With movements against oppression and exploitation heightening across the globe, radical activist... more With movements against oppression and exploitation heightening across the globe, radical activists and researchers are increasingly turning to educational theory to understand the pedagogical aspects of struggle. The Radical Politics and Education series opens a space at this critical juncture, one that pushes past standard expositions of critical education and critical pedagogy. Recognizing the need to push political and educational formulations into new theoretical and practical terrains, the series is an opportunity for activists, political thinkers, and educational philosophers to cross disciplinary divides and meet in common. This kind of dialogue is crucially needed as political struggles are increasingly concerned with questions of how to educate themselves and others, and as educational philosophy attempts to redefine itself beyond academic norms and disciplinary values. This series serves to facilitate new conversations at and beyond these borders.
Space 6.1 Introduction When we think of places to study, it is typically not classrooms, lecture ... more Space 6.1 Introduction When we think of places to study, it is typically not classrooms, lecture halls, or seminar rooms that come to mind. It may still happen there, if an instructor ends the seminar early or when the substitute teacher hasn't received any instructions and declares the class a "study hall," or when students use a classroom after the end of the school day. But the way we commonly think of it, studying takes place outside of and between places specifically designated for teaching and learning: in the library, the student lounge, in hallways, the cafeteria, the schoolyard, on the school bus or a commuter train, in a coffee shop, or on the living room couch. And while we might think of studying primarily as a solitary activity, it is also done with or alongside others, in homework clubs or study groups. And if we broaden our use of the term even just slightly, we may include conversations with friends or family members, a librarian, the school custodian, or a store clerk. The question considered in this chapter is how the way we think of the spatial features of educational institutions can inspire study in such a broader and/or a specifically Agambenian sense-namely as an activity that is not just auxiliary to what is happening in the spaces designated for learning (cramming for a test, doing research for a term paper), but one that is-broadly speaking-done for its own sake. I begin by introducing the concept of khōra to connect the discussion of educational space to the ideas in Agamben's work previously discussed and to conceptually link the following examples of spaces that inspire study in educational settings (6.2): the educational undercommons (6.3), the notch in the classroom architecture (6.4), the tent as a model for studious school design (6.5), and the digital screen as a space for study (6.6).
In my dissertation, I advance an argument for a non-directional conceptualization of philosophy w... more In my dissertation, I advance an argument for a non-directional conceptualization of philosophy with children as a pedagogical practice. Drawing from the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, I argue that engaging students in philosophical dialogue, conceived as a communal experimentation with concepts, allows for the experience of what Agamben calls infancy-an ontological state of openness toward new ways of speaking and thinking. Rather than being directed at specific goals or outcomes, the practice of philosophy (thus conceived), I argue, should be seen as a paradigm for an educational (as well as social, and political) form of life, aimed at individual and communal well-being. I begin my argument by showing how infancy is an integral aspect of historical conceptions of the practice of philosophy (Socratic Philosophy, Nietzsche, Dewey, and Phenomenology). I then demonstrate how the notion of infancy is also contained in contemporary conceptions of education that seek to redeem the idea underlying progressive education (and that of Dewey, in particular) that education needs to be rooted in experience. Tracing the notion of infancy in the work of John Dewey, Ivan Illich,
It is customary in a monograph such as this one to provide biographical information to get to kno... more It is customary in a monograph such as this one to provide biographical information to get to know the man or woman behind the work, in order to better understand the origin and formation of his or her ideas, and to reveal the human—and maybe all too human—side of a prominent thinker. In Agamben’s case, the problem is that we have only very little information about what is commonly considered a personal life. It is not that Agamben’s life lacks personal experiences or relationships but that those are so closely tied to his work that it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the two. As David Kishik has observed, “neither Agamben’s ‘life’ nor his ‘work’ can really make a lot of sense independently of one another, because they both operate in the zone of indetermination that we call a ‘lifework’” (2012, p. 3). That this closeness between his life and his work as a writer is not unintentional can be gleaned from his assertion that “life is only what is made in speech” (EP, p. 8...
With movements against oppression and exploitation heightening across the globe, radical activist... more With movements against oppression and exploitation heightening across the globe, radical activists and researchers are increasingly turning to educational theory to understand the pedagogical aspects of struggle. The Radical Politics and Education series opens a space at this critical juncture, one that pushes past standard expositions of critical education and critical pedagogy. Recognizing the need to push political and educational formulations into new theoretical and practical terrains, the series is an opportunity for activists, political thinkers, and educational philosophers to cross disciplinary divides and meet in common. This kind of dialogue is crucially needed as political struggles are increasingly concerned with questions of how to educate themselves and others, and as educational philosophy attempts to redefine itself beyond academic norms and disciplinary values. This series serves to facilitate new conversations at and beyond these borders.
