Mindfulness' is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought to... more Mindfulness' is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought to contemporary Western psychology. However, whilst mindfulness was already an ambiguous term in the original context, specified more by a set of practices than by a clear definition, its cross-cultural transmission has blurred its content even further. In this paper, I assess the recent criticism of the widespread definition of mindfulness as non-elaborative, purely receptive 'bare attention '. According to the critics of bare attention, what can be characterized as purely receptive is the automatic turning of attention toward an object. But should mindfulness be a quality of consciousness that is to be established and developed by the reflexive practice of meditation, it must be something more than this automatic turning of attention. This paper shows how the definition of mindful ness as bare attention can be defended by explicating it in terms of the phenomenological model of attention.
Puc, J. (2013). Das Selbstsein. Eine Kritik von Heideggers Begriff der eigentlichen Existenz. In ... more Puc, J. (2013). Das Selbstsein. Eine Kritik von Heideggers Begriff der eigentlichen Existenz. In Keiling, T. (Hrg.), Heideggers Marburger Zeit. Themen, Argumente, Konstellationen. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, S. 71–81. Im folgenden Text wird es mir um zwei Begriffe des Selbstseins gehen, von denen der eine in Heideggers Sein und Zeit bei der Abgrenzung der authentischen Existenz des Menschen eine entscheidende Rolle spielt, während der andere in den Modus der Uneigentlichkeit abgeschoben wird. Ich werde den zentralen Begriff des frühen Heidegger – das Selbstsein – nehmen, um zu zeigen, dass sich hinter seiner Individualitätstheorie eine Entscheidung für einen bestimmten Identitätsbegriff verbirgt. Weiterhin möchte ich eine Alternative bieten, die potentiellen Einwänden von der Heideggerschen Position aus standhalten kann, und in der Abschlussüberlegung zeigen, dass es für die Bestimmung der menschlichen Existenz notwendig ist, zwei verschiedene Begriffe des Selbstseins ins Spiel zu bringen.
This article addresses the function of the felt body in focusing-oriented psychotherapy. Focusing... more This article addresses the function of the felt body in focusing-oriented psychotherapy. Focusing, as defined by its founder Eugene T. Gendlin, innovated the person-centered approach with procedures attending to the bodily “felt sense” of the client’s situation. In a recent series of texts, Campbell Purton questioned the bodily nature of a felt sense, which in his opinion results from a misconception about emotions and language. This article aims to assess the extent to which Purton’s critique is cogent and where, on the contrary, it misses the presence and function of the body in psychotherapy. It is argued that contemporary phenomenological and neo-Jamesian theories of emotions offer ample means of defending the bodily nature of feelings.
The paper shows connection between the cultivation of attention in Buddhist meditation vipassanā ... more The paper shows connection between the cultivation of attention in Buddhist meditation vipassanā and the phenomenological theory of affectivity. At first, it shortly describes the way how the praxis of meditation achieves progress of mindfulness. Then, this experience is interpreted from the point of view of Husserl's theory of passive constitution. Finally, it describes mindfulness in terms of the boundary between activity and passivity of human being in the world.
The Unconscious as Ambiguous Consciousness. Merleau-Ponty on Psychoanalysis Merleau-Ponty’s attit... more The Unconscious as Ambiguous Consciousness. Merleau-Ponty on Psychoanalysis Merleau-Ponty’s attitude to psychoanalysis was ambiguous. On the one hand, he realized that the phenomena psychoanalysis deals with require to go beyond the area of act intentionality, and that, from a different angle, psychoanalysis addresses the same problem as Gestalt psychology, which played the central role in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project. On the other hand, he explicitly rejected the terms used by Freud for conveying his discoveries. Merleau-Ponty replaced unconscious mental contents, which act on conscious behavior, by ambiguous consciousness. In the Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception, he used the terms “habit,” “bad faith,” “bodily expression,” “affective intentionality,” and “body schema” to specify his notion of experiential “ambiguity.” This paper aims to present the key concepts of Merleau-Ponty’s early interpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious....
Studie ukazuje rozdílné přístupy k tvořivosti, tj. vzniku nového významu, u Merleau-Pontyho a Pat... more Studie ukazuje rozdílné přístupy k tvořivosti, tj. vzniku nového významu, u Merleau-Pontyho a Patočky. Srovnání je vedeno především na základě na Merleau-Pontyho přednášek L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) a Patočkova projektu Negativní platonismus (1953). Navzdory některým podobnostem se klíčové pojmy " založení " a " transcendence " rozhodujícím způsobem liší v otázce časového rozměru tvorby. Zatímco Merleau-Ponty přirovnává časovost založení k předbudoucímu času, čímž zdůrazňuje proplétání přítomných a budoucích událostí, Patočka vykládá novost jako něco naprosto odlišného od přítomného stavu světa. Z jeho pohledu se otázka, jak může vzniknout něco nového, rovná otázce, jak lze dosáhnout odstupu od dosavadní tradice. Oproti tomu Merleau-Ponty vychází z toho, že jakákoli živá tradice směřuje ke své vlastní proměně a překračuje sebe sama, neboť se řídí principem odchylky (écart). V závěru ukazujeme, že tyto dva přístupy se jednak vzájemně doplňují, jednak si vzájemně vykazují hranice. The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty's lectures L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka's project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts " institution " and " transcendence " , there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence, because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other.
