The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 2009
Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra has long been celebrated, alongside Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, ... more Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra has long been celebrated, alongside Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, for its explication of emptiness from the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka viewpoint, set within a broader presentation of the Mahāyāna path structure. While the features that these two texts share-and, indeed, the features of Prāsaṅgika itself-have been oft-debated in the history of Tibetan Madhyamaka, we have good textual and doctrinal evidence for associating them. One compelling reason is Śāntideva's declaration that "the ultimate is not a referent of awareness," 1 a claim that echoes Candrakīrti's statement that the ultimate "is ineff able and just not a referent of consciousness." 2 Further, in explication of Śāntideva's assertion, Prajñākaramati's (c. 950-1030) commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra quotes the Madhyamakāvatāra four times, linking these two texts' views on this central Madhyamaka doctrine. 3 The kind of ultimate suggested in these passages, an ultimate that transcends thought and language, would prove to be a stumbling block for those early Tibetan Mādhyamikas with strong com
The papers collected here represent a sampling of the ways contemporary scholars approach the Mad... more The papers collected here represent a sampling of the ways contemporary scholars approach the Madhyamaka tradition of Tibet. We have come a long way from the days when Tibetan texts were studied only for their utility in editing Indian works and from the old scholarly opinions that Tibetan commentaries and treatises constituted either sterile rehash of Indian innovations or hyper-scholastic hairsplitting of insignificant topics. To be fair, Tibetan authors’ guise of fidelity to Indian authorities, in which innovation (rang bzo) is disavowed, must have influenced these scholars’ assessments. With the work of several pioneers of Tibetan Madhyamaka, we can see through these modest claims of fidelity and appreciate that Tibetans inherited a good number of problems from Indian scholars, many of which may not have been apparent to the latter, and exhibit a high degree of creativity and sophistication of thought in their solutions. As first-rate scholarship expands to investigate the full ...
The Indian Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti (c. 570–640) created a systematic and far-reaching in... more The Indian Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti (c. 570–640) created a systematic and far-reaching interpretation of the central Madhyamaka (“Middle Way”) doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) that many in Tibet regard as the highest philosophical view and as essential to the attainment of awakening. His unique reading of the “two truths,” all in the self-portrayal of a faithful interpreter of Nāgārjuna, offered an austere interpretation of emptiness that redefined the awakened state and took effort to align with the Mahāyāna Buddhist path. His bivalent portrayal of “the world” portended a conservative approach to a Buddhist’s relationship to authoritative scripture and its trustworthy interpreter, Nāgārjuna, as well as reconceiving the role of philosophical argument within ordinary practices. As is the case with many Indian Buddhists, little is known about his life; he is placed historically on the basis of his references to somewhat better-known figures. His thoroughgoing critique of the em...
Classical and current-day scholars have long appreciated the pitfalls of holding to the Madhyamak... more Classical and current-day scholars have long appreciated the pitfalls of holding to the Madhyamaka Buddhist notion that all things are empty. Among the central difficulties attendant on emptiness are the epistemological issue of how one comes to know that all things are empty, despite appearances to the contrary, and the logical issue of how one might demonstrate this realization to others. While Buddhists face similar challenges with the constitutive and counterintuitive doctrine of selflessness, Mādhyamikas’ claim for the universality of emptiness renders it a special case: where logical and epistemological processes might be marshalled to support the claim that sentient beings lack an enduring self, those very processes that could be utilized to support the doctrine of emptiness must themselves be examples of empty phenomena. Put simply, if minds and arguments are empty, how can they know and prove emptiness?
