In this article, I reply to commentators Leonard Feldblyum, Robert Holub, and David Owen on my ar... more In this article, I reply to commentators Leonard Feldblyum, Robert Holub, and David Owen on my article “The Biology of Evil.” While I concede that Nietzsche often invoked standard degenerationist rhetoric about breeding, I argue that Nietzsche, unlike other degenerationists, never offered any concrete plans for such breeding and was not interested in raising the capacities of average citizens, but rather was concerned with the exceptional few. I argue that these “strokes of luck” do not readily lend themselves to planned breeding programs. I concede that Nietzsche did not favor societies that allowed for the integration of foreign elements, but rather some alternation between regimented hierarchical societies and motley societies. However, against Holub's and Feldblyum's contention that Nietzsche was interested in the alleged Jewish problem of his day, I expand on my claim that, for Nietzsche, the current malaise is more a product of the workings of the ancient than the mode...
1I define postmodernism as incredulity towards meta-narratives. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmo... more 1I define postmodernism as incredulity towards meta-narratives. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition When the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if you are an architect of the future and know the present will you understand it.
This essay addresses the questions of what exactly is nihilism, how did nihilism become Nietzsche... more This essay addresses the questions of what exactly is nihilism, how did nihilism become Nietzsche’s central concern, and what is the meaning of his notion of ‘the affirmation of life’, his self-designated response to nihilism. The general conclusion reached is that, while Nietzsche had a fairly detailed and compelling account of the nature and development of the problem of nihilism, his thoughts on the solution, on life-affirmation, were substantially less coherent and hence less compelling. Nietzsche notoriously boasted that he was the very first to experience nihilism in its full depth, and the first to get beyond it. This essay, while endorsing the first part of the claim, questions the latter while hopefully allowing us to see why Nietzsche himself thought he provided some means to overcoming nihilism.
Book synopsis: Nietzsche's critique of the modern subject is often presented as a radical bre... more Book synopsis: Nietzsche's critique of the modern subject is often presented as a radical break with modern philosophy and associated with the so-called ‘death of the subject’ in 20th century philosophy. But Nietzsche claimed to be a ‘psychologist’ who was trying to open up the path for ‘new versions and sophistications of the soul hypothesis.’ Although there is no doubt that Nietzsche gave expression to a fundamental crisis of the modern conception of subjectivity (both from a theoretical and from a practical-existential perspective), it is open to debate whether he wanted to abandon the very idea of subjectivity or only to pose the problem of subjectivity in new terms. The volume includes 26 articles by top Nietzsche scholars. The chapters in Part I, “Tradition and Context”, deal with the relationship between Nietzsche's views on subjectivity and modern philosophy, as well as with the late 19th century context in which his thought emerged; Part II, “The Crisis of the Subje...
Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selecti... more Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selective confirmation: Precise formulations of H-D should not have the consequence that where S confirms T, for any T', S confirms T&T'. It is the perceived failure of H-D to solve such problems that has lead John Earman to recently conclude that H-D is "very nearly a dead horse". This suggests the following state of play: H-D is an intuitively plausible idea that breaks down in the attempt to give it a precise formulation. Indeed I think that fairly captures the view among specialists in the field of confirmation theory. Here I argue that the truth about H-D is largely the reverse: H-D can be given a precise formulation that avoids the longstanding technical problems, however, it relies on a fundamentally unsound philosophical intuition. The bulk of this paper involves reviewing the problems affecting previous attempts at giving precise formulations of H-D and displaying som...
In his paper, "Explanations of Irrelevance" (1983), Paul Horwich proposes an amended ve... more In his paper, "Explanations of Irrelevance" (1983), Paul Horwich proposes an amended version of hypothetico-deductivism, (H-D*). In this discussion note it is shown that (H-D*) has the consequence that "A is a non-black raven" confirms "All ravens are black" relative to any tautology! It is noted that Horwich's (H-D*) bears a strong resemblance to Hempel's prediction criterion of confirmation and that the prediction criterion faces the same obstacle. A related problem for hypothetico-deductivism in its simplest form-that is, E confirms H iff E is an (observational) consequence of H-is displayed. The discussion concludes with a suggestion about how (H-D*) and simple hypothetico-deductivism might be amended in order to avoid these results. In response to Clark Glymour's trenchant attacks on hypothetico-deductive accounts of confirmation Paul Horwich in his paper "Explanations of Irrelevance" (1983) proposes the following amended vers...