This paper addresses the question as to whether the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious is ... more This paper addresses the question as to whether the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious is compatible with the phenomenological notion of consciousness defined as self-awareness. This problem is approached by explicating various concepts that Merleau-Ponty used in his attempts at a reinterpretation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. At first, the paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty' s position in the Phenomenology of Perception, which is specified by the concepts of bad faith, institution and body schema. After that, it is explained what are the implications of Merleau-Ponty' s late conceptions of primordial symbolism and embodied intersubjectivity for the problem of the unconscious and its manifestation in the consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6): 170-190, 2019
'Mindfulness' is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought t... more 'Mindfulness' is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought to contemporary Western psychology. However, whilst mindfulness was already an ambiguous term in the original context, specified more by a set of practices than by a clear definition, its cross-cultural transmission has blurred its content even further. In this paper, I assess the recent criticism of the widespread definition of mindfulness as non-elaborative, purely receptive 'bare attention'. According to the critics of bare attention, what can be characterized as purely receptive is the automatic turning of attention toward an object. But should mindfulness be a quality of consciousness that is to be established and developed by the reflexive practice of meditation, it must be something more than this automatic turning of attention. This paper shows how the definition of mindfulness as bare attention can be defended by explicating it in terms of the phenomenological model of attention.
Merleau-Pontyho postoj k psychoanalýze byl dvojznačný. Na jedné straně si uvědomoval, že fenomény... more Merleau-Pontyho postoj k psychoanalýze byl dvojznačný. Na jedné straně si uvědomoval, že fenomény, jimiž se psychoanalýza zabývá, si žádají překročit oblast aktové intencionality a psychoanalýza tak z jiného úhlu míří na tentýž problém jako tvarová psychologie, jež hrála v Merleau-Pontyho filozofickém projektu ústřední roli. Na druhé straně explicitně odmítal pojmy, jimiž Freud své objevy popsal. Namísto nevědomých duševních obsahů, které působí na vědomé chování, navrhl Merleau-Ponty dosadit dvojznačné vědomí. Ve Struktuře chování a Fenomenologii vnímání pak pomocí pojmů zvyk, neupřímnost, tělesný výraz, afektivní intencionalita a tělesné schéma vypracovává, jakým způsobem máme této „dvojznačnosti“ zkušenosti rozumět. Tato stať si klade za cíl představit klíčové pojmy Merleau-Pontyho raného výkladu psychoanalytického pojmu nevědomí. Dílčím úkolem je ukázat, jak se Merleau-Pontyho pojem neupřímnosti liší od téhož pojmu Sartrova a odlišit existenciální dvojznačnost od psychoanalytického pojmu předeterminace.
Merleau-Ponty’s attitude to psychoanalysis was ambiguous. On the one hand, he realized that the phenomena psychoanalysis deals with require to go beyond the area of act intentionality, and that, from a different angle, psychoanalysis addresses the same problem as Gestalt psychology, which played the central role in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project. On the other hand, he explicitly rejected the terms used by Freud for conveying his discoveries. Merleau-Ponty replaced unconscious mental contents, which act on conscious behavior, by ambiguous consciousness. In the Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception, he used the terms “habit,” “bad faith,” “bodily expression,” “affective intentionality,” and “body schema” to specify his notion of experiential “ambiguity.” This paper aims to present the key concepts of Merleau-Ponty’s early interpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious. A partial task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s concept of bad faith differs from that of Sartre, and to distinguish existential ambiguity from the psychoanalytic concept of overdetermination.
Cílem článku je vymezit pojem „pociťovaný smysl“, který do psychologie a psychoterapie zavedl E. ... more Cílem článku je vymezit pojem „pociťovaný smysl“, který do psychologie a psychoterapie zavedl E. T. Gendlin, tak aby se objasnil jeho vztah k tělesným počitkům a jeho odlišnost od emocí. Gendlinova vlastní definice, podle níž je pociťovaný smysl pojmově vágním tělesným pocitem s implicitním významem, je pro tento úkol příliš obecná. Gendlinova definice je ve článku upřesněna poukazem jednak na různé vrstvy vědomí tělesných pocitů, jednak na rozdíl mezi tělesnou přípravou k jednání a motivací k jednání. Podle upřesněné definice je pociťovaný smysl vědomím připravenosti k jednání nesené konfigurací tělesných počitků. Proti emocím se liší tím, že jednání, na které připravuje, není schopen sám motivovat. Článek též rozebírá intuici, která vedla Gendlina k založení vlastní psychoterapeutické techniky, a srovnává ji s psychoanalytickým pojetím propracování odporu během terapie.
The paper aims to define the concept of “felt sense”, introduced in psychology and psychotherapy by E. T. Gendlin, in order to clarify its relation to bodily sensations and its difference from emotions. Gendlin’s own definition, according to which the felt sense is a conceptually vague bodily feeling with implicit meaning, is too general for this task. Gendlin’s definition is specified by pointing out, first, the different layers of awareness of bodily feelings and, second, the difference between bodily readiness for action and motivation for action. According to the more precise definition, the felt sense is the awareness of readiness to act carried by the configuration of bodily sensations. The felt sense differs from emotions because it is not able to motivate the action for which it makes us ready. The article also discusses the intuition that led to the founding of Gendlin’s psychotherapeutic technique and compares it with the psychoanalytic concept of working through resistance during therapy.