It is customary in a monograph such as this one to provide biographical information to get to kno... more It is customary in a monograph such as this one to provide biographical information to get to know the man or woman behind the work, in order to better understand the origin and formation of his or her ideas, and to reveal the human—and maybe all too human—side of a prominent thinker. In Agamben’s case, the problem is that we have only very little information about what is commonly considered a personal life. It is not that Agamben’s life lacks personal experiences or relationships but that those are so closely tied to his work that it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the two. As David Kishik has observed, “neither Agamben’s ‘life’ nor his ‘work’ can really make a lot of sense independently of one another, because they both operate in the zone of indetermination that we call a ‘lifework’” (2012, p. 3). That this closeness between his life and his work as a writer is not unintentional can be gleaned from his assertion that “life is only what is made in speech” (EP, p. 81). While we should not take this to mean that, for Agamben, language is all there is (in contrast to Derrida, for Agamben there is life “outside the text”), it is certainly true that he sees the use of language as an essential and constitutive feature of a human life. This also means that instead of searching for clues about his ideas in “so-called real life” (EP, p. 82), to better understand his work, we need to look at what it means to lead a life that is “made in speech.”
In this paper, I argue that potentialism is uniquely able to articulate the value of educational ... more In this paper, I argue that potentialism is uniquely able to articulate the value of educational practices (such as philosophy with children, and study) that lack the kind of directionality commonly associated with educational activities. It does so by operating with radically different assumptions about the nature and value of education-assumptions that can be derived from the basic premise of progressive education that education needs to be rooted in experience. I follow here a line of thought that leads from Dewey's (broadly scientific) notion of experience aimed at new and better experiences, to Ivan Illich's emphasis on the experience of the new, to Gert Biesta's idea that education needs to allow students to bring something new into the world, to Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons' emphasis on the experience of the possibility of the new. Finally, drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben and Tyson E. Lewis, I show how a potentialist notion of experience operates with a different temporality, enabling us to think of the experience of the potentiality of the new as such as what accounts for the educational value of non-directional practicesnot only in spite of, but because of their lack of directionality.
Abstract Educational theorists ranging from Ivan Illich to Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons hav... more Abstract Educational theorists ranging from Ivan Illich to Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons have described institutionalized schooling as a modernized, secular church, full of rituals, sacraments, and various incantations. For them, the function of the teacher as priest and schooling as baptism is highly problematic, separating education from the common world. As such, the educational theology of the school needs to be suspended in order for educational life to take on new meaning beyond the sacraments of learning. To further this line of inquiry, we turn to the work of Giorgio Agamben on the oath and its originary function of guaranteeing the truthfulness of language (‘sacrament of language’). Insofar as the oath is also operable in learning (in the voice of the teacher), we argue that such operability can be suspended through a dialogic practice called ‘community of infancy’, thereby making possible new, profane forms of educational life beyond baptism.
Educational theorists ranging from Plato, to Freire, to bell hooks, to Peter McLaren have theoriz... more Educational theorists ranging from Plato, to Freire, to bell hooks, to Peter McLaren have theorized love as an essential factor in education. Whereas, typically, a particular kind of love (erotic love, caring love, etc.) is argued to be especially relevant for educational practice, what we do in this paper is to look at kinds of love that are constitutive for the relationship between teacher and student. Specifically, we outline four types of love that one might find in a classroom. We argue that from the perspective of Italian critical theorist Giorgio Agamben, the first three are problematic as they are not attentive to the potentiality of students to be whatever, and thus sacrifice potentiality of the child as such in the name of what must be or what is. The fourth type of love, on the other hand, embraces the potentiality of the child as a pure means rather than a means to another end. We further argue that there is an educational practice, what we are calling ''Philosophy for Infancy'' (P4I), that enables us to love our students' potentiality. In contrast to Philosophy for Children, P4I exposes children to their potentiality rather than orienting specific potentialities towards determined outcomes. As such, P4I has its own, distinctive take on love in the classroom that differentiates it from other forms of love. It is our intention to develop this theory of love.
