Distributive egalitarianism rests on the idea of equal moral status of persons. Does it follow fr... more Distributive egalitarianism rests on the idea of equal moral status of persons. Does it follow from that idea directly, without reference to institution-based relations between persons? The answer of non-institutional theories is yes. The answer of institutional theories is no. This chapter argues that both theories are defective. Institutional l theories cannot deliver the principle of equal shares which is at the core of distributive egalitarianism. Non-institutional theories cannot determine what persons have a claim to equal shares of, nor can they identify the standard of equality. A two-level account will be proposed, non-institutional at the basic level, but with recourse to institution-regarding considerations at the next level. Since the scope of the principle of equal shares is fixed at the basic level, two-level theories have the same position on the issue of scope as non-institutional theories. They have, thus, a strong built-in bias in favor of cosmopolitanism.
Distributive egalitarianism rests on the idea of equal moral status of persons. Does it follow fr... more Distributive egalitarianism rests on the idea of equal moral status of persons. Does it follow from that idea directly, without reference to institution-based relations between persons? The answer of non-institutional theories is yes. The answer of institutional theories is no. This chapter argues that both theories are defective. Institutional l theories cannot deliver the principle of equal shares which is at the core of distributive egalitarianism. Non-institutional theories cannot determine what persons have a claim to equal shares of, nor can they identify the standard of equality. A two-level account will be proposed, non-institutional at the basic level, but with recourse to institution-regarding considerations at the next level. Since the scope of the principle of equal shares is fixed at the basic level, two-level theories have the same position on the issue of scope as non-institutional theories. They have, thus, a strong built-in bias in favor of cosmopolitanism.
This paper systematises the works of György Márkus into two or possibly three periods. These emph... more This paper systematises the works of György Márkus into two or possibly three periods. These emphasise the underlying consistency of purpose and interpreting theoretical interests throughout the oeuvre. despite the changing and socio-political forms and language games, all three share common features. These stages move from this initial critique of Orthodox Marxism employing the intellectual rigor of analytical and a philosophical anthropology to an investigation of the internal contradictions in Marx’s mature economic writings. to a final post-marxist phase after he left Hungary dominated by continual philosophical themes and a social democratic political perspective.
This paper systematises the works of György Márkus into two or possibly three periods. These emph... more This paper systematises the works of György Márkus into two or possibly three periods. These emphasise the underlying consistency of purpose and interpreting theoretical interests throughout the oeuvre. despite the changing and socio-political forms and language games, all three share common features. These stages move from this initial critique of Orthodox Marxism employing the intellectual rigor of analytical and a philosophical anthropology to an investigation of the internal contradictions in Marx’s mature economic writings. to a final post-marxist phase after he left Hungary dominated by continual philosophical themes and a social democratic political perspective.
It is a central claim of Gyö rgy Márkus's philosophy of (modern) culture that the Enlightenment p... more It is a central claim of Gyö rgy Márkus's philosophy of (modern) culture that the Enlightenment project ended up in deep, apparently irresolvable antinomies. But, unlike the majority of 'postmodern' thinkers, Márkus insists that the commitments of the Enlightenment cannot and should not be given up. This tension between the failure of the Enlightenment to produce a society of free and equal persons, each leading their lives autonomously, drawing on the resources of rational high culture, and the impossibility and undesirability of the abandonment of the commitments of the Enlightenment finds an expression in what Márkus calls 'the antinomies of late modernity'. This paper offers an interpretation of Márkus's conception; it identifies a certain ambiguity in Márkus's use of the term 'antinomies' (a wobbling among three different senses as 'pairs of opposites', 'conflicts of values' and 'conceptual incoherence'), and suggests that Márkus's ambition is compatible with maintaining the first two but is failed by the third one which should, therefore, be abandoned.
www.wzb.eu Copyright remains with the author(s). Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminat... more www.wzb.eu Copyright remains with the author(s). Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the institute as a whole.