Studie ukazuje rozdílné přístupy k tvořivosti, tj. vzniku nového významu, u Merleau-Pontyho a Pat... more Studie ukazuje rozdílné přístupy k tvořivosti, tj. vzniku nového významu, u Merleau-Pontyho a Patočky. Srovnání je vedeno především na základě na Merleau-Pontyho přednášek L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) a Patočkova projektu Negativní platonismus (1953). Navzdory některým podobnostem se klíčové pojmy " založení " a " transcendence " rozhodujícím způsobem liší v otázce časového rozměru tvorby. Zatímco Merleau-Ponty přirovnává časovost založení k předbudoucímu času, čímž zdůrazňuje proplétání přítomných a budoucích událostí, Patočka vykládá novost jako něco naprosto odlišného od přítomného stavu světa. Z jeho pohledu se otázka, jak může vzniknout něco nového, rovná otázce, jak lze dosáhnout odstupu od dosavadní tradice. Oproti tomu Merleau-Ponty vychází z toho, že jakákoli živá tradice směřuje ke své vlastní proměně a překračuje sebe sama, neboť se řídí principem odchylky (écart). V závěru ukazujeme, že tyto dva přístupy se jednak vzájemně doplňují, jednak si vzájemně vykazují hranice.
The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty's lectures L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka's project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts " institution " and " transcendence " , there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence, because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other.
Puc, J. (2013). Das Selbstsein. Eine Kritik von Heideggers Begriff der eigentlichen Existenz. In ... more Puc, J. (2013). Das Selbstsein. Eine Kritik von Heideggers Begriff der eigentlichen Existenz. In Keiling, T. (Hrg.), Heideggers Marburger Zeit. Themen, Argumente, Konstellationen. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, S. 71–81.
Im folgenden Text wird es mir um zwei Begriffe des Selbstseins gehen, von denen der eine in Heideggers Sein und Zeit bei der Abgrenzung der authentischen Existenz des Menschen eine entscheidende Rolle spielt, während der andere in den Modus der Uneigentlichkeit abgeschoben wird. Ich werde den zentralen Begriff des frühen Heidegger – das Selbstsein – nehmen, um zu zeigen, dass sich hinter seiner Individualitätstheorie eine Entscheidung für einen bestimmten Identitätsbegriff verbirgt. Weiterhin möchte ich eine Alternative bieten, die potentiellen Einwänden von der Heideggerschen Position aus standhalten kann, und in der Abschlussüberlegung zeigen, dass es für die Bestimmung der menschlichen Existenz notwendig ist, zwei verschiedene Begriffe des Selbstseins ins Spiel zu bringen.
Vliv všímavosti na afektivitu. Fenomenologický výklad buddhistické meditace vipassanā Jan Puc Stu... more Vliv všímavosti na afektivitu. Fenomenologický výklad buddhistické meditace vipassanā Jan Puc Studie se zabývá vztahem mezi kultivací pozornosti v buddhistické meditaci vipassanā a fenomenologickou teorií afektivity. Nejprve stručně popisuje způsob, jakým meditace rozvíjí všímavost. Poté tuto zkušenost uchopuje z hlediska Husserlovy teorie pasívní konstituce. V závěru charakterizuje všímavost s ohledem na hranici mezi aktivitou a pasivitou lidského bytí ve světě. The paper shows connection between the cultivation of attention in Buddhist meditation vipassanā and the phenomenological theory of affectivity. At first, it shortly describes the way how the praxis of meditation achieves progress of mindfulness. Then, this experience is interpreted from the point of view of Husserl's theory of passive constitution. Finally, it describes mindfulness in terms of the boundary between activity and passivity of human being in the world.
Předmluva z knihy: Gendlin, E. T.: Dialog s prožíváním. Tělo a rozumění v psychoterapii a mimo ni... more Předmluva z knihy: Gendlin, E. T.: Dialog s prožíváním. Tělo a rozumění v psychoterapii a mimo ni [Dialogue with Experiencing. Body and Understanding in the psychotherapy and beyond]. Přel. J. Puc a F. Žitník, Praha: Ježek, 2016. 188 s.
Foreword to: Gendlin, E. T.: Dialog s prožíváním. Tělo a rozumění v psychoterapii a mimo ni [Dialogue with Experiencing. Body and Understanding in the psychotherapy and beyond]. Trans. to Czech J. Puc a F. Žitník, Prague: Ježek, 2016. 188 p.
Kniha Dialog s prožíváním přibližuje základní pilíře Gendlinova uvažování o terapii a životě. Tém... more Kniha Dialog s prožíváním přibližuje základní pilíře Gendlinova uvažování o terapii a životě. Tématem jejích tří částí se postupně stává řada otázek: Co obnáší terapeutická změna? Jestliže je možné, aby se díky terapii změnilo prožívání člověka, jaké teoretické důsledky lze z toho vyvodit pro obecný psychologický model osobnosti? Co se vlastně skrývá pod výrazem „nevědomí“, kterým od Freuda označujeme oblast „vytěsněných prožitků“? Jak mluvit o prožitcích, pro které nám chybí slova? A jak máme rozumět vzrůstajícímu zájmu veřejnosti o prožívání a vnitřní psychické procesy? Lze s vlastním proměnlivým prožíváním navázat kontakt, nebo s ním dokonce vést dialog? The book expounds basic ideas of E. Gendlin concerning psychotherapy and life. Its three parts are focused on these questions: What is the nature of the therapeutic change? If it is possible to change one’s experiencing by the means of a successful therapy, what theoretical consequences can be drawn for a general psychological model of personality? What is the actual referent of the term “unconscious”, by which we, since Freud, label the area of “repressed experiences”? How can we speak about experiences which we lack words for? And what does the rising public interest in personal experiencing and psychic processes stand for? Can we be in contact with our own changing experiencing, or even lead a dialogue with it?
