Papers by Jean-marie Baland
Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCAs)
Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks, 2008
Forest Degradation in the Himalayas and the Role of the State
Afrique contemporaine, 2009
Forest degradation in the Indian Himalayas leads to spectacular soil erosion and threatens the eq... more Forest degradation in the Indian Himalayas leads to spectacular soil erosion and threatens the equilibrium of the major rivers of the region. Different kinds of public interventions to reduce human pressure on forests will be examined here, based on a number of detailed field studies. This pressure will most likely be increasing in the coming years due to demographic growth and weak elasticity of households' wood consumption to wood collection costs. Next, we evaluate the impact of two public policies, to reduce wood-heating, namely subsidization of alternative energies such as natural gas, and modernization of property rights.
The economics of price scissors
European Economic Review, 1993
Abstract In the context of a centrally planned developing economy, Evgeny Preobrazhensky suggeste... more Abstract In the context of a centrally planned developing economy, Evgeny Preobrazhensky suggested the possibility of financing the accumulation process by turning the internal terms of trade against the peasantry without hurting the industrial proletariat, which proposition has recently been questioned in a celebrated paper by Sah and Stiglitz (1984). In the present analysis, we first show that consumer rationing is an essential component in Preobrazhensky's analysis and that Sah and Stiglitz model, since it relies on market equilibrium, cannot be considered as a valid test of Preobrazhensky's propositions. The conditions under which Preobrazhensky's thesis holds are then investigated together with an analysis of rural-urban differential pricing policies.
Forest Degradation in the Himalayas
Oxford University Press eBooks, Apr 17, 2014
We study the implications of vote buying for political equilibria and economic resource allocatio... more We study the implications of vote buying for political equilibria and economic resource allocation. We develop a model of a `market for votes' where votes may be bought and sold and distinguish between direct vote buying, when individuals sell their own votes to political parties, and indirect vote buying, when some individuals sell the votes of others. We show that the attraction of indirect vote buying to parties is that it can make We are grateful to Mauricio Benitez-Iturbe and Sebasti an Mazzuca for their outstanding research assistance. Our greatest debt is to Jonathan Conning who persevered through at least three previous versions, pointing out all the mistakes and confusions. He enormously improved the paper. We have also bene tted from the suggestions and advice of
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxfo... more Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Replication data for: Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile
Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the political institutions, ... more Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the political institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers' political behavior, such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot. We examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated with the landed oligarchy. After the reform, however, this difference across localities completely disappeared. (JEL D72, N46, O13, O15, O17)
Princeton University Press eBooks, 2020
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Nov 1, 2015
In the absence of well-developed markets for credit and insurance, extended families play a major... more In the absence of well-developed markets for credit and insurance, extended families play a major role as a traditional systems of mutual help. However these arrangements also involve important inefficiencies. As stressed by Kennedy (1988) and Platteau (1991), the taxation implicit in family transfers has large disincentive effects, in particular on effort and investment. In this paper, we use first hand data from Western Cameroon to explore this question. We find that the large majority of transfers follow a given pattern whereby elder siblings support their younger siblings in the early stages of their lives who in turn reciprocate by supporting their elder siblings when they have children. We interpret this pattern as a generalized system of reciprocal credit within the extended family. We propose a simple overlapping generation model to investigate its welfare properties. We then explore the implications of this pattern on labour market outcomes and find evidence for strong negative effects. This pattern of transfers also implies that younger siblings tend to be net donors at the time at which their own children are growing up which has consequences for fertility and education outcomes. As expected, we find that younger siblings have fewer children who also tend to be less educated.
American Journal of Political Science, Mar 16, 2012
In this article, we argue that when patron-client relations are grounded in economic relationship... more In this article, we argue that when patron-client relations are grounded in economic relationships, such as between landlord and worker, we should expect clientelism to influence not just how public policy, the state, and the political system work, but also how the economy works. We develop a simple model of the economic consequences of electoral clientelism when voting behavior can be observed. Landlords/patrons provide economic rents to workers, and in exchange workers vote for parties favored by landlords. As votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents, vote control increases the demand for labor and for land. The model implies that the introduction of the Australian ballot, which destroys this form of clientelism, should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron-client relationships are strongest. We test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in Chile around May 31, 1958, for which we collected original data. A characteristic of rural Chile at this time were patron-client relations based on the inquilinaje system, by which a worker, the inquilino, entered into a long-term, often hereditary, employment relationship with a landlord and lived on his landlord's estate. We show that the introduction of the Australian ballot in 1958 led to a fall of about 26% in land prices in the areas where these patron-client relationships were predominant.
Journal of Development Economics, Apr 1, 2000
This paper develops a model of rent-seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent-seeking is fore... more This paper develops a model of rent-seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent-seeking is foregone entrepreneurship. It provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent-seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship. We identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent-seeking over entrepreneurship. But we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium.
