Larry WelchThe views, findings, and recommendations of this report are those of the Quadrennial D... more Larry WelchThe views, findings, and recommendations of this report are those of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel itself and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Larry WelchThe views, findings, and recommendations of this report are those of the Quadrennial D... more Larry WelchThe views, findings, and recommendations of this report are those of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel itself and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
: Asymmetric threats counter an adversary's strengths by focusing on its weaknesses. In the p... more : Asymmetric threats counter an adversary's strengths by focusing on its weaknesses. In the post-Cold War world asymmetric threats to U.S. national security are far more likely than they were just a decade ago. This paper considers asymmetric threats from the perspective of ends, ways, and means. It examines American and enemy ends, as well as several means of projecting force asymmetrically, and also suggests that symmetrical means of applying force can be asymmetric threats if they are used in certain ways. The paper concludes that perhaps the most serious threat to U.S. national security for the next ten years is the organizational culture of the Department of Defense and of its component services that leads them to prepare almost exclusively for symmetrical threats. The nation must maintain its ability to deter symmetric threats to U.S. national security, but that capability will be insufficient to protect against all of the threats that the nation is likely to face in the n...
The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 2001
Recent changes in the international system and resulting shifts in US military engagement abroad ... more Recent changes in the international system and resulting shifts in US military engagement abroad have opened the door for a new examination of military opportunities for women, an issue which has for too long been clouded by extreme positions on both sides.[1] The view that a fatal feminization of the US Army is occurring at the present time is incorrect, but so is the claim that equal rights are immediately in order. A little moderation in the debate over the issue of combat roles for women in the US military is needed. It is our belief that moderation will result from a simple cost-benefit analysis rooted in the American democratic tradition. The timing for this is made even more appropriate by the Army's current embrace of transformation. We will first examine the current policy on women in combat units, then look at changes in the international system and in the current and future missions of the military which allow a reconsideration of the issue. After arguing that the functional imperative of military forces in the post-Cold War world has changed fundamentally while Department of Defense policy on women in combat has changed only incrementally, we will recommend an experiment to determine whether there should be changes to current Department of Defense policy.[2] We will then present what we consider to be the very real problems the military would face with a mixed-gender force in combat roles before concluding that the benefits of conducting an experiment are worth the costs. While our discussion of the topic is relevant to all branches of the military, we primarily focus on the Army because of our personal experience, in combat and peacetime, in that organization. Unfortunately, much of the current debate surrounding the presence of women in the positions in which they now serve is extremist and destructive. Women currently serve in division military police companies, fly combat aircraft, and attend the US Military Academy; it is highly unlikely that there will be a rollback, despite the wishes of many who oppose the presence of women in uniform. Brian Mitchell's recently published Women in the Military: Flirting with Disaster concludes that "women are no longer needed in the military [and] their expanding presence is destroying the military's body and soul."[3] Even if, as Mitchell argues, political correctness put women in the military in the first place, it is unlikely that they will be removed, as there are no indications that society's sensitivity toward issues such as this is diminishing. In addition, at least since the inception of the all-volunteer Army, the United States has never filled the Army exclusively with male recruits. When the dialogue surrounding the debate on women's roles is not forwardlooking but rather looking to find a scapegoat for the troubles plaguing the military today, problems attributed to the presence of women are exacerbated. This article attempts to tone down the rhetoric while examining the facts. Current Policy on Women in Combat Units In times of national emergency, traditional restrictions on gender roles tend to be eased. Some 33,000 women served in the US armed forces during World War I, most in the Nurse Corps; more than ten times that number served during World War II. In the wake of those national emergencies, traditional restrictions were again applied; the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 permitted no more than two percent of the enlisted ranks in the Army to be filled by women, a limit which was not lifted until another national emergency in 1967.