Mindfulness' is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought to... more Mindfulness' is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought to contemporary Western psychology. However, whilst mindfulness was already an ambiguous term in the original context, specified more by a set of practices than by a clear definition, its cross-cultural transmission has blurred its content even further. In this paper, I assess the recent criticism of the widespread definition of mindfulness as non-elaborative, purely receptive 'bare attention '. According to the critics of bare attention, what can be characterized as purely receptive is the automatic turning of attention toward an object. But should mindfulness be a quality of consciousness that is to be established and developed by the reflexive practice of meditation, it must be something more than this automatic turning of attention. This paper shows how the definition of mindful ness as bare attention can be defended by explicating it in terms of the phenomenological model of attention.
Puc, J. (2013). Das Selbstsein. Eine Kritik von Heideggers Begriff der eigentlichen Existenz. In ... more Puc, J. (2013). Das Selbstsein. Eine Kritik von Heideggers Begriff der eigentlichen Existenz. In Keiling, T. (Hrg.), Heideggers Marburger Zeit. Themen, Argumente, Konstellationen. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, S. 71–81. Im folgenden Text wird es mir um zwei Begriffe des Selbstseins gehen, von denen der eine in Heideggers Sein und Zeit bei der Abgrenzung der authentischen Existenz des Menschen eine entscheidende Rolle spielt, während der andere in den Modus der Uneigentlichkeit abgeschoben wird. Ich werde den zentralen Begriff des frühen Heidegger – das Selbstsein – nehmen, um zu zeigen, dass sich hinter seiner Individualitätstheorie eine Entscheidung für einen bestimmten Identitätsbegriff verbirgt. Weiterhin möchte ich eine Alternative bieten, die potentiellen Einwänden von der Heideggerschen Position aus standhalten kann, und in der Abschlussüberlegung zeigen, dass es für die Bestimmung der menschlichen Existenz notwendig ist, zwei verschiedene Begriffe des Selbstseins ins Spiel zu bringen.
This article addresses the function of the felt body in focusing-oriented psychotherapy. Focusing... more This article addresses the function of the felt body in focusing-oriented psychotherapy. Focusing, as defined by its founder Eugene T. Gendlin, innovated the person-centered approach with procedures attending to the bodily “felt sense” of the client’s situation. In a recent series of texts, Campbell Purton questioned the bodily nature of a felt sense, which in his opinion results from a misconception about emotions and language. This article aims to assess the extent to which Purton’s critique is cogent and where, on the contrary, it misses the presence and function of the body in psychotherapy. It is argued that contemporary phenomenological and neo-Jamesian theories of emotions offer ample means of defending the bodily nature of feelings.
The paper shows connection between the cultivation of attention in Buddhist meditation vipassanā ... more The paper shows connection between the cultivation of attention in Buddhist meditation vipassanā and the phenomenological theory of affectivity. At first, it shortly describes the way how the praxis of meditation achieves progress of mindfulness. Then, this experience is interpreted from the point of view of Husserl's theory of passive constitution. Finally, it describes mindfulness in terms of the boundary between activity and passivity of human being in the world.
The Unconscious as Ambiguous Consciousness. Merleau-Ponty on Psychoanalysis Merleau-Ponty’s attit... more The Unconscious as Ambiguous Consciousness. Merleau-Ponty on Psychoanalysis Merleau-Ponty’s attitude to psychoanalysis was ambiguous. On the one hand, he realized that the phenomena psychoanalysis deals with require to go beyond the area of act intentionality, and that, from a different angle, psychoanalysis addresses the same problem as Gestalt psychology, which played the central role in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project. On the other hand, he explicitly rejected the terms used by Freud for conveying his discoveries. Merleau-Ponty replaced unconscious mental contents, which act on conscious behavior, by ambiguous consciousness. In the Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception, he used the terms “habit,” “bad faith,” “bodily expression,” “affective intentionality,” and “body schema” to specify his notion of experiential “ambiguity.” This paper aims to present the key concepts of Merleau-Ponty’s early interpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious....
Studie ukazuje rozdílné přístupy k tvořivosti, tj. vzniku nového významu, u Merleau-Pontyho a Pat... more Studie ukazuje rozdílné přístupy k tvořivosti, tj. vzniku nového významu, u Merleau-Pontyho a Patočky. Srovnání je vedeno především na základě na Merleau-Pontyho přednášek L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) a Patočkova projektu Negativní platonismus (1953). Navzdory některým podobnostem se klíčové pojmy " založení " a " transcendence " rozhodujícím způsobem liší v otázce časového rozměru tvorby. Zatímco Merleau-Ponty přirovnává časovost založení k předbudoucímu času, čímž zdůrazňuje proplétání přítomných a budoucích událostí, Patočka vykládá novost jako něco naprosto odlišného od přítomného stavu světa. Z jeho pohledu se otázka, jak může vzniknout něco nového, rovná otázce, jak lze dosáhnout odstupu od dosavadní tradice. Oproti tomu Merleau-Ponty vychází z toho, že jakákoli živá tradice směřuje ke své vlastní proměně a překračuje sebe sama, neboť se řídí principem odchylky (écart). V závěru ukazujeme, že tyto dva přístupy se jednak vzájemně doplňují, jednak si vzájemně vykazují hranice. The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty's lectures L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka's project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts " institution " and " transcendence " , there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence, because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other.