In Gemes (1990) I examined certain formal versions of hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) showing that ... more In Gemes (1990) I examined certain formal versions of hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) showing that they have the unacceptable consequence that “Abe is a white raven” confirms “All ravens are black”! In Gemes (1992) I developed a new notion of content that could save H-D from this bizarre consequence. In this paper, I argue that more traditional formulations of H-D also need recourse to this new notion of content. I present a new account of the vexing notion of the natural axiomatization of a theory. The notion is used to construct a form of H-D that allows for the type of selective confirmation without which Glymour (1980a,b) claims H-D is hopeless.
In (D1), while 'α' ranges over single wffs, the variable 'ß' may be interpreted as ranging over b... more In (D1), while 'α' ranges over single wffs, the variable 'ß' may be interpreted as ranging over both single wffs and sets of wffs. So (D1) may be taken as given both the contents of wffs and the content of theories, where theories are taken to be sets of wffs. From here on we shall generally exclude mention of the notion of (D1) and subsequent definitions giving the content of theories and concentrate on the notion of the content of wffs. For more on the content of theories see Gemes (1993).
Philosophers of science as divergent as the inductivist Carnap and the deductivist Popper share t... more Philosophers of science as divergent as the inductivist Carnap and the deductivist Popper share the notion that the (logical) content of a proposition is given by its consequence class. I claim that this notion of content is (a) unintuitive and (b) inappropriate for many of the formal needs of philosophers of science. The basic problem is that given this notion of content, for any arbitrary p and q, [(p v q)] will count as part of the content of both p and q. In other words, any arbitrary p and q share some common content. This notion of content has disastrous effects on, for instance, Carnap's attempts to explicate the notion of confirmation in terms of probabilistic favorable relevance, and Popper's attempts to define verisimilitude. After briefly reviewing some of the problems of the traditional notion of content I present an alternative notion of (basic) content which (a) better fits our intuitions about content and (b) better serves the formal needs of philosophers of science.
Book synopsis: This astonishingly rich volume collects the work of an international group of scho... more Book synopsis: This astonishingly rich volume collects the work of an international group of scholars, including some of the best known in academia. Experts in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, political theory, aesthetics, history, critical theory, and hermeneutics bring to light the best philosophical scholarship what is arguably Friedrich Nietzsche's most rewarding but most challenging text. Including essays that were commissioned specifically for the volume as well as essays revised and edited by their authors, this collection showcases definitive works that have shaped Nietzsche studies alongside new works of interest to students and experts alike. Sections are devoted to the topic of genealogy generally, numerous essays on specific passages, applications of genealogy in later thinkers, and the import of Nietzsche's Genealogy in contemporary politics, ethics, and aesthetics. A lengthy introduction, annotated bibliography, and index make this an extremely useful guide for the classroom and advanced research.
Book synopsis: The nineteenth century is a period of stunning philosophical originality, characte... more Book synopsis: The nineteenth century is a period of stunning philosophical originality, characterised by radical engagement with the emerging human sciences. Often overshadowed by twentieth century philosophy which sought to reject some of its central tenets, the philosophers of the nineteenth century have re-emerged as profoundly important figures. The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy is an outstanding survey and assessment of the century as a whole. Divided into seven parts and including thirty chapters written by leading international scholars, the Companion examines and assesses the central topics, themes, and philosophers of the nineteenth century, presenting the first comprehensive picture of the period in a single volume: * German Idealism * Philosophy as political action, including young Hegelians, Marx and Tocqueville * Philosophy and subjectivity, including Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche * Scientific naturalism, including Darwinism, philosophy...
Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selecti... more Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selective confirmation: Precise formulations of H-D should not have the consequence that where S confirms T, for any T', S confirms T&T'. It is the perceived failure of H-D to solve such problems that has lead John Earman to recently conclude that H-D is "very nearly a dead horse". This suggests the following state of play: H-D is an intuitively plausible idea that breaks down in the attempt to give it a precise formulation. Indeed I think that fairly captures the view among specialists in the field of confirmation theory. Here I argue that the truth about H-D is largely the reverse: H-D can be given a precise formulation that avoids the longstanding technical problems, however, it relies on a fundamentally unsound philosophical intuition. The bulk of this paper involves reviewing the problems affecting previous attempts at giving precise formulations of H-D and displaying some recent versions that can handle these problems. It then briefly explains why the basic intuition behind H-D is itself unsound, namely, because H-D involves a tacit assumption of inductive scepticism. Finally, the historical relation between H-D and the positivists' quest for a criterion of empirical significance will be reconsidered with the surprising result that having glossed H-D as fundamentally unsound it is concluded that a sound version of the criterion of empirical significance is now available. The demarcation criterion, the positivists' philosopher's stone that serves to separate claims with empirical significance from claims lacking empirical significance having finally been found, it is argued that we should regard empirical significance as just one among a variety of virtues and not follow the positivists in taking it to be a sin qua non for all meaningful statements.
