To judge by the title, one would expect that interpretations of the Critique of Pure Reason would... more To judge by the title, one would expect that interpretations of the Critique of Pure Reason would prioritize the division of the book most about reason and its critique: The Transcendental Dialectic. But the Dialectic is surprisingly secondary in the most established interpretive approaches. This article argues as follows: There is a problem that contributes to explaining the lack of popularity: The problem of how arguments really based in the Dialectic itself really promise to ground a broader project in theoretical philosophy, of the scope of the Critique. But the problem can be solved: One aim important in the critique is critical argument against rationalist metaphysics. The Dialectic must play a central role in such critique, given a difficulty concerning begging the question. The positive claims of the Dialectic, about reason and the unconditioned, are necessary for such an argument, and the Dialectic gives them enough defense for that purpose. Finally, there are reasons to ta...
For the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Brittan I am much indebted to Franz Knappik and Ro... more For the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Brittan I am much indebted to Franz Knappik and Robert Stern for their generous attention to my work and their thoughtful arguments. 1 I have learned a great deal from this and many other exchanges with both of them, and I am happy to have this opportunity to acknowledge the debt. In my response, I don't want to let the generous spirit of what they write distract us from the considerable force of their worries-or from the considerable appeal of their counter-proposals. So I will here focus on these worries and proposals, trying to explain why I will-at least for nowmostly stick with the position I defend in Reason in the World. 1 I also want to thank Tobias Rosefeldt for hosting the book symposium at which these papers were presented, at the Lehrstuhl für Klassische Deutsche Philosophie of the Humboldt University.
medieval thought has exerted a strong infl uence. This omission appears to have resulted from the... more medieval thought has exerted a strong infl uence. This omission appears to have resulted from the editorial decision to spread discussion of issues in philosophy of religion over various chapters (analogous language in Ashworth, the existence of God in Menn, eternity and foreknowledge and necessity in Marenbon, creation in Sylla and Dobbs-Weinstein). This was not, in my opinion, a good idea. So important an intersection between medieval and contemporary thought as philosophy of religion deserved its own chapter, where the reader could readily fi nd an account of medieval treatments not only of the topics just mentioned but also of the nature of faith, the divine attributes, the problem of evil, and so forth.
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, 2008
Hegel accords great philosophical importance to Kant's discussions of Au: James on Table of Conte... more Hegel accords great philosophical importance to Kant's discussions of Au: James on Table of Contents? Which do you prefer? teleology and biology in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, and yet also disagrees with Kant's central conclusions there. 1 More specifically, Kant argues for a generally skeptical view of teleological explanation 1 In citing works, the following abbreviations have been used: HEGEL: Most writings are contained in the Werke in zwanzig Bände, ed. by E. Moldenhauer und K. Michel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970-1971. The first references to these writings are by volume: page in that edition. The exception is that I cite the Encyclopedia by § §number, with "A" indicating Anmerkung and "Z" indicating the Zusatz; where helpful I also add after a "/" a citation from Werke. I indicate individual works using the abbreviations below.
Hegel seeks to overturn Kant's conclusion that our knowledge is restricted, or that we cannot hav... more Hegel seeks to overturn Kant's conclusion that our knowledge is restricted, or that we cannot have knowledge of things as they are in themselves. Understanding this Hegelian ambition requires distinguishing two Kantian characterizations of our epistemic limits: First, we can have knowledge only within the "bounds of experience." Second, we cannot have knowledge of objects that would be accessible only to a divine intellectual intuition, even though the faculty of reason requires us to conceive of such objects. Hegel aims to drive a wedge between these two characterizations, showing that we can have knowledge beyond Kant's bounds of experience, yet without need of divine intuition. And attention to such knowledge is supposed to show that we have no legitimate need to even conceive of divine intuition and its objects-and no need to conclude that our own knowledge is restricted by comparison, or that we cannot know things as they are in themselves. I focus here on the initial case Hegel uses to introduce this extended argument strategy: we can have more knowledge of natural kinds and laws than would be allowed by Kant's bounds of experience. Recent work on Hegel lacks consensus concerning the central ambitions of his mature project in theoretical philosophy. It is at least widely agreed that Hegel's ambitions are closely tied to his rejection of Kant's famous claim about our epistemic limits: Kant denies that we can have theoretical knowledge of things as they are in themselves; Hegel seeks, in response, to show that our knowledge is not restricted or limited in Kant's sense. But there is a surprising divergence between two recently popular approaches to this central Hegelian ambition.