This paper examines the role of pramān : a in Jayānanda's commentary to Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāv... more This paper examines the role of pramān : a in Jayānanda's commentary to Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra. As the only extant Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti's works (available only in Tibetan translation), written in the twelfth century when Candrakīrti's interpretation of Madhyamaka first became widely valued, Jayānanda's Madhyamakāvatārat : īkā is crucial to our understanding of early Prāsa _ ngika thought. In the portions of his text examined here, Jayānanda offers a pointed critique of both svatantra inferences and the broader Buddhist epistemological movement. In developing this critique, he cites at length Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā treatment of svatantra, and so comes to comment on the locus classicus for the Svātantrika-Prāsa _ ngika distinction. For Jayānanda, svatantra inferences are emblematic of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti epistemological tradition, which asserts an unwarranted validity to human cognition. As such, Nāgārjuna's philosophy admits neither svatantra inference, nor pramān : a (as ''valid cognition'') more generally. Instead, Jayānanda argues for Nāgārjuna's ''authority'' (pramān : a) as our prime means for knowing reality. Jayānanda's account of authority offers a helpful counterbalance to the current trend of portraying Prāsa _ ngika Madhyamaka as a form of skepticism. Keywords Jayānanda Á Candrakīrti Á Prāsa _ ngika Á Pramān : a Á Authority Á Skepticism Buddhism is frequently portrayed as a ''rational religion,'' eminently concerned with critical investigation of reality, rather than with a faithful acceptance of central beliefs. From early Buddhist scriptures in which the Buddha himself urges his
This paper examines the role of pramāṇa in Jayānanda’s commentary to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatā... more This paper examines the role of pramāṇa in Jayānanda’s commentary to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. As the only extant Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti’s works (available only in Tibetan translation), written in the twelfth century when Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Madhyamaka first became widely valued, Jayānanda’s Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā is crucial to our understanding of early Prāsaṅgika thought. In the portions of his text examined here, Jayānanda offers a pointed critique of both svatantra inferences and the broader Buddhist epistemological movement. In developing this critique, he cites at length Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā treatment of svatantra, and so comes to comment on the locus classicus for the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction. For Jayānanda, svatantra inferences are emblematic of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti epistemological tradition, which asserts an unwarranted validity to human cognition. As such, Nāgārjuna’s philosophy admits neither svatantra inference, nor pramāṇa (as “valid cognition”) more generally. Instead, Jayānanda argues for Nāgārjuna’s “authority” (pramāṇa) as our prime means for knowing reality. Jayānanda’s account of authority offers a helpful counterbalance to the current trend of portraying Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka as a form of skepticism.
Page 1. Page 2. Tibet's Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness &amp... more Page 1. Page 2. Tibet's Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness & the Buddha Matrix Translated here for the first time into any language, Mountain Doctrine, Ocean of Definitive Meaning: Final Unique Quintessential Instructions ...
This paper examines early Tibetan authors’ treatment of “elimination” (viccheda/vyavaccheda), in ... more This paper examines early Tibetan authors’ treatment of “elimination” (viccheda/vyavaccheda), in order to trace competing lines of Madhyamaka exegesis. I compare Gyamarwa’s (rgya dmar ba byang chub grags; twelfth century) treatment of this topic in his Analysis of the Essence of Madhyamaka with that of his teacher Gangpa Sheu (gangs pa she’u) and four early Tibetan Prāsaṅgika authors. I conclude that Gyamarwa knew of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka from Atiśa’s followers, but prioritized utilizing Śāntideva’s and Jñānagarbha’s views to support his Madhyamaka position. I reflect further on the nature of “tradition” in early Tibetan scholasticism, focusing on Sangpu Neutok (gsang phu ne’u thog) Monastery.
... While Indian Buddhist authors composed sim-ilar texts, Tibetan doxographies uniquely divided ... more ... While Indian Buddhist authors composed sim-ilar texts, Tibetan doxographies uniquely divided the Middle Way into subschools centered round Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka.3 In Tibetan esti-mations, Candrakīrti's subschool, Prāsaṅgika,4 consistently ranks ahead of ...
This article examines Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s understandings of svatantra and prasaṅga pr... more This article examines Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s understandings of svatantra and prasaṅga proofs in the attempt to clarify how and why Tibetan Prāsaṅgikas came to portray svatantra inference as an instance of the very thing Madhyamaka rejects. The article proceeds in four parts. (1) A brief comparison of Patsap Nyimadrak’s (pa tshab nyi ma grags, c. 1055–1145) portrayal of svatantra inference with Bhāviveka’s and Candrakīrti’s employment of this expression shows that Patsap expanded the meaning of it, charging its users with embracing a realism at odds with Madhyamaka emptiness. (2) Patsap’s arguments against Śāntarakṣita’s “neither one nor many” proof lead us consider the latter’s and Kamalaśīla’s understanding of svatantra and prasaṅga proofs, which turns out to be consistent with, if more sophisticated than, Bhāviveka’s and Candrakīrti’s usage. (3) An exploration of Kamalaśīla’s development of the proof of the naturelessness of all things, real and imagined, calls into question the svatantra-prasaṅga distinction but still leaves us without a source for Patsap’s characterization. (4) A consideration of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s use of svatantra to characterize Mīmāṃsā conceptions of an authorless Veda and “intrinsic validity,” as well as their own view of “self-awareness,” offers potential sources for characterizing (indeed, misunderstanding) valid cognition and, by extension, inference as “autonomous.”