[4] Women became an increasingly important part of the military after the creation of the all-volunteer force in 1973, and they demonstrated that they had become essential to the successful employment of the military during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, in which some 40,000 women served, representing seven percent of the total deployed forces.[5] The combat exclusion rule was revealed as dubious during that conflict, as women served in logistics bases forward of allmale infantry and armor units, but not on aircraft carriers hundreds of miles to the rear of the front lines. After that conflict, opportunities for women were expanded, and women were given the opportunity to serve in combat planes
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Specifically the center will perform five functions: (1) Develop and maintain instructional mater... more Specifically the center will perform five functions: (1) Develop and maintain instructional materials in support of a program of instruction to the Corps of Cadets on the Professional Military Ethic; (2) Assess the effectiveness of the "West Point Experience" in developing within cadets a professional self-concept and an understanding of the Professional Military Ethic; (3) Conduct research on the Professional Military Ethic to determine its current content, the potential requirements for change, and its application to the education of cadets and ultimately to the Army; (4) Develop outreach initiatives to assist and interface with the Army, particularly schools of professional military education, and other appropriate Federal and civilian institutions on the subject of professional ethics and ethical education relating to the Profession of Arms and scholastic integrity; (5) Supervise the Cadet Honor and Respect Committees. This paper, jointly sponsored by SSI and CPME, is intended to be the first of many whose purpose is to promote scholarship on Officership and the Professional Military Ethic as well as enhance the discussion of military professionalism within the Army and sister services.
This article is a revised and updated version of a paper originally published as Institutionalizi... more This article is a revised and updated version of a paper originally published as Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps by the Center for a New American Security in June 2007. These views are the author's own. "Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking." -Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007.1 ARMY DOCTRINE and recent events on the ground in two wars have demonstrated that the achievement of American goals in Iraq and Afghanistan will increasingly depend on the performance of the security forces of those countries themselves. U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, describes the many complicated and interrelated tasks that should be conducted simultaneously to defeat an insurgency and then notes, "Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force."2 In recognition of the enduring need for American advisors to coach, teach, and mentor host-nation security forces in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in dozens of other countries around the globe, the Army should create a permanent standing advisory command with responsibility for all aspects of the advisor mission-from doctrine through facilities. An advisory command is essential to enable and empower the security forces of our allies to defeat extremism. Most importantly, any advisor command should have responsibility over a standing force of some 20,000 soldiers. It has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency-the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to do so.3 The most important contribution the U.S. Army makes to the development of security forces like the Iraqi Army (IA) and Afghan National Army (ANA) is embedded advisory (or "transition") teams. These teams coach, teach, and mentor host nation security forces, training them before deployment and accompanying them into combat; the mission is described by the acronym FID, for "foreign internal defense." Advisors bring important combat multipliers to the fight: artillery and close air support; medical evacuation and support; and, perhaps most importantly, a culture of leadership and training, two crucial pillars of success for all effective armies. From a strategic perspective, competent advisor teams also communicate a commitment to legitimacy. Since host-nation security forces have important cultural awareness and linguistic advantages over U.S. forces and are likely to be far more palatable to the local public whose support is ultimately the key in any counterinsurgency campaign, the advisory role of U.S. forces has become increasingly important. Strategic outcomes now hinge on advisor mission competence and success for at least two reasons. First, because America does not have enough ground forces to meet all security threats everywhere and must therefore rely upon the strategic leverage foreign troops provide; and second, because those forces have more legitimacy than do American troops who can be perceived as occupiers. American advisors serve as enormously efficient combat multipliers; the whole is far more than the sum of its parts, and effective host-nation forces, enabled and empowered by dedicated combat advisors, are now the foundation of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, years of hard work to train, equip, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces are beginning to show results. After effective U.S.-led counterinsurgency operations dramatically improved security in Iraq in 2007, consecutive Iraqi-led operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul in the spring of 2008 have, following a shaky start, led to further gains that dramatically increased confidence in the government and Iraqi Army. …