Kant has a distinctive account of the particular laws of nature, such as the laws concerning what... more Kant has a distinctive account of the particular laws of nature, such as the laws concerning what causes what. His account is a surprising package view: restrictive inflationism. It includes a simple inflationary account of what particular laws of nature are: they are ways in which the natures of different kinds of things necessitate what the things do. And it restricts our knowledge: outside of a special kind of exceptional case, we cannot achieve knowledge, but can only increasingly approximate knowledge of the particular laws of nature. I argue that this unusual combination brings some surprising philosophical advantages, from which we can learn about otherwise hidden features of the philosophical terrain underlying continuing debates about the laws of nature.
Hegel criticizes mechanistic explanation in both versions of his Science of Logic,1 assigning it ... more Hegel criticizes mechanistic explanation in both versions of his Science of Logic,1 assigning it a subordinate or inferior status: teleology, he says, is 'the truth of mechanism' (WL 6:437-8/735 ). As always with Hegel, the meaning of this claim is not immediately and transparently ...
Recent debates about Hegel's theoretical philosophy are marked by a surprising lack of agreem... more Recent debates about Hegel's theoretical philosophy are marked by a surprising lack of agreement, extending all the way down to the most basic question:what is Hegel talking about?On the one hand, proponents of ‘metaphysical’ interpretations generally read Hegel as aiming to articulate the overall structure or organisation of reality itself, and the nature of a highest or most fundamental being. Particularly influential is the idea that Hegel is reviving and modifying a form of Spinoza's metaphysical monism, according to which the organised whole of everything is the highest being, providing a ground or reason for everything real. On the other hand, proponents of ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretations argue Hegel's topic is something else entirely. The idea is that Hegel agrees with Kant in finding pre-critical forms of metaphysics to be uncritical or dogmatic. And the topic of Hegel's positive project is supposed to be not the nature of reality itself, nor any most fund...
To judge by the title, one would expect that interpretations of the Critique of Pure Reason would... more To judge by the title, one would expect that interpretations of the Critique of Pure Reason would prioritize the division of the book most about reason and its critique: The Transcendental Dialectic. But the Dialectic is surprisingly secondary in the most established interpretive approaches. This article argues as follows: There is a problem that contributes to explaining the lack of popularity: The problem of how arguments really based in the Dialectic itself really promise to ground a broader project in theoretical philosophy, of the scope of the Critique. But the problem can be solved: One aim important in the critique is critical argument against rationalist metaphysics. The Dialectic must play a central role in such critique, given a difficulty concerning begging the question. The positive claims of the Dialectic, about reason and the unconditioned, are necessary for such an argument, and the Dialectic gives them enough defense for that purpose. Finally, there are reasons to ta...
For the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Brittan I am much indebted to Franz Knappik and Ro... more For the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Brittan I am much indebted to Franz Knappik and Robert Stern for their generous attention to my work and their thoughtful arguments. 1 I have learned a great deal from this and many other exchanges with both of them, and I am happy to have this opportunity to acknowledge the debt. In my response, I don't want to let the generous spirit of what they write distract us from the considerable force of their worries-or from the considerable appeal of their counter-proposals. So I will here focus on these worries and proposals, trying to explain why I will-at least for nowmostly stick with the position I defend in Reason in the World. 1 I also want to thank Tobias Rosefeldt for hosting the book symposium at which these papers were presented, at the Lehrstuhl für Klassische Deutsche Philosophie of the Humboldt University.
medieval thought has exerted a strong infl uence. This omission appears to have resulted from the... more medieval thought has exerted a strong infl uence. This omission appears to have resulted from the editorial decision to spread discussion of issues in philosophy of religion over various chapters (analogous language in Ashworth, the existence of God in Menn, eternity and foreknowledge and necessity in Marenbon, creation in Sylla and Dobbs-Weinstein). This was not, in my opinion, a good idea. So important an intersection between medieval and contemporary thought as philosophy of religion deserved its own chapter, where the reader could readily fi nd an account of medieval treatments not only of the topics just mentioned but also of the nature of faith, the divine attributes, the problem of evil, and so forth.
