Papers by Jonathan Powell
Democratization, 2016
Despite being traditionally seen as the largest threat to democratization, coups have recently be... more Despite being traditionally seen as the largest threat to democratization, coups have recently been argued to provide a window of opportunity for a democratic transition (e.g., Marinov & Goemans 2014). Central to post-coup democratization is the belief that the international community can exert sufficient leverage to coerce coup-born governments to allow a transition to civilian rule. We contribute to this young body of work by theorizing that less coercive aspects of transnational economics can prompt coup-born governments to voluntarily transition to civilian rule. In short, we argue that coups in states that are more closely tied to the international economy through trade dependence, and are more vulnerable to loss of investor confidence due to reliance on high contract intensiveness, will see coup-born governments attempt to legitimize a new government and to restore confidence in the rule of law by swiftly stepping down. A cross-national assessment of over 200 coups from 1950 to 2010 provides strong support for the argument, as trade dependence and contract intensive money are far stronger determinants of post-coup democratization than other factors commonly associated with democratization.
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. R... more Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Foreign Policy Analysis, 2020
Research on host-country effects of peacekeeping deployments has highlighted destabilizing conseq... more Research on host-country effects of peacekeeping deployments has highlighted destabilizing consequences for contributing states, suggesting that deployments can increase the willingness and ability of soldiers to mutiny or attempt coups. Yet others expect that peacekeeping contributions may bring a variety of benefits, including improved civilian control of the armed forces. We reconcile these conflicting assessments in two ways. First, we identify important differences across peacekeeping organizations. Missions undertaken by the United Nations (UN) are generally better funded and equipped, invoke selection criteria that should produce fewer grievances than missions operated by regional organizations, and may be more risk averse. The benefits or hazards of peacekeeping can thus vary substantially, leading to different consequences for organizations. Second, the pros and cons of peacekeeping can incentivize mutinies and coups differently. When grievances are present, financial incen...
Since 1990, Côte d'Ivoire has experienced over a dozen army mutinies, with three major events occ... more Since 1990, Côte d'Ivoire has experienced over a dozen army mutinies, with three major events occurring in the first half of 2017. This paper explores the underlying causes of these events, considering both this year's mutinies and the state's prior experiences with military insubordination. A review of the events of Côte d'Ivoire's tumultuous 2017 indicates a number of parallels with some of its earlier mutinies, though these more recent events are perhaps unique due to the presence of a larger range of dynamics and the scale of the mutineers' demands. Beyond requests for better pay, which are nearly ubiquitous, these events also illustrate the general hazards of post-conflict civil-military relations, including challenges related to demobilisation, integration of rebel forces, the consequences of soldiers having contributed to a leader's ascendance, and the perils of soldier loyalties lying with personalities instead of the state.
Previous literature regarding the efficacy of international sanctions is mixed. Scholars such as ... more Previous literature regarding the efficacy of international sanctions is mixed. Scholars such as Pape (1997) have condemned the practice, while more recent scholarship suggests the threat of sanctions could have a meaningful role in deterring rogue actions. I go a step further by offering a theory of sanctions deterrence under which rational actors will altogether avoid actions that are all but guaranteed to result in sanctions, a behavior that will have even the threat of sanctions go unrealized. As a test, I look at coup activity in regional organizations that have adopted formal norms regarding constitutional power transfers. Rational coup plotters should avoid coups due to the high expectation of subsequent sanctions and long-term costs in these organizations. The theory is tested using global coup data from 1950-2010, multivariate analyses for the years 19632007, and case studies from the Organization of American States and the African Union. Secondary analyses involve the impa...
African Security, 2020
Recent scholarship has claimed that peacekeepers are more likely to mutiny or attempt military co... more Recent scholarship has claimed that peacekeepers are more likely to mutiny or attempt military coups against their governments after returning home. These trends stand in contrast to the case of Ghana, which witnessed a perhaps unprecedented transition out of the "coup trap" to stable democratic rule, including multiple transfers of power to the political opposition while providing substantial and ongoing peacekeeping manpower. This is especially interesting given Ghana's infamous mutiny in the Congo and the coup against Kwame Nkrumah, had their roots in peacekeeping. Potentially seen as a deviant case through the lens of recent scholarship, as evaluation of Ghana's experience illustrate that different leaders under various regime types deliberately utilized peacekeeping deployments as a coup avoidance strategy. This experience has also acted as a tool to gain military resources from foreign donors, while the government has deliberately made efforts to avoid mission hardships and perceptions of victimisation seen in other contingents.
