimally conservative investment policy, effectively aligning her risk-taking incentives with those of the debt holders. By the same token, higher investor protection is associated with riskier investment policy and faster firm growth. We test these predictions in a large Global Vantage panel. We find strong empirical confirmation that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Dec 1, 2016
An underlying assumption in the executive compensation literature is that there is a national lab... more An underlying assumption in the executive compensation literature is that there is a national labor market for CEOs. The urban economics literature, however, documents higher ability among workers in large metropolitans, which results in a real and stable urban wage premium. In this paper, we investigate the link between the spatial clustering of firms in big, central cities (i.e., urban agglomeration) and the level and structure of CEO compensation. Using CEO compensation data for the period 1992-2004, we document a positive relation between the size and centrality of the city in which the firm is headquartered and the total, as well as the equity based portion of CEO pay. Our results are robust to a host of control variables, sensitivity and endogeneity tests, indicating that urban agglomeration may reflect positive externalities, such as knowledge spillovers, business connections and improved access to private information that have a positive effect on CEO pay and incentive driven compensation for good performance. We document gradual human capital gains acquired from big city work experience that are transferable to the rural area, and rewarded for, once the CEO relocates into a smaller, less central community. Our tests provide novel evidence of information spillovers and networking opportunities in big cities that can directly affect how CEOs are compensated. Such sources of information and influence represent something for which firms are willing to pay higher and more incentive driven pay, evidence in favor of a market-based explanation for CEO compensation.
Employment protection increases labor adjustment costs and hence the expected costs of financial ... more Employment protection increases labor adjustment costs and hence the expected costs of financial distress for labor-intensive firms. It follows that these firms are likely to increase their cash holdings to reduce the risk of financial distress when employment protection is strengthened. Consistent with this prediction, we find that labor-intensive firms in China significantly increase their cash holdings following the enactment of China's Labor Contract Law; other contemporaneous shocks do not seem to drive the finding. We also find that two events prior to the enactment that increase the likelihood of enacting the law have a similar effect. Further analysis shows that the impact of the law is concentrated on areas with strict law enforcement, state-owned enterprises, and industries that employ large numbers of migrant workers.
With 12,500 members from nearly 90 countries, INFORMS is the largest international association of... more With 12,500 members from nearly 90 countries, INFORMS is the largest international association of operations research (O.R.) and analytics professionals and students. INFORMS provides unique networking and learning opportunities for individual professionals, and organizations of all types and sizes, to better understand and use O.R. and analytics tools and methods to transform strategic visions and achieve better outcomes. For more information on INFORMS, its publications, membership, or meetings visit
We study the effects of country-level creditor protections on the firm-level choice of debt struc... more We study the effects of country-level creditor protections on the firm-level choice of debt structure. Using data from 46 countries, we show that firms have more concentrated debt structures in countries with stronger creditor protection. Firms choose debt structure concentrations by trading-off between the probability of a strategic default against an inefficient liquidation by creditors. In countries with strong creditor protections, managers are less likely to strategically default thus the trade-off shifts toward preventing inefficient liquidation. Firms, therefore, choose more concentrated debt structures to facilitate coordination among creditors thereby reduce the probability of inefficient liquidation. Firms with ex-ante higher bankruptcy costs, including those with more intangible assets and higher cash-flow volatilities, exhibit stronger effects. A difference-in-differences analysis of firms' debt structure responses to creditor rights reforms confirms the cross-country results. Our findings are robust to alternative settings and a battery of robustness checks.
... Schnatterly and Paul J. Seguin 41 INTERNAL CASH FLOWS AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT DECISIONS Raj ... more ... Schnatterly and Paul J. Seguin 41 INTERNAL CASH FLOWS AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT DECISIONS Raj Agganval and Sijing Zong 73 PREFERENCES ON RELATIVE RETURN: A POTENTIAL EXPLANATION FOR SOME PRICING ANOMALIES Beni Lauterbach and ...
