Books by Keith Buhler
My dissertation about ethical naturalism.
In it, I defend what I take to be the best version ... more My dissertation about ethical naturalism.
In it, I defend what I take to be the best version of ethical naturalism on offer -- in which we must understand the term "nature" to refer both to descriptive and to irreducibly normative facts.
Philippa Foot (and Michael Thompson, and to a lesser extent, John McDowell) are co-laborers here.
My metaethical claim is that a rigidly biological basis for morality is inadequate. I also claim, however, that biology is relevant to morality. And my particular ethical claim is summed up in the idea that practical wisdom, which is excellence in practical reasoning, is the master virtue that enables one to succeed in becoming truly human, despite varying abilities and life circumstances
Formal Abstract:
Philippa Foot and John McDowell both defend contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethics but each represents a rival expression of the same. They are united in the affirmation that virtue is ‘natural goodness’ for human beings; they are divided in their rival conceptions of ‘nature.’ McDowell distinguishes second nature or the ”space of reasons” from first nature or the “realm of law.” Foot rejects this division.
On Foot’s naturalism, natural goodness is a just as much a feature of first nature as health is, even though human practical reasoning is unique in the biological world. I defend Foot’s view by appealing to “generic propositions,” a little-utilized feature of linguistic theory. Life forms and functions described in generic statements are intrinsically normative and yet just as scientifically respectable as other naturalistic concepts. Hence, the generic proposition that ”humans are practical, rational primates” has both descriptive and normative content. It follows that the ethical and rational norms defining a good human life are a subset of natural norms which can be known as such from an “external” scientific point of view as well as from an “internal” ethical point of view.
Going beyond Foot’s views, I present a new interlocking neo-Aristotelian account of virtue and practical reason. Virtues are excellences of practical reasoning and rational practice. Virtues enable and partly constitute a good life for human beings. Practical reasoning is the ability to pursue perceived goods and avoid perceived evils in every action. Practical wisdom, which is excellence in practical reasoning, is the master virtue that enables one to succeed in becoming truly human, despite varying abilities and life circumstances. In short, all of us ought to pursue virtue and practical wisdom because of what we are; virtue and practical wisdom are natural ends.
I aim to secure the naturalistic credentials of my view by examining three influential conceptions of ‘nature,’ criticizing McDowell’s conception and showing how my view is consistent with the remaining two. The resulting view is called ’recursive naturalism’ because nature recurs within nature when natural beings reason about nature, about themselves, and about their own reasoning.
Talks by Keith Buhler
Contemporary virtue ethicists rarely, if ever, address vainglory or keno-doxia. Instead, vainglor... more Contemporary virtue ethicists rarely, if ever, address vainglory or keno-doxia. Instead, vainglory is often conflated with pride or dismissed as a petty vice. In this paper, I argue that vainglory is not merely a form of pride but one of three major roots of sin having to do with the lust of the eyes. Drawing on Scriptural, patristic, and contemporary writings, I show that vainglory is a distinctive craving for seeing and being seen which manifests in a multitude of forms, some familiar (such as clothes) and others less familiar. The virtues of which vainglory is a counterfeit include both obscurity and true glory from God.
Abandoning the search for natural teleology was a harbinger of modern sci- ence. Francis Bacon an... more Abandoning the search for natural teleology was a harbinger of modern sci- ence. Francis Bacon and others believed that the search for final causes corrupted science. Has this belief been tested and found wanting? Two reasons should lead us to think that natural teleology is ripe for review. Firstly, contemporary scientists and philosophers have proven unable to re- duce or eliminate teleological talk from biology, medicine, even cosmology. Secondly, the anti-teleological reductive Darwinian account is unable to ex- plain objective value reason; it is unable to explain the presence of mind in the cosmos. Historically, teleological accounts have invoked divine mind, so some fear that reconsidering natural teleology risks sullying nature with divinity. Thomas Nagel defends a secular alternative – teleology without theology. His hypothesis of ‘naturalized’ Platonism or Aristotelianism is a non-religious answer to the “cosmic question” of how rational, moral crea- tures like us came to be, and how we fit in. Though he personally rejects theism, I argue that Nagel’s hypothesis is compatible with (certain kinds of) atheism and (certain kinds of) theism, which should commend it to both kinds of philosophers. Further, I argue that Nagel’s argument against anti- teleological naturalism is sound, but that his secular alternative is not very Platonic or Aristotelian. It may be right, but it is nothing more or less than Nagelian.