Armed Forces & Society, 2019
Recent years have seen increased study of military coups. While this generally emphasizes coups a... more Recent years have seen increased study of military coups. While this generally emphasizes coups as a dependent variable, there is a growing debate as to how coups influence a country’s long-term political trajectory. This literature includes a handful of studies that claim coups against authoritarian regimes can act for the public good and provide a boost to the state’s democratization prospects. Causal mechanisms have included factors such as aid conditionality, economic interdependence, and foreign pressure more generally. We argue that this growing body of work can benefit from increased attention given to those who carry out coups: the armed forces. Specifically, we argue that coups reflecting a larger societal interest, be it the removal of a dictator or the desire for democracy after a dictator’s ouster, are more likely undertaken by conscript armies. A cross-national exploration of over 170 coups suggests that conscript militaries are in fact significantly more likely to over...
Democratization, 2018
In contrast to the conventional wisdom that democratization reduces coups, 46% of coups targeted ... more In contrast to the conventional wisdom that democratization reduces coups, 46% of coups targeted democracies from 2000-2009, twice the rate seen in the prior half-century. Efforts to explain coups have arrived at wildly varied conclusions regarding the vulnerability of democracies. We argue that this is attributable to regime type acting as a conditional influence. We theorize that democratization incentivizes old elites to veto the process, and these vetoes are more likely to occur when the new regime cannot credibly commit to the military's corporate interests. Using cross-national data for 172 states for the years 1952-2009, we find that though young democracies are more vulnerable to coups than either authoritarian regimes or older democracies, this vulnerability is completely mitigated when military expenditures are near or above the sample mean. We also find that commonly-argued determinants of coups have little influence in authoritarian regimes, suggesting the need for scholars to revisit commonly held assumptions regarding autocratic survival.
Africa Spectrum, 2017
Since 1990, Côte d'Ivoire has experienced over a dozen army mutinies, with three major events... more Since 1990, Côte d'Ivoire has experienced over a dozen army mutinies, with three major events occurring in the first half of 2017. This paper explores the underlying causes of these events, considering both this year's mutinies and the state's prior experiences with military insubordination. A review of the events of Côte d'Ivoire's tumultuous 2017 indicates a number of parallels with some of its earlier mutinies, though these more recent events are perhaps unique due to the presence of a larger range of dynamics and the scale of the mutineers' demands. Beyond requests for better pay, which are nearly ubiquitous, these events also illustrate the general hazards of post-conflict civil–military relations, including challenges related to demobilisation, integration of rebel forces, the consequences of soldiers having contributed to a leader's ascendance, and the perils of soldier loyalties lying with personalities instead of the state.
African Affairs, 2018
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern yo... more Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document. When citing, please reference the published version. Take down policy While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2017
Signals from domestic and international actors have been shown to influence the likelihood of cou... more Signals from domestic and international actors have been shown to influence the likelihood of coups. Coups remain difficult to predict and consequently leave policy makers in a reactive stance, but little systematic work assesses how these reactions influence long-term outcomes. We examine how reactions from domestic and international actors influence the duration of coup-born regimes, arguing that negative reactions will shorten leadership duration. We further probe these relationships by considering how signaling consistency, Cold War dynamics, and precoup relationships condition the influence of reactions on leadership duration. Tests use events data to capture domestic and international reactions and newly coded information on leadership to capture leader duration. Results indicate that international responses have a profound influence on leadership tenure, especially those from strong actors. We find tentative support that state reactions have the strongest effect during the Cold War, while international organizations matter the most afterward.
Journal of Peace Research, 2016
The capitalist peace thesis argues transnational economic ties have a pacifying effect on interst... more The capitalist peace thesis argues transnational economic ties have a pacifying effect on interstate relations. An extension of this literature reports that economic ties can prompt belligerents in civil conflicts to peacefully resolve their disputes and can attract third-party intervention from states with strong economic ties. This pacifying effect of economic ties, we argue, is applicable in the context of coups d’état: as a state becomes more economically interdependent with the rest of the world, the opportunity costs of domestic political disturbances are raised for both the targeted state and its financial partners. These costs – potential economic losses and a damaged economic reputation – influence belligerents in the state to use constitutional means to resolve their disputes while providing stronger incentives to foreign economic partners to influence the calculus of these belligerents as they consider the coup attempt. We test this argument quantitatively by investigatin...
