I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to ... more I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of transhumanism. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as “dignity,” Heidegger’s analysis can help us understand how new technologies employed to modify the body, brain, and consciousness will enframe our own bodies and identities as something akin to “standing reserve.” Under transhumanism, the body is enframed as an external, technologically modifiable product. I indicate some of the problems that might arise when our own bodies no longer appear as central to our identity as embodied beings. Further, I argue that, by treating aspects of our own consciousness as technologically modifiable, we will be driven into a commodified and inauthentic relation to our identities. By examining the work of prominent transhumanists – including Brad Allenby, Daniel Sarewitz, and Andy Clark – I show how the threat that technology poses can be hidden wh...
proposition that the soul has a being and an existence separate from the physical body; it is ano... more proposition that the soul has a being and an existence separate from the physical body; it is another matter entirely to face death calmly. Thus, the Phaedo warns that we must be on our guard against the dangers of “taking refuge in λόγοι,” as Aristotle cautions in the Nichomachean Ethics, at 1105b12. 2.2 Persuasion, Refutation, and Emotion Considering that Simmias and Cebes already accept that the soul can exist separately from the body, it must be their fear of death that prevents them from accepting the idea that the soul can ‘survive’ death. In order to understand how their emotions affect their conclusions concerning the arguments for the immortality of the soul, we
Plato is philosophy, and philosophy, Plato. Emerson, Plato; or The Philosopher But it is the faul... more Plato is philosophy, and philosophy, Plato. Emerson, Plato; or The Philosopher But it is the fault of our rhetoric that we cannot strongly state one fact without seeming to belie some other. Emerson, History For Emerson, Plato is the quintessential philosopher. I will argue that, to the extent that Emerson wanted his essays to have philosophical depth, he considered his work to be an extension of the work found in Plato's dialogues. Thus, in his relationship to the towering figure of Plato we can discern his understanding of the relation between his literary and philosophical endeavors. When we read his comments on Plato, we find crystallized what philosophical work Emerson intended his essays to accomplish. Hence, the reader must be attentive not simply to the explicit content of his essays, but also the dialectic form of the essays. As we know from the Phaedrus, and from the dialogical nature of his writings, for Plato the techne of rhetoric is not merely stating factual propo...
I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to ... more I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of transhumanism. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as “dignity,” Heidegger’s analysis can help us understand how new technologies employed to modify the body, brain, and consciousness will enframe our own bodies and identities as something akin to “standing reserve.” Under transhumanism, the body is enframed as an external, technologically modifiable product. I indicate some of the problems that might arise when our own bodies no longer appear as central to our identity as embodied beings. Further, I argue that, by treating aspects of our own consciousness as technologically modifiable, we will be driven into a commodified and inauthentic relation to our identities. By examining the work of prominent transhumanists – including Brad Allenby, Daniel Sarewitz, and Andy Clark – I show how the threat that technology poses can be hidden wh...
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy
This paper is a response to Christopher Moore’s excellent paper, “Questioning Aristotle’s Radical... more This paper is a response to Christopher Moore’s excellent paper, “Questioning Aristotle’s Radical Account of Σωφροσύνη.” I expand upon some of the themes in the four suggestions Moore makes in his “Four Possible Defenses” of Aristotle that I take to be the most fruitful avenues of research. I then argue that pursuing these avenues will show that Aristotle’s thinking in the Nicomachean Ethics about σωφροσύνη—and virtues in general—cannot be understood by looking only at the early books. I argue that his deeper analysis of virtue and φρόνησις in book VI demand a revaluation of the apparent finality of his comments in book III. Specifically, I argue that the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole is constructed as a dialectical advancement that points to a progressively deepening understanding of the relationship between the discussion of the individual virtues in the early books and the discussion of φρόνησις in book VI must be developed in order to understand Aristotle’s conception of any ind...
Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought
This paper presents a reading of the political dimensions of Plato’s Cratylus. Following Sallis, ... more This paper presents a reading of the political dimensions of Plato’s Cratylus. Following Sallis, I argue that Socrates’ claim that we can achieve a direct access to being unmediated by language is ironic. There is a comedic element to the attempt to transcend language in order to test the names given by the ‘lawgiver’ against a pure awareness of the nature of beings themselves. I show that this account of human life, as always mediated by logos, has a political dimension. Specifically, the paper argues that the mediation performed by Socrates in the dialogue is intended to get us to turn toward one another in the formation of communities of philosophical discourse.
questions ourselves; with this power, we return to the dialogues not for Plato's answers, but for... more questions ourselves; with this power, we return to the dialogues not for Plato's answers, but for his questions. Socrates' second complaint in the Phaedrus is that the writings can "roll around everywhere," being read by people to whom it ought to speak and those to whom it ought not. The result of this, Socrates says, is that it can be unjustly reviled by those who do not understand it, and thus needs the defense of its "father." 5 At 271aff Socrates gave an account that states that the rhetorician has to be able to understand the different kinds (γένη) of souls, and to present the right kind of λόγος to each kind of soul on the basis of an account of what kind of soul is persuaded by what kind of λόγος. The failure of writing is, then, that it is unable to make this judgment, and instead speaks the same to all people. The dialogues would, then, have to overcome this defect by attempting to speak differently to different kinds of souls. If this were the case-if it were the case that Plato attempted to overcome the defects in writing which he obviously was aware of in composing the dialogues-then we must not expect the dialogues to have the same meaning for different people. These considerations certainly place the interpreter in a difficult position. In what way are we to understand how the dialogues are intended as tools for teaching-first teaching the members of the Academy, and then the rest of us? In what way are we to 5 It is interesting to note the term "father" here. It could lead us to the image of Socrates as barren in the Theaetetus, but as the one capable of delivering others of their wisdom. The dialogues thus can be seen as performing the function of a midwife, and thus being, again, the image of Socrates. Also, we could turn to the Symposium to look at the "levels" of ἔρος that seek natural offspring (an issue conspicuously suppressed in the Phaedo's account of generation) at one level, and poetic offspring at another. 11 Cf. Friedlander 1969 p 36. 12 See 102a and 88c-e. On the importance of the "interruptions" of the dialogue effected by these shifts to the frame-dialogue, see Sallis 2004: "These two interruptions serve also to delimit the λόγος with which the dialogue attains, in philosophical significance, its pinnacle. In the interval between the interruptions, Socrates presents two λόγοι in behalf of λόγος, first, a defense against misology and then, more significantly, a discourse on how he came to philosophize as he does, on how he came to launch-as he calls it-his second sailing. In launching his second sailing-as in the absence of wind sailors take to the oars-Socrates carries out the decisive turn by which a new beginning is inaugurated. In this move he turns away from things, takes distance from them, and does so primarily by turning to λόγοι, by having recourse to them. On his second sailing he forgoes directly investigating things as well as heir causes and instead, taking refuge in λόγοι, "looks in them for the truth of beings" (99e). Thus the form of the Phaedo, that of a λόγος set at a
I argue that Heidegger's account of technology as "enframing" is a helpful lens through which to ... more I argue that Heidegger's account of technology as "enframing" is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of transhumanism. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as "dignity," Heidegger's analysis can help us understand how new technologies employed to modify the body, brain, and consciousness will enframe our own bodies and identities as something akin to "standing reserve." Under transhumanism, the body is enframed as an external, technologically modifiable product. I indicate some of the problems that might arise when our own bodies no longer appear as central to our identity as embodied beings. Further, I argue that, by treating aspects of our own consciousness as technologically modifiable, we will be driven into a commodified and inauthentic relation to our identities. By examining the work of prominent transhumanistsincluding Brad Allenby, Daniel Sarewitz, and Andy Clark-I show how the threat that technology poses can be hidden when the essence of technology is not uncovered in a primordial way. I argue that by threatening to obscure death as a foundational possibility for Dasein, transhumanism poses the danger of hiding the need to develop a free and authentic relation to technology, Truth, and ultimately to Dasein itself. In this paper, I argue that Heidegger's account of enframing (Gestell) is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of unbridled transhumanism with respect to innovations in Human Genetic Enhancement (HGE), cloning, and human cybernetic implementation of nanotechnology to enhance cognitive and biological functions. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as "dignity," Heidegger's analysis can help us understand how biotech will enframe our own bodies as something akin to "standing reserve." 1 The body thus becomes an object present-at-hand that is open to our manipulation. Heidegger's analysis of
I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to ... more I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of transhumanism. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as “dignity,” Heidegger’s analysis can help us understand how new technologies employed to modify the body, brain, and consciousness will enframe our own bodies and identities as something akin to “standing reserve.” Under transhumanism, the body is enframed as an external, technologically modifiable product. I indicate some of the problems that might arise when our own bodies no longer appear as central to our identity as embodied beings. Further, I argue that, by treating aspects of our own consciousness as technologically modifiable, we will be driven into a commodified and inauthentic relation to our identities. By examining the work of prominent transhumanists – including Brad Allenby, Daniel Sarewitz, and Andy Clark – I show how the threat that technology poses can be hidden wh...