This paper addresses the question as to whether the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious is ... more This paper addresses the question as to whether the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious is compatible with the phenomenological notion of consciousness defined as self-awareness. This problem is approached by explicating various concepts that Merleau-Ponty used in his attempts at a reinterpretation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. At first, the paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty' s position in the Phenomenology of Perception, which is specified by the concepts of bad faith, institution and body schema. After that, it is explained what are the implications of Merleau-Ponty' s late conceptions of primordial symbolism and embodied intersubjectivity for the problem of the unconscious and its manifestation in the consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6): 170-190, 2019
'Mindfulness' is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought t... more 'Mindfulness' is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought to contemporary Western psychology. However, whilst mindfulness was already an ambiguous term in the original context, specified more by a set of practices than by a clear definition, its cross-cultural transmission has blurred its content even further. In this paper, I assess the recent criticism of the widespread definition of mindfulness as non-elaborative, purely receptive 'bare attention'. According to the critics of bare attention, what can be characterized as purely receptive is the automatic turning of attention toward an object. But should mindfulness be a quality of consciousness that is to be established and developed by the reflexive practice of meditation, it must be something more than this automatic turning of attention. This paper shows how the definition of mindfulness as bare attention can be defended by explicating it in terms of the phenomenological model of attention.
Merleau-Pontyho postoj k psychoanalýze byl dvojznačný. Na jedné straně si uvědomoval, že fenomény... more Merleau-Pontyho postoj k psychoanalýze byl dvojznačný. Na jedné straně si uvědomoval, že fenomény, jimiž se psychoanalýza zabývá, si žádají překročit oblast aktové intencionality a psychoanalýza tak z jiného úhlu míří na tentýž problém jako tvarová psychologie, jež hrála v Merleau-Pontyho filozofickém projektu ústřední roli. Na druhé straně explicitně odmítal pojmy, jimiž Freud své objevy popsal. Namísto nevědomých duševních obsahů, které působí na vědomé chování, navrhl Merleau-Ponty dosadit dvojznačné vědomí. Ve Struktuře chování a Fenomenologii vnímání pak pomocí pojmů zvyk, neupřímnost, tělesný výraz, afektivní intencionalita a tělesné schéma vypracovává, jakým způsobem máme této „dvojznačnosti“ zkušenosti rozumět. Tato stať si klade za cíl představit klíčové pojmy Merleau-Pontyho raného výkladu psychoanalytického pojmu nevědomí. Dílčím úkolem je ukázat, jak se Merleau-Pontyho pojem neupřímnosti liší od téhož pojmu Sartrova a odlišit existenciální dvojznačnost od psychoanalytického pojmu předeterminace.
Merleau-Ponty’s attitude to psychoanalysis was ambiguous. On the one hand, he realized that the phenomena psychoanalysis deals with require to go beyond the area of act intentionality, and that, from a different angle, psychoanalysis addresses the same problem as Gestalt psychology, which played the central role in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project. On the other hand, he explicitly rejected the terms used by Freud for conveying his discoveries. Merleau-Ponty replaced unconscious mental contents, which act on conscious behavior, by ambiguous consciousness. In the Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception, he used the terms “habit,” “bad faith,” “bodily expression,” “affective intentionality,” and “body schema” to specify his notion of experiential “ambiguity.” This paper aims to present the key concepts of Merleau-Ponty’s early interpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious. A partial task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s concept of bad faith differs from that of Sartre, and to distinguish existential ambiguity from the psychoanalytic concept of overdetermination.
Cílem článku je vymezit pojem „pociťovaný smysl“, který do psychologie a psychoterapie zavedl E. ... more Cílem článku je vymezit pojem „pociťovaný smysl“, který do psychologie a psychoterapie zavedl E. T. Gendlin, tak aby se objasnil jeho vztah k tělesným počitkům a jeho odlišnost od emocí. Gendlinova vlastní definice, podle níž je pociťovaný smysl pojmově vágním tělesným pocitem s implicitním významem, je pro tento úkol příliš obecná. Gendlinova definice je ve článku upřesněna poukazem jednak na různé vrstvy vědomí tělesných pocitů, jednak na rozdíl mezi tělesnou přípravou k jednání a motivací k jednání. Podle upřesněné definice je pociťovaný smysl vědomím připravenosti k jednání nesené konfigurací tělesných počitků. Proti emocím se liší tím, že jednání, na které připravuje, není schopen sám motivovat. Článek též rozebírá intuici, která vedla Gendlina k založení vlastní psychoterapeutické techniky, a srovnává ji s psychoanalytickým pojetím propracování odporu během terapie.
The paper aims to define the concept of “felt sense”, introduced in psychology and psychotherapy by E. T. Gendlin, in order to clarify its relation to bodily sensations and its difference from emotions. Gendlin’s own definition, according to which the felt sense is a conceptually vague bodily feeling with implicit meaning, is too general for this task. Gendlin’s definition is specified by pointing out, first, the different layers of awareness of bodily feelings and, second, the difference between bodily readiness for action and motivation for action. According to the more precise definition, the felt sense is the awareness of readiness to act carried by the configuration of bodily sensations. The felt sense differs from emotions because it is not able to motivate the action for which it makes us ready. The article also discusses the intuition that led to the founding of Gendlin’s psychotherapeutic technique and compares it with the psychoanalytic concept of working through resistance during therapy.