African Security Review, 2014
The Egyptian military's unconstitutional removal of President Mohamed Morsi has reignited a debat... more The Egyptian military's unconstitutional removal of President Mohamed Morsi has reignited a debate regarding the theory of the 'democratic coup'. Though coups are almost invariably condemned, many political observers and a few scholars have recently argued that coups can act as catalysts for democratisation. This paper empirically assesses the democratic coup hypothesis for Africa. Multivariate analyses from 1952 to 2012 suggest that coups statistically improve a country's democratisation prospects. Extensions of the model show that coups appear to be likely precursors for democratisation in staunchly authoritarian regimes, have become less likely to end democracy over time, and their positive influence has strengthened since the end of the Cold War. As of 2012, countries that have experienced a recent coup are expected to be four times more likely to witness a democratic transition than those that have remained coup-free. Forthcoming at African Security Review 'favoritism in public appointments,' and his benefitting 'the rich, big men.' 2 Perhaps more sincerely, Colonel A.A. Afrifa has rather elegantly written about the Ghanaian army's action as a 'last resort' to combat the authoritarian entrenchment of the once wildly popular Kwame Nkrumah. 3 But even an army that brings about some degree of democratisation can also promote a constitution that reserves 'substantive constitutional powers for itself…' or 'may establish counter-majoritarian institutions…that continue to enforce the military's policy preferences…' 4 Focusing solely on praetorian outcomes such as Amin's Uganda, however, inevitably biases our ability to assess the potential for coups to lead to a wider range of outcomes, including democratic gains. Few would
African Security Review, 2014
This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders... more This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making effort to extend their own tenure. While "coup-proofing" practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has considered the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilizing data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of "coup-proofing" counterweights significantly worsens a state's security prospects, specifically in regards to civil conflict. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to-or can even potentially benefit from-the existence of an insurgency.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders... more This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making effort to extend their own tenure. While "coup-proofing" practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has considered the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilizing data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of "coup-proofing" counterweights significantly worsens a state's security prospects, specifically in regards to civil conflict. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to-or can even potentially benefit from-the existence of an insurgency.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite t... more It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being chronically plagued with rebellion. This tendency has been explained in part by studies that have argued the practice of coup-proofing both increases the mobilizational capacity of dissidents and reduces the military effectiveness of the state (Roessler 2011; Powell 2014b). However, these arguments are lacking on one major respect: though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, the state could possess substantial military capabilities in the form of a well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing apparatus. I theorize that a missing part of the coup-proofing and rebellion story is the willingness of autocrats to deploy their paramilitaries. In short, I argue that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are most hesitant to deploy the units associated with the practice: when coup risk is high. The theory is empirically tested using a global sample for the years 1971-2011. Results indicate that heavily coup-proofed authoritarian regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high. In contrast to prior studies, the results also suggests that a stronger coup-proofing apparatus is not associated with rebellion when coup risk is low.
Journal of Peace Research, 2011
Once considered a ‘hot topic’ among scholars, research on coups d’état has waned in recent years.... more Once considered a ‘hot topic’ among scholars, research on coups d’état has waned in recent years. This decline is surprising given that 7 coups have happened between January 2008 and December 2010, bringing the last decade’s total to almost three dozen. One explanation for the lack of coup research is the absence of a temporally and spatially comprehensive dataset to test theories. Also absent is a discussion of what makes coups distinct from other forms of anti-regime activity. This article seeks to remedy these problems. The authors present a new dataset on coups from 1950 to 2010. They begin by explaining their theoretical definition and coding procedures. Next, they examine general trends in the data across time and space. The authors conclude by explaining why scholars studying a variety of topics, including civil wars, regime stability, and democratization, would benefit by paying closer attention to coups.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2012
Previous studies have attested to leaders “coup-proofing” their regimes by reducing the ability o... more Previous studies have attested to leaders “coup-proofing” their regimes by reducing the ability or disposition of their armies to seek their removal. The following article tests the utility of these efforts. “Structural” coup-proofing such as counterbalancing is expected to reduce the ability to organize a coup plot by creating substantial coordination obstacles to soldiers. Coup-proofing by spoiling militaries with organizational resources is expected to reduce the willingness to intervene. However, increased organizational resources are expected to increase the army’s capabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of a coup’s success. The theory is empirically tested using a selection model with a global sample from 1961 to 2000. Findings suggest that both coup-proofing strategies are effective deterrents of coup activity and, more generally, that characteristics of the military appear to be far more important than economic influences on coups.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2012
In this article, I move beyond prior efforts to explore the relationship between the risk of a co... more In this article, I move beyond prior efforts to explore the relationship between the risk of a coup and international conflict by considering alternatives that leaders can utilize to strengthen their regimes. I offer two theoretical expectations. First, I theorize that leaders lose the incentive and ability to use diversion when the structural coup-proofing apparatus is strengthened. Second, I expect military finances to lead to disparate behavior when considering regime type. Autocrats are expected to use military funds to provide private incentives to the armed forces, largely in the form of allowances. Democracies, in contrast, will be required to use expenditures to promote the public good of national security due to the transparency of their regimes. Autocrats are expected to lose the incentive to use diversion as the financial endowment of their militaries increase, while democracies will continue to show a diversionary trend due to their increased military capabilities. The t...
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Papers by Jonathan Powell