While some argue that the only way to make a place for Philosophy for Children (P4C) in today'... more While some argue that the only way to make a place for Philosophy for Children (P4C) in today's strict, standardised classroom is to measure its efficacy in promoting reasoning, we believe that this must be avoided in order to safeguard what is truly unique in P4C dialogue. When P4C acquiesces to the very same quantitative measures that define the rest of learning, then the philosophical dimension drops out and P4C becomes yet another progressive curriculum and pedagogy for enhancing argumentation skills that can easily be appropriated by any content area. What we want to offer in this article is a reevaluation of P4C that remains faithful to a radical kernel that we find when we do philosophy with children and young adults. To theorise the potential for P4C, we draw heavily on Agamben's work, and in particular his reflections on speech and infancy. We propose that the redemption of P4C necessitates a shift from a community of inquiry (as the dialogic pedagogical model underlying P4C) to a community of infancy. Such a community is not a community that operates according to predefined rules or standardised assessment protocols but rather is an inoperative community that is defined by letting ends idle. On our account, a community of infancy is an example of dialogic studious play that is neither ritual nor just play, thus avoiding the extreme polarities of the ritualised classrooms of high-stakes testing and the ‘ludic’ postmodern classroom of free play. What is at stake here is to preserve the last vestige of freedom within the school.
This paper reassesses a perennial concern of philosophy of education: the nature of the education... more This paper reassesses a perennial concern of philosophy of education: the nature of the educational community and the role of the teacher in relation to such a community. As an entry point into this broader question, we turn to Philosophy for children (P4C), which has consistently emphasized the importance of community. Yet, not unlike pragmatist notions of community more broadly, the P4C community has largely focused on the goal-directed, purposive, aspect of the process of inquiry. The purpose of our paper is to move beyond P4C (as it has traditionally been conceived) in order to theorize a non-instrumental, in-tentional, educational community without pre-conceived goals or intentions. Drawing largely from the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, we describe the P4C-classroom as one that refuses to be operative (moving forward toward reaching common goals) and thus undermines the taken-for-granted logic of means and ends that underlies how educational communities are typically depicted and justified. Again drawing from Agamben, we identify the specific ways in which the experience of love and friendship (both of which are pure means rather than means to an end) constitute the in-tentional community. The silence of the voice of the teacher enables the experience of love and friendship to come about. Being included as an exclusion via his/her silence, the teacher is neither immanent (facilitator of student learning) nor transcendent (outside or beyond learning) but alongside the community as a paradigm of friendship.
With movements against oppression and exploitation heightening across the globe, radical activist... more With movements against oppression and exploitation heightening across the globe, radical activists and researchers are increasingly turning to educational theory to understand the pedagogical aspects of struggle. The Radical Politics and Education series opens a space at this critical juncture, one that pushes past standard expositions of critical education and critical pedagogy. Recognizing the need to push political and educational formulations into new theoretical and practical terrains, the series is an opportunity for activists, political thinkers, and educational philosophers to cross disciplinary divides and meet in common. This kind of dialogue is crucially needed as political struggles are increasingly concerned with questions of how to educate themselves and others, and as educational philosophy attempts to redefine itself beyond academic norms and disciplinary values. This series serves to facilitate new conversations at and beyond these borders.
Space 6.1 Introduction When we think of places to study, it is typically not classrooms, lecture ... more Space 6.1 Introduction When we think of places to study, it is typically not classrooms, lecture halls, or seminar rooms that come to mind. It may still happen there, if an instructor ends the seminar early or when the substitute teacher hasn't received any instructions and declares the class a "study hall," or when students use a classroom after the end of the school day. But the way we commonly think of it, studying takes place outside of and between places specifically designated for teaching and learning: in the library, the student lounge, in hallways, the cafeteria, the schoolyard, on the school bus or a commuter train, in a coffee shop, or on the living room couch. And while we might think of studying primarily as a solitary activity, it is also done with or alongside others, in homework clubs or study groups. And if we broaden our use of the term even just slightly, we may include conversations with friends or family members, a librarian, the school custodian, or a store clerk. The question considered in this chapter is how the way we think of the spatial features of educational institutions can inspire study in such a broader and/or a specifically Agambenian sense-namely as an activity that is not just auxiliary to what is happening in the spaces designated for learning (cramming for a test, doing research for a term paper), but one that is-broadly speaking-done for its own sake. I begin by introducing the concept of khōra to connect the discussion of educational space to the ideas in Agamben's work previously discussed and to conceptually link the following examples of spaces that inspire study in educational settings (6.2): the educational undercommons (6.3), the notch in the classroom architecture (6.4), the tent as a model for studious school design (6.5), and the digital screen as a space for study (6.6).