The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 2009
Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra has long been celebrated, alongside Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, ... more Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra has long been celebrated, alongside Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, for its explication of emptiness from the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka viewpoint, set within a broader presentation of the Mahāyāna path structure. While the features that these two texts share-and, indeed, the features of Prāsaṅgika itself-have been oft-debated in the history of Tibetan Madhyamaka, we have good textual and doctrinal evidence for associating them. One compelling reason is Śāntideva's declaration that "the ultimate is not a referent of awareness," 1 a claim that echoes Candrakīrti's statement that the ultimate "is ineff able and just not a referent of consciousness." 2 Further, in explication of Śāntideva's assertion, Prajñākaramati's (c. 950-1030) commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra quotes the Madhyamakāvatāra four times, linking these two texts' views on this central Madhyamaka doctrine. 3 The kind of ultimate suggested in these passages, an ultimate that transcends thought and language, would prove to be a stumbling block for those early Tibetan Mādhyamikas with strong com
The papers collected here represent a sampling of the ways contemporary scholars approach the Mad... more The papers collected here represent a sampling of the ways contemporary scholars approach the Madhyamaka tradition of Tibet. We have come a long way from the days when Tibetan texts were studied only for their utility in editing Indian works and from the old scholarly opinions that Tibetan commentaries and treatises constituted either sterile rehash of Indian innovations or hyper-scholastic hairsplitting of insignificant topics. To be fair, Tibetan authors’ guise of fidelity to Indian authorities, in which innovation (rang bzo) is disavowed, must have influenced these scholars’ assessments. With the work of several pioneers of Tibetan Madhyamaka, we can see through these modest claims of fidelity and appreciate that Tibetans inherited a good number of problems from Indian scholars, many of which may not have been apparent to the latter, and exhibit a high degree of creativity and sophistication of thought in their solutions. As first-rate scholarship expands to investigate the full ...
The Indian Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti (c. 570–640) created a systematic and far-reaching in... more The Indian Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti (c. 570–640) created a systematic and far-reaching interpretation of the central Madhyamaka (“Middle Way”) doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) that many in Tibet regard as the highest philosophical view and as essential to the attainment of awakening. His unique reading of the “two truths,” all in the self-portrayal of a faithful interpreter of Nāgārjuna, offered an austere interpretation of emptiness that redefined the awakened state and took effort to align with the Mahāyāna Buddhist path. His bivalent portrayal of “the world” portended a conservative approach to a Buddhist’s relationship to authoritative scripture and its trustworthy interpreter, Nāgārjuna, as well as reconceiving the role of philosophical argument within ordinary practices. As is the case with many Indian Buddhists, little is known about his life; he is placed historically on the basis of his references to somewhat better-known figures. His thoroughgoing critique of the em...
Classical and current-day scholars have long appreciated the pitfalls of holding to the Madhyamak... more Classical and current-day scholars have long appreciated the pitfalls of holding to the Madhyamaka Buddhist notion that all things are empty. Among the central difficulties attendant on emptiness are the epistemological issue of how one comes to know that all things are empty, despite appearances to the contrary, and the logical issue of how one might demonstrate this realization to others. While Buddhists face similar challenges with the constitutive and counterintuitive doctrine of selflessness, Mādhyamikas’ claim for the universality of emptiness renders it a special case: where logical and epistemological processes might be marshalled to support the claim that sentient beings lack an enduring self, those very processes that could be utilized to support the doctrine of emptiness must themselves be examples of empty phenomena. Put simply, if minds and arguments are empty, how can they know and prove emptiness?
