In the Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson presents an account of modal reasoning where ... more In the Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson presents an account of modal reasoning where the capacities that produce and evaluate everyday modal knowledge epistemologically grounds more abstract counterfactual reasoning. Further, if thought experiments, a traditional source of purported philosophical knowledge, can be epistemologically grounded in this type of reasoning, then the knowledge gleaned from them can also be epistemologically grounded. To that end, Williamson examines the logical structure of Gettier cases. Gettier cases are counterexamples to the justified true belief account of knowledge. 1 In a Gettier case a subject obtains a justified false belief and, from this belief, justifiably infers a true proposition. The proposition is true and the subject is justified in holding it (since she justifiably inferred it from a justified belief) but does not constitute knowledge because it was inferred from a false premise. So having a belief that is both justified and tr...
In the Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson presents an account of modal reasoning where ... more In the Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson presents an account of modal reasoning where the capacities that produce and evaluate everyday modal knowledge epistemologically grounds more abstract counterfactual reasoning. Further, if thought experiments, a traditional source of purported philosophical knowledge, can be epistemologically grounded in this type of reasoning, then the knowledge gleaned from them can also be epistemologically grounded. To that end, Williamson examines the logical structure of Gettier cases. Gettier cases are counterexamples to the justified true belief account of knowledge. 1 In a Gettier case a subject obtains a justified false belief and, from this belief, justifiably infers a true proposition. The proposition is true and the subject is justified in holding it (since she justifiably inferred it from a justified belief) but does not constitute knowledge because it was inferred from a false premise. So having a belief that is both justified and tr...
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