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, 2008
Hegel accords great philosophical importance to Kant's discussions of Au: James on Table of Conte... more Hegel accords great philosophical importance to Kant's discussions of Au: James on Table of Contents? Which do you prefer? teleology and biology in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, and yet also disagrees with Kant's central conclusions there. 1 More specifically, Kant argues for a generally skeptical view of teleological explanation 1 In citing works, the following abbreviations have been used: HEGEL: Most writings are contained in the Werke in zwanzig Bände, ed. by E. Moldenhauer und K. Michel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970-1971. The first references to these writings are by volume: page in that edition. The exception is that I cite the Encyclopedia by § §number, with "A" indicating Anmerkung and "Z" indicating the Zusatz; where helpful I also add after a "/" a citation from Werke. I indicate individual works using the abbreviations below.
Hegel seeks to overturn Kant's conclusion that our knowledge is restricted, or that we cannot hav... more Hegel seeks to overturn Kant's conclusion that our knowledge is restricted, or that we cannot have knowledge of things as they are in themselves. Understanding this Hegelian ambition requires distinguishing two Kantian characterizations of our epistemic limits: First, we can have knowledge only within the "bounds of experience." Second, we cannot have knowledge of objects that would be accessible only to a divine intellectual intuition, even though the faculty of reason requires us to conceive of such objects. Hegel aims to drive a wedge between these two characterizations, showing that we can have knowledge beyond Kant's bounds of experience, yet without need of divine intuition. And attention to such knowledge is supposed to show that we have no legitimate need to even conceive of divine intuition and its objects-and no need to conclude that our own knowledge is restricted by comparison, or that we cannot know things as they are in themselves. I focus here on the initial case Hegel uses to introduce this extended argument strategy: we can have more knowledge of natural kinds and laws than would be allowed by Kant's bounds of experience. Recent work on Hegel lacks consensus concerning the central ambitions of his mature project in theoretical philosophy. It is at least widely agreed that Hegel's ambitions are closely tied to his rejection of Kant's famous claim about our epistemic limits: Kant denies that we can have theoretical knowledge of things as they are in themselves; Hegel seeks, in response, to show that our knowledge is not restricted or limited in Kant's sense. But there is a surprising divergence between two recently popular approaches to this central Hegelian ambition.
Kant has a distinctive account of the particular laws of nature, such as the laws concerning what... more Kant has a distinctive account of the particular laws of nature, such as the laws concerning what causes what. His account is a surprising package view: restrictive inflationism. It includes a simple inflationary account of what particular laws of nature are: they are ways in which the natures of different kinds of things necessitate what the things do. And it restricts our knowledge: outside of a special kind of exceptional case, we cannot achieve knowledge, but can only increasingly approximate knowledge of the particular laws of nature. I argue that this unusual combination brings some surprising philosophical advantages, from which we can learn about otherwise hidden features of the philosophical terrain underlying continuing debates about the laws of nature.
Hegel criticizes mechanistic explanation in both versions of his Science of Logic,1 assigning it ... more Hegel criticizes mechanistic explanation in both versions of his Science of Logic,1 assigning it a subordinate or inferior status: teleology, he says, is 'the truth of mechanism' (WL 6:437-8/735 ). As always with Hegel, the meaning of this claim is not immediately and transparently ...
Recent debates about Hegel's theoretical philosophy are marked by a surprising lack of agreem... more Recent debates about Hegel's theoretical philosophy are marked by a surprising lack of agreement, extending all the way down to the most basic question:what is Hegel talking about?On the one hand, proponents of ‘metaphysical’ interpretations generally read Hegel as aiming to articulate the overall structure or organisation of reality itself, and the nature of a highest or most fundamental being. Particularly influential is the idea that Hegel is reviving and modifying a form of Spinoza's metaphysical monism, according to which the organised whole of everything is the highest being, providing a ground or reason for everything real. On the other hand, proponents of ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretations argue Hegel's topic is something else entirely. The idea is that Hegel agrees with Kant in finding pre-critical forms of metaphysics to be uncritical or dogmatic. And the topic of Hegel's positive project is supposed to be not the nature of reality itself, nor any most fund...
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