Studie ukazuje rozdílné přístupy k tvořivosti, tj. vzniku nového významu, u Merleau-Pontyho a Pat... more Studie ukazuje rozdílné přístupy k tvořivosti, tj. vzniku nového významu, u Merleau-Pontyho a Patočky. Srovnání je vedeno především na základě na Merleau-Pontyho přednášek L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) a Patočkova projektu Negativní platonismus (1953). Navzdory některým podobnostem se klíčové pojmy " založení " a " transcendence " rozhodujícím způsobem liší v otázce časového rozměru tvorby. Zatímco Merleau-Ponty přirovnává časovost založení k předbudoucímu času, čímž zdůrazňuje proplétání přítomných a budoucích událostí, Patočka vykládá novost jako něco naprosto odlišného od přítomného stavu světa. Z jeho pohledu se otázka, jak může vzniknout něco nového, rovná otázce, jak lze dosáhnout odstupu od dosavadní tradice. Oproti tomu Merleau-Ponty vychází z toho, že jakákoli živá tradice směřuje ke své vlastní proměně a překračuje sebe sama, neboť se řídí principem odchylky (écart). V závěru ukazujeme, že tyto dva přístupy se jednak vzájemně doplňují, jednak si vzájemně vykazují hranice.
The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty's lectures L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka's project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts " institution " and " transcendence " , there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence, because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other.
Puc, J. (2013). Das Selbstsein. Eine Kritik von Heideggers Begriff der eigentlichen Existenz. In ... more Puc, J. (2013). Das Selbstsein. Eine Kritik von Heideggers Begriff der eigentlichen Existenz. In Keiling, T. (Hrg.), Heideggers Marburger Zeit. Themen, Argumente, Konstellationen. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, S. 71–81.
Im folgenden Text wird es mir um zwei Begriffe des Selbstseins gehen, von denen der eine in Heideggers Sein und Zeit bei der Abgrenzung der authentischen Existenz des Menschen eine entscheidende Rolle spielt, während der andere in den Modus der Uneigentlichkeit abgeschoben wird. Ich werde den zentralen Begriff des frühen Heidegger – das Selbstsein – nehmen, um zu zeigen, dass sich hinter seiner Individualitätstheorie eine Entscheidung für einen bestimmten Identitätsbegriff verbirgt. Weiterhin möchte ich eine Alternative bieten, die potentiellen Einwänden von der Heideggerschen Position aus standhalten kann, und in der Abschlussüberlegung zeigen, dass es für die Bestimmung der menschlichen Existenz notwendig ist, zwei verschiedene Begriffe des Selbstseins ins Spiel zu bringen.
Vliv všímavosti na afektivitu. Fenomenologický výklad buddhistické meditace vipassanā Jan Puc Stu... more Vliv všímavosti na afektivitu. Fenomenologický výklad buddhistické meditace vipassanā Jan Puc Studie se zabývá vztahem mezi kultivací pozornosti v buddhistické meditaci vipassanā a fenomenologickou teorií afektivity. Nejprve stručně popisuje způsob, jakým meditace rozvíjí všímavost. Poté tuto zkušenost uchopuje z hlediska Husserlovy teorie pasívní konstituce. V závěru charakterizuje všímavost s ohledem na hranici mezi aktivitou a pasivitou lidského bytí ve světě. The paper shows connection between the cultivation of attention in Buddhist meditation vipassanā and the phenomenological theory of affectivity. At first, it shortly describes the way how the praxis of meditation achieves progress of mindfulness. Then, this experience is interpreted from the point of view of Husserl's theory of passive constitution. Finally, it describes mindfulness in terms of the boundary between activity and passivity of human being in the world.
Předmluva z knihy: Gendlin, E. T.: Dialog s prožíváním. Tělo a rozumění v psychoterapii a mimo ni... more Předmluva z knihy: Gendlin, E. T.: Dialog s prožíváním. Tělo a rozumění v psychoterapii a mimo ni [Dialogue with Experiencing. Body and Understanding in the psychotherapy and beyond]. Přel. J. Puc a F. Žitník, Praha: Ježek, 2016. 188 s.
Foreword to: Gendlin, E. T.: Dialog s prožíváním. Tělo a rozumění v psychoterapii a mimo ni [Dialogue with Experiencing. Body and Understanding in the psychotherapy and beyond]. Trans. to Czech J. Puc a F. Žitník, Prague: Ježek, 2016. 188 p.
Kniha Dialog s prožíváním přibližuje základní pilíře Gendlinova uvažování o terapii a životě. Tém... more Kniha Dialog s prožíváním přibližuje základní pilíře Gendlinova uvažování o terapii a životě. Tématem jejích tří částí se postupně stává řada otázek: Co obnáší terapeutická změna? Jestliže je možné, aby se díky terapii změnilo prožívání člověka, jaké teoretické důsledky lze z toho vyvodit pro obecný psychologický model osobnosti? Co se vlastně skrývá pod výrazem „nevědomí“, kterým od Freuda označujeme oblast „vytěsněných prožitků“? Jak mluvit o prožitcích, pro které nám chybí slova? A jak máme rozumět vzrůstajícímu zájmu veřejnosti o prožívání a vnitřní psychické procesy? Lze s vlastním proměnlivým prožíváním navázat kontakt, nebo s ním dokonce vést dialog? The book expounds basic ideas of E. Gendlin concerning psychotherapy and life. Its three parts are focused on these questions: What is the nature of the therapeutic change? If it is possible to change one’s experiencing by the means of a successful therapy, what theoretical consequences can be drawn for a general psychological model of personality? What is the actual referent of the term “unconscious”, by which we, since Freud, label the area of “repressed experiences”? How can we speak about experiences which we lack words for? And what does the rising public interest in personal experiencing and psychic processes stand for? Can we be in contact with our own changing experiencing, or even lead a dialogue with it?