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Battle is the ultimate to which the whole life's labor of an officer should be directed. He m... more Battle is the ultimate to which the whole life's labor of an officer should be directed. He may live to the age of retirement without seeing a battle; still, he must always be getting ready for it as if he knew the hour of the day it is to break upon him. And then, whether it comes late or early he must be willing to fight-he must fight. -Brigadier General C.F. Smith1 THE MILITARY OFFICER must fill a number of roles, often simultaneously. He has responsibilities as a warfighter, as the Nation's servant, as a member of the profession of arms, and as a leader of character. These four roles are interrelated almost to the point of inseparability, but examining each separately allows a better understanding of their inherent complexities. The central premise of this article is that preparing for battle is a lifelong developmental process and a worthy life's work. While fighting America's wars is not the professional soldier's only task, it is the task that only the professional soldier can do. Warfighting's complex arrangement of activities includes generating, applying, and sustaining combat power from the fort to the port to the fighting position to achieve the aims of policy. Most of the examples cited come from the realms of direct and indirect fire, but that fact stems more from our inability to discuss the other critical aspects of warfighting than it does from any contention that the point of the spear is somehow more important than the shaft. Developing the set of skills necessary to manage violence in the Nation's service is a lifelong developmental process that begins when an officer receives his commission and continues throughout a career. Professionalism is a combination of competence and devotion to service that grows over time, and growth occurs differently in each individual. There is no rank or position or level of education that clearly delineates the professional from the mere jobholder. Furthermore, the relationship between professionals at differing stages of career development is symbiotic. The younger professional benefits from the older one's wisdom and dignity, while the older benefits from the younger one's idealism and energy. Mastering the art and science of warfighting encompasses every aspect of the human experience-- physical, intellectual, and moral.2 To understand fully the officer's responsibilities as a warfighter, we must explore in detail each of these aspects. The Physical Dimension The Army inspires soldiers to have the strength, the confidence, and the will to fight and win anywhere, anytime. -The Army Vision, 2002(3) This statement from Army Vision, 2002, is as applicable to General George Washington's crossing of the Delaware in 1776 as it is to Task Force Eagle's crossing of the Sava in 1995. Warfighting always has been and always will be a struggle, not only against hostile forces but also against hostile environments. The officer as warfighter has a duty to prepare himself and his subordinates to cope with such physical rigors. This duty begins at the earliest stages of an officer's service. After arriving at his first duty station, a second lieutenant is expected to set the standard for his platoon in physical toughness. Toughness, not mere fitness, is the standard by which soldiers measure leaders. That the lieutenant be in excellent physical condition is necessary, but not sufficient. More important is his willingness to share his soldiers' physical hardships. Sergeant Major John Stepanek, addressing a group of officer candidates, stated succinctly what they could expect from noncommissioned officers (NCOs): "You can expect loyalty to your position, devotion to our cause, admiration for your honest effort, courage to match your courage, guts to match your guts, endurance to match your endurance, motivation to match your motivation, esprit to match your esprit, a desire for achievement to match your desire for achievement. …