Our meeting today is not just a matter of happenstance. The dissatisfaction growing throughout so... more Our meeting today is not just a matter of happenstance. The dissatisfaction growing throughout society has finally succeeded in mobilizing the Party membership, in stirring the apparatus out of its quiescence, and in reaching the summit of power. Within the week, new elections to the top leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party will be held. Today there exists no mechanism in this country for the people to elect or recall its leaders. The people won't be voting next week, yet it is the people who have forced next week's special election. They have voted no confidence in government by a leadership which has not been elected. We must not expect rapid far-reaching change. Democracy will not simply drop into our laps; we will have to struggle long and hard to achieve it, step by step. For this reason I consider it of the utmost importance to look objectively at the situation and at ourselves before the struggle begins. Frankly, I find such past efforts to be woefully inadequate. Denes Csengey has just said, "Serious public self-examination of the Hungarian intelligentsia appears unavoidable." As far as I know, this is the first serious demand for such public selfassessment by the intelligentsia, and I wish now to enlarge upon this demand.
In ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin wavered between two readings of the concept of positive libe... more In ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin wavered between two readings of the concept of positive liberty. In the first one, ‘positive liberty’ is a distinct concept, different from that of ‘negative liberty’. Those who advocate liberty in the negative sense and those who advocate it in the positive sense do not disagree on which interpretation of the same thing – ‘liberty’ – is the correct one; they speak about different things. Both defend valid ideals, although those ideals may not be simultaneously achievable. In the second reading, negative and positive liberty are competing interpretations of the same concept, the defenders of negative liberty being involved in a substantive disagreement with the advocates of positive liberty on what the same term – ‘liberty’ – really means. On this understanding, negative and positive liberty cannot both be valid ideals: one of them (negative liberty) is a genuine value, the other (positive liberty) being nothing but the perversion of it. My article aims to uncover the roots of this ambiguity in unresolved difficulties in Berlin’s account of the history of the ideas of negative and positive liberty and, more importantly, in his conception of value pluralism.
... debate 6 1.3 A brief outline of the argument 12 2. The circumstances of politics 21 2.1 Two f... more ... debate 6 1.3 A brief outline of the argument 12 2. The circumstances of politics 21 2.1 Two faces of politics 21 2.2 Insufficient compliance 29 2.3 Preliminary remarks on politics as a moral problem 34 3. Realism: the unconstrained thesis 41 3.1 Machiavelli's paradox 41 3.2 ...
Distributive egalitarianism rests on the idea of equal moral status of persons. Does it follow fr... more Distributive egalitarianism rests on the idea of equal moral status of persons. Does it follow from that idea directly, without reference to institution-based relations between persons? The answer of non-institutional theories is yes. The answer of institutional theories is no. This chapter argues that both theories are defective. Institutional l theories cannot deliver the principle of equal shares which is at the core of distributive egalitarianism. Non-institutional theories cannot determine what persons have a claim to equal shares of, nor can they identify the standard of equality. A two-level account will be proposed, non-institutional at the basic level, but with recourse to institution-regarding considerations at the next level. Since the scope of the principle of equal shares is fixed at the basic level, two-level theories have the same position on the issue of scope as non-institutional theories. They have, thus, a strong built-in bias in favor of cosmopolitanism.
Distributive egalitarianism rests on the idea of equal moral status of persons. Does it follow fr... more Distributive egalitarianism rests on the idea of equal moral status of persons. Does it follow from that idea directly, without reference to institution-based relations between persons? The answer of non-institutional theories is yes. The answer of institutional theories is no. This chapter argues that both theories are defective. Institutional l theories cannot deliver the principle of equal shares which is at the core of distributive egalitarianism. Non-institutional theories cannot determine what persons have a claim to equal shares of, nor can they identify the standard of equality. A two-level account will be proposed, non-institutional at the basic level, but with recourse to institution-regarding considerations at the next level. Since the scope of the principle of equal shares is fixed at the basic level, two-level theories have the same position on the issue of scope as non-institutional theories. They have, thus, a strong built-in bias in favor of cosmopolitanism.
This paper systematises the works of György Márkus into two or possibly three periods. These emph... more This paper systematises the works of György Márkus into two or possibly three periods. These emphasise the underlying consistency of purpose and interpreting theoretical interests throughout the oeuvre. despite the changing and socio-political forms and language games, all three share common features. These stages move from this initial critique of Orthodox Marxism employing the intellectual rigor of analytical and a philosophical anthropology to an investigation of the internal contradictions in Marx’s mature economic writings. to a final post-marxist phase after he left Hungary dominated by continual philosophical themes and a social democratic political perspective.