The classical "laws of thought" (such as the law of non-contradiction) do not describe the way we... more The classical "laws of thought" (such as the law of non-contradiction) do not describe the way we always think but denote the way we ought and ought not to think. Likewise, moral, legal, and prudential laws do not describe the way we always feel, intend, and act but the ways we ought and ought not to feel, intend, and act. Are there parallel laws of imagination? I hypothesize that there are. These laws -- which I call "imaginative norms" -- denote the ways we ought and ought not to imagine. The Imaginative Norm Hypothesis explains of the phenomenon of "imaginative resistance" (that is, resistance to imagining gross immorality). My primary thesis is that an agent's entertaining thoughts or images with grossly ugly or immoral mental contents -- irrespective of whether these thoughts influence action -- tend to detract from the highest moral character and healthiest overall psychology. Thus, the mental attitude of imaginative resistance can be explained: it is a peculiarly moral mental attitude arising from the aspiration to high moral character. As a corollary, we might expect those who (for whatever reason) are less worried about strictly protecting their mind pure and spotless will report less imaginative resistance; and second, that the mental attitude of resistance will not appear as strongly -- or not appear at all -- when an agent entertains thoughts or images that are less morally objectionable. Both of these corollaries turn out to be true.
Drafts by Keith Buhler
The ethical naturalist evaluates humans and other organisms on the basis of what they are and wha... more The ethical naturalist evaluates humans and other organisms on the basis of what they are and what they typically do. Yet facts (i.e., the way things are) and norms (i.e., the way things ought to be) are quite different. So it is generally agreed that the ethical naturalist has an is-ought problem. How, if at all, does the way things *are* relate to the way things *ought to be*? Most ethical naturalists assume that natural facts are descriptive facts and try to show how natural facts "ground," or "entail," or "realize" normative facts. There is another, more promising, approach. The ethical naturalist can argue that some normative facts are themselves fundamentally natural, that some natural facts are fundamentally normative. Philippa Foot calls such facts "natural norms." Natural norms do not *bridge* the is-ought divide but rather preempt the division. In this paper, I argue that natural norms are real, scientifically respectable, and (potentially) ethically significant. I not only summarize Philippa Foot's defense of this notion but bring to bear some new evidence from linguistic theory, namely "generic" propositions which are ubiquitous in scientific discourse. Appealing to generic propositions as they are deployed in typical natural and life sciences bolsters the view that normativity is a feature of nature itself and not merely projected onto nature by scientists and philosophers. Further, I give reasons to think that the project of *reducing* normative features to non-normative ones is not very promising -- it is certainly not the only scientific or rationally justifiable option. Rather, real, naturalistic normativity is just as scientifically respectable as other properties countenanced by scientific realists.
Publications by Keith Buhler
Metaphysica, 2020
Many common arguments for physicalism begin with the principle that the cosmos is “causally close... more Many common arguments for physicalism begin with the principle that the cosmos is “causally closed.” But how good are the arguments for causal closure itself? I argue that the deductive, a priori arguments on behalf of causal closure tend to beg the question. The extant inductive arguments fare no better. They commit a sampling error or a non-sequitur, or else offer conclusions that remain compatible with causal openness. In short, we have no good arguments that the physical world is causally closed.
Uploads
Books by Keith Buhler
In it, I defend what I take to be the best version of ethical naturalism on offer -- in which we must understand the term "nature" to refer both to descriptive and to irreducibly normative facts.
Philippa Foot (and Michael Thompson, and to a lesser extent, John McDowell) are co-laborers here.
My metaethical claim is that a rigidly biological basis for morality is inadequate. I also claim, however, that biology is relevant to morality. And my particular ethical claim is summed up in the idea that practical wisdom, which is excellence in practical reasoning, is the master virtue that enables one to succeed in becoming truly human, despite varying abilities and life circumstances
Formal Abstract:
Philippa Foot and John McDowell both defend contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethics but each represents a rival expression of the same. They are united in the affirmation that virtue is ‘natural goodness’ for human beings; they are divided in their rival conceptions of ‘nature.’ McDowell distinguishes second nature or the ”space of reasons” from first nature or the “realm of law.” Foot rejects this division.