We live in an age of "heavy peace. "... There will be other Kosovos, and, whether for s... more We live in an age of "heavy peace. "... There will be other Kosovos, and, whether for strategic or humanitarian reasons---or just muddled impulses-we will not be able to resist them all. ... We cannot enter upon such commitments under the assumption that they will be temporary and brief... We must stop pretending those challenges will disappear--that "something will turn up "and prepare to meet them.1 -Ralph Peters WITH THE END of the Cold War and the rise of ethnonationalisticconflicts, complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) have proliferated around the world. Internal conflicts that combine large-scale displacements of people, mass famine and fragile or failing economic, social and political institutions are becoming commonplace. War remains a common feature of the international landscape despite growing global interdependence. While the end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of great-power conflict, it has also decreased the perceived constraints on proxy wars, and as a result, over 40 unresolved conflicts currently fester, simmer or rage. International peacekeeping forces alone are unlikely to achieve lasting results in most cases, but they can stop the fighting and help implement fair and lasting resolutions.3 While the US Army prepares to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, it will frequently be called upon to provide the military forces necessary to implement our nation's multifaceted respouse to CHEs.4 Even though peace operations and preventing deadly conflict are becoming increasingly common missions, the Army currently treats each CHE as an exception; it engages in little routine preparation for such events.5 This problem is now known and discussed beyond the corridors of the Pentagon or the fields of Fort Bragg. Major newsmagazines and newspapers regularly debate the issue, including the report that "of all the services, the Army has had the most difficult transition from a Cold War force ready to defeat the Soviet Union to the sort of nimble force needed to fight wars like the one in Kosovo."6 The Army has conducted a number of joint, multinational, multiorganizational, multiagency and multicultural exercises to better prepare our troops for these new challenges, but they are still administered ad hoc. Because the US military, particularly the Army, is overwhelmed by internal debate concerning when and how to provide humanitarian assistance, it has not created the necessary precrisis training that numerous after-action reviews have stressed is crucial for success in these operations.7 The Army must immediately adjust while continuing to debate the options of creating a twotier military establishment complete with a constabulary force, changing the structure of the force to make deployments easier or simply not getting involved.8 Such modifications are crucial, for involvement in CHEs will not wait until the debate over America's role in the post-Cold War world has been resolved.9 The Army must create a routine training program to make the US response to CHEs more successful. Unless the Army creates specialized units whose primary mission is to respond to CHEs, all units must have the ability to perform them. Hence, in keeping with our "train as you fight" philosophy, all National Training Center (NTC), Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations should include a CHE scenario both leading up to and building down from a typical mid-intensity conflict (MIC) scenario (see figure). This scenario more accurately reflects the situations in which our military is likely to find itself involved and presents a greater training challenge to US forces. The Army must more actively prepare for CHEs. RAND researcher Jennifer Morison Taw noted that "the Army is the most likely of all US military services to pay the price for failings in interagency coordination."10 US policy implementation in Bosnia lacks a mechanism to ensure effective integration of the civilian and military peacebuilding programs at the tactical, operational or strategic level. …
Larry WelchThe views, findings, and recommendations of this report are those of the Quadrennial D... more Larry WelchThe views, findings, and recommendations of this report are those of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel itself and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Larry WelchThe views, findings, and recommendations of this report are those of the Quadrennial D... more Larry WelchThe views, findings, and recommendations of this report are those of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel itself and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
: Asymmetric threats counter an adversary's strengths by focusing on its weaknesses. In the p... more : Asymmetric threats counter an adversary's strengths by focusing on its weaknesses. In the post-Cold War world asymmetric threats to U.S. national security are far more likely than they were just a decade ago. This paper considers asymmetric threats from the perspective of ends, ways, and means. It examines American and enemy ends, as well as several means of projecting force asymmetrically, and also suggests that symmetrical means of applying force can be asymmetric threats if they are used in certain ways. The paper concludes that perhaps the most serious threat to U.S. national security for the next ten years is the organizational culture of the Department of Defense and of its component services that leads them to prepare almost exclusively for symmetrical threats. The nation must maintain its ability to deter symmetric threats to U.S. national security, but that capability will be insufficient to protect against all of the threats that the nation is likely to face in the n...