In this article, I reply to commentators Leonard Feldblyum, Robert Holub, and David Owen on my ar... more In this article, I reply to commentators Leonard Feldblyum, Robert Holub, and David Owen on my article “The Biology of Evil.” While I concede that Nietzsche often invoked standard degenerationist rhetoric about breeding, I argue that Nietzsche, unlike other degenerationists, never offered any concrete plans for such breeding and was not interested in raising the capacities of average citizens, but rather was concerned with the exceptional few. I argue that these “strokes of luck” do not readily lend themselves to planned breeding programs. I concede that Nietzsche did not favor societies that allowed for the integration of foreign elements, but rather some alternation between regimented hierarchical societies and motley societies. However, against Holub's and Feldblyum's contention that Nietzsche was interested in the alleged Jewish problem of his day, I expand on my claim that, for Nietzsche, the current malaise is more a product of the workings of the ancient than the mode...
1I define postmodernism as incredulity towards meta-narratives. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmo... more 1I define postmodernism as incredulity towards meta-narratives. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition When the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if you are an architect of the future and know the present will you understand it.
This essay addresses the questions of what exactly is nihilism, how did nihilism become Nietzsche... more This essay addresses the questions of what exactly is nihilism, how did nihilism become Nietzsche’s central concern, and what is the meaning of his notion of ‘the affirmation of life’, his self-designated response to nihilism. The general conclusion reached is that, while Nietzsche had a fairly detailed and compelling account of the nature and development of the problem of nihilism, his thoughts on the solution, on life-affirmation, were substantially less coherent and hence less compelling. Nietzsche notoriously boasted that he was the very first to experience nihilism in its full depth, and the first to get beyond it. This essay, while endorsing the first part of the claim, questions the latter while hopefully allowing us to see why Nietzsche himself thought he provided some means to overcoming nihilism.
Book synopsis: Nietzsche's critique of the modern subject is often presented as a radical bre... more Book synopsis: Nietzsche's critique of the modern subject is often presented as a radical break with modern philosophy and associated with the so-called ‘death of the subject’ in 20th century philosophy. But Nietzsche claimed to be a ‘psychologist’ who was trying to open up the path for ‘new versions and sophistications of the soul hypothesis.’ Although there is no doubt that Nietzsche gave expression to a fundamental crisis of the modern conception of subjectivity (both from a theoretical and from a practical-existential perspective), it is open to debate whether he wanted to abandon the very idea of subjectivity or only to pose the problem of subjectivity in new terms. The volume includes 26 articles by top Nietzsche scholars. The chapters in Part I, “Tradition and Context”, deal with the relationship between Nietzsche's views on subjectivity and modern philosophy, as well as with the late 19th century context in which his thought emerged; Part II, “The Crisis of the Subje...
Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selecti... more Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selective confirmation: Precise formulations of H-D should not have the consequence that where S confirms T, for any T', S confirms T&T'. It is the perceived failure of H-D to solve such problems that has lead John Earman to recently conclude that H-D is "very nearly a dead horse". This suggests the following state of play: H-D is an intuitively plausible idea that breaks down in the attempt to give it a precise formulation. Indeed I think that fairly captures the view among specialists in the field of confirmation theory. Here I argue that the truth about H-D is largely the reverse: H-D can be given a precise formulation that avoids the longstanding technical problems, however, it relies on a fundamentally unsound philosophical intuition. The bulk of this paper involves reviewing the problems affecting previous attempts at giving precise formulations of H-D and displaying som...
In his paper, "Explanations of Irrelevance" (1983), Paul Horwich proposes an amended ve... more In his paper, "Explanations of Irrelevance" (1983), Paul Horwich proposes an amended version of hypothetico-deductivism, (H-D*). In this discussion note it is shown that (H-D*) has the consequence that "A is a non-black raven" confirms "All ravens are black" relative to any tautology! It is noted that Horwich's (H-D*) bears a strong resemblance to Hempel's prediction criterion of confirmation and that the prediction criterion faces the same obstacle. A related problem for hypothetico-deductivism in its simplest form-that is, E confirms H iff E is an (observational) consequence of H-is displayed. The discussion concludes with a suggestion about how (H-D*) and simple hypothetico-deductivism might be amended in order to avoid these results. In response to Clark Glymour's trenchant attacks on hypothetico-deductive accounts of confirmation Paul Horwich in his paper "Explanations of Irrelevance" (1983) proposes the following amended vers...