This paper examines the role of pramān : a in Jayānanda's commentary to Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāv... more This paper examines the role of pramān : a in Jayānanda's commentary to Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra. As the only extant Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti's works (available only in Tibetan translation), written in the twelfth century when Candrakīrti's interpretation of Madhyamaka first became widely valued, Jayānanda's Madhyamakāvatārat : īkā is crucial to our understanding of early Prāsa _ ngika thought. In the portions of his text examined here, Jayānanda offers a pointed critique of both svatantra inferences and the broader Buddhist epistemological movement. In developing this critique, he cites at length Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā treatment of svatantra, and so comes to comment on the locus classicus for the Svātantrika-Prāsa _ ngika distinction. For Jayānanda, svatantra inferences are emblematic of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti epistemological tradition, which asserts an unwarranted validity to human cognition. As such, Nāgārjuna's philosophy admits neither svatantra inference, nor pramān : a (as ''valid cognition'') more generally. Instead, Jayānanda argues for Nāgārjuna's ''authority'' (pramān : a) as our prime means for knowing reality. Jayānanda's account of authority offers a helpful counterbalance to the current trend of portraying Prāsa _ ngika Madhyamaka as a form of skepticism. Keywords Jayānanda Á Candrakīrti Á Prāsa _ ngika Á Pramān : a Á Authority Á Skepticism Buddhism is frequently portrayed as a ''rational religion,'' eminently concerned with critical investigation of reality, rather than with a faithful acceptance of central beliefs. From early Buddhist scriptures in which the Buddha himself urges his
This paper examines the role of pramāṇa in Jayānanda’s commentary to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatā... more This paper examines the role of pramāṇa in Jayānanda’s commentary to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. As the only extant Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti’s works (available only in Tibetan translation), written in the twelfth century when Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Madhyamaka first became widely valued, Jayānanda’s Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā is crucial to our understanding of early Prāsaṅgika thought. In the portions of his text examined here, Jayānanda offers a pointed critique of both svatantra inferences and the broader Buddhist epistemological movement. In developing this critique, he cites at length Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā treatment of svatantra, and so comes to comment on the locus classicus for the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction. For Jayānanda, svatantra inferences are emblematic of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti epistemological tradition, which asserts an unwarranted validity to human cognition. As such, Nāgārjuna’s philosophy admits neither svatantra inference, nor pramāṇa (as “valid cognition”) more generally. Instead, Jayānanda argues for Nāgārjuna’s “authority” (pramāṇa) as our prime means for knowing reality. Jayānanda’s account of authority offers a helpful counterbalance to the current trend of portraying Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka as a form of skepticism.
Page 1. Page 2. Tibet's Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness &amp... more Page 1. Page 2. Tibet's Fundamental Treatise on Other-Emptiness & the Buddha Matrix Translated here for the first time into any language, Mountain Doctrine, Ocean of Definitive Meaning: Final Unique Quintessential Instructions ...
This paper examines early Tibetan authors’ treatment of “elimination” (viccheda/vyavaccheda), in ... more This paper examines early Tibetan authors’ treatment of “elimination” (viccheda/vyavaccheda), in order to trace competing lines of Madhyamaka exegesis. I compare Gyamarwa’s (rgya dmar ba byang chub grags; twelfth century) treatment of this topic in his Analysis of the Essence of Madhyamaka with that of his teacher Gangpa Sheu (gangs pa she’u) and four early Tibetan Prāsaṅgika authors. I conclude that Gyamarwa knew of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka from Atiśa’s followers, but prioritized utilizing Śāntideva’s and Jñānagarbha’s views to support his Madhyamaka position. I reflect further on the nature of “tradition” in early Tibetan scholasticism, focusing on Sangpu Neutok (gsang phu ne’u thog) Monastery.
... While Indian Buddhist authors composed sim-ilar texts, Tibetan doxographies uniquely divided ... more ... While Indian Buddhist authors composed sim-ilar texts, Tibetan doxographies uniquely divided the Middle Way into subschools centered round Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka.3 In Tibetan esti-mations, Candrakīrti's subschool, Prāsaṅgika,4 consistently ranks ahead of ...
This article examines Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s understandings of svatantra and prasaṅga pr... more This article examines Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s understandings of svatantra and prasaṅga proofs in the attempt to clarify how and why Tibetan Prāsaṅgikas came to portray svatantra inference as an instance of the very thing Madhyamaka rejects. The article proceeds in four parts. (1) A brief comparison of Patsap Nyimadrak’s (pa tshab nyi ma grags, c. 1055–1145) portrayal of svatantra inference with Bhāviveka’s and Candrakīrti’s employment of this expression shows that Patsap expanded the meaning of it, charging its users with embracing a realism at odds with Madhyamaka emptiness. (2) Patsap’s arguments against Śāntarakṣita’s “neither one nor many” proof lead us consider the latter’s and Kamalaśīla’s understanding of svatantra and prasaṅga proofs, which turns out to be consistent with, if more sophisticated than, Bhāviveka’s and Candrakīrti’s usage. (3) An exploration of Kamalaśīla’s development of the proof of the naturelessness of all things, real and imagined, calls into question the svatantra-prasaṅga distinction but still leaves us without a source for Patsap’s characterization. (4) A consideration of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s use of svatantra to characterize Mīmāṃsā conceptions of an authorless Veda and “intrinsic validity,” as well as their own view of “self-awareness,” offers potential sources for characterizing (indeed, misunderstanding) valid cognition and, by extension, inference as “autonomous.”
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