The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 2001
Recent changes in the international system and resulting shifts in US military engagement abroad ... more Recent changes in the international system and resulting shifts in US military engagement abroad have opened the door for a new examination of military opportunities for women, an issue which has for too long been clouded by extreme positions on both sides.[1] The view that a fatal feminization of the US Army is occurring at the present time is incorrect, but so is the claim that equal rights are immediately in order. A little moderation in the debate over the issue of combat roles for women in the US military is needed. It is our belief that moderation will result from a simple cost-benefit analysis rooted in the American democratic tradition. The timing for this is made even more appropriate by the Army's current embrace of transformation. We will first examine the current policy on women in combat units, then look at changes in the international system and in the current and future missions of the military which allow a reconsideration of the issue. After arguing that the functional imperative of military forces in the post-Cold War world has changed fundamentally while Department of Defense policy on women in combat has changed only incrementally, we will recommend an experiment to determine whether there should be changes to current Department of Defense policy.[2] We will then present what we consider to be the very real problems the military would face with a mixed-gender force in combat roles before concluding that the benefits of conducting an experiment are worth the costs. While our discussion of the topic is relevant to all branches of the military, we primarily focus on the Army because of our personal experience, in combat and peacetime, in that organization. Unfortunately, much of the current debate surrounding the presence of women in the positions in which they now serve is extremist and destructive. Women currently serve in division military police companies, fly combat aircraft, and attend the US Military Academy; it is highly unlikely that there will be a rollback, despite the wishes of many who oppose the presence of women in uniform. Brian Mitchell's recently published Women in the Military: Flirting with Disaster concludes that "women are no longer needed in the military [and] their expanding presence is destroying the military's body and soul."[3] Even if, as Mitchell argues, political correctness put women in the military in the first place, it is unlikely that they will be removed, as there are no indications that society's sensitivity toward issues such as this is diminishing. In addition, at least since the inception of the all-volunteer Army, the United States has never filled the Army exclusively with male recruits. When the dialogue surrounding the debate on women's roles is not forwardlooking but rather looking to find a scapegoat for the troubles plaguing the military today, problems attributed to the presence of women are exacerbated. This article attempts to tone down the rhetoric while examining the facts. Current Policy on Women in Combat Units In times of national emergency, traditional restrictions on gender roles tend to be eased. Some 33,000 women served in the US armed forces during World War I, most in the Nurse Corps; more than ten times that number served during World War II. In the wake of those national emergencies, traditional restrictions were again applied; the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 permitted no more than two percent of the enlisted ranks in the Army to be filled by women, a limit which was not lifted until another national emergency in 1967.[4] Women became an increasingly important part of the military after the creation of the all-volunteer force in 1973, and they demonstrated that they had become essential to the successful employment of the military during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, in which some 40,000 women served, representing seven percent of the total deployed forces.[5] The combat exclusion rule was revealed as dubious during that conflict, as women served in logistics bases forward of allmale infantry and armor units, but not on aircraft carriers hundreds of miles to the rear of the front lines. After that conflict, opportunities for women were expanded, and women were given the opportunity to serve in combat planes
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Specifically the center will perform five functions: (1) Develop and maintain instructional mater... more Specifically the center will perform five functions: (1) Develop and maintain instructional materials in support of a program of instruction to the Corps of Cadets on the Professional Military Ethic; (2) Assess the effectiveness of the "West Point Experience" in developing within cadets a professional self-concept and an understanding of the Professional Military Ethic; (3) Conduct research on the Professional Military Ethic to determine its current content, the potential requirements for change, and its application to the education of cadets and ultimately to the Army; (4) Develop outreach initiatives to assist and interface with the Army, particularly schools of professional military education, and other appropriate Federal and civilian institutions on the subject of professional ethics and ethical education relating to the Profession of Arms and scholastic integrity; (5) Supervise the Cadet Honor and Respect Committees. This paper, jointly sponsored by SSI and CPME, is intended to be the first of many whose purpose is to promote scholarship on Officership and the Professional Military Ethic as well as enhance the discussion of military professionalism within the Army and sister services.