Journal of Development Economics, Sep 1, 2019
We start from the observation that, in fixed roscas in Sub-Saharan African, members often prefer ... more We start from the observation that, in fixed roscas in Sub-Saharan African, members often prefer to take the last turn. We argue that, when exchanges of turns are allowed during a cycle, a late turn allows to request the pot when an urgent need arises. Survey data indicate that insurance needs are critical in determining the preferred position of rosca members. We develop a theoretical model to formalize the argument and show that the preference for the last position requires that the probability of a shock is neither too low nor too high. We test this prediction in a lab-in-the-field experiment and confirm that the preference for being last is non-monotonic in the risk of negative shocks.
Journal of Development Economics, Feb 1, 1993
In this note, we proceed to a macroeconomic analysis of speculative foodgrain stocks and of parti... more In this note, we proceed to a macroeconomic analysis of speculative foodgrain stocks and of partial food price stabilization policies in a dual semi-industrialized economy of the type proposed by Rattsra (1989). We adopt a dynamic perspective which allows us to highlight the medium-run effects on industrial employment of their interaction with wage indexation in industry.
Are labels effective against child labor?
Journal of Public Economics, Dec 1, 2009
ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the impact of introducing a label certifying the absence o... more ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the impact of introducing a label certifying the absence of child labor in the export production of the South. When most eligible producers in the South can obtain the label, its impact is considerably reduced by a displacement effect whereby adult workers replace children in the export sector while children replace adults in the domestic sector. The label is then unable to create a price differential in the South between goods produced under the label and those produced without it.When only a small fraction of eligible producers have access to the label, the South exports both labeled and unlabeled goods to the North. In this case, labeled producers generally gain while those without a label generally loose from the introduction of the label. Ex ante welfare may fall in the South if the probability of getting a label when one qualifies is small. The impact on child labor is in general ambiguous.
Innovation, monopolies and the poverty trap
Journal of Development Economics, Apr 1, 1996
ABSTRACT
Journal of Public Economics, Jun 1, 2002
We study the implications of the trade-off between child quality and child quantity for the effic... more We study the implications of the trade-off between child quality and child quantity for the efficiency of the rate of population growth. We show that if quantity and quality are inversely related then, even in the case of full altruism within the family, population growth is inefficiently high, if the family does not have, or does not choose to use, compensating instruments (for example, bequests or savings are at a corner). In non-altruistic models this trade-off certainly generates a population problem. We therefore prove that the repugnant conclusion is not only repugnant, it may be inefficient. Moreover, we cannot expect intra-family contracting to resolve the inefficiency since it involves contracts which are not credible.
Elsevier eBooks, 2010
Written as a chapter in the Handbook of Development Economics, edited by Dani Rodrik and Mark Ros... more Written as a chapter in the Handbook of Development Economics, edited by Dani Rodrik and Mark Rosenzweig to be published by North Holland. We are grateful to Frederico Finan and Robert Putnam for providing us with their data to Mar a Ang elica Bautista for her research assistance and Dani Rodrik for his detailed comments on an earlier draft.
The Economics of price scissors : a defence of Preobrazhensky', European Economic Review, 1993, 37, 37-60
Abstract In the context of a centrally planned developing economy, Evgeny Preobrazhensky suggeste... more Abstract In the context of a centrally planned developing economy, Evgeny Preobrazhensky suggested the possibility of financing the accumulation process by turning the internal terms of trade against the peasantry without hurting the industrial proletariat, which proposition has recently been questioned in a celebrated paper by Sah and Stiglitz (1984). In the present analysis, we first show that consumer rationing is an essential component in Preobrazhensky's analysis and that Sah and Stiglitz model, since it relies on market equilibrium, cannot be considered as a valid test of Preobrazhensky's propositions. The conditions under which Preobrazhensky's thesis holds are then investigated together with an analysis of rural-urban differential pricing policies.
Foodgrain stocks and macrodynamic adjustement mechanisms in a dual semi-industrialized economy', Journal of Development Economics, 1993, 40, 171-185
Afrique contemporaine, 2009
Thème 2 * Jean-Marie Baland est professeur au département d'économie de l'université de Namur en ... more Thème 2 * Jean-Marie Baland est professeur au département d'économie de l'université de Namur en Belgique et travaille au Centre de recherche en économie du développement (CRED). Ses axes de recherches incluent l'analyse des institutions informelles dans les pays les moins développés. Son approche est développée sur base de l'analyse microéconomique et fondée sur des travaux de terrain. Dans le passé, il a conduit ses recherches sur les groupes informels des bidonvilles de Kiberia au Kenya, le fonctionnement des marchés fonciers en Ouganda, la déforestation dans la partie indienne de l'Himalaya, et les systèmes d'entraide en Inde. 1. Je voudrais remercier mes quatre collaborateurs au projet de recherches général sur lequel se base ce rapport, à savoir Pranab Bardhan (University of California, Berkeley), Sanghamitra Das (ISI, Delhi), Dilip Mookherjee (Boston University) et Rinki Sarkar (CISED, Bangalore). Je tiens également à remercier, pour une relecture attentive, Catherine Guirkinger (CRED, Namur).
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Papers by Jean-marie Baland