In my dissertation, I advance an argument for a non-directional conceptualization of philosophy w... more In my dissertation, I advance an argument for a non-directional conceptualization of philosophy with children as a pedagogical practice. Drawing from the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, I argue that engaging students in philosophical dialogue, conceived as a communal experimentation with concepts, allows for the experience of what Agamben calls infancy-an ontological state of openness toward new ways of speaking and thinking. Rather than being directed at specific goals or outcomes, the practice of philosophy (thus conceived), I argue, should be seen as a paradigm for an educational (as well as social, and political) form of life, aimed at individual and communal well-being. I begin my argument by showing how infancy is an integral aspect of historical conceptions of the practice of philosophy (Socratic Philosophy, Nietzsche, Dewey, and Phenomenology). I then demonstrate how the notion of infancy is also contained in contemporary conceptions of education that seek to redeem the idea underlying progressive education (and that of Dewey, in particular) that education needs to be rooted in experience. Tracing the notion of infancy in the work of John Dewey, Ivan Illich,
It is customary in a monograph such as this one to provide biographical information to get to kno... more It is customary in a monograph such as this one to provide biographical information to get to know the man or woman behind the work, in order to better understand the origin and formation of his or her ideas, and to reveal the human—and maybe all too human—side of a prominent thinker. In Agamben’s case, the problem is that we have only very little information about what is commonly considered a personal life. It is not that Agamben’s life lacks personal experiences or relationships but that those are so closely tied to his work that it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the two. As David Kishik has observed, “neither Agamben’s ‘life’ nor his ‘work’ can really make a lot of sense independently of one another, because they both operate in the zone of indetermination that we call a ‘lifework’” (2012, p. 3). That this closeness between his life and his work as a writer is not unintentional can be gleaned from his assertion that “life is only what is made in speech” (EP, p. 8...
With movements against oppression and exploitation heightening across the globe, radical activist... more With movements against oppression and exploitation heightening across the globe, radical activists and researchers are increasingly turning to educational theory to understand the pedagogical aspects of struggle. The Radical Politics and Education series opens a space at this critical juncture, one that pushes past standard expositions of critical education and critical pedagogy. Recognizing the need to push political and educational formulations into new theoretical and practical terrains, the series is an opportunity for activists, political thinkers, and educational philosophers to cross disciplinary divides and meet in common. This kind of dialogue is crucially needed as political struggles are increasingly concerned with questions of how to educate themselves and others, and as educational philosophy attempts to redefine itself beyond academic norms and disciplinary values. This series serves to facilitate new conversations at and beyond these borders.
It is customary in a monograph such as this one to provide biographical information to get to kno... more It is customary in a monograph such as this one to provide biographical information to get to know the man or woman behind the work, in order to better understand the origin and formation of his or her ideas, and to reveal the human—and maybe all too human—side of a prominent thinker. In Agamben’s case, the problem is that we have only very little information about what is commonly considered a personal life. It is not that Agamben’s life lacks personal experiences or relationships but that those are so closely tied to his work that it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the two. As David Kishik has observed, “neither Agamben’s ‘life’ nor his ‘work’ can really make a lot of sense independently of one another, because they both operate in the zone of indetermination that we call a ‘lifework’” (2012, p. 3). That this closeness between his life and his work as a writer is not unintentional can be gleaned from his assertion that “life is only what is made in speech” (EP, p. 81). While we should not take this to mean that, for Agamben, language is all there is (in contrast to Derrida, for Agamben there is life “outside the text”), it is certainly true that he sees the use of language as an essential and constitutive feature of a human life. This also means that instead of searching for clues about his ideas in “so-called real life” (EP, p. 82), to better understand his work, we need to look at what it means to lead a life that is “made in speech.”
In this paper, I argue that potentialism is uniquely able to articulate the value of educational ... more In this paper, I argue that potentialism is uniquely able to articulate the value of educational practices (such as philosophy with children, and study) that lack the kind of directionality commonly associated with educational activities. It does so by operating with radically different assumptions about the nature and value of education-assumptions that can be derived from the basic premise of progressive education that education needs to be rooted in experience. I follow here a line of thought that leads from Dewey's (broadly scientific) notion of experience aimed at new and better experiences, to Ivan Illich's emphasis on the experience of the new, to Gert Biesta's idea that education needs to allow students to bring something new into the world, to Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons' emphasis on the experience of the possibility of the new. Finally, drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben and Tyson E. Lewis, I show how a potentialist notion of experience operates with a different temporality, enabling us to think of the experience of the potentiality of the new as such as what accounts for the educational value of non-directional practicesnot only in spite of, but because of their lack of directionality.