Presentation at the annual ICNAP conference in Ramapo, 27 th May 2017
The aim of this presentati... more Presentation at the annual ICNAP conference in Ramapo, 27 th May 2017
The aim of this presentation is to show the connection between mindfulness, attention and affectivity. I will draw mainly from two sources: from a description of attention, as we find it in the phenomenology of E. Husserl, and from the technique of refinement of mindfulness, as it is practiced in Buddhist meditation vipassana. I will attempt to grasp the meditation in phenomenological concepts and show how far they are applicable to it. The questions are: how much can mindfulness be accounted for by means of Husserlian phenomenology, and potentially what would Husserl have added, had he himself meditated? The presentation has three parts. The beginning of the investigation will be the so-called 'operational definition' of mindfulness, proposed by J. Kabat-Sinn. Firstly, I will comment on the definition of mindfulness and I will show that mindfulness is not an unequivocal term. Secondly, I will present the phenomenological model of attention, with special focus on the term " affection ". Thirdly, I will describe meditation vipassana in phenomenological terms and show the point that Husserl did not take into account.
What is the ludic stance, i.e. playfulness? And is it desirable for us to adopt it in the real wo... more What is the ludic stance, i.e. playfulness? And is it desirable for us to adopt it in the real world? What can we learn about life by playing games? Originally a "no paper lecture" at conference "Playful communication", Prague 2016 Sept. 16th-18th.
We invite conference paper submissions that explore historical, methodological, and systematic li... more We invite conference paper submissions that explore historical, methodological, and systematic links between enactivism and phenomenology.
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Papers by Jan Puc
Merleau-Ponty’s attitude to psychoanalysis was ambiguous. On the one hand, he realized that the phenomena psychoanalysis deals with require to go beyond the area of act intentionality, and that, from a different angle, psychoanalysis addresses the same problem as Gestalt psychology, which played the central role in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project. On the other hand, he explicitly rejected the terms used by Freud for conveying his discoveries. Merleau-Ponty replaced unconscious mental contents, which act on conscious behavior, by ambiguous consciousness. In the Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception, he used the terms “habit,” “bad faith,” “bodily expression,” “affective intentionality,” and “body schema” to specify his notion of experiential “ambiguity.” This paper aims to present the key concepts of Merleau-Ponty’s early interpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious. A partial task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s concept of bad faith differs from that of Sartre, and to distinguish existential ambiguity from the psychoanalytic concept of overdetermination.
The paper aims to define the concept of “felt sense”, introduced in psychology and psychotherapy by E. T. Gendlin, in order to clarify its relation to bodily sensations and its difference from emotions. Gendlin’s own definition, according to which the felt sense is a conceptually vague bodily feeling with implicit meaning, is too general for this task. Gendlin’s definition is specified by pointing out, first, the different layers of awareness of bodily feelings and, second, the difference between bodily readiness for action and motivation for action. According to the more precise definition, the felt sense is the awareness of readiness to act carried by the configuration of bodily sensations. The felt sense differs from emotions because it is not able to motivate the action for which it makes us ready. The article also discusses the intuition that led to the founding of Gendlin’s psychotherapeutic technique and compares it with the psychoanalytic concept of working through resistance during therapy.
The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty's lectures L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka's project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts " institution " and " transcendence " , there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence, because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other.
Im folgenden Text wird es mir um zwei Begriffe des Selbstseins gehen, von denen der eine in Heideggers Sein und Zeit bei der Abgrenzung der authentischen Existenz des Menschen eine entscheidende Rolle spielt, während der andere in den Modus der Uneigentlichkeit abgeschoben wird. Ich werde den zentralen Begriff des frühen Heidegger – das Selbstsein – nehmen, um zu zeigen, dass sich hinter seiner Individualitätstheorie eine Entscheidung für einen bestimmten Identitätsbegriff verbirgt. Weiterhin möchte ich eine Alternative bieten, die potentiellen Einwänden von der Heideggerschen Position aus standhalten kann, und in der Abschlussüberlegung zeigen, dass es für die Bestimmung der menschlichen Existenz notwendig ist, zwei verschiedene Begriffe des Selbstseins ins Spiel zu bringen.
The paper shows connection between the cultivation of attention in Buddhist meditation vipassanā and the phenomenological theory of affectivity. At first, it shortly describes the way how the praxis of meditation achieves progress of mindfulness. Then, this experience is interpreted from the point of view of Husserl's theory of passive constitution. Finally, it describes mindfulness in terms of the boundary between activity and passivity of human being in the world.
Books by Jan Puc
Foreword to: Gendlin, E. T.: Dialog s prožíváním. Tělo a rozumění v psychoterapii a mimo ni [Dialogue with Experiencing. Body and Understanding in the psychotherapy and beyond]. Trans. to Czech J. Puc a F. Žitník, Prague: Ježek, 2016. 188 p.