proposition that the soul has a being and an existence separate from the physical body; it is ano... more proposition that the soul has a being and an existence separate from the physical body; it is another matter entirely to face death calmly. Thus, the Phaedo warns that we must be on our guard against the dangers of “taking refuge in λόγοι,” as Aristotle cautions in the Nichomachean Ethics, at 1105b12. 2.2 Persuasion, Refutation, and Emotion Considering that Simmias and Cebes already accept that the soul can exist separately from the body, it must be their fear of death that prevents them from accepting the idea that the soul can ‘survive’ death. In order to understand how their emotions affect their conclusions concerning the arguments for the immortality of the soul, we
Plato is philosophy, and philosophy, Plato. Emerson, Plato; or The Philosopher But it is the faul... more Plato is philosophy, and philosophy, Plato. Emerson, Plato; or The Philosopher But it is the fault of our rhetoric that we cannot strongly state one fact without seeming to belie some other. Emerson, History For Emerson, Plato is the quintessential philosopher. I will argue that, to the extent that Emerson wanted his essays to have philosophical depth, he considered his work to be an extension of the work found in Plato's dialogues. Thus, in his relationship to the towering figure of Plato we can discern his understanding of the relation between his literary and philosophical endeavors. When we read his comments on Plato, we find crystallized what philosophical work Emerson intended his essays to accomplish. Hence, the reader must be attentive not simply to the explicit content of his essays, but also the dialectic form of the essays. As we know from the Phaedrus, and from the dialogical nature of his writings, for Plato the techne of rhetoric is not merely stating factual propo...
I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to ... more I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of transhumanism. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as “dignity,” Heidegger’s analysis can help us understand how new technologies employed to modify the body, brain, and consciousness will enframe our own bodies and identities as something akin to “standing reserve.” Under transhumanism, the body is enframed as an external, technologically modifiable product. I indicate some of the problems that might arise when our own bodies no longer appear as central to our identity as embodied beings. Further, I argue that, by treating aspects of our own consciousness as technologically modifiable, we will be driven into a commodified and inauthentic relation to our identities. By examining the work of prominent transhumanists – including Brad Allenby, Daniel Sarewitz, and Andy Clark – I show how the threat that technology poses can be hidden wh...
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy
This paper is a response to Christopher Moore’s excellent paper, “Questioning Aristotle’s Radical... more This paper is a response to Christopher Moore’s excellent paper, “Questioning Aristotle’s Radical Account of Σωφροσύνη.” I expand upon some of the themes in the four suggestions Moore makes in his “Four Possible Defenses” of Aristotle that I take to be the most fruitful avenues of research. I then argue that pursuing these avenues will show that Aristotle’s thinking in the Nicomachean Ethics about σωφροσύνη—and virtues in general—cannot be understood by looking only at the early books. I argue that his deeper analysis of virtue and φρόνησις in book VI demand a revaluation of the apparent finality of his comments in book III. Specifically, I argue that the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole is constructed as a dialectical advancement that points to a progressively deepening understanding of the relationship between the discussion of the individual virtues in the early books and the discussion of φρόνησις in book VI must be developed in order to understand Aristotle’s conception of any ind...
Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought
This paper presents a reading of the political dimensions of Plato’s Cratylus. Following Sallis, ... more This paper presents a reading of the political dimensions of Plato’s Cratylus. Following Sallis, I argue that Socrates’ claim that we can achieve a direct access to being unmediated by language is ironic. There is a comedic element to the attempt to transcend language in order to test the names given by the ‘lawgiver’ against a pure awareness of the nature of beings themselves. I show that this account of human life, as always mediated by logos, has a political dimension. Specifically, the paper argues that the mediation performed by Socrates in the dialogue is intended to get us to turn toward one another in the formation of communities of philosophical discourse.
questions ourselves; with this power, we return to the dialogues not for Plato's answers, but for... more questions ourselves; with this power, we return to the dialogues not for Plato's answers, but for his questions. Socrates' second complaint in the Phaedrus is that the writings can "roll around everywhere," being read by people to whom it ought to speak and those to whom it ought not. The result of this, Socrates says, is that it can be unjustly reviled by those who do not understand it, and thus needs the defense of its "father." 5 At 271aff Socrates gave an account that states that the rhetorician has to be able to understand the different kinds (γένη) of souls, and to present the right kind of λόγος to each kind of soul on the basis of an account of what kind of soul is persuaded by what kind of λόγος. The failure of writing is, then, that it is unable to make this judgment, and instead speaks the same to all people. The dialogues would, then, have to overcome this defect by attempting to speak differently to different kinds of souls. If this were the case-if it were the case that Plato attempted to overcome the defects in writing which he obviously was aware of in composing the dialogues-then we must not expect the dialogues to have the same meaning for different people. These considerations certainly place the interpreter in a difficult position. In what way are we to understand how the dialogues are intended as tools for teaching-first teaching the members of the Academy, and then the rest of us? In what way are we to 5 It is interesting to note the term "father" here. It could lead us to the image of Socrates as barren in the Theaetetus, but as the one capable of delivering others of their wisdom. The dialogues thus can be seen as performing the function of a midwife, and thus being, again, the image of Socrates. Also, we could turn to the Symposium to look at the "levels" of ἔρος that seek natural offspring (an issue conspicuously suppressed in the Phaedo's account of generation) at one level, and poetic offspring at another. 11 Cf. Friedlander 1969 p 36. 12 See 102a and 88c-e. On the importance of the "interruptions" of the dialogue effected by these shifts to the frame-dialogue, see Sallis 2004: "These two interruptions serve also to delimit the λόγος with which the dialogue attains, in philosophical significance, its pinnacle. In the interval between the interruptions, Socrates presents two λόγοι in behalf of λόγος, first, a defense against misology and then, more significantly, a discourse on how he came to philosophize as he does, on how he came to launch-as he calls it-his second sailing. In launching his second sailing-as in the absence of wind sailors take to the oars-Socrates carries out the decisive turn by which a new beginning is inaugurated. In this move he turns away from things, takes distance from them, and does so primarily by turning to λόγοι, by having recourse to them. On his second sailing he forgoes directly investigating things as well as heir causes and instead, taking refuge in λόγοι, "looks in them for the truth of beings" (99e). Thus the form of the Phaedo, that of a λόγος set at a
I argue that Heidegger's account of technology as "enframing" is a helpful lens through which to ... more I argue that Heidegger's account of technology as "enframing" is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of transhumanism. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as "dignity," Heidegger's analysis can help us understand how new technologies employed to modify the body, brain, and consciousness will enframe our own bodies and identities as something akin to "standing reserve." Under transhumanism, the body is enframed as an external, technologically modifiable product. I indicate some of the problems that might arise when our own bodies no longer appear as central to our identity as embodied beings. Further, I argue that, by treating aspects of our own consciousness as technologically modifiable, we will be driven into a commodified and inauthentic relation to our identities. By examining the work of prominent transhumanistsincluding Brad Allenby, Daniel Sarewitz, and Andy Clark-I show how the threat that technology poses can be hidden when the essence of technology is not uncovered in a primordial way. I argue that by threatening to obscure death as a foundational possibility for Dasein, transhumanism poses the danger of hiding the need to develop a free and authentic relation to technology, Truth, and ultimately to Dasein itself. In this paper, I argue that Heidegger's account of enframing (Gestell) is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of unbridled transhumanism with respect to innovations in Human Genetic Enhancement (HGE), cloning, and human cybernetic implementation of nanotechnology to enhance cognitive and biological functions. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as "dignity," Heidegger's analysis can help us understand how biotech will enframe our own bodies as something akin to "standing reserve." 1 The body thus becomes an object present-at-hand that is open to our manipulation. Heidegger's analysis of
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