This article is a revised and updated version of a paper originally published as Institutionalizi... more This article is a revised and updated version of a paper originally published as Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps by the Center for a New American Security in June 2007. These views are the author's own. "Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking." -Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007.1 ARMY DOCTRINE and recent events on the ground in two wars have demonstrated that the achievement of American goals in Iraq and Afghanistan will increasingly depend on the performance of the security forces of those countries themselves. U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, describes the many complicated and interrelated tasks that should be conducted simultaneously to defeat an insurgency and then notes, "Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force."2 In recognition of the enduring need for American advisors to coach, teach, and mentor host-nation security forces in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in dozens of other countries around the globe, the Army should create a permanent standing advisory command with responsibility for all aspects of the advisor mission-from doctrine through facilities. An advisory command is essential to enable and empower the security forces of our allies to defeat extremism. Most importantly, any advisor command should have responsibility over a standing force of some 20,000 soldiers. It has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency-the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to do so.3 The most important contribution the U.S. Army makes to the development of security forces like the Iraqi Army (IA) and Afghan National Army (ANA) is embedded advisory (or "transition") teams. These teams coach, teach, and mentor host nation security forces, training them before deployment and accompanying them into combat; the mission is described by the acronym FID, for "foreign internal defense." Advisors bring important combat multipliers to the fight: artillery and close air support; medical evacuation and support; and, perhaps most importantly, a culture of leadership and training, two crucial pillars of success for all effective armies. From a strategic perspective, competent advisor teams also communicate a commitment to legitimacy. Since host-nation security forces have important cultural awareness and linguistic advantages over U.S. forces and are likely to be far more palatable to the local public whose support is ultimately the key in any counterinsurgency campaign, the advisory role of U.S. forces has become increasingly important. Strategic outcomes now hinge on advisor mission competence and success for at least two reasons. First, because America does not have enough ground forces to meet all security threats everywhere and must therefore rely upon the strategic leverage foreign troops provide; and second, because those forces have more legitimacy than do American troops who can be perceived as occupiers. American advisors serve as enormously efficient combat multipliers; the whole is far more than the sum of its parts, and effective host-nation forces, enabled and empowered by dedicated combat advisors, are now the foundation of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, years of hard work to train, equip, and mentor the Iraqi Security Forces are beginning to show results. After effective U.S.-led counterinsurgency operations dramatically improved security in Iraq in 2007, consecutive Iraqi-led operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul in the spring of 2008 have, following a shaky start, led to further gains that dramatically increased confidence in the government and Iraqi Army. …
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Battle is the ultimate to which the whole life's labor of an officer should be directed. He m... more Battle is the ultimate to which the whole life's labor of an officer should be directed. He may live to the age of retirement without seeing a battle; still, he must always be getting ready for it as if he knew the hour of the day it is to break upon him. And then, whether it comes late or early he must be willing to fight-he must fight. -Brigadier General C.F. Smith1 THE MILITARY OFFICER must fill a number of roles, often simultaneously. He has responsibilities as a warfighter, as the Nation's servant, as a member of the profession of arms, and as a leader of character. These four roles are interrelated almost to the point of inseparability, but examining each separately allows a better understanding of their inherent complexities. The central premise of this article is that preparing for battle is a lifelong developmental process and a worthy life's work. While fighting America's wars is not the professional soldier's only task, it is the task that only the professional soldier can do. Warfighting's complex arrangement of activities includes generating, applying, and sustaining combat power from the fort to the port to the fighting position to achieve the aims of policy. Most of the examples cited come from the realms of direct and indirect fire, but that fact stems more from our inability to discuss the other critical aspects of warfighting than it does from any contention that the point of the spear is somehow more important than the shaft. Developing the set of skills necessary to manage violence in the Nation's service is a lifelong developmental