In Gemes (1990) I examined certain formal versions of hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) showing that ... more In Gemes (1990) I examined certain formal versions of hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) showing that they have the unacceptable consequence that “Abe is a white raven” confirms “All ravens are black”! In Gemes (1992) I developed a new notion of content that could save H-D from this bizarre consequence. In this paper, I argue that more traditional formulations of H-D also need recourse to this new notion of content. I present a new account of the vexing notion of the natural axiomatization of a theory. The notion is used to construct a form of H-D that allows for the type of selective confirmation without which Glymour (1980a,b) claims H-D is hopeless.
In (D1), while 'α' ranges over single wffs, the variable 'ß' may be interpreted as ranging over b... more In (D1), while 'α' ranges over single wffs, the variable 'ß' may be interpreted as ranging over both single wffs and sets of wffs. So (D1) may be taken as given both the contents of wffs and the content of theories, where theories are taken to be sets of wffs. From here on we shall generally exclude mention of the notion of (D1) and subsequent definitions giving the content of theories and concentrate on the notion of the content of wffs. For more on the content of theories see Gemes (1993).
Philosophers of science as divergent as the inductivist Carnap and the deductivist Popper share t... more Philosophers of science as divergent as the inductivist Carnap and the deductivist Popper share the notion that the (logical) content of a proposition is given by its consequence class. I claim that this notion of content is (a) unintuitive and (b) inappropriate for many of the formal needs of philosophers of science. The basic problem is that given this notion of content, for any arbitrary p and q, [(p v q)] will count as part of the content of both p and q. In other words, any arbitrary p and q share some common content. This notion of content has disastrous effects on, for instance, Carnap's attempts to explicate the notion of confirmation in terms of probabilistic favorable relevance, and Popper's attempts to define verisimilitude. After briefly reviewing some of the problems of the traditional notion of content I present an alternative notion of (basic) content which (a) better fits our intuitions about content and (b) better serves the formal needs of philosophers of science.
Book synopsis: This astonishingly rich volume collects the work of an international group of scho... more Book synopsis: This astonishingly rich volume collects the work of an international group of scholars, including some of the best known in academia. Experts in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, political theory, aesthetics, history, critical theory, and hermeneutics bring to light the best philosophical scholarship what is arguably Friedrich Nietzsche's most rewarding but most challenging text. Including essays that were commissioned specifically for the volume as well as essays revised and edited by their authors, this collection showcases definitive works that have shaped Nietzsche studies alongside new works of interest to students and experts alike. Sections are devoted to the topic of genealogy generally, numerous essays on specific passages, applications of genealogy in later thinkers, and the import of Nietzsche's Genealogy in contemporary politics, ethics, and aesthetics. A lengthy introduction, annotated bibliography, and index make this an extremely useful guide for the classroom and advanced research.
Book synopsis: The nineteenth century is a period of stunning philosophical originality, characte... more Book synopsis: The nineteenth century is a period of stunning philosophical originality, characterised by radical engagement with the emerging human sciences. Often overshadowed by twentieth century philosophy which sought to reject some of its central tenets, the philosophers of the nineteenth century have re-emerged as profoundly important figures. The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy is an outstanding survey and assessment of the century as a whole. Divided into seven parts and including thirty chapters written by leading international scholars, the Companion examines and assesses the central topics, themes, and philosophers of the nineteenth century, presenting the first comprehensive picture of the period in a single volume: * German Idealism * Philosophy as political action, including young Hegelians, Marx and Tocqueville * Philosophy and subjectivity, including Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche * Scientific naturalism, including Darwinism, philosophy...
Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selecti... more Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selective confirmation: Precise formulations of H-D should not have the consequence that where S confirms T, for any T', S confirms T&T'. It is the perceived failure of H-D to solve such problems that has lead John Earman to recently conclude that H-D is "very nearly a dead horse". This suggests the following state of play: H-D is an intuitively plausible idea that breaks down in the attempt to give it a precise formulation. Indeed I think that fairly captures the view among specialists in the field of confirmation theory. Here I argue that the truth about H-D is largely the reverse: H-D can be given a precise formulation that avoids the longstanding technical problems, however, it relies on a fundamentally unsound philosophical intuition. The bulk of this paper involves reviewing the problems affecting previous attempts at giving precise formulations of H-D and displaying some recent versions that can handle these problems. It then briefly explains why the basic intuition behind H-D is itself unsound, namely, because H-D involves a tacit assumption of inductive scepticism. Finally, the historical relation between H-D and the positivists' quest for a criterion of empirical significance will be reconsidered with the surprising result that having glossed H-D as fundamentally unsound it is concluded that a sound version of the criterion of empirical significance is now available. The demarcation criterion, the positivists' philosopher's stone that serves to separate claims with empirical significance from claims lacking empirical significance having finally been found, it is argued that we should regard empirical significance as just one among a variety of virtues and not follow the positivists in taking it to be a sin qua non for all meaningful statements.
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