On Foot’s naturalism, natural goodness is a just as much a feature of first nature as health is, even though human practical reasoning is unique in the biological world. I defend Foot’s view by appealing to “generic propositions,” a little-utilized feature of linguistic theory. Life forms and functions described in generic statements are intrinsically normative and yet just as scientifically respectable as other naturalistic concepts. Hence, the generic proposition that ”humans are practical, rational primates” has both descriptive and normative content. It follows that the ethical and rational norms defining a good human life are a subset of natural norms which can be known as such from an “external” scientific point of view as well as from an “internal” ethical point of view.
Going beyond Foot’s views, I present a new interlocking neo-Aristotelian account of virtue and practical reason. Virtues are excellences of practical reasoning and rational practice. Virtues enable and partly constitute a good life for human beings. Practical reasoning is the ability to pursue perceived goods and avoid perceived evils in every action. Practical wisdom, which is excellence in practical reasoning, is the master virtue that enables one to succeed in becoming truly human, despite varying abilities and life circumstances. In short, all of us ought to pursue virtue and practical wisdom because of what we are; virtue and practical wisdom are natural ends.
I aim to secure the naturalistic credentials of my view by examining three influential conceptions of ‘nature,’ criticizing McDowell’s conception and showing how my view is consistent with the remaining two. The resulting view is called ’recursive naturalism’ because nature recurs within nature when natural beings reason about nature, about themselves, and about their own reasoning.
Talks by Keith Buhler
Drafts by Keith Buhler
Publications by Keith Buhler
In it, I defend what I take to be the best version of ethical naturalism on offer -- in which we must understand the term "nature" to refer both to descriptive and to irreducibly normative facts.
Philippa Foot (and Michael Thompson, and to a lesser extent, John McDowell) are co-laborers here.
My metaethical claim is that a rigidly biological basis for morality is inadequate. I also claim, however, that biology is relevant to morality. And my particular ethical claim is summed up in the idea that practical wisdom, which is excellence in practical reasoning, is the master virtue that enables one to succeed in becoming truly human, despite varying abilities and life circumstances
Formal Abstract:
Philippa Foot and John McDowell both defend contemporary neo-Aristotelian ethics but each represents a rival expression of the same. They are united in the affirmation that virtue is ‘natural goodness’ for human beings; they are divided in their rival conceptions of ‘nature.’ McDowell distinguishes second nature or the ”space of reasons” from first nature or the “realm of law.” Foot rejects this division.
On Foot’s naturalism, natural goodness is a just as much a feature of first nature as health is, even though human practical reasoning is unique in the biological world. I defend Foot’s view by appealing to “generic propositions,” a little-utilized feature of linguistic theory. Life forms and functions described in generic statements are intrinsically normative and yet just as scientifically respectable as other naturalistic concepts. Hence, the generic proposition that ”humans are practical, rational primates” has both descriptive and normative content. It follows that the ethical and rational norms defining a good human life are a subset of natural norms which can be known as such from an “external” scientific point of view as well as from an “internal” ethical point of view.
Going beyond Foot’s views, I present a new interlocking neo-Aristotelian account of virtue and practical reason. Virtues are excellences of practical reasoning and rational practice. Virtues enable and partly constitute a good life for human beings. Practical reasoning is the ability to pursue perceived goods and avoid perceived evils in every action. Practical wisdom, which is excellence in practical reasoning, is the master virtue that enables one to succeed in becoming truly human, despite varying abilities and life circumstances. In short, all of us ought to pursue virtue and practical wisdom because of what we are; virtue and practical wisdom are natural ends.
I aim to secure the naturalistic credentials of my view by examining three influential conceptions of ‘nature,’ criticizing McDowell’s conception and showing how my view is consistent with the remaining two. The resulting view is called ’recursive naturalism’ because nature recurs within nature when natural beings reason about nature, about themselves, and about their own reasoning.