This paper systematises the works of György Márkus into two or possibly three periods. These emph... more This paper systematises the works of György Márkus into two or possibly three periods. These emphasise the underlying consistency of purpose and interpreting theoretical interests throughout the oeuvre. despite the changing and socio-political forms and language games, all three share common features. These stages move from this initial critique of Orthodox Marxism employing the intellectual rigor of analytical and a philosophical anthropology to an investigation of the internal contradictions in Marx’s mature economic writings. to a final post-marxist phase after he left Hungary dominated by continual philosophical themes and a social democratic political perspective.
It is a central claim of Gyö rgy Márkus's philosophy of (modern) culture that the Enlightenment p... more It is a central claim of Gyö rgy Márkus's philosophy of (modern) culture that the Enlightenment project ended up in deep, apparently irresolvable antinomies. But, unlike the majority of 'postmodern' thinkers, Márkus insists that the commitments of the Enlightenment cannot and should not be given up. This tension between the failure of the Enlightenment to produce a society of free and equal persons, each leading their lives autonomously, drawing on the resources of rational high culture, and the impossibility and undesirability of the abandonment of the commitments of the Enlightenment finds an expression in what Márkus calls 'the antinomies of late modernity'. This paper offers an interpretation of Márkus's conception; it identifies a certain ambiguity in Márkus's use of the term 'antinomies' (a wobbling among three different senses as 'pairs of opposites', 'conflicts of values' and 'conceptual incoherence'), and suggests that Márkus's ambition is compatible with maintaining the first two but is failed by the third one which should, therefore, be abandoned.
www.wzb.eu Copyright remains with the author(s). Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminat... more www.wzb.eu Copyright remains with the author(s). Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the institute as a whole.
Our meeting today is not just a matter of happenstance. The dissatisfaction growing throughout so... more Our meeting today is not just a matter of happenstance. The dissatisfaction growing throughout society has finally succeeded in mobilizing the Party membership, in stirring the apparatus out of its quiescence, and in reaching the summit of power. Within the week, new elections to the top leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party will be held. Today there exists no mechanism in this country for the people to elect or recall its leaders. The people won't be voting next week, yet it is the people who have forced next week's special election. They have voted no confidence in government by a leadership which has not been elected. We must not expect rapid far-reaching change. Democracy will not simply drop into our laps; we will have to struggle long and hard to achieve it, step by step. For this reason I consider it of the utmost importance to look objectively at the situation and at ourselves before the struggle begins. Frankly, I find such past efforts to be woefully inadequate. Denes Csengey has just said, "Serious public self-examination of the Hungarian intelligentsia appears unavoidable." As far as I know, this is the first serious demand for such public selfassessment by the intelligentsia, and I wish now to enlarge upon this demand.
In ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin wavered between two readings of the concept of positive libe... more In ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin wavered between two readings of the concept of positive liberty. In the first one, ‘positive liberty’ is a distinct concept, different from that of ‘negative liberty’. Those who advocate liberty in the negative sense and those who advocate it in the positive sense do not disagree on which interpretation of the same thing – ‘liberty’ – is the correct one; they speak about different things. Both defend valid ideals, although those ideals may not be simultaneously achievable. In the second reading, negative and positive liberty are competing interpretations of the same concept, the defenders of negative liberty being involved in a substantive disagreement with the advocates of positive liberty on what the same term – ‘liberty’ – really means. On this understanding, negative and positive liberty cannot both be valid ideals: one of them (negative liberty) is a genuine value, the other (positive liberty) being nothing but the perversion of it. My article aims to uncover the roots of this ambiguity in unresolved difficulties in Berlin’s account of the history of the ideas of negative and positive liberty and, more importantly, in his conception of value pluralism.
... debate 6 1.3 A brief outline of the argument 12 2. The circumstances of politics 21 2.1 Two f... more ... debate 6 1.3 A brief outline of the argument 12 2. The circumstances of politics 21 2.1 Two faces of politics 21 2.2 Insufficient compliance 29 2.3 Preliminary remarks on politics as a moral problem 34 3. Realism: the unconstrained thesis 41 3.1 Machiavelli's paradox 41 3.2 ...
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