process that begins when an officer receives his commission and continues throughout a career. Professionalism is a combination of competence and devotion to service that grows over time, and growth occurs differently in each individual. There is no rank or position or level of education that clearly delineates the professional from the mere jobholder. Furthermore, the relationship between professionals at differing stages of career development is symbiotic. The younger professional benefits from the older one's wisdom and dignity, while the older benefits from the younger one's idealism and energy. Mastering the art and science of warfighting encompasses every aspect of the human experience-- physical, intellectual, and moral.2 To understand fully the officer's responsibilities as a warfighter, we must explore in detail each of these aspects. The Physical Dimension The Army inspires soldiers to have the strength, the confidence, and the will to fight and win anywhere, anytime. -The Army Vision, 2002(3) This statement from Army Vision, 2002, is as applicable to General George Washington's crossing of the Delaware in 1776 as it is to Task Force Eagle's crossing of the Sava in 1995. Warfighting always has been and always will be a struggle, not only against hostile forces but also against hostile environments. The officer as warfighter has a duty to prepare himself and his subordinates to cope with such physical rigors. This duty begins at the earliest stages of an officer's service. After arriving at his first duty station, a second lieutenant is expected to set the standard for his platoon in physical toughness. Toughness, not mere fitness, is the standard by which soldiers measure leaders. That the lieutenant be in excellent physical condition is necessary, but not sufficient. More important is his willingness to share his soldiers' physical hardships. Sergeant Major John Stepanek, addressing a group of officer candidates, stated succinctly what they could expect from noncommissioned officers (NCOs): "You can expect loyalty to your position, devotion to our cause, admiration for your honest effort, courage to match your courage, guts to match your guts, endurance to match your endurance, motivation to match your motivation, esprit to match your esprit, a desire for achievement to match your desire for achievement. …
We live in an age of "heavy peace. "... There will be other Kosovos, and, whether for s... more We live in an age of "heavy peace. "... There will be other Kosovos, and, whether for strategic or humanitarian reasons---or just muddled impulses-we will not be able to resist them all. ... We cannot enter upon such commitments under the assumption that they will be temporary and brief... We must stop pretending those challenges will disappear--that "something will turn up "and prepare to meet them.1 -Ralph Peters WITH THE END of the Cold War and the rise of ethnonationalisticconflicts, complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) have proliferated around the world. Internal conflicts that combine large-scale displacements of people, mass famine and fragile or failing economic, social and political institutions are becoming commonplace. War remains a common feature of the international landscape despite growing global interdependence. While the end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of great-power conflict, it has also decreased the perceived constraints on proxy wars, and as a result, over 40 unresolved conflicts currently fester, simmer or rage. International peacekeeping forces alone are unlikely to achieve lasting results in most cases, but they can stop the fighting and help implement fair and lasting resolutions.3 While the US Army prepares to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, it will frequently be called upon to provide the military forces necessary to implement our nation's multifaceted respouse to CHEs.4 Even though peace operations and preventing deadly conflict are becoming increasingly common missions, the Army currently treats each CHE as an exception; it engages in little routine preparation for such events.5 This problem is now known and discussed beyond the corridors of the Pentagon or the fields of Fort Bragg. Major newsmagazines and newspapers regularly debate the issue, including the report that "of all the services, the Army has had the most difficult transition from a Cold War force ready to defeat the Soviet Union to the sort of nimble force needed to fight wars like the one in Kosovo."6 The Army has conducted a number of joint, multinational, multiorganizational, multiagency and multicultural exercises to better prepare our troops for these new challenges, but they are still administered ad hoc. Because the US military, particularly the Army, is overwhelmed by internal debate concerning when and how to provide humanitarian assistance, it has not created the necessary precrisis training that numerous after-action reviews have stressed is crucial for success in these operations.7 The Army must immediately adjust while continuing to debate the options of creating a twotier military establishment complete with a constabulary force, changing the structure of the force to make deployments easier or simply not getting involved.8 Such modifications are crucial, for involvement in CHEs will not wait until the debate over America's role in the post-Cold War world has been resolved.9 The Army must create a routine training program to make the US response to CHEs more successful. Unless