This paper examines the economic implications of scaling blockchains under two different consensu... more This paper examines the economic implications of scaling blockchains under two different consensus protocols: Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS). We study an economic model whereby agents can store wealth through the blockchain's cryptocurrency but may face a costly delay when liquidating due to the blockchain's finite transaction rate. Agents may expedite processing by paying fees to the blockchain's validators. Within such a model, we study the ability of a malicious agent to compromise the security of the blockchain. We show how improved scaling alleviates congestion, leading to a decrease in equilibrium fees. Under a PoW protocol, this leads validators to earn less revenue and thus spend less on computational power, lowering the cost of a successful attack and therefore the security of the PoW blockchain. Scaling has the opposite effect for the PoS protocol as alleviating congestion increases the demand and therefore the market value of the blockchain's cryptocurrency. That increased market value increases the cost of acquiring enough cryptocurrency necessary for a successful attack and thereby improves PoS blockchain security.
This paper examines corporate payout and debt policies from an agency perspective. We argue that ... more This paper examines corporate payout and debt policies from an agency perspective. We argue that corporate governance and precommitment to cash distributions are alternative methods of addressing manager-shareholder conflicts. We find that total cash distributions, total payouts to shareholders, cash dividends, share repurchases, and interest payments to debtholders are decreasing in corporate governance. Corporate governance also affects the structure of cash distributions. Among different forms of payout to shareholders, irregular payouts such as repurchases or special dividends have the weakest precommitment effect, whereas regular quarterly cash dividends have the strongest effect. Firms with weak governance combine debt and dividends, set high interest and dividend payments, and include short-term debt. Firms affected by the passage of state antitakeover laws increase cash dividends, total payouts to shareholders, and total distributions committed to shareholders and debtholders (dividends and interest).
In this study, we evaluate the effects of natural disasters on the stock (market) values of firms... more In this study, we evaluate the effects of natural disasters on the stock (market) values of firms located in the affected counties. We are able to measure the change in stock prices of the firms affected by the 2021 Texas winter storm. To measure the abnormal return due to the storm, we use four different benchmark models: (1) the market-adjusted model, (2) the market model, (3) the Fama-French three-factor model, and (4) the Fama French plus momentum model. These statistical models in finance characterize the normal risk-return trade-off.
This paper discusses a decentralized finance (DeFi) application called MakerDAO. The Maker Protoc... more This paper discusses a decentralized finance (DeFi) application called MakerDAO. The Maker Protocol, built on the Ethereum blockchain, enables users to create and hold currency. Current elements of the Maker Protocol are the Dai stable coin, Maker Vaults, and Voting. MakerDAO governs the Maker Protocol by deciding on key parameters (e.g., stability fees, collateral types and rates, etc.) through the voting power of Maker (MKR) holders. The Maker Protocol is one of the largest decentralized applications (DApps) on the Ethereum blockchain and is the first decentralized finance (DeFi) application to earn significant adoption. The objective of this paper is to analyze and discuss the significance, uses, and functions of this DeFi application.
We analyze the interrelationships among the corporate organization structure, the capital structu... more We analyze the interrelationships among the corporate organization structure, the capital structure, and the ownership structure of a firm with multiple projects, when incumbent management derives control benefits. The choices made by firm management are: (1) Whether to set up projects as a joint firm or as separate firms (spin-off), (2) the amount of debt financing to use, (3) the structure of the debt contract (e.g., straight debt on the joint firm, limited-recourse project financing, or spin-off with straight debt), and (4) the fraction of equity to hold in each firm (ownership structure). Differences in managerial ability across projects, benefits of control, and the probability of loss of control through a takeover or through bankruptcy are driving factors in this model. We relate the project characteristics to the optimality of spin-offs and limited-recourse project financing arrangements, and derive implications for the allocation of debt and the ownership structure across projects.
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