The book expounds basic ideas of E. Gendlin concerning psychotherapy and life. Its three parts are focused on these questions: What is the nature of the therapeutic change? If it is possible to change one’s experiencing by the means of a successful therapy, what theoretical consequences can be drawn for a general psychological model of personality? What is the actual referent of the term “unconscious”, by which we, since Freud, label the area of “repressed experiences”? How can we speak about experiences which we lack words for? And what does the rising public interest in personal experiencing and psychic processes stand for? Can we be in contact with our own changing experiencing, or even lead a dialogue with it?
Merleau-Ponty’s attitude to psychoanalysis was ambiguous. On the one hand, he realized that the phenomena psychoanalysis deals with require to go beyond the area of act intentionality, and that, from a different angle, psychoanalysis addresses the same problem as Gestalt psychology, which played the central role in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project. On the other hand, he explicitly rejected the terms used by Freud for conveying his discoveries. Merleau-Ponty replaced unconscious mental contents, which act on conscious behavior, by ambiguous consciousness. In the Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception, he used the terms “habit,” “bad faith,” “bodily expression,” “affective intentionality,” and “body schema” to specify his notion of experiential “ambiguity.” This paper aims to present the key concepts of Merleau-Ponty’s early interpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious. A partial task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s concept of bad faith differs from that of Sartre, and to distinguish existential ambiguity from the psychoanalytic concept of overdetermination.
The paper aims to define the concept of “felt sense”, introduced in psychology and psychotherapy by E. T. Gendlin, in order to clarify its relation to bodily sensations and its difference from emotions. Gendlin’s own definition, according to which the felt sense is a conceptually vague bodily feeling with implicit meaning, is too general for this task. Gendlin’s definition is specified by pointing out, first, the different layers of awareness of bodily feelings and, second, the difference between bodily readiness for action and motivation for action. According to the more precise definition, the felt sense is the awareness of readiness to act carried by the configuration of bodily sensations. The felt sense differs from emotions because it is not able to motivate the action for which it makes us ready. The article also discusses the intuition that led to the founding of Gendlin’s psychotherapeutic technique and compares it with the psychoanalytic concept of working through resistance during therapy.
The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty's lectures L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka's project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts " institution " and " transcendence " , there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence, because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other.
Im folgenden Text wird es mir um zwei Begriffe des Selbstseins gehen, von denen der eine in Heideggers Sein und Zeit bei der Abgrenzung der authentischen Existenz des Menschen eine entscheidende Rolle spielt, während der andere in den Modus der Uneigentlichkeit abgeschoben wird. Ich werde den zentralen Begriff des frühen Heidegger – das Selbstsein – nehmen, um zu zeigen, dass sich hinter seiner Individualitätstheorie eine Entscheidung für einen bestimmten Identitätsbegriff verbirgt. Weiterhin möchte ich eine Alternative bieten, die potentiellen Einwänden von der Heideggerschen Position aus standhalten kann, und in der Abschlussüberlegung zeigen, dass es für die Bestimmung der menschlichen Existenz notwendig ist, zwei verschiedene Begriffe des Selbstseins ins Spiel zu bringen.
The paper shows connection between the cultivation of attention in Buddhist meditation vipassanā and the phenomenological theory of affectivity. At first, it shortly describes the way how the praxis of meditation achieves progress of mindfulness. Then, this experience is interpreted from the point of view of Husserl's theory of passive constitution. Finally, it describes mindfulness in terms of the boundary between activity and passivity of human being in the world.
Foreword to: Gendlin, E. T.: Dialog s prožíváním. Tělo a rozumění v psychoterapii a mimo ni [Dialogue with Experiencing. Body and Understanding in the psychotherapy and beyond]. Trans. to Czech J. Puc a F. Žitník, Prague: Ježek, 2016. 188 p.
The book expounds basic ideas of E. Gendlin concerning psychotherapy and life. Its three parts are focused on these questions: What is the nature of the therapeutic change? If it is possible to change one’s experiencing by the means of a successful therapy, what theoretical consequences can be drawn for a general psychological model of personality? What is the actual referent of the term “unconscious”, by which we, since Freud, label the area of “repressed experiences”? How can we speak about experiences which we lack words for? And what does the rising public interest in personal experiencing and psychic processes stand for? Can we be in contact with our own changing experiencing, or even lead a dialogue with it?
The aim of this presentation is to show the connection between mindfulness, attention and affectivity. I will draw mainly from two sources: from a description of attention, as we find it in the phenomenology of E. Husserl, and from the technique of refinement of mindfulness, as it is practiced in Buddhist meditation vipassana. I will attempt to grasp the meditation in phenomenological concepts and show how far they are applicable to it. The questions are: how much can mindfulness be accounted for by means of Husserlian phenomenology, and potentially what would Husserl have added, had he himself meditated? The presentation has three parts. The beginning of the investigation will be the so-called 'operational definition' of mindfulness, proposed by J. Kabat-Sinn. Firstly, I will comment on the definition of mindfulness and I will show that mindfulness is not an unequivocal term. Secondly, I will present the phenomenological model of attention, with special focus on the term " affection ". Thirdly, I will describe meditation vipassana in phenomenological terms and show the point that Husserl did not take into account.
Originally a "no paper lecture" at conference "Playful communication", Prague 2016 Sept. 16th-18th.