Abstract Educational theorists ranging from Ivan Illich to Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons hav... more Abstract Educational theorists ranging from Ivan Illich to Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons have described institutionalized schooling as a modernized, secular church, full of rituals, sacraments, and various incantations. For them, the function of the teacher as priest and schooling as baptism is highly problematic, separating education from the common world. As such, the educational theology of the school needs to be suspended in order for educational life to take on new meaning beyond the sacraments of learning. To further this line of inquiry, we turn to the work of Giorgio Agamben on the oath and its originary function of guaranteeing the truthfulness of language (‘sacrament of language’). Insofar as the oath is also operable in learning (in the voice of the teacher), we argue that such operability can be suspended through a dialogic practice called ‘community of infancy’, thereby making possible new, profane forms of educational life beyond baptism.
Educational theorists ranging from Plato, to Freire, to bell hooks, to Peter McLaren have theoriz... more Educational theorists ranging from Plato, to Freire, to bell hooks, to Peter McLaren have theorized love as an essential factor in education. Whereas, typically, a particular kind of love (erotic love, caring love, etc.) is argued to be especially relevant for educational practice, what we do in this paper is to look at kinds of love that are constitutive for the relationship between teacher and student. Specifically, we outline four types of love that one might find in a classroom. We argue that from the perspective of Italian critical theorist Giorgio Agamben, the first three are problematic as they are not attentive to the potentiality of students to be whatever, and thus sacrifice potentiality of the child as such in the name of what must be or what is. The fourth type of love, on the other hand, embraces the potentiality of the child as a pure means rather than a means to another end. We further argue that there is an educational practice, what we are calling ''Philosophy for Infancy'' (P4I), that enables us to love our students' potentiality. In contrast to Philosophy for Children, P4I exposes children to their potentiality rather than orienting specific potentialities towards determined outcomes. As such, P4I has its own, distinctive take on love in the classroom that differentiates it from other forms of love. It is our intention to develop this theory of love.
While some argue that the only way to make a place for Philosophy for Children (P4C) in today'... more While some argue that the only way to make a place for Philosophy for Children (P4C) in today's strict, standardised classroom is to measure its efficacy in promoting reasoning, we believe that this must be avoided in order to safeguard what is truly unique in P4C dialogue. When P4C acquiesces to the very same quantitative measures that define the rest of learning, then the philosophical dimension drops out and P4C becomes yet another progressive curriculum and pedagogy for enhancing argumentation skills that can easily be appropriated by any content area. What we want to offer in this article is a reevaluation of P4C that remains faithful to a radical kernel that we find when we do philosophy with children and young adults. To theorise the potential for P4C, we draw heavily on Agamben's work, and in particular his reflections on speech and infancy. We propose that the redemption of P4C necessitates a shift from a community of inquiry (as the dialogic pedagogical model underlying P4C) to a community of infancy. Such a community is not a community that operates according to predefined rules or standardised assessment protocols but rather is an inoperative community that is defined by letting ends idle. On our account, a community of infancy is an example of dialogic studious play that is neither ritual nor just play, thus avoiding the extreme polarities of the ritualised classrooms of high-stakes testing and the ‘ludic’ postmodern classroom of free play. What is at stake here is to preserve the last vestige of freedom within the school.
This paper reassesses a perennial concern of philosophy of education: the nature of the education... more This paper reassesses a perennial concern of philosophy of education: the nature of the educational community and the role of the teacher in relation to such a community. As an entry point into this broader question, we turn to Philosophy for children (P4C), which has consistently emphasized the importance of community. Yet, not unlike pragmatist notions of community more broadly, the P4C community has largely focused on the goal-directed, purposive, aspect of the process of inquiry. The purpose of our paper is to move beyond P4C (as it has traditionally been conceived) in order to theorize a non-instrumental, in-tentional, educational community without pre-conceived goals or intentions. Drawing largely from the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, we describe the P4C-classroom as one that refuses to be operative (moving forward toward reaching common goals) and thus undermines the taken-for-granted logic of means and ends that underlies how educational communities are typically depicted and justified. Again drawing from Agamben, we identify the specific ways in which the experience of love and friendship (both of which are pure means rather than means to an end) constitute the in-tentional community. The silence of the voice of the teacher enables the experience of love and friendship to come about. Being included as an exclusion via his/her silence, the teacher is neither immanent (facilitator of student learning) nor transcendent (outside or beyond learning) but alongside the community as a paradigm of friendship.
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Papers by Igor Jasinski