the Army creates specialized units whose primary mission is to respond to CHEs, all units must have the ability to perform them. Hence, in keeping with our "train as you fight" philosophy, all National Training Center (NTC), Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations should include a CHE scenario both leading up to and building down from a typical mid-intensity conflict (MIC) scenario (see figure). This scenario more accurately reflects the situations in which our military is likely to find itself involved and presents a greater training challenge to US forces. The Army must more actively prepare for CHEs. RAND researcher Jennifer Morison Taw noted that "the Army is the most likely of all US military services to pay the price for failings in interagency coordination."10 US policy implementation in Bosnia lacks a mechanism to ensure effective integration of the civilian and military peacebuilding programs at the tactical, operational or strategic level. …
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (University of Chicago Press, 2007)
Conducting Presentations 343 Speaking Techniques 344 appendix d. Legal Considerations 347 Authori... more Conducting Presentations 343 Speaking Techniques 344 appendix d. Legal Considerations 347 Authority to Assist a Foreign Government 347 Authorization to Use Military Force 349 Rules of Engagement 350 The Law of War 351 Internal Armed Confl ict 352 Detention and Interrogation 354 Enforcing Discipline of U.S. Forces 356 Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction 357 Training and Equipping Foreign Forces 359 Claims and Solatia 360 Establishing the Rule of Law 360 appendix e. Airpower in Counterinsurgency 363 Overview 363 Airpower in the Strike Role 364 Airpower in Intelligence Collection 365 Air and Space Information Operations 366 High-Technology Assets 367 Low-Technology Assets 368 Airlift 368 The Airpower Command Structure 370 Building Host-Nation Airpower Capability 371 Source Notes 373 Glossary 379 Annotated Bibliography 391 Military References 397 Index 401 contents viii List of Tables, Figures, and Vignettes Tables 1-1. Successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practices 51 2-1. Example interagency coordination checklist 76 3-1. Factors to consider when addressing grievances 100 3-2. Insurgency characteristics and order of battle factors 101 3-3. Critical information regarding popular support 106 3-4. Insurgent support activities and capabilities 107 3-5. Media forms insurgents use 107 3-6. Potential indicators of insurgent approaches 114 3-7. Examples of insurgent tactics 115 3-8. Potential sources of human intelligence 122 3-9. Comprehensive insurgency analysis tasks 130 3-10. Possible intelligence community assets in a division area of operations 133 5-1. Considerations for developing the information operations LLO 162 5-2. Considerations for developing the combat operations/civil security 166 5-3. Considerations for developing the host-nation security forces LLO 168 5-4. Considerations for developing the essential services LLO 169 5-5. Considerations for developing the governance LLO 172 5-6. Considerations for the economic development LLO 173 5-7. Example progress indicators 192 5-8. Examples of lethal and nonlethal targets 193 6-1. Staff functions required when training host-nation security forces 207 6-2. Characteristics of effective host-nation security forces 208 6-3. Security force pay considerations 216 6-4. Methods of training host-nation security forces 221 6-5. Guidelines for advisors 227 8-1. Conventional and counterinsurgency operations contrasted 257 8-2. Civil affairs capabilities used by logisticians 272 8-3. Logistic units and their capabilities 273 B-1. Examples of key civilian areas 309 B-2. Examples of important structures 310 C-1. Orientation for interpreters 342 C-2. Good and bad practices for speakers 346 D-1. Extract of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 355 Figures 1-1. Aspects of counterinsurgency operations 35 1-2. Support for an insurgency 36 2-1. Sample country team 71 4-1. Design and planning continuum 139 4-2. Iterative counterinsurgency campaign design 144 4-3. 1st Marine Division's operational design for Operation Iraqi Freedom II 149 5-1. Example logical lines of operations for a counterinsurgency 155 5-2. Example goals and objectives along logical lines of operations 156 5-3. The strengthening effect of interrelated logical lines of operations 157 5-4. Example of essential services categories and objectives 170 6-1. Factors affecting security force development 213 8-1. Comparison of essential services availability to insurgency effectiveness 275 8-2. Tactical fi nancial management organizations 283 B-1. Example imagery photograph 308 B-2. Example population support overlay 313 B-3. Example ethnicity overlay 314 B-4. Example perception assessment matrix 315 B-5. Examples of dyads 318 B-6. Comparison of network densities 319 B-7. Example of changes to tactics based on density shift 320 B-8. Networked organization with high connections 321 B-9. Fragmented network 321 B-10. Simple network 324 B-11. Example activities matrix 326 B-12. Example association matrix 327 B-13. Example historical time line 328 list of tables, figures, and vignettes x B-14. Example pattern analysis plot sheet 330 B-15. Example coordinates register 331 B-16. Example link diagram 332 B-17. Example time-event chart 333 Vignettes "Hand Shake Con" in Operation Provide Comfort 58
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